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The prospective commanding officer (PCO) of an unfinished ship has one major §oal: to commission her, with well trained ■Wen, on time. To reach this goal, he needs an Organization capable of meeting every exigency, from ferreting out office furniture, through the hectic processing of hundreds of t'ew men, to the co-ordinating of the last tense moments of the commissioning ceremony. What form should such an organization take?
What may be termed the traditional organization provides for a nucleus crew under the command of the prospective commanding °ificer at the shipbuilding site, and a balance Crew under the command of the prospective c*ecutive officer at the Fleet Training Center.
In addition to this, men from both the balance and nucleus crews are at schools or in transit under the command of neither the prospective commanding officer nor the prospective executive officer. Depending on the geographical distance between the two parts of the crew, there may or may not be strong lines of communication. The PCO has no authority to transfer his men, assign per diem or send them to schools. To do these things, if he cares to try, he must work through several commands, such as the Type Commander, the Training Command, or the District Commandant. Such a pro- j^edure is wasteful, time-consuming, and fstrating, to say the least.
A Kennedy precommissioning research team,
1 Example, learned that, in one precommis- °ning unit, under the traditional system, new en were detained in student pools—some- t,les up to six weeks—waiting for enough men to form a class in the School of the Ship. Another precommissioning unit’s research team discovered about 12,000 man-weeks wasted because facilities and instructors were unable to handle the personnel inflow.
The precommissioning unit structure traditionally follows shipboard organization. This structure is inadequate to carry out efficiently the varied precommissioning unit functions, many of which are unlike shipboard functions. The larger the ship, the more inhibitive are traditional practices. What is the answer? Create a viable organization, and give the PCO the authority he needs to get the job done efficiently.
Each new-construction ship has special needs. Each encounters problems of personnel, time, material, technical resources, availability of funds, and criticality of need. Each has matters requiring the attention of higher authority. For these reasons, any model precommissioning unit structure should be tailored to meet the individual needs of the ship using it.
In the case of the Kennedy, the PCO requested and got authority to set up a new three-unit organization. First, there was the precommissioning unit, officers and men staffing a building some 12 miles from the ship. The precommissioning unit controlled, co-ordinated, and supported over-all precommissioning activities. The PCO was headquartered here in the early and middle stages of the work. Second, there was the nucleus crew (Detachment Alpha) with its own officer-in-charge at the ship site. It monitored and validated the ship’s systems as they were completed. The PCO shifted to this location in the final weeks of construction. Third, there was the training activity (Detachment Bravo) also with its own officer-in-charge, located near the Fleet Training Center. The unit officer-in-charge co-ordinated all training, including on-the-job training, and training in outside schools. The PCO delegated authority to each officer-in-charge—a major principle of management—and freed himself from the minutiae of both ship validation and training.
With this new three-unit organization, the PCO needed one more thing to give him the flexibility he needed for the massive pre-
77
commissioning undertaking: he requested and got authority to transfer his men between units. Along with this came the authority to assign per diem. This transfer capability proved particularly beneficial with senior petty officers early in the precommissioning activities. Petty officers were transferred to the nucleus crew where they learned the ship layout and systems, then transferred back to the balance crew where they developed their training programs with a new insight.
Operating as a separate and detached command, the training unit shortened the normal precommissioning training by four months. Approximately 25 per cent waste was eliminated. No personnel were held in standby, even for short periods of time. Moreover, the PCO was able to establish supporting programs (such as Afloat College Education), to consolidate the varied administrative and clerical activities, and to co-ordinate and control the vital flow of ship’s supplies.
A second organizational question evolved: Would the precommissioning unit be more flexible if the traditional shipboard organization were subordinated to one that was more suited to precommissioning activities? An affirmative answer brought about a functional organization, with some shipboard counterparts, but nevertheless unique to the precoin- missioning unit.
A control center was established—much like the shipboard CIC—and christened the Management Control and Information Center (MCIC). Having one knowledgeable man from each department in MCIC allowed the control center to do an excellent job on a day- to-day basis. The MCIC received and matched work requirements with available resources on a continuing and dynamic basis. Chronology and milestone charts, continuously updated, played a big part in this control center-
Traditionally, the task of matching requirements with resources is done by the PC° and the prospective executive officer, and h has always bogged them down. Constantly beset with smaller problems, they could no1 devote their full attention to important matters. The MCIC relieved the PCO and his PXO from the day-to-day, hour-to-hour requirements of shifting personnel and resources. If the transfer cut across administrative organizational lines, it moved up to higher authority for resolution.
The concept of “control” for the MCIC is important. Most management information centers have no control, and frequently the collected information serves no useful purpose. The MCIC, like the shipboard CIC in the tactical area, exercises limited management control under policy directives and priorities from the CO.
Other parallels exist with the shipboard CIC. Take, for instance, the situation where an airborne command pilot is 200 miles from his ship. An enlisted aircontroller back at the ship directs the pilot from CIC. The aircoti' trailer’s orders are followed even though he js junior. This delegation of responsibility lS necessary because the captain could not possibly serve in this capacity. The man m CIC has the broader picture, and, withm limitations, he has the command authority- The pilot ultimately does have the power ot veto, however.
A very- similar situation might occur in the MCIC. All action taken by the MCIC Director or his subordinates is subject to reclama by the person it affects. That person ultimately can go to the captain with his problem if he feels it necessary. This is part of the directive-
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primary qualification for a director, some respects, the Kennedy did not make e rnost of the MCIC concept, but her men earned from their mistakes. In the early pre- ^Ommissioning stages, some time was wasted. ^,°r example, it took several days to devise a °rtnat for the kind of chronology and milestone charts that would present precisely the lecture wanted. Too, because the instructors acked practical experience—and the time to acfiuire it—they were unable to educate their !nen, particularly the third class and below, *n modern management techniques. They ‘^covered that each man must understand mere and how he fits in, and how he can ^'oid causing problems. Because of the lack experience and time, this was not done.
^ retrospect, a better job could have been °ue in convincing the junior officers and the Os of the merits and feasibility of the ClG- Because many of those who would ^ake or break the MCIC were not completely 0n it beforehand, time that might other- ^ISe have been spent on making it work better
tive
?0r example, if, for some reason, 20 men are Pulled off their jobs to go to firefighting school, [he department head can discuss the matter with the captain.
The selection of the director of the MCIC is cntical. To interpose another authoritative v°ice, thus breaking tradition, creates a delicate problem for the conservatives of the haditional system. The man selected for this 'uiportant position on board the Kennedy was amiliar with handling Navy personnel probes; he was well liked and got the co-opera- ll°n he needed. On an aircraft carrier, the ^ir Intermediate Maintenance Department °fficer would probably have the right background. He has experience in carrier opera- Pons, and in maintenance and management, rfe has experience with the 3-M system for •'4 Ml), which parallels the data-collecting Process of the MCIC. In any case, the Director must have management acumen. He must be Capable of employing the young data processing analysts or management consultants 'vho might be called on for certain tasks— ^uthout letting them usurp control. Yet,
Ae final analysis, depth of experience is squandered. It was learned, then,—or, ^ ore properly, confirmed—that any innova- management system that is to be introduced into the precommissioning process will be effective only if it is genuinely supported by all hands at all levels.
A major contribution of the management control system, over and above matching requirements to resources, was the way that MCIC furnished justifying personnel requests. This was a powerful tool. It gave the means to identify, collect, and evaluate tasks to be accomplished, and also supplied man-hour estimates and skills required to accomplish those tasks. Although some estimates were off, most total estimates were remarkably close to those required. The manpower check paid big dividends. For the six-month period prior to commissioning, it was discovered that the Kennedy was 25 per cent short in total manhours of work to be performed as required by higher authority. This led to another innovation. The skills needed were identified and a letter sent out to Naval Reserve units. Within weeks, the first of 40 Reserve officers and chiefs began reporting aboard for 60-day and 90-day tours. Thus, the schedule was maintained.
Some estimates exceeded what was required. By being flexible, some functions were consolidated and personnel were used more efficiently. When feasible, large group instruction was used. More benefit was gained from on-the-job training, and a savings was made by combining on-the-job training with the discrepancy control program.
The MCIC failed to live up to only one expectation—officer training. Yet, despite this lone failure and despite the fact that, at first, MCIC was envisioned as a temporary expedient to be used only during the precommissioning activities, it is now being used on board ship, subordinate however, to the shipboard organization. Still, it should prove to be a useful problem-solving tool.
Monitoring the ship’s construction is a continuing problem for a PCO. He must establish rapport with the shipbuilder and the contractor. This is not always easy, because there is no legal status in the contract for the prospective commanding officer. It is true that there is recognition of a “government agent,” and under certain phases of the contract and specifications the prospective commanding officer could be considered this
“government agent.” But this is vague. If the wording of the contract is taken literally, it must be admitted that the Supervisor of Ships has the responsibility, and the PCO must work through the Supervisor of Ships.
The Kennedy people read the contract and took action to remedy this vague legal anachronism. Early in the precommissioning activities, with approval from higher authority, an agreement was reached between the Supervisor of Ships and the Kennedy. This agreement spelled out the relationship between SupShips’ people and Kennedy people. In order to keep it flexible, modifications were provided for as work progressed. The nucleus crew acquainted themselves with this agreement early. And an interchange of ideas between themselves and those installing the equipment resulted. Consequently, there were several months of smooth running operation. Harmony is essential, especially in those hectic weeks preceding the acceptance trials. Navy Regulations assigns the prospective commanding officer the monitoring responsibility, and in, let us say, 1885 this was probably acceptable. But, monitoring a modern warship’s construction exceeds one man’s capacity. It exceeds the capacity and talent of Navy people alone. The ordinary sailor is not trained in industrial inspection techniques and is unaware of construction techniques and procedures. The ordinary sailor is trained to use his equipment, but he is not trained in design and evaluation of equipment. As the men of the Kennedy learned by trial and error,
it is necessary to create an inspection system that follows prescribed criteria in simplified forms. Only by having such a system can the ship systematically be covered.
Again, hindsight reveals that the Kenned) | crew did not get started early enough in thinking through this massive detailed undertaking' Using the system of staging to identify the tasks, inspection teams staged on equipment rather than on equipment operation. This was the wrong approach. The operator wants his entire system to work. To check out the | system’s isolated units would not prove the system’s effectiveness. By the time the inspection teams realized this, they found that the)' were short of adequately trained people to follow the systems through from Stage One down to the substages and analyze the system’s total capability. Although teams were inspecting early in the precommissioning per' iod, they got confused between what the contractor had done wrong and what he had no1 yet done. This was caused by an inability t0 distinguish between the errors and the on-
finished work on the basis of the specifications
and the drawings. Understandably, friction resulted between the nucleus crew and the . contractor.
In the past, a highly skilled inspector caine on board and checked out the system. If ^ didn’t come, the system didn’t get checker* i out. By staging out systems on the Kennedy, the ) entire ship was covered. The shipbuilder doe5 not always test an entire system. He assumes that, if the components check out, the system
Vvill work. This may not be true, especially in the area of electronics. The ship was staged tor inspection by area so that all construction Phases could also be covered. This required s°ae specification rewriting.
Although complete testing takes place at Sea, it was felt that about 90 per cent should he done at dockside. This presented no conflict with the shipyard. The nucleus crew, be- lng relegated to observer position by the contact terms, could not arbitrarily run their °Wn tests. But, as observers, they could encourage strict testing, and hopefully come up ''ath any component mismatches of a system.
acceptance trials and contract trials they had complete freedom in systems check out. As the men had closely observed shipyard 1 inspection teams, they were ready to start testing immediately. They knew which systems required scrutiny. Having established a systematic approach, the men were better equipped to observe the builder’s trials.
On-the-job training as related to the monitoring program was also important. The crew Aad to be able to take over the operation of the ship on the trial date, at least minimally. This is where the new relationship between the training group and the nucleus crew at shipside became valuable. The nucleus crew, j'nder its own officer-in-charge, had responsibility for systems inspections, deficiencies, and progress reports. The training group, under 'ts officer-in-charge, continuously had repreSentation in the nucleus crew. Co-ordination °f the training people visiting the ship site was
The Kennedy’s PCO, Captain Earl Yates, and some of the first members of his Precommissioning Unit established headquarters in a building 12 miles from the ship.
done by the officer-in-charge of the training unit. The chief engineer headed up the nucleus crew, as a major portion of the work was in the area of engineering. But on-the-job training was under the responsibility of the officer in charge of training, not the officer in charge of the nucleus crew.
The magnitude of ship inspection demands the incorporation of computer programing to marshal the infinite details. There are so many details in formal on-the-job training that, when you bring 100 variables together with 2,500 people, the permutations and combinations exceed human capabilities to schedule effective testing. A computer must be used. When a computer is used, it will be easy to add the training variable. Without a computer program, a carrier would need a staff of more than 30 officers and 30 enlisted men to handle the fantastically complex scheduling process. The Kennedy, with her computer program, used seven officers and 30 enlisted men, and they were hard pressed from start to finish.
A computer program can easily assimilate such variables as school requirements, personnel flow, assignment of qualified instructors, on-the-job training, and shipboard training opportunities. With computerized control of these details, a ship’s training program would not be thrown into chaos with changes in the date for builder’s trials or for delivery, the discovery of new requirements, or the loss of personnel. The computer would facilitate adjustment in priorities when schedules are not being met.
Traditionally, the balance crew forms up in accordance with the standard ship’s organization under the prospective executive officer at the Fleet Training Center. Under this setup, while there is some interaction and no attempt to preclude an interchange between the balance and the nucleus crews, there is no major attempt to maximize this exchange.
Again, innovation was the order of the day in the Kennedy.
The PCO modified the traditional approach for granting travel, issuing orders, and making funds available. In Norfolk, for example, travel is not much of a problem. But, in Quincy, where there is no Fleet Training Center, travel between the balance and nucleus crews would be prohibitive. In Norfolk, busses were used daily to keep open the communication lines between the two groups.
Aware that certain training functions can always be pushed downstream—postponed until later in the precommissioning activities, or even after the commissioning—it made sense to identify the training activities that could be postponed. For example, the men had to be trained in firefighting and damage control, but the AIMD would not need to be functioning well until the air group came aboard after the commissioning. With his new authority, the PCO transferred the greater part of AIMD people from the nucleus crew to the training group. Here the Kennedy made savings in per diem, and put the emphasis on the more pressing requirements.
The lack of skilled men impelled some tough decisions on where to cut. It was essential to the nucleus crew to have priority on the highly skilled talent, but this problem is not as obvious as it might first seem.
The officer-in-charge of the balance crew was responsible for training up to 2,500 men. This constituted a large and important effort. What would the long range effects be if the balance crew did not also have highly trained men as instructors? The decision was to favor the nucleus crew at shipside, bearing in mind the overriding importance of meeting builder’s schedules. Without this squeeze, the decision might have been made the other way.
Because of this, scheduling and the School of the Ship suffered. To reduce to a minimum the lack of skilled instructors, the Kennedy executed a programmed-planned training package. An IBM man on two weeks’ temporary active duty set up a program. It was a great help, but it fell short; he should have had more time.
There were other deficiencies that taught their lessons. For example, few in the crew had any experience as instructors. The curriculum for the School of the Ship was inadequate. It had to be developed from scratch- Available lesson plans were poor. Moreover, the shortage of trained personnel precluded any pilot program whereby a better curriculum could be developed quickly.
It was also learned that instructors play a big role in creating and maintaining morale of the new men. If each instructor is not the best qualified and highly motivated, the results will be chaotic. Despite efforts to screen and eliminate those who could not rise to the occasion, it was disappointing to accept only 65 per cent of the group.
The most important lesson learned relates to officer training. Officer man-hours were used up early developing future plans. Then with the rapid acceleration of activities and the mushrooming of new tasks, the officers, especially the junior officers already performing vital middle management jobs, could not be sent off to schools. The Kennedy's problem was compounded when a Fleet Commander’s policy change forced a cancellation of 2,000 man-weeks of school, and the Bureau of Personnel did not provide officers on the requested time profile. Early planning and flexibility in approach should provide for such exigencies. At the earliest possible time a sound officer training program should be created. The officer program should be developed first and be the basis for the enlisted training program.
Two other things should be done early for training purposes: define the ship configuration, and validate all ship equipment. For the Kennedy, OPNAV 1000/2 and BUPERS still carried a requirement for sonarmen. And the Kennedy had no sonar! The Navy enlisted codes and job cards should be updated and organized early to show how many men need special training in outside schools. All of this is part of the training program, and to have effective training, these things must be spelled out in detail early in the precommissioning activities. It is too late when the men get on board ship. That is the time they should be doing their jobs, not going off to schools.
Under the traditional approach to precommissioning, valuable time is wasted when the PCO has to set up his own base of operations. At the outset, the Kennedy was confronted by two problems that should have
Per diem would bte probability ffaud, per diem
been taken care of before the prospective commanding officer ever came on the scene. First, there were no spaces assigned to set up the precommissioning unit, and second, berthing was inadequate for the nucleus crew at dockside.
The building that was finally assigned to the precommissioning unit was being partially occupied by officials from the Office of Equal Opportunity; civilian classes were be- tng held in it. As it turned out, this was the only building on the naval station that was adequate for the precommissioning unit’s operation. Initially, no funding was provided for maintenance, upkeep, and utilities. The Fleet Training Center was overcommitted; other units could not help, and the shipyard bad no provisions for the nucleus crew. From scratch the crew had to ferret out its own spaces and equipment. As the weeks slipped by, the men of the precommissioning unit spent valuable time collecting furniture and equipment from Defense Department surplus furniture pools from as far way as Chicago and Richmond. For six days in the dead of ""inter, there was no heat in the building because the utilities had not been funded.
The office space required for a ship the size °f the Kennedy is approximately 12,000 square feet. At one time the precommissioning unit '''as cramped for space—it needed another f>800 square feet of office space. In addition, approximately 30 classrooms that can hold 30 People per class are needed. A precommission- *ug unit should also have access to a large auditorium—big enough to hold 2,000 People—twice a week. Fortunately this was bailable.
For the major portion of the time the uucleus crew had approximately 3,600 square feet. This was adequate. When the supply department moved over and joined the nucleus Crew, they took up another 1,500 square feet, releasing an equal amount at the precom- tuissioning unit for other departments to use.
Berthing was nonexistent in the area of the lard. Without advanced per diem, nonrated Personnel have heavy financial demands. A be Kennedy made it a rule that no advanced be paid. In order to eliminate of error, and suspicion of was paid only after the duty been performed. Fortunately, the major portion of the nucleus crew were rated people and they managed their money well.
Another important area for any PCO is the control of documents. There does not seem to be an adequate administrative system for handling the hundreds of shipboard documents pouring in from dozens of sources, in addition to those that are generated by the ship’s departments. And, of course, a misfiled document is worthless. Snowed under by this blizzard of paper, it was decided early that, if the benefits of computerized ADP assistance were to be realized, documentation for all departments would have to be consolidated. The problems of ordering, and the mechanics of getting documents on board ship are not widely known in the Navy. Who to see, where to find him, how to get the job done efficiently—these are often unanswered questions simply because they are asked so infrequently.
The Kennedy research team discovered a gross deficiency in other ships—a large number of the documents were not recorded anywhere. Ships did not know what they had, where it was, or what was needed. There was no consolidated accounting list. Furthermore,
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company
the research team discovered inadequacies in the quality and timeliness of documents—and through the years the ships had passed inspections on these documents. For instance, on one carrier, the billets assigned on the Battle Bill did not match those billets set down in the Watch, Quarter, and Station Bill. One guess is that the Battle Bill was drawn up in great haste and copied from the documents of another ship. At any rate, it was out of date and inadequate. The research team, in talking with the people from other ships, found that the ships did not even know what they were supposed to have.
It was determined early in the precommissioning activities that this charge would not be made against the Kennedy. Careful research, on a broad basis, of the ship’s files enabled her crew to put together a requirements list of their documentation. To date, more than 30,000 items have been identified. With the data processing system, all classified and unclassified library books, instructions, pamphlets, technical manuals, and operating directives have been consolidated into one accountability system.
This innovation produced a systematic approach to management review of documents and also provided a basis both for inventory and updating.
Early in the precommissioning activities, the Kennedy assumed responsibility for Navywide co-ordination and programing of consolidation and implementation of all allowance lists. It was found that, under the traditional structure of the precommissioning unit, the supply function was fragmented. Material came from the shipyard, the builder, the various Bureaus and subordinating activities, Aviation Supply, Electronic Supply, Ships Parts Supply Center, the Naval Supply Center, and the Type Commander.
The Kennedy crew realized that, in order to collect, identify, order, arrange, bin-store, transport, restore in the ship’s bins, and to maintain the detailed stock records in order to know what was on board, where it was, and what was missing, and to incorporate data processing, the supply activity would have to be consolidated under one head. By controlling and co-ordinating this activity, an early start could be obtained, milestone and com
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1959, Lieutenant Commander Clift was designated a naval aviator in 1961, he was assigned to VF-13 until 1964, during which time he deployed with the USS Shangri La twice to the Mediterranean. He attended the U. S. Naval Post-graduate School from 1964 to 1966, then served as an exchange pilot with the U. S. Air Force’s 4781st Combat Crew Training Squadron until December 1967. He reported to the Kennedy in January 1968, and is presently Special Projects Officer and Maintenance Control Information Center Director.
A graduate of Suffolk University in 1955, Lieutenant Commander Stevens was commissioned in October 1956. He was deck officer of the USS Merrimack (TAO-37) in 1957 and, from December 1957 until 1959 was an instructor at the NAV/OOD School, Newport, R. I. Since 1961, he has been a student, Naval Re" serve Officers’ School 1-1, Boston, Mass. His eight periods of active duty since 1960 include the two months, July and August 1968, when he was assigned to the PreCom Unit, USS John F. Kennedy (CVA-67). He is now English Department Chairman, Wakefield High School, Wakefield, Mass.
mitment dates could be laid out, and delivery dates from all supplying activities could be requested. Thus, a new control over the transfer of supplies to the ship was exercised.
By becoming self-supporting early—three and a half months ahead of schedule—in the area of supply, early co-ordination of COSALS was achieved. This in turn permitted early validation of the ship and allowed for a more accurate planned maintenance system. Theretofore, because allowance lists had not been developed early, the loading of stores might lag from three to six months. Almost 95 per cent of the required allowance list items were on board the Kennedy by fitting out time.
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Previously, men attached to the precorn- missioning unit had been detailed to the local disbursing office. Again the Kennedy consolidated, and took over this function. The men were paid earlier, and the disbursing activity was functioning and ready to assume
its shipboard dudes upon commissioning. What had been wasted motion, now became training time. Moreover, with payday under the ship’s control, the morale of the men was boosted. This innovation pushed Kennedy’s disbursing activities a full four months ahead °f the schedule of the former disbursing Method.
Before the Kennedy was halfway through her precommissioning period, representatives horn other precommissioning units had ^quested administrative help. Assistance was given, but it was evident that a handful of ^novations and lessons learned from trial and error were not the answer to improving the precommissioning process. The importance and complexity of precommissioning a ^Tavy ship, along with the paucity of modern Management techniques, computers, and guidelines to assist precommissioning units, encouraged the Kennedy to take two steps to tniprove the situation.
The first step was to prepare a precomMissioning guide based on the Kennedy’s experience, and make this guide available to °ther precommissioning units.
The second step was to highlight in this Publication the Kennedy’s progress and problems, and invite a thorough study of the traditional precommissioning process by higher authority for the purpose of modernizing it.
Such a study, among other things, might: (1) produce a training film that follows step- by-step the precommissioning progress of the aircraft carrier Nimitz or other new-construc- tion ship; (2) compare the costs of maintaining a barge at shipside with the costs of paying der diem to men; (3) consider the use of a trained cadre of Reserves on a continuous TAD basis—Naval Reserve educators who could play an important role in training would be plentiful during the summer months; (4) compare the cost of maintaining precommissioning unit buildings in key locations, manned by skeleton crews, with the cost of allowing each precommissioning unit to find its own spaces and gather its own furniture; and (5) invite management consultants and data processing analysts to present their recommendations on modernizing precommissioning techniques.
Any man who has gone through the precommissioning process doubtless could add more possibilities.
The conclusions of such a study, setting forth the best methods of getting a new ship into the Fleet efficiently and on time, could not fail to improve the precommissioning process and thereby benefit the entire Navy.
A Cool Customer
Vice Admiral E. B. “Whitey” Taylor, U. S. Navy (Retired), was the sole passenger in the twin-engine Grumman amphibian en route from Andrews Air Force Base to Norfolk. Immediately after take-off, one of the engines quit. While the pilots commenced emergency procedures, the crewman went aft to make sure the Admiral’s seat belt was securely fastened.
“Admiral, we’ve just lost an engine.” The Admiral looked up from his magazine.
“Yes, I noted you had one feathered.” And the Admiral went back to his reading.
Up forward, the pilots struggled to maintain their 300-foot altitude. The alerted tower cleared out other aircraft and sent the crash crews racing to their stations. Skill and luck prevailed, however; the one good engine stood the strain, and a potential disaster was averted.
Later, with the plane safely stopped on the runway, the plane commander went aft to see how badly shaken the Admiral had been by their experience. The Admiral’s first comment was, “Could you leave the auxiliary power unit running so I’ll have light to finish this magazine article?”
------------------------------------- Contributed by Captain Robert D. McWethy, U. S. Navy
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)