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At the midpoint of their careers, the lieutenant commander and commander involved in “middle management” have precious little time to look back wistfully to their Young Stud days or forward philosophically to their Old Fad days.
Yet, when they do, many of these naval officer/executives, on ivhose shoulders will one day fall the burden of top management, often find themselves harboring doubts—doubts which can and should be put to rest.
To understand today’s Navy, it must be considered in relation to the society it serves. Changes in national attitudes or sociological patterns are necessarily reflected in the Armed Forces, because service members are drawn from the general population of the nation.
In the mid-19th century, the U. S. Navy, like many in the world, was modeled upon the Royal Navy, which had gone unchanged for nearly two centuries. The officers were a self-regenerating cadre who shared common social strata, education, moral training, and experience. Officers were developed out of midshipmen by means of hard trial and error. Technical skill consisted chiefly of seamanship and great heroics. Promotion, however, was unlike the British nepotism and political appointments. It was based simply upon seniority, and there was no system for retirement. Leadership and discipline were alike in depending upon the ration of rum and the threat of the lash.
At that time, in the United States the industrial revolution was giving new status to those with mechanical skills, the transatlantic steamship had arrived, and more than 700 inland and coastal steamers were in operation. Richard Henry Dana aroused national sympathy for the living conditions of sailors, and the public became concerned with the character of the Navy.
Change, once started, progressed rapidly. In 1837, came the first steam frigate; in 1842, a Corps of Engineers; in 1845, the Naval Academy. Congress abolished flogging in 1850 and grog 11 years later. In the century which followed, rapid technological and industrial advancements provided steel ships, submarines, massive increases in the destructive power of weapons, and, finally, aircraft and nuclear power. With each increase in complexity, the technician became more important; with each jump in destructive
power, officer education was emphasized) with each advance of social consciousness) discipline became more reasonable; and, wi^ each advance of the civilian labor movement) rights and benefits of enlisted men were tn- fluenced.
Our country has experienced big business) big industrialization, big labor, and big government with all their attendant problems. “Big military” has also arrived with large standing forces, huge budgets, and destructive power of incredible proportions. • The Officer/Executive Function. It has been 3 common view in the United States that the military officer is disciplined and inflexible) is characterized by mental traits which are blunt, direct, and uncompromising. The military establishment is seen as an institution in which “debate is no more at a premium than persuasion: one obeys and one commands.” This may have been the environment of the military establishment of the past, but it hardly describes comtemporary military organizations, where size and complexity require elaborate management techniques for co-ordination. The concentration of personnel with “purely” military occupational specialities has fallen from 93.2 per cent in the Civil War to less than 25 per cent in the Navy at present. Commensurate with the shift of occupational specialities is the required change in skills of the commander. He must have mastered the techniques of organization, public relations, and financial management processes. These capabilities become concentrated at the top management level producing a reduced skill differential between military and civilian executives and a transferability of skills from the military establishment to civilian organizations. This increased demand for managerial skill by top management naval officers has been established in writing by several Secretaries of the Navy- In letters of guidance to Flag Selection Boards
sions on other than the expectation of practical results. Careers in this environment produce tough-minded pragmatists.
The involvement of the military officer in problems of leadership is obvious. Whether in military action or in staff organizations, the standard is combat readiness of the force, and the goal of the leader is to maintain initiative. Prior to World War II, the prevalent mode of leadership was autocratic. Maintenance of discipline was held the first requisite. With the rise of large standing forces, the influence of the technologist, and the spirit of revolt against overt authority in our general population, autocratic leadership became no longer effective. Bureaucratic procedures and reporting systems flourished and democratic methods have been prescribed. No leadership formula has been found, however, and since it is an individualistic trait, a pat formula is not possible.
We all know, or know of, naval officers who have achieved influential positions or command through unusual effort performed in response to psychological needs rather than as a result of normal ambition. Some of these have become authorities in a specific field and have done exceptional work for the nation. Others, in command positions which demand achievement in a wide range of interests, have been notably unsuccessful. These are the neurocrats. They are everpresent in large organizations like the Navy, usually making exceptional effort. They are ever-ready to move up into command positions to fill vacancies left by shortages of better qualified officers.
Except in highly technical functions, as an officer advances, the ability to relate to the Navy as a whole becomes more important than his specialized experience as a junior officer. This places emphasis upon formal education (both in military and civilian institutions). Emphasis also bears on obtaining the type of billets which enable the officer to develop perspective both for organizational leadership and for various liaison roles in the defense establishment. Career management patterns exist which rotate an officer through both schools and “career-enhancing” billets. These patterns expose the individual to the broader concepts of management and provide contact between him and top naval officer
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St?01 to 1966, the most prevalent trait essed by Secretaries was executive manage- ^ experience.
ace military today more than ever must nie°Unt ^°r stewar(Isfiip- Modern managers techniques have been applied to military ^sources to a degree and with a rapidity un- t^ard of in most civilian industries. Each of baT rrianaSement systems has a data feeder C to revtew authorities. The sum achieve- ent is compared to approved budgets and j-j 0Srams in subsequent review in the Navy ofePartment, Department of Defense, Bureau he1 •6 ®udget, and Legislative Committee J^8- Those programs or commands ar »ch prove inefficient or not “cost effective” Sge not awarded budgetary/administrative action and are sometimes discontinued. ersonal Executive Characteristics. That the b ‘ ltary officer works for the perpetual well- sje,ng of his organization hardly needs discus- ti°n' 9.n the contrary, the common view of 6 military “brass” has been that they have SeCen overconcerned with protection of their nrvice to the occasional detriment of the 9 H°n’ In the last decade, however, this 9'dency I138 t>een diminished. This change o|v!ns Irom: a broad recruitment policy for stCer candidates which draws men from all ^rata of the population; less concentration of SeCadetny graduates among officers in any
aiT.f’ m°re emPhasis uP°n empirical data ~ cost effectiveness” in decision-making; jj. a greater necessity to defend decisions, suh Cornin'tment> moreover, is greater to the Seb".Unit to which he is attached than to the y rvice as a whole. This theory regarding subnit commitment has been tested among cava^ War College students in informal dis- tissions and found valid. Sub-units, in these ’scussions, were identified as “Submarine erVlce,” “Destroyer Force,” “Naval Avia- tl°n;” and the like.
e decision-making, the naval officer tests ^ach alternative for its validity by its practical ^xpected results. From his earliest training i(Lan officer candidate, he has been taught, cbe first duty of a naval officer is to ac- 0rnplish his mission. His second duty is to f1S rnen-’’ Guided by this principle, working °r the well-being of his organization, and slsciplined by the feedback of management Vstems, the naval officer cannot make decimanagers. These assignments and their opportunities call for self-development efforts on the part of the officer corresponding to those of his civilian peers. They also call for some degree of disruption of his personal life, involving frequent transfers and significant time commitment to master the intricacies of new assignments.
• Family Life. The primary personal price an officer executive pays for his commitment to the Navy is in disruption of family life. Normally, in sea duty, 60 to 75 per cent of his time is spent away from home. Even when the ship is in home port there are watches, late hours, schools, and so on, to distract him from his family.
Bureau of Naval Personnel and academic studies of high resignation/retirement rates agree that deprivation of home life is the most common reason for premature departure from the service. Common complaints among officers and their wives in these studies indicate that the tension owing to the increased operating pace, even before the Vietnam war, was calling for a sacrifice which they considered unreasonable.
The family of today differs from that of previous eras. Recruitment has broadened to include all population elements. Large forces have broken the custom of a “Navy community,” and now our officers live chiefly in middle-class suburban areas within driving distance of their duty station. An officer’s occupation and education are now in great part management-oriented, as are those of his civilian counterpart. Whether the Navy family of today sacrifices more than those of former years is a moot point. Today they feel more severely the differences in family life between themselves and civilians and the compensation of “Navy family” social traditions is diminishing.
The outstanding middle management officer, the man who shows high potential for top management status, we call the A-per- former. This officer needs several prerequisites if he is to ascend the seniority ladder. He needs education. A college degree is essential. Postgraduate school and service college are desirable. He needs operational experience. Command is essential. Proper tours in squadrons, deep-draft ships, and seagoing staffs are desirable. He must have management exper1' ence, preferably in the Department of f*e" fense complex in Washington. While these i tours are needed to prepare for top manage ment responsibility, time in rank, which is N opportunity to experience the tours, is beifo compressed. Using the Officer Personnel Act as a standard, promotion to lieutenant con1' mander is due in the 12th year of comm1?' sioned service, and to commander in the l^1 year. Today officers are being promoted ,0 lieutenant commander in their 9th year an1 to commander in their 14th year. They are approaching selection with three to four yearS less experience. They have had less opport11' nity to achieve qualification for advancement or maturity in present rank.
An allied facet of the compressed careen and frequent transfers for qualifying expC1' | ence, is the pressure to learn new assignment in minimum time. About one year is require11 | for a civilian executive to have complete . command of his position in an organization and to have established his image of authority’ But in the military, where rotation is frequent there is pressure upon the individual to con1' press this break-in time by extra effort, W overtime, and by foregoing leave. Thus, the effect, in time and self-development, of hlS commitment to the organization is felt mote strenuously by the officer executive than W the civilian.
• Prestige. A career military officer is not in 3 high status executive position in the United States. Some sociologists explain that, n’ American society, where overt authority lS becoming an object for contempt, a man in uniform symbolizes that authority and lS therefore held in low esteem. This image plC' tures him as inflexible, dedicated to the use A force and often incompetent, except 111 combat. Two polls by the Gallup organiza' tion listed career officers below all profeS' sional people, just below school teachers. A poll of former naval officers, all Naval Academy graduates, added the point that they felt that theirs had been a low status profession. The more recent their active duty experience, the stronger was their conviction on this point.
When the Navy was relatively small and its officers maintained relatively isolated social group status, such public attitudes mattered
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UtlVes in the same post-World War II era, as revealed by the same studies, has been one 0 increasing respect.
• Tension. There is tension for the A-per- °rmer middle manager in the Navy just as
ere is tension for comparable level civilian executives. The constructive tensions of organizational leadership apply. There is not a profit standard, but there are standards of °Perational performance, resource manage- ln^nt, administrative action, and the like,
. ich are subject to frequent and detailed inspection. There is tension connected with e results of selection boards. These boards,
? 'vhich the author has been considered by °nr in as many years, determine in large 'neasure not only actual selection for promo- tlQn> but also the routes to potential for further
Election.
There is tension in the family, as in that of hie civilian executives, brought on by the nsband’s time commitment to the organization. But in the case of the Navy family, it is aSgravated by the husband’s prolonged and irregular absences. The more successful an ufficer is before selection boards, the more he Can expect rapid rotation and “careerenhancing” billets. These billets are primarily at sea or, if ashore, they are billets of high responsibility and high tension, usually in 'Washington. It rapidly becomes apparent to Pc wife that reward for selection simply ''leans a greater opportunity to excel in the arder billets. Since careers are compressed, Pese opportunities are coming back-to-back ^ith little break.
While a recent commander selection board was in session, some wives of service college students who were in the zone expressed opposition or indifference to their husband’s election, because they were tired of the ten- s‘°ns and separations of sea duty. A like perCentage of wives, whose husbands were being c°nsidered for command, expressed similar v'ews. These officers will complete 20 years’ active duty. Hopefully, the loss of respect at Pome for their commitment to the naval ser
vice will not dull the efficiency of their performance. But continuing tension, provoked by such career experiences, will erode their commitment and their desire for top Navy management positions.
• Health. Naval officers are a younger and generally healthier group than the general population of executives. This situation is prearranged by high medical standards at recruitment, and the relatively early age at which careers are completed. Comparative studies of incidence of “executive syndrome” illness are not available to illustrate a difference in the two groups. Some isolated cases suggest that the effects of their occupation on health is the same for officer executives as for civilian executives. For example, in 1966 a rash of heart attacks suffered by Navy flag officers in demanding management billets was widely reported.
An executive environment is one in which, to maximum extent, a man’s other problems and needs are attended to so that he may give his full attention to directing the organization. The practice of giving the executive a staff to free him from routine administrative work originated in the military, and we find it fully implemented in the rigid organizational structures of military commands.
Executive authority in military commands and administrative billets is similarly clearly defined. While in the past this authority has been circumscribed, and flexibility may have been impossible owing to the limited scope of authority, evidence is found by students of organization that control in the military at all levels is evolving from domination to persuasion, from centralized command to unit initiative.
The goal of this evolution appears to be to create involvement in management at each level in the organizational structure. There is no clear-cut agreement among writers as to the nature of this new form of authority and no widely used term for it. But the transformation of military authority can be seen in every phase of organizational behavior—for example, the narrowing difference in privilege and status between officers and enlisted men, or the development of conference techniques of command from small units even to the Joint Chiefs.
This is a transition with conflicting implica-
tions for the officer executive. While yielding some power in his element of command, he is now participating more in the authority of senior echelons. He must develop techniques of manipulative control over both officers and men of his command although, unlike his civilian counterpart, he has little or no influence over selection of his “team.” Inevitably, as ships and society change, our officers and men are changing and becoming more sophisticated.
• Personal Environment. On board ship and, to a certain extent, at shore stations, some officer executive routine personal needs are satisfied by the Navy. Flag officers, as top managers, have aides to perform these chores when they are in billets which authorize a staff. Commanding officers of large units are provided cars for official functions. But apart from these instances, and particularly applying to family affairs, a military executive has few prerogatives and is not freed of these problems to any degree greater than is an enlisted man. In fact, the converse is true. An A-performer, a potential top manager, can expect to experience more family problems, since he will be rotated to as many career-enhancing billets as possible.
• Compensation. We can consider executive compensation in two categories, psychological (status) and material (financial). The position that the level of financial compensation may be a symbol of status will not be argued, for all compensation gives status. For discussion purposes, however, we will consider fringe benefits, executive prerogatives, or status symbols as psychological compensation, while pay is separated as material compensation.
• Fringe Benefits. Post-World War II action by Congress and by the Department of Defense has gradually eroded what prerogatives had previously existed. The spirit of these actions has been democratic, to minimize the differences between officers and enlisted men, and expedient, to use the very size of the Armed Forces population to accomplish administration aims not related to Defense. To illustrate the latter point, the President became concerned about gold flow problems in 1960. When he curtailed the numbers of dependents accompanying service members to foreign duty stations, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates issued a statement that “ . . . our people are accustomed to sacrifice- To discuss fringe benefits in detail in tb( matter of executive environment for office15 would be pointless. Fringe benefits are equall) available to all service members and the>( dependents. So equal in many cases, such 3' medical care, commissaries, and governmed housing, that for a senior officer to makf habitual use of them, he would be accepting a second-class status. For example, while ,1 civilian shops in a modern, spacious, ai^ competitive supermarket, if the senior office) takes advantage of his commissary “benefit; he must shop in an overcrowded, limited' choice store, accepting minimum quality’ The most telling comment on fringe benefit5 in recent years was the Hubbell Committee s recommendation to do away with most o* them.
Rather than cite a long list of status prob' lems which would not be constructive, let uS quote two thoughtful comments on this factor- Then, by induction, the executive status pic' ture in the Navy may become clear.
In an article entitled “A Call to Arms . • 1 for Peace,” in the Harvard Business RevieWt January-February 1960, William H. Bine* wrote:
The effectiveness of military leaders is deeply conditioned by the interest and status which civilian society accords the profession. In effect society gets what it pays for. ... A public convinced that a military career is a low status profession creates apathy and hostility fundamental to legislative inertia. Legislative inertia perpetuates the universally recognized inferior conditions of employment. The services are then unable to compete effectively for quality officer personnel and the concept perseveres. . . . This is a self-fulfilling prophecy at work—one that fulfills itself as a result of the behavior of the person who makes the prophecy and believes it.
As Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., U. S- Marine Corps (Retired), stated:*
It is simply this: an alarming erosion of the status, privilege, and confidence heretofore reposed in the officer corps has taken place under our very eye. This erosion has awakened widespread complaint, frustration, and even
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* See R. D. Heinl, Jr., “Special Trust and Confidence,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1956, pp. 463-473.
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of the community. Finally, we find that the naval officer is a member of a recognized group that enforces its own standards and is capable of granting meaningful rewards. Significantly, these factors conform to a widely held definition of a profession concisely expressed by Samuel P. Huntington as: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. It is the sense of responsibility and corporateness that constitute the reasons for many A- performers remaining as officer executives rather than leaving to seek a better environment and higher financial compensation. This is a tenuous hold, depending for strength upon the maintenance of a sense of solidarity, of high standards, and meaningful rewards for the officer corps. Professionalism depends upon a sense of purpose, a skillful use of its peculiar expertise in the national interest. To the extent that the corporateness of the officer corps is dissipated, to the extent that the Navy loses identity with the spirit of responsibility to the national community, then to that extent will naval officers become just another group of executives competing for jobs with the best working conditions and compensation. Then the A-performers will leave. Less qualified men will remain. Then the condition of the Navy and our nation will indeed be grave.
Solution to the problem of retaining superior personnel for Naval top management must be sought in two ways:
Acknowledge the involvement of the officer executive by tailoring his compensation to his new consciousness of the competitive opportunities that exist in civilian agencies and industry.
Renew the professionalism of the officer corps by providing more responsibility to junior officers, higher promotion standards, variable time in grade, and permanent status and reward for professional achievement.
As we discuss these approaches, we should keep in mind that industry has learned that high gross compensation is not nearly so important to the man getting it as to the fellow a step or two below him.
• Executive Compensation. An executive’s resource is his time. He will consider the difference in compensation prospects for the investment of increments of time in competing
bitterness, among officers who have served any ength of time. It has unquestionably disparaged likely young men of high caliber r°m becoming regular officers. By leveling °ut distinctions between officers and enlisted men, it has imposed serious handicaps on 'eadership.
alnancial Compensation. The naval officer as executive is paid less throughout his entire reer than his civilian counterpart. The Uhbell Committee estimated that officer pay as 7 per cent less than civilian government executives.
* The Comparison. Although the officer execu- te organizational environment is satisfac- ry and challenging, the service does not ete'npt to solve his personal problems in an ecutive environment as do civilian organisations. Further, both in status symbols and •j, Pay> the officer executive trails the civilian, j Us> although our officers are in a situation . 'vhich many facets of their occupation are ljfterchangeable with civilian positions, officer . ® is more demanding, officer environment is ^ erior, and compensation lags. On a side- ^y-side comparison, we should expect that vr talented and pragmatic officer executives Q°uld logically resign and seek employment y.1 the open talent market for executives.
‘ any officers are doing just that.
. Are these A-performers who are leaving?
e Bureau of Naval Personnel would have to s 'lalyze their records to tell us. But there are ^■iie indications that they are. The academic tidies show that this attrition is concentrated ^ along those officers with the highest scholas- *c achievement.
Aet, the rate of these departures has not Ct grown to the disastrous proportions we ^‘ght expect from a “cost effectiveness”
' Pproach. We submit that the force which has e|d our officers is their professionalism. r When we analyzed the occupation of the aval officer we found in it characteristic Xecutive traits. It deserves a more complex nalysis. We also find that the naval officer Possesses an expertise in knowledge of the sea, the technology that enables him to use it, nd of the ability to command warships at ya- This combination of knowledge is without exact counterpart in any other occupation, .prther, we find that the officer’s occupation entirely devoted to protection and service
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occupations. When his incremental costs in time bring diminishing returns with respect to investment in a competitive occupation, he will change occupations. His incremental costs and expected returns will be different at different decision points in his career. Thus, the program for his compensation must vary if it is to be appropriate to his needs.
In illustration of these decision points, consider an officer at the point of 10 years’ commissioned service. He has probably completed his first tour of shore duty and is a junior lieutenant commander. His children are entering school, his wife is seeing for the first time the real disruptive effects of relocating the family. His responsibilities both at work and at home are multiplying. He would not be attracted by an increase in gross pay or retirement benefits as much as by a newly earned (by promotion) eligibility for better fringe benefits. For example, better household goods shipments, aid in locating and buying homes, improved family medical and dental benefits, or an assured annual leave program with payment for earned leave not taken.
Similarly, consider an officer at about 20 years’ commissioned service. He is at his point of highest financial expenditure, his children are approaching college or getting married.[1] [2] He is being asked to assume top management responsibilities. He has the sum of civilian pay plus Navy retired pay as an alternative to his gross compensation on active duty. He would consider an offer of greater gross pay with its effect upon future retirement pay. He might also respond to a Navy-sponsored college-aid program for children of senior officers on active duty. If this program were to grant entrance of his sons to the NROTG program by appointment, the Navy would benefit in another way.
The regular NROTC program now produces fewer career-motivated officers than any other. But sons of regular officers have a record of higher career commitment regardless of the program in which they were commissioned. Thus, appointing qualified sons of regular officers to this program would improve its effectiveness in terms of percentage of
* See H. N. Lyon, “A Plan For All Seasons,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1969, pp. 3543.
A graduate of Holy Cro^ College (NROTC Regular in 1954, Commander Purtc was designated a Naval Avl ator in 1956. Since then, has flown helicopters an multi-engine aircraft in: VN- (Deepfreeze) from 1956 40 1958; VU-4 from 1958 t0 1959; HU-2 from 1959 40 1960; HS-5 from 1963 40 1965; and CVSG-54 (Staff) from 1965 to 1967. served in the Budget and Plans Division, BuWeps’ from 1961 to 1963. He received his M.S. in \lana--:) ment at the Naval Postgraduate School, and attend^ the Naval War College (Command and Staff) 1,1 1967-68. He is now Executive Officer, I lelicop4'') Antisubmarine Squadron Two on board the Hornet (CVS-12).
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margin of cost differential to margin of °utput when the output is a human factor ^Cch as management ability. Reason tells us, owever, that if we become more competitive l’1 executive motivation we will retain more '^'Performers, our management will be better, and there should be compensatory savings in Service efficiency. Part of the cost of increased executive compensation can be offset by re-
each year-group would allow accelerated promotion for those A-performers who rapidly mature, without prejudice to those who are Pr°gressing at a normal rate. This procedure )'°uld add flexibility to time in grade, reduc- lrig the requirement for continuous arduous tQUrs in career-enhancing billets. Under this P*an> a year-group would be in the promotion z°ne for three years. In the first year, 25 per
Cent of
in-zone selectees would be from this Sfoup; in the second year, 25 per cent; and m the third year, 50 per cent. An officer would n°t be “passed over” until after the third l'ear. Upon selection, the officer would be- c°me a member of the new grade’s year group °‘ the fiscal year in which selected.
Rewards of greater pay and status should be accorded officers on the basis of professional achievement, as well as for seniority. Thus, 'vhen an officer takes command, he should ,>e compensated for his added responsibility °y rewards in terms of today’s national stan- (^ards of success. When he has successfully completed his command tour, these rewards could remain permanently his. There are Ur>doubtedly other professional achievements 'v°rthy of such status which would be designed after personnel studies by the Navy ePartment.
jil These recommendations are purposefully ystrative, rather than detailed, to stimulate inking about new approaches to executive °hvation. In these areas, detailed cost ^Ornate by a systems analysis loop is not ays possible. One cannot accurately relate
ducing the numbers of commanders and captains, involving more junior officers in management responsibilities. There should be no increased cost in the NROTC due to a direct appointment program of “Navy Juniors, while the possible improved career commitment among NROTC graduates would be a savings. It is submitted that the example of governmental and industrial executive programs applies. Improved executive environment and compensation are economical in terms of improved organization management.
The naval officer of today differs from those of former periods because he has become more management-oriented and less of a purely military leader. In this evolution he has developed characteristics common to those of civilian executives. He has, to a great extent, been influenced by civilian standards of behavior. To the same degree his insulation from the civilian society as a naval professional has lessened.
The officer executive middle manager, lieutenant commander or commander, has become aware of his opportunity to obtain civilian executive positions either in mid-career or at his earliest retirement oppoi tunity. Officers are doing this in significant numbers, and the only force which has prevented a general exodus of top talent has been the professionalism of the naval officer.
The Navy needs to retain its most promising middle managers to become the top managers of tomorrow. To do this, we must become competitive with civilian organizations in terms of executive motivation, and we must reverse the trend of dissolution of officer professionalism.
Only if the Navy is able to attract and retain the most superior officer executives, who will one day occupy the top management positions, will the Navy be able to influence its own future and the security of the nation.
★
A position in the Navy is not an occupation; it is a trust. Your obligation is to prepare yourself for responsible duties upon the successful discharge of which may some day depend the welfare of our country. A lifetime is not too long for this preparation.
* ' Admiral William S. Sims, U. S. Navy, 1921
career officers graduated.
In terms of how much pay increase award an executive when you promote hun the program offered by the president Du Pont is recommended. He makes me point that a 25 per cent increase per prom0' tion is necessary to induce the best qualify men to accept and sustain the burden 0 increased responsibilities.
[2] Professionalism. Professional career comm ment grows stronger in proportion to 4 degree in which the officer perceives that 4 skills are being utilized. This conclusion 0 sociological studies has impact for both juni ^ and senior officers. Greater involvement 0 junior officers in responsibility, both afl°at and ashore, would improve their retenti0’1 rates and permit the Navy to make seni°’ officers a more exclusive (and higher statu84 group. For example, why must an aviatio11 squadron have a commander as an execute officer, when many lieutenant commands5 could successfully do the job? There are al8° many commanders and captains in the Nav) Department who feel that their jobs don 1 require men of their training and experience- At the other end of the spectrum, nothin? hurts retention and morale more than juni0’ officers who are semi-idle. Greater use 0 junior officers in responsible billets worn4 allow the Navy to have fewer, more carefully selected, and better compensated seni°r officers.
A longer period in the promotion zone f°*