This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Pictorial—"Our First Steel Warships”
(See pp. 84-99, January 1969 Proceedings)
Alfred W. Harris—Not only were the protected cruisers Atlanta and Boston unusual in the offset arrangement of their 8-inch main battery guns, but in addition, they had an odd arrangement for their 6-inch secondary battery. Four of the 6-inch guns were mounted in the central portion of the superstructure. The third gun, starboard side, was located in the forward angle of the superstructure, and was provided with two gun-ports. One gun-port was located just aft of the small gun sponson, and allowed the same degree of train, 60 degrees forward of and abaft the beam, as for all of the broadside guns. This gun could also be shifted to its second gun-port in the front of the superstructure, where it commanded a somewhat narrower field of fire directly forward. It was while using this forward gun- port that the 8-inch gun crew was forced to leave their weapon.
The third 6-inch gun on the port side was placed in a similar position in the stern angle of the superstructure, where it also had two gun-ports, giving it similar fields of fire to port and astern, where it, too, had its effect on the crew of the after 8-inch gun.
Certainly, the Atlanta’s contribution to torpedo boat defense was even more unique. On the night of 11 October 1887, the Atlanta, together with other ships of the Navy, participated in a mock battle to test their defensive capabilities when attacked by torpedo boats. The torpedo boats of that era were required to approach their quarry at extremely close range, so that the torpedoes, which were attached to the ends of long spars, could be placed against the hull of the ship they were attacking.
To prevent the attacking boats from getting close enough to place their torpedoes, the Atlanta surrounded herself with a 5-inch cable, suspended from her yardarms, and a system of outriggers, so that the cable hung just above the surface of the water and at a distance from the hull, except for a small area at the stern. At intervals of 30 feet, mines were
attached to the cable. These could be detonated electrically whenever an attacking boat ventured near.
Trailing astern of the ship was a large hawser, each end of which was attached to the steel cable, so that it formed a large U around the stern. This hawser was suspended just below the surface by a series of floating kegs. 0 was hoped that any torpedo boat, attacking from this direction, would find her propehel entangled in the hawser. These defenses; coupled with the more effective deterrent 0 quick-firing guns and aided by the relatively new searchlight, were quite formidable but the Atlanta had yet another weapon 10 strike fear into the hearts of attacking torped® boat crews. A whaleboat, towed close to thf Atlanta’s stern, was armed with a large hose- From this hose, a stream of very hot water; supplied by the warship’s boilers, could bf directed against any torpedo boat foolish enough to come within range. During tl'e mock battle, any torpedo boat that received a stream of hot water for more than a quarter o a minute, was judged to have been put out o action. Apparently there was no lack of 1°' genuity in the Navy of 1887.
"Arm the AGRs?”
(See W. A. Erwin, pp. 112-113, October 1968, all£* pp. 106-107, January 1969 Proceedings)
Ernest T. Lutz—It would be worthwhile after the USS Pueblo and USS Liberty incidents to conduct research into a better type of ship to carry out the duties of surveillance. These ships were not intended to be combatants, aS Mr. Bock brought out. There is not enough storage and magazine space for guns an® ammunition, and these ships were not de' signed to carry armament.
I should like to suggest replacements f°f these ships. For the AGERs, a modified destroyer-escort of either the Bostwick or Edsat class. A ship of this type could retain an armament of two 3-inch guns, several .50- caliber machine guns, and two Mark 3^ torpedo mounts with either the Mark 46 01 48 torpedo. For the AGTRs, a modified ligh1 cruiser of the Cleveland class. The 6-inch gmlS
'v°uld be removed along with eight of the 5- *nch, the 5-inch mounts forward and aft being Stained, with two dual mounts of 3-inch 50- caliber guns mounted amidships.
These ships would not only have an advantage in armament, but they would also have a great advantage in speed and combat- Vvorthiness.
jjabmarime Pressure Dock for the federal German Navy
Stefan Terzibaschitsch, West German ‘''aval Writer—Presently, the Federal Ger- lrian Navy possesses only small coastal submarines, suitable for duties in the shallow 'Vaters of the Baltic Sea. Between 1961 and J68, only 12 of the 24 submarines contracted ave been completed. Plans called for these submarines to be built of a special anti-mag- lletic steel. Seven of the first eight were conducted of this steel, which comes from Aus- hia. The U-3 was built of normal steel, bemuse she was to be used as a testing boat for he Royal Norwegian Navy.
In 1963, fine imperfections were found in lhc hulls of the U-1 and U-2, which were Caused by corrosion of the anti-magnetic steel. A temporary building halt was ordered, j1' order to investigate the reasons for the Maws. The pressure hulls of the U-4 through submarines were given a zinc covering as
a corrosion protection, but this has somewhat limited their operational capabilities.
Because of imperfections in the U-1 and U-2, they were completely rebuilt. Their new pressure hulls were of an improved antimagnetic steel, and the configuration of both submarines was changed to look like the U-9 class submarine. At the present time, these two submarines, and the U-9 through U-12 boats, are the only ones in the Federal German Fleet that are fully operational. The U-3 was decommissioned after her successful tour with the Norwegian Navy.
The second series of coastal submarines will be constructed in the next few years, as additions to the U-9 class. They will be designated U-13 to U-24.
In an effort to get exact information on pressure resistance of various submarine hulls, extensive deep-diving tests had to be conducted. There was no pressure dock available, so deep-diving tests were performed by suspending submarines on the hook of a floating crane, and then submerging the submarine, without her crew aboard, to various depths in the Oslo Fjord. The experiments were too expensive, however, and in 1963, a contract was awarded to the Flenderwerke at Lubeck, to build a submarine pressure dock. This shipyard was chosen because it had already planned testing docks for the Imperial Gcr-
man Navy and the Kriegsmarine. Four years later, in 1967, the dock was completed at a cost of about $4 million. The submarine pressure dock is now located at the naval arsenal of Kiel, the main Baltic Fleet base of the Federal German Navy.
A submarine to be tested enters the partly flooded dock and the round doors are closed behind her. The cylindrical interior of the dock is then filled with water and the water subjected to the pressure required to simulate a particular ocean depth. It is estimated that the dock can simulate depths down to about 725 feet. The dock is partly submerged during operations for security reasons.
The cylindrical tube of the dock is approximately 220 feet long, and over 40 feet in diameter, and can accommodate any of the existing German and Norwegian submarines, or either of the two 143-foot Danish boats under construction. For larger submarines, however, it appears to be too small. Although it is not known by this author if the increased size of submarines of the future was taken into consideration during the planning stage, it is possible that the generation of Federal German submarines yet to come will be able to use the dock. Nevertheless, the existence of this submarine pressure dock now contributes materially to the improved construction of limited-size submarines for the Federal German and the northern NATO navies.
"How Young We Were”
(See P. B. Ryan, pp. 26-36, December 1968 Proceedings)
Captain Roland E. Krause, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Ryan concludes: “If
the blame for Pearl Harbor can be apportioned among Americans in general, the final responsibility must repose with those leaders—both civil and military—who were in charge in Washington.” In a democracy such as ours, the voice of the people governs, and therefore, it must be that the “final responsibility” rests with the people. They decide any major issue, what can and what cannot be done. Our statesmen, our Senators and Representatives, have their ears finely attuned to public opinion. It is true that public opinion can be manipulated to support the ends politicians seek.
“Lend-Lease,” the transfer of 50 destroyers in exchange for bases, would have been irm possible if the American people had said “no- So we built up an explosive situation without due regard for our own security. Shortly be' fore Pearl Harbor, I wished to send men to the Machine Gun School on Oahu, but WaS advised by the officer-in-charge, “No v>se sending your men, I have no ammunition"! can’t fire the guns.” That was strange—war seemed to be impending, and yet we could not train machine-gunners. It naturally led one to think that perhaps the danger was not as great as it appeared. My experience was a smalt sample of what the Commanders-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Admirals Richardson and Kimmel, had to contend with. Both begged in vain for patrol planes in adequate numbers- This was one factor that caused Admiral Richardson to request his relief.
We all must share the responsibility. Tragic as was Pearl Harbor, it was not all loss. 1* we had to get into the war, the alternative o' Hitler and Company ruling Europe today, lS even less appealing than our present com flict. It served to unite the American people as nothing else could.
"NATO: Now is the Time for all good members . . .”
(See J. A. Robinson, pp. 38-47, January 1969 Proceedings)
Captain Harvey B. Seim, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The reader is perhaps left will’ the impression that little or nothing done by NATO in the past has produced private outcomes. Such an implication would certainly be misleading.
Since the mid-1950s, NATO has sponsored, or has provided, the milieu for a variety defense-related activities that have resulted in private pay-offs to individual member countries. These activities have included cooperation in research, development, and production of weaponry, as well as the exchange of technical information. Examples of NATO- sponsored co-operative development and pr°' duction of weapon systems are a lightweight tactical reconnaissance aircraft (Fiat G-9l)> developed under the aegis of Supreme Allied Command Europe, and produced in Italy and Germany for their respective air forces, and a maritime patrol aircraft (Breguet Atlantique), developed under NATO auspices by Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, with E- S. assistance, and now in production by a European consortium for several NATO member countries.
U. S. technical and production knowhow, Eas been shared with almost every NATO Member nation through arrangements for co- 0l'dinated production in Europe of several E'- S.-developed weapons, such as the Hawk sUrface-to-air missile system, the Sidewinder a>i'-to-air missile, the Mark 44 ASW torpedo, lhe F-104G Starfighter, and the Bullpup air- to-surface missile. This process is continuing—• h>r example, with the Seasparrow surface-to- a'r missile for close-in defense of ships.
Most European NATO countries have also received private pay-offs of some kind, through the NATO common infrastructure Program, which has financed projects in all Parts of NATO Europe. These projects range h'om airfields, naval facilities, pipelines, and Unclear weapon storage sites to communica- hons networks and air defense warning and Control installations.
While not always recognized as being in the category of private outcomes, one should not overlook the value to the individual NATO Oiember nation of training and schooling S*ven to their nationals at U. S. military schools and installations.
In addition, mention should be made of otany collective activities in NATO, from 'vhich members may receive private benefits. These include agencies such as the NATO defense College and a complex of activities for co-operative technical research like the ^>Hape Technical Center, the Advisory Group f°r Aerospace Research and Development (agard), and the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic ASW Research Center in Italy.
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to 'Vttte brief comments on material published in the 1 Roceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication ln these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceed- IN°s is to provide a place where ideas of importance *° the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of *45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
The foregoing should serve to demonstrate that there has been a considerable amount of “technology sharing” in NATO since its inception, and that there have been some private outcomes as a result. On the other hand, past efforts have been modest and sporadic; there is much room for improvement. Nevertheless, the lack of spectacular achievement in the past does not invalidate Dr. Robinson’s contention that the private benefits of a program of technology sharing, will contribute to greater cohesion and more equitable burden sharing in NATO. Efforts in this direction deserve full U. S. support.
Finally, two possibilities come to mind for private outcomes in non-technical areas, which might induce a country to continue its membership in NATO: operational information and intelligence, which it receives from U. S. sources by virtue of its Alliance affiliation; and opportunities, not otherwise available, to influence U. S. policies and planning, both military and non-defense, through the NATO consultative process.
"Indebtedness”
{See D. G. Smith, pp. 140-142, December 1968, and pp. 114-116, April 1969 Proceedings)
Captain A. Lincoln Baird, U. S. Navy, Retired, Consultant—Knowing how to borrow cheaply is a first step to living effectively in our society. A second step is perhaps even more important, to learn when to borrow. In business, a loan is considered sound when it enables the business to earn enough to repay the loan and make a profit. This rule may be adapted to personal living. Under it, reasonable investments in a home or transportation might so bolster one’s well being and earning power, as to qualify for loans. Few other purchases would qualify. It might be even better if we could spread some wisdom about when to borrow.
Let us look at Commander Smith’s example of a first class petty officer who bought a color TV on time. The cost with tax and a year’s service was $1,069.78. He paid $200 down and paid $32.66 per month for 36 months ($1,375.66 for a $995 box). Suppose the man could have been induced by his division officer to restrain himself to black- and-white viewing for two years, while he kept his down payment and same monthly
payments in a savings and loan account where today, he can receive 5 per cent daily interest. At the end of two years, he would have had enough to buy the TV outright. Side benefits, such as a later model set and bargaining power, would also have been his. At the end of three years, if he continued the same payments, he would be a practicing capitalist with over $400 earning money for him, rather than owning an aging machine, and being a victim of the system.
Perhaps it is asking too much for a person who buys a $1,000 color TV on time, ever to show such restraint. However, insofar as we can influence our men to become wise participants in capitalism, rather than the opposite, we help both them and ourselves to place our energies on operating the Navy rather than on some of the less important mechanics of living.
"The Research Catamaran T-AGOR-16”
(See J. C. Froid, pp. 132-136, December 1968 Proceedings)
Commander Alexander C. Brown, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The term catamaran is in itself curious, derived as it is from the Tamil dialect of Ceylon: Katta-Mamam (tied trees). Native fishermen of the Indian Ocean placed hollowed logs parallel to each other and connected them with stout crossbeams. Obviously, such twin canoes provided far greater stability than a slim, single log dugout. The use of double-hulled vessels by shipbuilders technologically competent to build seaworthy conventional craft with single hulls goes back many years. In the mid-17th century. Sir William Petty was vigorously promoting sailing catamarans for the Royal Navy.
Robert Fulton was the first American to build steam catamarans and, only a few years after the successful voyage up the Hudson by the Clermont, he engaged in the New York harbor ferry business with the wooden twin-hulled, double-ended Jersey, York, and Nassau, the city’s first steam-powered ferry* boats. Fulton described the Jersey in 1813 as “built of two boats, each ten feet beam, feet long, five feet deep in the hole {sic); which boats are distant from each other ten feet’ confined by strong transverse beam-knee and diagonal braces, forming a deck 30 feet wide; 80 feet long .... By placing the propelling water-wheel between the boats it is guarded from injury from ice or shocks on approaching or entering the dock.”
'in 1 '"Her 1‘ktrd
■niiri
The
"nine deep, bin 11 k cana di‘Uv< locate "raid lhe c
hatte
knots
abro;
they
as it
bolic
lasses
to sr
Thoi
Pour
equi.
New
Illustrated London
Forerunners of present day catamaran vessels were these two twin-hulled English Channel steamships of the late 1800s. Shown in the drawings are the 290-foot Castalia, 1875 (left), and the 302-foot Calais-Douvres, 1877 (right).
As the nation’s principal exponent °* marine steam, it was natural that Fulton should have been selected to design and supervise the construction of a revolutionar) craft for the U. S. Navy—the floating batter) Demologos (“Voice of the People”)—claimed as the first steam warship in history. The War of 1812 was then in progress, but hostilitieS were suspended before the Fulton batter) could be put to a practical demonstration against the British. Shortly after her launch on 29 October 1814, Fulton himself died, and though certain changes were made by Cap*
etween the two hulls. A 120-h.p. engine was
tain David Porter—notably the addition of Unnecessary sails—when the vessel was completed, her creator was honored by having her burned Fulton.
The U. S. steam frigate Fulton—first of the name—was 156 feet long by 56 beam and 20 ^eep. She had a single paddlewheel of 16-foot ^‘aineter, operating in the 14-foot wide canal,” which ran the length of the vessel
Seated amidships in one of the hulls and caldrons of copper to prepare her steam” in Jhe other. On her trial trip, the floating battery was able to make five-and-a-half kr>ots. She was viewed by the British from abroad in considerable trepidation. Aghast, they reported her size at about twice as much it really was, and credited her with diabolical machinery designed to brandish cut- asses over the side, as well as powerful pumps ^ spray scalding water on her adversaries. 1 hough she was designed to carry 20 32- Pounders, the Fulton had no such frightening Equipment on board. Actually, she never left •New York harbor. Denied deep sea service, she was employed usefully for a considerable period as a receiving ship in Brooklyn. Some 15 years after she was built, she was totally destroyed on 4 June 1829 by the explosion of her powder magazine.
In the years following, a considerable number of steam-powered catamarans were built both in the United States and abroad, principally as harbor or river ferries. The latter may still be found on the Mississippi and, of course, catamaran yachts of all sizes are extremely popular today.
Two large, seaworthy catamarans, designed to ply the rough waters of the English Channel, were built in the late 1800s. The Castalia, proposed by Captain W. T. Dicey, a former official of the port of Calcutta, where he had long been impressed by the performance of sailing catamarans used by native fishermen, was laid down in 1872 at the yard of the Thames Iren Works Company of Blackwall. She measured 290 feet in length, and each iron hull was 17 feet wide, separated from the other by a 26-foot in-between space. Her draft was six-and-a-half feet.
Instead of having twin fully rounded hulls capable of independent flotation, the Cas- talia’s double-ended hulls were two halves of a conventional hull split longitudinally, separated, and then strongly fastened together across the open space between the hulls. The vessel had two pairs of diagonal, direct- acting engines, one in each hull, powering two separate paddlewheels. These were 22 feet in diameter and turned in the middle of the 26-foot wide interspace. Raised upon the common deck, laid over both hulls, was a superstructure 168 feet long, 60 feet wide, and eight feet high. This afforded her passengers “a magnificent promenade” 14 feet above the waterline.
On her first public trials, the Castalia made the 22-mile run between Dover and Calais in one hour and 50 minutes. She then completed several years of profitable cross-Channel service. Upon retirement, the Castalia was converted to a floating pesthouse for smallpox victims.
A larger catamaran steamer, the Calais- Douvres, was built in 1877. This vessel went back to the fully symmetrical twin hulls, and was 302 feet long and 62 feet wide. Though she proved faster than the Castalia in crossChannel service, she was a “coal eater,” and the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company disposed of her to French owners. The Calais-Douvres was finally scrapped in 1899, after a lengthy stint on the Thames as a coal hulk.
These two British channel steamers were the largest catamarans ever built, and even today are not challenged in their size by either of the two catamaran designs included in the U. S. Navy’s present shipbuilding program—the 246^-foot USNS Hudson of Commander Froid’s article, and a pair of 251-foot auxiliary submarine rescue ships (ASSR), now being built in Alabama.
Though obviously present-day naval architects would consider the catamaran type only in relation to its suitability for highly specialized duties requiring a broad, stable platform, the old Fulton, whose mission was also specialized—as much to scare the enemy as fight him—should not be forgotten. She was a useful member of the U. S. Navy of yesteryear, preceding by a century-and-a-half the Navy’s renewed interest in catamarans.
"The Deep Question”
CSee J. M. Cohen, pp. 26-37, January 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Lee H. Taylor, U- S- Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve Offi" cer’s School 1-5(2) Portsmouth, New Hamp' shire—The Dolphin's successful sea trials and the resulting favorable comments are the best rebuttal to the ill-chosen words “trouble- beset.” The term “conventional submarine is entirely in error. The proper word should have been “experimental.”
★ ★ ★
Commander C. J. Chwalek, U. S. Naval Reserve (R), Instructor, Naval Reserve Officer’s School, Portsmouth, New Hampshire"' As in any revolutionary engineering research project concerning deep submergence submarines, intricate engineering problems were obviously encountered by the engineers at Portsmouth, and were adequately resolved- In fact, the Dolphin incorporates unique and
sophisticated equipment and instrumentation never before used in submarine design and construction; much of it is being evaluated for ultimate incorporation in future combatant submarines. The Dolphin is not a mere test or research vehicle, but a true submarine, which, when ultimately proven, will conceivably and hopefully become the workhorse of the Navy, as is the USS Albacore (AGSS-569), in its perfection of a new breed of submarine.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Blaine, U. S. Naval Reserve—Ensign Cohen states “the Aluminaut is the only submarine that uses aluminum in her pressure hull.” Project Moray, for which I was pilot from 1964 through 1966, also has aluminum pressure capsules.
Pictorial—"Remembrance of My Cruise”
(See C. A. Focht, pp. 88-103, August, and pp- 109" 110, December 1968 Proceedings)
Captain P. R. Osborn, U. S. Navy (Re' tired)—It might be interesting to readers to note that Admiral Dewey’s old flagship, the USS Olympia, which carried his flag at the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, is now berthed at Pier 2 North, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-
She is maintained as a marine memorial and Museum by the Cruiser Olympia Association, Inc., in the same fashion as the frigate Constellation is maintained in Baltimore.
The Olympia is the last remaining ship of lhe “Great White Fleet,” and brings alive fhe history and traditions of a ship that served "i both the Spanish-American War and ^Vorld War I. Her last official assignment was lo return the body of the unknown soldier to lhe United States in 1921. For many years, she served as a training ship at the U. S. -'''.aval Academy. After decommissioning in 1922, she was kept as a naval relic at the Philadelphia Navy Yard until being turned °ver to the Cruiser Olympia Association in 1957. Funds were raised, by public subscrip- hon, to restore the ship to her original condi- hon as a public exhibit and museum.
The ship is in trouble, however: her condition has deteriorated, and the necessary hinds for her continued repair and main- T'nance have proved inadequate. A drive to raise $250,000 is lagging and thus her fate is uncertain.
The Navy and the public have not been too hind to our naval heritage. Although the ligate Constitution is maintained, officially, at Poston by the Navy, Admiral Farragut’s Civil y ar flagship, the Hartford, was allowed to Slnk at her moorings in Norfolk in 1956 and has now been lost.
The famous battleship Oregon of Spanish- Arnerican War fame, after being preserved frr many years by the people of Portland, Oregon, was recalled by the Navy during ^orld War II. She was partially scrapped, then used as an ammunition barge, and finally, sold to Japan for scrap in 1955—an ignominious end! Several of our battleships of World War II fame, have had a better fate, and are being preserved by their namesake states. England preserves Nelson’s Victory, Japan, Togo’s Mikasa’, and Russia, the cruiser Aurora. It is hoped that we will likewise be able to successfully maintain the Olympia for the benefit of future generations.
"Contingency Planning”
(See D. R. Hughes, pp. 26-37, November 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert W. Sherer, U. S. Navy, Department of State, Geneva—Lieutenant Colonel Hughes states in his article that the age of deterrence arrived with the advent of nuclear weapons. I submit that the concept of deterrence dates back to the beginning of history. Thucydides in his Peloponnesian War suggested, “And perhaps, when they see our actual strength is keeping pace with the language we use, they will be more inclined to give way, since their land will still be untouched and, in making up their minds, they will be thinking of advantages which they still possess and which have not been destroyed.” These words were written in 400 B.C.
As recently as the outbreak of World War II, the Swiss very effectively deterred Hitler from seizing their country, by making evident their intent to fight a protracted guerrilla war from the mountain-fortified retreats, and to sabotage the St. Gotthard tunnel in the event of invasion.
The sensational novel that revives a ship’s log of memories for every Franklin man
THE
Hero Ship
Hank searls
“Stunning" is the word the New York Times Book Review uses to describe this sometimes enraging, sometimes exalting, always enthralling novel of the life and death of a giant Pacific aircraft carrier and the heroes and cowards who manned her through one of the fiercest battles in the history of naval warfare. A real “hair on the chest” book.
—Newsday
An NAL Book • $5.95 at bookstores WORLD PUBLISH I IMG
TIMES MIRROR
New York and Cleveland
The difference, which became evident in 1945, was that weapons which had been developed, were by their very nature, many times more effective when not employed than when actually used.
"The Day the Navy Caught a Zero”
(See R. L. Underbrink, pp. 136-137, February 1968; and pp. 105-106, January 1969 Proceedings)
Bill Martin—I was stationed at the Naval Air Station in Dallas, Texas, when the Zero captured in Alaska came in for refueling en route to the East Coast for some sort of evaluation. I was sitting on the fender of one of our crash trucks, watching students shooting landings, when one of the cadets came up to me and said, “There’s a Zero on final approach!” You can imagine the kidding he took, but we had to eat our words when the Zero landed.
As I recall, it was accompanied by a twin Beech, with a crew of mechanics, who were by then familiar with the craft. Information on this flight was not posted on the “arrival” board in Operations, and we were not given any notice of its impending landing.
For some strange reason, the commanding officer of the station roped off the area around the plane, and let only officers inspect it-
By the way, the caption with the picture used in the Comment and Discussion section in the January 1969 issue, says the Zero was shot down, but the pilot at Dallas said he was told it had landed because of engine trouble. The plane had no battle damage. [1]
* Ed. Note: During the Dutch Harbor attack, two bullets punctured the fuel line of Koga’s Zero, and he cracked up the plane while making an emergency landing.
"Night Fight Off Oran”
(See H. Sanders, pp. 56-63, January 1969 Proceedings)
Kapitanleutnant Peter Merzhauser, Federal German Navy, Post Graduate School, Monterey—It is indeed a fact that submarines have no room for survivors, but they came to the surface, picked up seamen, and there was certainly no sanguinity involved in any of the losses the Allied powers suffered in the Atlantic. I cannot accept the implied conjecture, if there is any, about the attitudes of German submariners towards the surviving seamen of torpedoed ships. I use the word “German” instead of “Nazi,” because for me these words are not synonymous.
Admiral Sanders’ judgment, based on a remark of one submarine officer, cited not in connection with the event described, is 3 generalization that does not stand up to the facts.
I am certain that Admiral Sanders knows about the Laconia incident. This incident caused Admiral Donitz to give the order not to surface anymore for rescue operations. On 12 September 1942, 600 miles south of the Azores, the armed troop transport Laconia, with nearly 3,000 men aboard, was torpedoed by the U-156. The captain, Kapitanleutnant Hartenstein, gave open radio calls in English and German. He bound himself by assuring not to attack anyone who would come to his assistance. In addition, Admiral Donitz ordered several submarines to help in the rescue, in which 800 of the 811 British seamen, and 450 of 1,850 Italian POWs were saved- The survivors were transferred to a French cruiser, which was also called by radio. During that rescue operation, the submarines, with lifeboats in tow, were attacked by Amen-
can aircraft. The U-156 was damaged, and °ne boat with survivors sank.
After this incident, there was probably no difference in policy between submarine opera- dons in the Atlantic and the Pacific. The Pacific was declared a war zone on the first day of war against Japan. American submarines attacked without warning. Rescue °perations were not usual, when American submarines were in danger or hindered in ’heir future operations.
The showing of mercy is a very personal characteristic, and I believe strongly that every German submarine officer, especially '''hen surfacing was not possible, was deeply uffected, when he saw other seamen struggling for their lives in the ocean. I am confident ’hat every effort was made to minimize these fosses, the same effort Admiral Sanders made affer evaluating the risk to his own ships.
★ ★ ★
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. -\’avy—I read Admiral Sanders’ article, with considerable interest—both because it illustrated the fine work that can be done on the sPur of the moment by destroyermen, and because of the rather startling manner in which ’he U-boat skipper handled his submarine.
this notwithstanding, I hasten to add that ’he USS Buck (DD-761) is still alive.
I believe that the Buck Admiral Sanders talked about, was DD-420, and a sister to the destroyers involved in the action he recalls, d hat Buck was struck by one and possibly two torpedoes on 9 October 1943, while on patrol °ff Salerno. The damage sustained was so extensive that the ship had to be abandoned ''Uthin three minutes after she was hit. She Sank a minute later; only 97 of her crew survived. Up to this time, the Buck had received three battle stars for her service. ★
The USS Buck (DD-761) was launched on 11 March 1945 and was commissioned on 28 June 1946. In September of that year, the Buck joined the Pacific Fleet, where she still serves. During her career, she made four trips to Korean waters during that conflict, operating with both the fast carriers and the shore bombardment forces, and she received six battle stars for this service. She has seen similar duty during the Vietnam war.
Portrait of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
(See cover, January 1969 Proceedings)
Dean H. Hamilton—I cannot recall ever seeing a U. S. naval officer wearing a dress uniform, having a left breast pocket with a handkerchief inserted therein. Accordingly, I am wondering if Mr. Neilson, the artist, has correctly detailed the uniform in his portrait of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. Navy?
★ ★ ★
Ensign Richard S. McClarrinon, U. S. Navy—A copy of the January 1969 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, with the portrait of Fleet Admiral E. J. King, U. S. Navy, on the cover, crossed my desk recently. While reviewing the campaign ribbons, my attention was drawn to the Admiral’s use of a white handkerchief in the breast pocket. Not finding a basis for the handkerchief usage in the Uniform Regulations, I was wondering if this style was adopted by a particular Naval Academy class, or if some other significance is attached?
(Note: Inquiries made in response to these two queries, and those of others, obtained the considered opinion that Admiral King did, in fact, wear a handkerchief as depicted on the cover portrait, and that such details of uniform dress are regarded as the prerogative of officers of such senior rank.)
Don’t throw away your back issues of the Proceedings. If you don’t want them for your own professional library, donate them to a high school or college library. You may help to interest youngsters in a naval career.