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A Neglected Resource
Research reservists examine a mock-up of a Gemini space capsule at a McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation Space Science Seminar.
J^jince World War II, many individual naval reservists and entire naval reserve com- sit"lcs have been recalled to active duty for ^nations such as those that developed in ha°rea’ Tebanon, Cuba, and Vietnam, and th Ve ^ernonstratecl by their performance that reC structure of their reserve units and the serve training they received was adequate. cie'ncj available for recall and being suffi- ntly trained to perform their missions upon Ca 1 to active duty only partially justified their existence. That they were recalled offered complete justification.
It is prudent, therefore, to assume that these reservists and reserve companies will be used again in the future and to continue maintaining these reserve units in essentially their present form. There is at least one exception,however; the Research Reserve.
Only for singular and isolated cases have individuals of the Research Reserve been recalled to active duty to serve in research-related billets during war . or national emergency, y The U. S. Navy, there- / s' ', fore, should be coni' cerned whether or not
ure maintenance of this reserve element is 1Ustified.
isThis reserve element, the Research Reserve, a unique source of naval officers of talent, professional experience, education, and past c1Ve naval experience. And, because it is jj-011‘Prised of these very elements, it is a vital, neglected, national resource.
Superiority in weapons depends upon a long-term superiority in a nation’s technology, which in turn is based upon a broad spectrum of basic scientific achievements and discoveries. This is illustrated by the development, before and during World War II, of radar, degaussing, acoustic mines, proximity fuses, rocket and jet engines, and the atom bomb; the most dramatic and familiar example being the development of the atom bomb.
Starting at the beginning of the 20th century, the basic sciences of quantum mechanics, relativity, and modern atomic and nuclear physics began accumulating. By 1939, sufficient information was available for a group of renowned scientists to be confident enough to petition Dr. Albert Einstein to write his celebrated letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt suggesting development of an atomic weapon. The protracted accumulation of discoveries in these basic sciences over approximately 40 years was then followed by an intense effort for almost seven more years under the Manhattan project, the culmination of which was the proposed atomic weapon.
Partly because of experiences associated with this program, which clearly indicated the desirability of encouraging basic scientific activity for long periods, President Roosevelt recognized the need for a high level government organization to guide and nurture technology and basic science. For these purposes he created the Office of Scientific Research and Development. The military services also accepted, in varying measure, the wisdom of reliance upon science and technology for the success of their future missions, but the Navy went furthest in financial as well as moral support of the basic sciences. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox created the Office of Co-ordination of Research and Development, and later Dr. James Wakelin and three other Naval Reservists effected the eventual evolution, on 1 August 1945, of the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The ONR was established by Act of Congress as the first permanent government organization whose purpose was the support of basic scientific research. After the success of ONR was demonstrated and its durability was ensured, the Chief of Naval Research established in 1948 the Naval Reserve Research Program with the mission:
To provide individuals qualified in the conduct and administration of scientific research; or in the development and application of techniques of simulation and synthetic training devices; or in research contract administration; or in patent, trademark, and copyright matters, to be available in time of national emergency to meet the requirements of the Office of Naval Research and of the Naval Establishment in excess of the regular component during and after the period needed for procurement and training of additional qualified individuals to achieve planned mobilization, [author’s italics]
This reserve element has existed since 1948 until now under essentially the same precept and with approximately the same size complement of 2,500 officers. It is a unique and distinguished group of considerable education and experience whose members are volunteer Naval Reserve officers of all grades, designators, and types of past active duty. Approximately 95 per cent have a B.A.—about 5 per cent of whom are enlisted men in college who, upon graduating, will receive a B.A. and a commission in the naval reserve—50 per cent have an M.A., and 25 per cent have a Ph.D. Many of these naval reservists are senior and respected members of government, university, and industrial scientific activities. These officers are formed into approximately 100 Research Reserve companies of approximately 25 members each. The training program, designed to prepare an officer to meet the obligations of the mission of the Research Reserve if he were recalled to active duty, is composed primarily of from 24 to 48 drills per year, correspondence courses, occasional weekend seminars, and two weeks of Active Duty for Training (AcDuTra) per year. The drills usually embody administrative necessities and then a lecture, movie, or presentation of a technical, military, or administrative subject by either a member or a guest. Weekend seminars are generally
visits to military bases, manufacturing fim15’ and engineering or research laboratories AcDuTra may be with the operating forces at a technical seminar, or in On-the-Jc^ Training (OJT).
The Research Reserve has been maintained for 20 years because world conditions during this time were such that a large-scale military build-up and its associated research activity for an extended period was always a possibd' ity. This kind of buildup did not occur, ant* except for individuals in the Research Reserve being recalled for other than research duty> during this initial period of its history, the Research Reserve was virtually unused.
Though the Navy continues to profesS enthusiasm for continuing the Research Reserve, in recent years it has become increaS' ingly difficult to attract qualified young officers into it, and its complement is decreasing. Reasons for qualified reservists rejecting this part of the reserve program include the passive training program, its history of inactivity, and lack of promotion opportunities’ Promotion is difficult because of the need t0 satisfy the requirements for a designator f°r which one does not train specifically in the Research Reserve. In illustration, attendance at a nuclear physics seminar for AcDuTra lS appropriate for training for a Research Reservist, but if he has a General Line (1105) designator, he encounters a promotional disadvantage when compared by a selection board with another 1105 officer who performed his AcDuTra at sea. Many young officers entering the reserve program after completion of active duty avoid the Research Reserve for these reasons even though they would prefer to associate with it, are qualified i for it, and it might be advantageous to the Navy to have them in it.
After two decades it seems timely and pertinent to ask, “Is the continuation of a reserve element of this type justified?” To answer this question, let us look at four possible situations that might require recall to active duty of the Naval Research Reserve.
Short Limited War. This may be defined as one short enough so that research and development of weapons and systems would not be required and recall of the Research Re- i serve would be necessary.
The Research Reserve—A Neglected Resource 85
Granting, then, that a recall of the Research Reserve to active duty for war or national emergency in the future is remote, we rephrase our question; “Should the Naval Research Reserve be continued?” It should. But, after 20 years, during which world conditions and naval requirements have changed considerably, it is time to reconsider the mission, use, and therefore, the structure and training program of the Research Reserve. Not only should the Research Reserve be continued, but also its size and relative importance in the Naval Reserve program should be increased. To accomplish this, the mission should be rephrased and the structure and training program should be revised.
The mission of the Research Reserve should be that which was stated above, except for the deletion of the two sections which were italicized by the author. This would amount to a reinterpretation of the mission which would then make this unique group of skilled officers available to the Navy at all times rather than only when recalled to active duty. To achieve continuous use of these reservists in this manner would require adjustments in the structure and training programs of the Research Reserve and in the responsibilities of the individual reservists.
The Research Reserve could be used continuously by the Navy, without the need for recall to active duty, by modification of its structure and training program. What follows are specific suggestions for reconstituting the Research Reserve.
• This reserve element is unique in the reserve program and the Navy because of the high level of education and experience of its members, and this uniqueness should be appreciated and identified by establishing a Research Corps as a staff corps with its own designator and conditions for appointment, promotion, and retention. The Medical Corps offers an example for this.
• The Research Corps complement should be increased by transfer and change of designator of qualified officers presently in other reserve programs, and also by a review and possible recall from retirement of highly qualified research officers who suffered premature attrition because they no longer qualified for retention with the designator they held. There are many officers in this
group who would be anxious to continue in the Research Reserve and are not only highly qualified professionally, but motivated by esprit de corps and patriotism.
• Require each Research Reserve Company to work on a project of interest to ONR. This should be part of the training program and be in addition to the usual lectures and visits that now comprise the major part of each company’s training program. A suggestion of this type was made in February 1957 by the former Chief of Research, Rear Admiral John K. Leydon, when he said he would turn over to his relief, Rear Admiral Thomas B. Owen, his desire to see more “in depth” projects undertaken by the Research Reserve in “direct support of ONR.” Precedent for this exists now under the concepts of Group AcDuTra and Team Training.
• Proposals for research should be solicited by ONR from individual research reservists, the research to be performed in addition to or in lieu of drill attendance. Remuneration for this research could be in the form of drill credit and assignment of the officer to a reserve pay billet. This type of research need not require laboratory equipment but could be qualitative studies of concern to the Navy, ONR, or the reserve program.
• Periods of AcDuTra should be interchanged regularly with periods of what I shall call Active Duty for Contributing (AcDuCon). A research reservist on AcDuCon would be assigned a billet, according to his education and experience, in which he would perform a specific mission contributing to a specific requirement of ONR. Navy laboratories and other facilities always have unresolved problems on which they are not working because they do not have sufficient personnel. These problems could be worked on by Research Reservists. Do not restrict AcDuCon to two weeks per year. Let its duration and frequency be flexible to match the needs and requirements of ONR and the availability of qualified
research reservists to satisfy these needs and requirements. In a modified form, this has been achieved on occasion in the Research Reserve by OJT billets, and in Medical and CB Corps’ AcDuTra. Also on occasion Special AcDuTra and Temporary Active Duty are used for similar purposes.
• Allow an entire Research Reserve Company to take AcDuCon together at a local ONR or Naval Reserve facility. The members of the company could work together for an extended period on a project of interest to ONR or the reserve program on which they also work during regular drill nights. Precedent for this has been established by CB Battalions building or repairing Navy facilities while on AcDuTra.
• Use AcDuCon as a major criterion it[1] selecting officers for promotion and retention, because those officers who contribute most to the Navy would be of the greatest value and should attain to the senior ranks. This policy should include early selection of officers who perform more AcDuCon than officers of the same or higher grade. Precedence for early promotion for unique cases now exists in the Navy, and such precedence could be extended to the Research Reserve.
The Naval Research Reserve should be continued, but with a reinterpretation of its mission so that it could be used continuously while in reserve, not only if recalled to active duty. This would require reconstituting its structure and training program to include not only AcDuTra, but also AcDuCon. The Research Reserve might then attract qualified individuals who might otherwise be lost to the Research Reserve or even the naval reserve program. It would enable them to develop a naval reserve career and actively contribute to strengthening the navy of the future. These changes would make the Research Reserve a useable rather than a neglected resource as it is at present.
Enlisting in the U. S. Navy in 1943, Doctor Veigele served as MoMM 2/c in the PC-793. Discharged in 1946, he reenlisted in the U. S. Naval Reserve in 1949, was commissioned in 1951. Prior to his retirement in 1968, he served with two surface divisions, a composite company, and for r, seven years with Research
in°m^>an[2]eS ani^ 9-21, of which he was command- anrn?"ICCr' *S nOW a ^e-search Scientist (Physicist) Project Manager with Kaman Nuclear, Colorado Prings, Colorado.
Winston Churchill
Long, Limited War. The war in Vietnam is
[1] ustrative of this situation. Future limited 'vars probably would not exceed the magni- u<ae of this one, and the war in Vietnam has hot required a recall of the Research Reserve, Vvhich implies that for future long limited Wars this reserve element would not be re- CaUed to active duty.
Nuclear War. This type of war would ter-
tnate within the lead time of research and evelopment of weapons and systems, there- ,°re> recall of the Research Reserve would not )e possible.
National Emergency. National emergencies, °ther than wars, may be of two types: (a) Sudden, short -term situations illustrated by he Cuban crisis or (b) expected, long-term Sltuations, such as the Cold War. Events move s° rapidly in the short-term emergency that reserve recall will be limited virtually only to hose reservists who can be deployed imme- iately for tactical purposes. Included here Vv°uld be Aviation and Selected Surface Divi- f°ns, but not Research Reserve Companies.
here may be long-term emergencies similar to the Cold War in the future, but none of the Potential opponents with whom we may contend in such situations will have a technology as advanced, relative to ours, as was that of |he Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold ”'ar. Their contention, therefore, will not Place the same requirements on advancing °ur military technology and basic sciences as *d that of the Soviet Union. The Research Reserve was not recalled during the period of lhe Cold War; therefore, it is unlikely that it w°uld be required for a similar future national emergency.
In war what you don’t dislike is not usually what the enemy does.