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ctiveen the first Enterprise and the 'ghth—the former survived Benedict , fold’s defeat at Valcour Island . 1776; her nuclear-powered namesake ^ seen replenishing in Tonkin Gulf— j e U. S. Navy had acquired nine basic ^ nctions. Some, e.g., coastal defense,
^ Ce changed their form radically, ut °ll have endured.
One of the continuing controversies throughout the history of the U. S. Navy has been the argument about the function of the Navy. Indeed, it was one of the many debatable items facing the framers of the Constitution. John Jay asked, “whether it would be more wise in the U. S. to withdraw their attention from the sea, and permit foreigners to fetch and carry for them; or to persevere in concerting and pursuing such measures as may conduce to render them a maritime power?” Alexander Hamilton stated the Federalist view that “A regular Navy was an indispensable instrument of national policy in dealing with foreign nations . . . could at least hold the balance of power within this hemisphere. A price would be set not only upon our friendship but upon our neutrality.” Patrick Henry, a southern Republican, made the opposite argument that “A Navy was an instrument of imperiled ambition, a heavy financial burden, an unnecessary burden; for such was the condition of European affairs, that it would be unsafe for a European power to send fleets or armies against us.”
There was no national Navy during the Confederation. Out of the arguments that surfaced during the framing of the Constitution, two basic concepts of the function of the Navy emerged. The Republicans held that: “7. The Navy is for coastal defense." The Federalists held that this was true but that, in addition: “2. The Navy is for commerce raiding." Division of political sentiment was largely geographic. The North and East were Federalist and believed that the Navy would stimulate and unify the national economy. The South and West were Republican and believed that the benefits would be sectional (not theirs) but that tax costs on the contrary would be national. The Navy question was just one of many between the two parties. It was not resolved, but rather depended on year-to-year, short-term decisions, expressed in the form of annual appropriations.
In 1794, there occurred the war with the Barbary pirates. Jefferson, although a Republican, had espoused a compromise position in the Navy debates. On this occasion he remarked, “The Barbary pirates were a good
Navy itself resisted the innovation. So,
at
the
change in the American position in the work and to both a timely and remarkably cogeIlt explication of the role of seapower by Maha)1, Actual experience in the 1890s and early 20U1 century reinforced the theory. America'1 society as a whole held that: “4. The Navy is a'1 instrument of foreign policy,” and: “5. The is for commanding the seas.”
excuse for re-establishing a Navy. We could not begin it in a better cause or against a weaker foe.” The Navy did carry out a very successful campaign under particularly capable professional leadership. A third function had in fact been executed and accepted by the body politic: “3. The Navy is for enforcing respect for U. S. interests, especially trade and shipping.”
There was another persisting effect of this naval construction program. The Federalist administration took advantage of the opportunity. They deliberately spread the construction program as widely as possible and among as many individuals and companies as possible, in order to develop a popular constituency which would support a continuing naval program. An appreciation by the Congress resulted of the patronage value of the naval establishment. Coupled with this appreciation was a continuing intent to maintain firm congressional control of naval policy and programs.
After the war with the Barbary pirates and the brief naval war with France, U. S. policy reverted to a shifting compromise between pure coastal defense, and coastal defense plus a limited capability for commerce raiding. Neither concept was implemented decisively. In fact, the War of 1812 demolished both. The coasts were not defended. British commerce was not destroyed, not really significantly affected at all. The British blockade was imposed and maintained with essentially no opposition. At the same time, the victories on the Great Lakes and in individual ship- frigate engagements brought the Navy prestige, and served to confirm in the public and congressional mind the functional concepts which had in fact been shown to be wrong.
After the war, the roles and missions gradually grew in response to revival and expansion of foreign trade, the opening of new markets worldwide, the need to clear the seas of pirates and slavers, and the desirability of showing the flag abroad. In fact, a fourth function was in the embryo stage: “4. The Navy is an instrument of foreign policy.” The Navy secured appropriations for expanding forces but these ships were for coastal defense and for widely dispersed ships and squadrons.
The first major technical improvement to affect the Navy was the advent of steam. The
first, did the Executive. Van Buren made 1 statement “never consent to let our old sfl L perish and transform our Navy into a flee^e sea monsters.” Congress led the fight for introduction of steam power.
The net result of the technological sh new construction, and expansion, intensi the aspects of patronage, pork barrels, a'^ local rivalries. The Navy was very much 1 politics. But in spite of increased approp11^ tions, naval power and efficiency steadil) 0 dined, so that by 1853 the United States * not have a single ship capable of confront)1 a first-class European warship.
In the Civil War the Navy in fact took 01 two more functions. By its blockade °PeI‘' tions it was shown: “5. The Navy is for manding the seas;” and, by its riverine ca1'1^ paigns: “6. The Navy is for direct support of i°'n operations.” Actually neither of these flinch0'1^ passed immediately into the body of accept1 professional or political thought. The coi’‘ rnand of the sea concept went unnoticed hf cause there was no challenge to actual co)”^ mand of the sea. The direct support conceP also went unnoticed, perhaps because it" viewed as a singularly unique situation. Wh ^ was reinforced in the public mind, as a res1 of the Alabama and others, was the efficacy 0 commerce raiding and a heightened den'3'1 for local defense.
After the war came stagnation with h0'1 clads (another technical impact—armor) ^°[ coastal defense and wooden ships, largfk under sail, on overseas stations in disperse squadrons. Congress, the Executive, and Navy were in agreement, and the result)'1" policy reflected the public preoccupation vm ■ continental development and the sense 0 geographic isolation.
i
The change came with Mahan (and Roose velt and Lodge). Navy functional concept’ had not really responded to technologic3 changes. They did respond to a drast'C
This
Nged by drives for economy, largely ob- q'ned through World War I. The Naval Act 0j. for example, had an “avowed purpose a* Creating a Navy ‘second to none’.” The Ual operational requirements of the war ^ere different, however. The U. S. battle 3set ^et no opposing fleet. The submarine, : a °ew form of commerce-raiding, domed the naval scene. The major operational v f Was for escort ships, destroyers. The jTn V was slow to react to these realities which ,rrned the focal point of Sims’s postwar criti- I 11 °f the Navy with the subsequent Naval 'litigation by the Congress.
Bei
the
policy, although periodically chal-
j^Srri the Navy with the Instigation by the Congrc^. etween the wars there was some erosion of concepts of naval functions. The erosion • llrned from a number of causes. The Navy ^ 11 restated the existing concept of the ^eet composed of big-gun ships and . ^ Posed continued building towards a • avy second to none.” At the same time, it ve|S S^ow to adjust to the technological de- pl cprnents of the submarine and the air- lat ne Pl,bl>c turned sharply towards iso- l0nism, disarmament, and economy. Con- t> reflected the public attitude and addi- Jnally questioned the battle fleet concept, l!1g the alternative of air power and the Wlng importance of the submarine, p under the strong executive leadership of ^'a,1klin D. Roosevelt and as World War II p Pcoached, the Navy began again to re- tio'^^ 'nterest*ng case of competing func- j ns arose with the division of the Fleet in f into an Atlantic and a Pacific Fleet, j 9vy Professional opinion held that the Navy °r commanding the sea by defeating the ^emy battle fleet and therefore that the ^ ' S- fleet must be kept in one ocean, as it been since 1932. The executive view held at the Navy is an instrument of foreign ,lcy and that additional ships were re- rii]lred in the Atlantic. The executive opinion ed. The building program then, however, directed towards a “two-ocean fleet.”
. c-ven though the immediate prewar build- 5 program did not emphasize aircraft carrs and submarines, the Navy very quickly justed to their use in the war itself. Func- ns of coastal defense, commerce raiding, j Standing the sea, and direct support of arid operations were modified somewhat to
suit the times and technology, but were reinforced dramatically. A new function was also specifically explicated by the Navy itself, and accepted by the U. S. government and public opinion: “7. The Navy is for projecting force inland from the seas.” This was not new in principle, but the scale of the carrier air strikes and of amphibious operations was so increased as to establish in effect a new function. At the same time air and naval gunfire support, particularly in campaigns like Okinawa, expanded the sixth function, direct support of land operations.
In the post-World War II period, there have been a number of factors which have affected and are affecting the concepts of Navy functions. Certainly one of these is technology—- particularly the truly revolutionary introduction of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the change in degree of destructive power obtainable is here again so large as to constitute a change in kind. Because this change is so significant, it has also really added a new function: “8. The Navy is an integral and important component of the strategic deterrent power of the United States.”
Of course, there have been many other technological changes which, by adding capability or imposing restriction, have modified the means for carrying out previously established functions. Nuclear propulsion, electronics, missiles, space and deep submergence technologies, high speed computers, and lasers are some of the items in this category.
The world political situation is another operative factor. The post-World War II political climate quickly became one of hostility, featuring a bipolar world in which the United States led the Free World against a relatively monolithic Communist bloc headed by the Soviet Union. Faced by such an adversary, the United States could not and did not retreat into isolationism and economy, but rather responded with an ambitious Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe, and a whole series of actions and agreements designed to contain Communist Russia. Many of these actions and agreements were primarily military in nature. The climate of hostility was marked with a series of political and military crises, which sometimes erupted into violence, and sometimes into prolonged military conflict on a very substantial scale indeed. It is worth noting that in all these crises there was
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U. S. declared strategy through this peI'l0| included shifts of emphasis which reflect both the changes of technology and chang in the power structure of the world. The "e known shift was, of course, from massive (e taliation to flexible response. However, "'ll flexible response is the most publicized faCt of U. S. defense policy, the total policy tod3, rests on three legs. One of these is flexible >c sponse, but the other two are just as imP°j
tant—a capability for assured destruction a1’
1 free
the
the
of
isolationism. Today, however, at least one
no actual declaration of war, even though the crises might be characterized, as in Korea, by large-scale and prolonged armed conflict.
Perhaps one of the reasons for this rather unique situation was the revolutionary nuclear technology which led in fact to a sort of Pax Ballistica, where the principal antagonists were restrained from direct conflict by their appreciation of the inevitable destruction that would accrue to both sides in the event of a nuclear exchange which might be triggered by any conflict. It is obvious, of course, that the Pax Ballistica did not mean a cessation or even a decrease in political violence. (Parenthetically it is interesting to note that during the hundred years of Pax Britannica, the British engaged in at least 36 wars or substantial campaigns.)
Since the close of World War II, political violence has steadily increased, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere. These outbreaks of violence were associated primarily with the revolutionary social trends sweeping the undeveloped portions of the world. In these areas a growing social consciousness among the poor, intensified by a technological revolution in communications, fostered hopes and aspirations that could not be met by the existing social, political, and economic base. The failure to realize these aspirations led to frustration, which in turn led to violence. Frequently this violence was diverted into ethnic or racial channels.
The heightened incidence of violence can be measured by any one of a number of statistics. During this century, prior to World War II, the annual rate of incidence of political violence ran about six per year. After the war until the mid-1950s, it doubled to about 12, going to perhaps 15 during the next decade and to around 20 during the past three years. In 1958, there were 23 prolonged insurgencies underway; in 1965, this number had risen to 58.
In such a crisis-ridden, violent environment it is not surprising that the Navy has been called upon frequently to exercise many of the functions which had been developed throughout her history. Indeed, the Navy’s function as an integral and important component of the strategic deterrent power of the United States is a primary factor in maintaining the Pax Ballistica. Naval crisis operations in the
Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the ** cific are examples of the fulfillment of naV functions as an instrument of foreign P°'lC^ for commanding the sea, in direct supp°rt, land operations, and for projecting force 111 land from the seas.
a concept of mutual security with other nations of the world. It is obvious that Navy contributes to all three, and that naval functions developed through two l'111’ dred years of U. S. history likewise contribute to all three. Of particular significance, Pel haps, is the contribution to mutual securm’ because of the fact that geography constrain5 the association of Free World powers to maritime alliance or at least to maritime c° operation. ,
The shifts in strategy have been parallel by shifts in defense structures within thc United States. The sometimes bitter unifh3 tion debates were followed by the Nation3 Security Act of 1947 and by the Key West attempt to spell out roles and missions for d'1 services. This was followed by various amen<^ ments to the Act which modified the origin3 structure and generally tended to invest m authority in the Office of the Secretary 0 Defense. This trend was accentuated under Secretary Robert S. McNamara. One of tbe results of this centralization was still anothef pressure making for change in the service functions. This pressure combined with tech nological change and with changes in tbe international power position to result in sub' stantial de facto changes in service function^ One other factor bears special mention^ the internal development of public opini0'1 and public support in the United States. ThlS support in the postwar years followed °l directed the foreign policy shift away froU1
the most important aspects of that develop'
f different from those of the newly emerg- World power a century later. Part of the
h v* VV V— X cl V l 1. A l Lit j id LL t ■ X dl L v /1 LitL •
Kl Sl°nab'y ready acceptance of the ideas of ide 'lan stemmed from the congruence of his tiapS the current realities of the inter. tonal situation and the accepted expan- the'lj V*ews °f American public opinion and
government.
The
a^nt is the widespread social revolution which t[^ects the United States internally, as well as tjo^rest of the world. Out of this social revolu- > which is an accomplished, or perhaps ^Plishing, fact there may well be an °th lt'°na^ function for the Navy and the to Cr ^rnieci Services: “9. The Navy is a means implement social reforms.” The Navy’s role in al opportunity and fair housing, is among srnanifestations of this new function which rns to be developing right now.
s We have seen, then, the kind of Navy rem re<^’ and wbat that Navy is expected to do, Sl[, ^ Vary, often significantly, in a period of stantial international tension. A fairly recase in point is the difference in the con- itiVi tbe function of the Navy between the ^ 920s or early 1930s, and the late 1930s,
rt.^en the signs of the coming major war were ^ e and more evident. A related reason is (^ange in the U. S. power position relative to ^ rest of the world. Obviously the naval Ve( S,°f the newly established Republic were ing
ta- to one certainty for the future is the cer- 'u>' of continuing change. As a recent exP e, Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia ob- Cly modify previously prevailing attitudes tvh ar<^ a ^ente’ Even in the strategic area, (j ®re there is abundant evidence that the ^tted States and the Soviet Union both ap- th C'ate tbe desirability of mutual deterrence, Ore js tjje Ukeiihooj 0f change stemming cl u* nlb country additions to the nuclear o. In any event, however, there appears to no doubt that we must preserve the ca- juty for assured destruction of the Soviet . n*on and other possible antagonists. The Provements in technology, currently ex- t(jCSsed ’n the Poseidon-MIRV program, point t keVen Sreat;er emphasis on the Navy con. JUtion to this assured destruction capabil- tio' an<^ therefore reinforce the eighth func- 0j. n> an integral and important component the strategic deterrent power of the United
THE NAVY IS:
for coastal defense;
jor commerce raiding;
for enforcing respect for U. S. interests, especially trade and shipping;
an instrument of foreign policy;
for commanding the sea;
for direct support of land operations;
for projecting force inland from the sea;
an integral and important component of the strategic deterrent power of the United States;
a means to implement social reforms.
■
States. Future developments in technology are likely to further increase the emphasis on sea-borne systems.
At the same time, and still in the strategic area, technology is re-establishing the first of the Navy functions, coastal defense. The modern version of coastal defense involves defense against ballistic missiles. Here again, improved technology combined with geography affords advantages to a sea-based system. An effective ballistic missile defense system, moreover, must include an enhanced ASW posture to help counter Soviet and eventually Chinese missile-launching submarines.
A second feature of the near future that seems almost as certain as continuing change is that the world environment of violence will continue and is likely to increase. It is extremely probable that the United States will be involved in some of this violence. Further, the United States should have the capability to influence the outcome of such violence, so that U. S. interests can be supported from a position of strength. Military action is no cure for the root causes of violence, but may well be required to sustain an environment where social, economic, and political measures can operate on the root causes.
In such an environment, flexible response and mutual security are likely to continue as the two other legs of the tripod of U. S. defense policy. Here again, there are factors operating to increase the contribution of the Navy. Among these are the obvious and accelerating trend towards declining base rights abroad, the maritime nature of the geography of so much of the area of concern, particularly in the Southern hemisphere, and the unwritten but empirically observable trend towards a sea sanctuary among the major powers involved in such disputes. Indeed, the observable de facto phenomenon of a sea sanctuary points up the desirability of positioning a larger portion of the logistic support for all operations at sea. The cost of only a part of the fixed, vulnerable, and irretrievable logistic installations ashore in Vietnam would have paid for a very large increase in mobile, relatively invulnerable logistic support at sea, which would still be available to the United States in the future, any place on the high seas where needed. Technology also affords the opportunity for more revolutionary de-
(CAG-;
BuOrd, in the Special Pj0^
ects office, in the Office of Program Appraisal antU
the Naval War College. He is an ordnance p1
graduate from M.I.T. in 1948, and a graduate ^ Armed Forces Staff College in 1954, and Indus#* College of the Armed Forces in 1960 He is curren the Commander Cruiser Destrover Flotilla 4.
velopment of such sea-based support.
These trends reinforce the third through1 ^ seventh functions, enforcing respect for U- interests, especially trade and shipping; act*11'
as an instrument of national policy: cod’
,d
manding the sea; direct support of l3"1 operations; and projecting force inland »r° the seas. The Pueblo incident points up 1 need for the third function and the Vietn3 experience in the muddy waters, along 1
coast and in the rivers, renews and emp
h3'
lod
sizes the Civil War function of direct supp1 of land operations.
The current and projected Soviet develop ment as a maritime power is obvious and ^
documented. It is characterized by a s1
stantial growth in naval power particularly ^ submarines, by a corresponding expansion naval operations in the Mediterranean an the high seas, by the introduction of ne'
forces like naval infantry and helicopter
can
re-
riers, by a very ambitious oceanographic
- vtn
search program, by a truly dramatic gr°'v j of the merchant marine, and by a politlca offensive designed to facilitate expanded man
time operations on a world-wide basis.
Not
the least of these moves is Soviet interest 11 strategic islands—e.g., Malta, Iceland, Cu ’ and islands in the Indian Ocean. __
This clearly observable trend tends to ^ duce the asymmetrical power position of t1^ maritime United States and the continent3 Soviet Union. As such, it marks an obvio1
threat underlined by advances in submari0^ and in missiles. At the same time, it marks
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P . - hostage to the United States, a l ffStence suc^ a hostage makes possible Cqerent and unusual kind of war—a war ttlar.aed to the sea. In such a war, current rev Ulrne and continental roles would be Sar)e^Sed- Rather than the sea constituting a
rcfptlUSUal ‘n rhe conventional framework of ty r^cej but so is Vietnam unusual and so °rea’ era l^e ^aX Ballistica,
^ 1(1 between the major contenders must be sual if mutual destruction is to be avoided, t; tlerent in the policy of assured destruc- ,|jjp ls the concept of deterrence. There is a lenerence between deterrence and compel- adv ^ ^owever- ^ is much easier to deter your cers&ry from aggressive action than it is to Pel him to undo a fait accompli or to H Crta^e an action in response to your wishes. e Soviet presence at sea, therefore, repre- n°t only a positive threat but also a
social revolution will con- and that it will affect the United States ,, ally as well. Public opinion and the lament, in both the executive and legis- th *Ve branches, are very likely to accelerate a growth of the ninth function, the Navy is W;,leans to implement social reforms. If this ta^S°> h stands in the Navy interest to under- e such a function willingly and with the
er‘ze execution of other naval functions.
Our review of the history of the U. S. Navy has disclosed a series of nine functions which have developed during the course of that history. These functions might be expressed in different terms or they might be combined or separated in a different way. The birth and growth of these functions depended upon a number of factors including technology, the world situation, the power status of the United States vis a vis that situation, and the attitudes of the Navy itself, of the government in its executive and legislative branches, and of U. S. public opinion. None of these functions has completely gone away. Some, like coastal defense, have changed their form radically in tune with technology, but all have endured. At the same time, relative emphasis among these functions has shifted almost constantly. There have been times when Navy professional attitudes, governmental attitudes and public opinion have been in agreement as to the relative importance of various functions. There have been other times, obviously, when there has been disagreement, sometimes as to the very existence of a specific function. The future is not likely to be different. The future is likely, however, to bring increased importance to the maritime interests and power of the United States. Technology, geography, the Pax Ballistica, political developments throughout the world, the increasing climate of violence on a global basis, and the increasing presence of the Soviet Union at sea all tend toward this end. Execution of naval functions will continue to demand the best from professional naval officers but so will explanation of naval functions to the government and to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------- * -------------------------------------------
Name, Rank, and Serial Number
The Department of Radiology at the U. S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Maryland, was usually quite crowded and frequently had many dignitaries in for routine X-rays.
One day, an anxious White House official called and demanded, “Has the Vice President had his chest X-ray, yet?”
The corpsman at the desk calmly replied, “I don’t know, but if you will give me his name, I will check the log.”
------------------ Contributed by Lieutenant William T. Cobb, MC, U. S. Naval Reserve
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 jor each anecdote tiublished in the Proceedings.)
Opportunity and challenge for the U. S. Navy today are greater than ever before.