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news is good furthermore.
outside world” by those in the Navy’s operating forces and, at the same time, the Unawareness within much of the Navy’s Public affairs community of the workings of lhe operational Navy. It now appears, however, that the officers in command—and the founger officers and men—who are making lhe news and dealing with the most important Press corps in the world, are more aware than ever of what makes news. They know what and significant for the Navy; , even when the Navy news is bad,” they know that it has to be released. 1 hey are more knowledgeable of the news- jean’s needs, and they are candid when talk- lng with newsmen. This public affairs educa- Uonal process, which was accelerated by the Pressure-filled atmosphere of war, and has uffected many of those who will be leading Jbe Navy in years to come, cannot help but benefit the Navy.
This is how it “happened,” and how it forked in the Seventh Fleet, and in Vietnam. *be public affairs climate in the Seventh *eet early in 1964 was like almost any other Cet—perhaps a bit busier, but limited to the Same concerns: ship visits to foreign ports,
people-to-people programs, Fleet exercises, hometown news, and an occasional visit to a ship by a U. S. or foreign newsman. A small staff of two officers and a few supporting enlisted men ran the show from the flagship. At the same time, the Gulf of Tonkin was a relatively quiet body of water—and not a newspaper dateline. On 4 August 1964, this all changed.
Four North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats attacked the USS Maddox (DD-731) and the USS Turner Joy, (DD-951). The Navy leaped into the headlines. The Tonkin Gulf dateline became known around the world. The next day, President Lyndon Johnson ordered aircraft from the attack carriers USS Constellation (CVA-64) and USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) to strike patrol boat bases and supporting facilities in North Vietnam in retaliation for the PT boat attacks on U. S. ships in international waters.
Again, the Navy was in the headlines. It was a significant international news story, and it was Navy news. The retaliatory strikes were possible because of the Navy’s presence, readiness, and unique capabilities to be where it is needed to respond to our country’s policies.
The onset of the air war in North Vietnam made it necessary for the Navy’s limited public affairs capability to be greatly extended to cope with the increased demands of world press coverage. (Left) Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, then Commander, Seventh Fleet, meets with the members of the Saigon press corps.
WO Rod Moen, VSN
The air war over North Vietnam had begun, and the Navy instantly became a major part of the war news from Southeast Asia. Operationally, the Navy was ready, but it was not ready for the public affairs requirements, which increased as a result of the increased press and public interest, as the tempo of operations picked up. Neither the manpower, physical facilities, nor modus operandi were available immediately to react to, or take advantage of, this increased interest and need. The Seventh Fleet, though aware of the public affairs demands placed on the Fleet, was too understaffed to carry out the extensive press relations and news operations necessary.
It was apparent from the beginning that the collateral duty public affairs officers in the ships, and their commanding officers, were not aware of the nature and complexity of the “big time” public affairs league into which they had been thrown almost overnight. Furthermore, ground rules for the release of news on the air war were not then established, and there was a natural tendency to say nothing. In addition, there was no Navy public affairs representation in Saigon, to get the Navy’s news to the huge concentration of press representatives working there.
In March 1965, the Commander in Chief Pacific, directed that the Seventh Fleet be represented at the daily Saigon press brief) which became widely known as the “Five o’Clock Follies.” This was when the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Office of Information (MACOl) briefed the Saigon press corps on the war action during the preceding 24 hours. The ground action in South Vietnam and the air war over North Vietnam, were briefed separately. In adcli' tion, a representative of the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) briefed the nonmili' tary aspects of the situation in Vietnam.
The Seventh Fleet had an operational detachment in Saigon, Detachment Charlie; charged with the responsibility for liaison between the Air Force and the Seventh Fleet s Task Force 77, for air operations in North and South Vietnam, and with other commands in Vietnam for other Navy and Seventh Flee1 business. However, before March 1965, there were no public affairs personnel assigned. The Seventh Fleet’s assistant public affairs officer was assigned to Detachment Charlie to get the Fleet’s news flowing to the news media ia Saigon. He and the Seventh Fleet public affairs officer rotated this duty for several weeks—commuting between the carriers i°
Tonkin Gulf, the flagship, and Saigon. 1 hey lived out of a suitcase, and worked out °f a hotel room, with no clerical or journalistic distance. Information was taken from oper- ahonal reports coming into the Detachment’s °Peration office, and written into releasable nevvs copy. The Fleet news copy was then cleared for release by MACOI.
As time passed, other PAOs assigned to 0rrtmander, Pacific Fleet were sent to ‘ aigon on temporary duty for periods of two
0 three months, to assist with the Fleet’s Public affairs program. There was no estab- 'shed office, only limited enlisted assistance, and no regular transportation within the city, cc to the Fleet at sea. Communication capacities between Saigon and the Fleet were aJso limited. In October 1965, a Navy public C*airs office was officially opened in the Rex
°tel, next door to the Joint U. S. Public . ”airs Office in downtown Saigon, and within Walking distance of the major Saigon news . Ureaus. Daily Navy press reports were lssued, and the first permanently assigned Public affairs personnel arrived—eight Jjonths after the Navy’s air war had begun.
his was the real beginning of an established Public affairs program for the Seventh Fleet Jij the Vietnam war. Additional public affairs
1 bts were established, and filled, in Task ^°rces 77, 76, and 73, in individual CVAs, in
c naval gunfire support flagship, and in
0tw units of the Fleet
bet Charlie’s” public affairs office grew to ^CVen officers and about 20 enlisted men. They lee?an making two daily news summary re- ases, morning and evening, flying the news to °P C t0 Fbet twice a week, averaging 50 ° 60 newsmen and women a month, on what ^as nicknamed the Yankee Station Press Pecial. In addition, Det Charlie personnel veled to Fleet units, preparing word and c ture features, making tape interviews, and ae|ularly “held school” for the Fleet’s public airs and photographic personnel. As a ofS'Jlt’ ^le Navy began to win its fair share Ihe news filed from Saigon. There was ways competition with the Army, Marines, . Air Force, the political situation, terrorist t c tvities, pacification, the economic situa- t.°n, and several other “happenings”—some- *Illes even Radio Hanoi. For example, on ny given day, a wire service following the
Five O’clock Follies filed some 1,000 to 2,000 words on the war to its New York office. If the Navy’s news was to fit into that limited number of words, it had to be hard, timely, and significant.
Generally speaking, the deepwater Navy has had a good and a sympathetic press. This is not to say that there were no problems. Interesting the press in Navy actions rather than in trying to disinterest them was a problem; however, this has made it easier for the Navy, operators, and public affairs officers alike, to establish and maintain a deserved credibility among the press. With the mentioning of “credibility,” questions arise about the Saigon press corps, and the nature of the battle that exists between them and the U. S. “establishment” in Vietnam and in Washington, D. C. Both sides have leveled criticism at each other—probably to the confusion and bewilderment of the American people.
Reporters have been called irresponsible and not interested in reporting the full story. U. S. officials have been accused of withholding information, of putting a rosy tint on information released, and of conducting a “Madison Avenue War.”
Hanson Baldwin, in 1966 wrote, “the reporting of the war, and the effect of the whole upon the American public in particular, could win or lose the war, regardless of what happens in jungle battles.” This importance was also evidenced in the anguished cry of a Washington official: “Whose side are you [the press] on?”
Robert Shaplen, a knowledgeable veteran of Vietnam, who writes for The New Yorker magazine, was quoted in The New York Times article, in which, he said, referring to U. S. officialdom, “It is their business to be optimistic. And, it is our business to be pessimistic . . . skeptical rather than pessimistic.”
Bill Touhy, a respected journalist, and bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times in Saigon, has said: We’re not operators and administrators. We tend to be examiners.” And, Tom Wicker of The New York Times, adds, “If they [the press] don’t, who will?”
It is easy to sympathize with the press, as they try to make sense out of the Vietnam situation. The situation is so complex and confounding that what an official said one day in all sincerity, and with firm belief,
could change overnight and make him look less than credible.
Any time a naval officer deals with news media, the two most valuable commodities he can develop are credibility and respect. The press must respect his integrity, and believe that what he tells them is the truth. They must believe that the Navy will give them as much information on a story—within the bounds of security—as possible, whether the story is a “good” or “bad” one. Not to do this, is cheating the press, and thus the American public and the Navy. Whenever the Navy’s credibility or professional knowledge is suspect, the Navy’s public affairs effectiveness will be minimal.
As the Navy’s public affairs program in Vietnam matured, so did the public affairs awareness of naval officers and men operating the ships and flying the aircraft. As they began to see reports of their work appearing in the newspapers and on television throughout the United States, they began, too, to realize that their work was news, big news, that getting the news out was important to the Navy, and that in almost all cases, they were being correctly depicted. They began to recognize that members of the press who visited their ships were not just people to “tolerate,” but individuals who could give their units the recognition they rightly deserved. They began to increase the tempo of their own public affairs efforts—and this had a snowballing effect.
The Navy operators and public affairs officers had to learn what was news in Vietnam. They had to recognize that news is not defined by the military, but by the newsmen who are reporting it, the editors who are printing it, or the commentators who are presenting it on radio and television. For example, the fact that Commander Blank relieved Commander Doubleblank as commanding officer of a destroyer in the Tonkin Gulf was not news in Saigon. But if both men were killed by an enemy shore battery during the change of command ceremony, that would be news. The actions of an individual destroyer conducting routine interdiction and harassment fire, although extremely hard work, performed with diligence, would not be news, unless the action was against a significant target or inflicted considerable damage
on the enemy. This, of course, is sometimes difficult for a ship’s commanding officer to accept, especially when he feels his crew did a commendable job in their assignment.
An example of top ranking public affairs awareness was when The New York TimeS reporter in Saigon expressed a desire to do a “day-in-the-life-of ’ story of an admiral on Yankee Station. The reporter was known as a tough, incisive interviewer—and The York Times' less-than-enthusiastic editorial stand on the Vietnam war was well knoWi>' The reporter said he wanted to do the stor)'i only if he could spend considerable time with j the admiral during a two-day period, and discuss various subjects informally—but on the record. The task force commander sa"’ the value of a favorable story in the Timet> and so he invited the reporter to his flagship' The results: an extremely favorable story f°r the Navy, and a very complimentary story for the flag officer, something over 1,500 words on the front page of The New York Times. The admiral understood the needs of the reporter, was confident and knowledge able enough to know it could be done, and because he was disposed to give of his valuable time, it happened.
But there was still another result. The ad' miral, and the Navy, gained an objective friend. The newsman commented to a pubhc affairs officer after returning from the Fleet) that “The admiral is one of the most urbane> knowledgeable, witty, deeply read, aware> and charming people I have met in a long time.” The reporter, known to most of Viet' nam’s newsmakers as a fearsome questionet) has nothing but praise now for the Navy.
Perhaps the most significant example of efl' lightened public affairs effort came at the time of the fire on the USS Forrestal (CVA-59)'
It is relatively easy to be “public affatf5 minded” when the news is favorable. It measurably more difficult when the news jS “bad.” But, the carrier division commanded the commanding officer, the air wing con1' mander, and the officers and men of the Forrestal, so prepared for war and so ill-used by disaster, also were prepared for the pubhc affairs job they had to do. They were ready t0 \ report it fully and frankly to the America11 public through the press. They did this wid1 forthrightness and skill, even while battling
the
Press, while at the same time, the courage,
finickl
y as possible. I believe this had a lot
successful actions, there would be no story to tell. But, the important fact is, that without their recognition of the value of public affairs and their co-operation in getting the story told, there would be no public affairs program, and there would be no public appreciation. The knowledge, maturity, and professional outlook they have gained by this experience will have a deep effect on the and style of Navy public affairs in the f
the fire. They recognized the need to get as tttuch information as was commensurate with Security, and release it as soon as possible to ehminate speculation. They knew it was de- Slrable and necessary to get the press to the Scene quickly so that they might report directly.
When a press pool, representing a TV net- w°rk, two wire services, a national maga- 2lne> and a large metropolitan daily arrived °n board at sea, even as the crew was battling le fire, the ship welcomed them. Officers and Crewmen were available for interviews. Tours °. the damaged area, and briefings, were ?lven. A full and frank disclosure of informa- h°n on damage and casualties was released to
tCnacity, and great feats of heroism of the t-rew were highlighted. The press respected all ^fifis, and wrote the story sympathetically.
. officers and men of the Forrestal reacted q£lckly and properly to a difficult public f, a'rs situation—to the credit and benefit of the Navy.
Tt, ’
ine press reacted with the following:
The ABC-TV Saigon bureau chief, whose t^ew ^lan<q^c<q lhe television pool, wrote to p e Navy: “The news coverage of the carrier festal fire was factual, in depth, and prompt th ^ because °f your untiring efforts to allow e television networks, wire services, and ^ spapers to film and interview survivors of c6 tragedy . . . your efforts resulted in the ^omplcte and honest story being told.”
he Associated Press’ Saigon bureau chief p ecfi “When our staffer landed on the sibl*5*^ • • . he was accorded the best pose opportunities to cover this momentous ^ ^ completely. Particularly advantageous traS hneup of those most involved in the tak^e<^’ ^nc^ucf^n§ phots who were about to fie l. °n missi°ns) and others on the flight <0 ’ when the fire began. ... It was an
th k to us ancl this enabled us to get ^ est possible coverage.”
§a- reporter from The New York Times' s 'Son bureau had this to say: “ . . . The Us i which the information was given inf 3 °nS with the complete candidness of the cei°rinat'0n °ificers and men on the ship „osented the Navy’s credibility. Although fre . °f the news was ‘bad,’ it was given . y> and as accurately, candidly, and
to do with the understanding and sympathetic coverage given the story.”
From a public affairs standpoint, the events which followed the flight deck explosions in the Forrestal were the model from which future disaster bills might well be written.
The Navy has derived a great deal of deserved public and press recognition for its actions in the Vietnam war. The effectiveness of the Navy’s public affairs effort in Southeast Asia is due in great measure to the professional performance of the men flying the aircraft and operating the ships. Without their
Lt. Cdr. J. A. Garrozv, USN
By Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Roberts,
U. S. Marine Corps,
Conclave Marine Corps Representative
FIRST NAVAL GUNNERY CONCLAVE
In August 1968, a meeting aimed at improving the Navy’s “gun” posture, was convened in Dahlgren, Virginia, by the Commander, Naval Ordnance Systems Command, Rear Admiral Arthur R. Gralla, U. S. Navy.
For the assembled technical representatives from the military and industrial community, Admiral Gralla defined the purpose of the First Naval Gunnery Conclave as that of improving Navy surface weapons systems capability. The Conclave participants were charged with studying the various technological means of advancing, and then selecting, the most efficient, economical, and rapid means of improvements.
Thereafter, an initial presentation pointed out that the Navy of the future can expect to fight more “small” wars, using improved conventional weapons. These weapons will have to support forces ashore, which have greatly increased speed and maneuverability. The forces requiring support may be forced to operate in remote areas of the world, and their operations will often be some distance inland. Similarly, in building our forces for the future, the requirements also exist for support of major land operations involving the commitment of large land and naval forces. The Conclave members were faced with filling a triple need: first, an ability to provide adequate and flexible support, on extremely short notice, in areas far from the Navy support bases, on a 24-hour all-weather basis; second, support ships will often be required to operate in areas where there are either no bombardment charts, or where the available charts are of dubious accuracy; third, the fire support ships would need to mass their fires, or deliver them with extreme accuracy, depending on the situation. The land forces,
because of the speed and maneuverability they will possess, will require support from the water’s edge to over 100 miles inland- The targets will also possess high mobility) be difficult to locate, and vary in nature, requiring flexibility in ammunition types with which to attack them.
But there was more. The participants in [ this Naval Gunnery Conclave were then asked to turn their attention to the possible threat to both land and naval forces by aircraft, missile, or small boat attacks.
The Conclave divided into small groups to , examine means for improving the gunfire ca- | pability of the fleet in three major areas: guns, I mounts, and launchers; ammunition; and fire control. Working groups looked at power drives and controls, materials technology, interior ballistics, and ammunition handling within the area of guns, mounts, and launchers. Ammunition was examined by groups in the areas of payload and design, fuzing, inflight propulsion, and guidance. In the fire control category, Conclave members checked on sensors, fire control solutions, ancillary equipment, and communications links.
Each group organized its efforts to reflect requirements, major problems to be overcome, applications of technology to improve | existing systems, systems under development, and new developments required. This method was used because it follows logically from 3 statement of Navy requirements to a proper expenditure of research and development (R & D) efforts, and, it lends itself to easy ^ presentation.
What were the means selected as offering rapid, efficient, and economical improvement to the Navy’s surface weapons system? They are broken down into the same major areas 13 which they were examined at the Conclave, but in many areas, classification prevents more than a mention.
• Guns, Mounts, and Launchers. In the interior ballistics area, the over-all requirement was that of improving the performance, and the problems were largely technical. Initial velocities are not constant and are too loW, barrel wear is not uniform, and models are not available to study internal ballistic effects- Some immediate corrections were known to be possible, and were recommended. More uniformly burning propellants are available,
Immediate improvements considered pos- 'ole included: use of higher yield steels in the hew loose liner gun barrels, and new inserts °r older barrels; better shields for gun mounts 'hade of lighter and higher-strength rna- ^r*als, and rotating bands on ammunition 0 be made of materials which would cause ess barrel wear.
Recommended improvements for systems CUrrently under development were: increased application of the loose liner principle, and e use of muzzle brakes to allow more im- 1 se to be transmitted to the projectile with
out
proved by reduction in vibration, and use of active coatings, and the previously men- oed lighter shield. Future developments
rec0:
use
new
and should be used with propellant additives, to ensure uniform initial velocities and reduce bore wear. Methods of packaging propellants are also available to increase the efficiency of lhe propellants, and should be applied.
For systems currently under development, 'Oiprovements recommended include bore evacuators, consumable cases, and multipurpose propellant charges. The need for Urther developmental effort was pointed °ut for such items as simultaneous propellant charge ignition, the use of rocket propellant technology in gun system propellants, and consideration of the effects of possible hypervelocity gun systems.
The materials technology group looked at a Prime requirement to improve gun barrels.
resent day techniques in steel production can produce yield-strengths up to three times hose of the gun barrels now in the Fleet, he problems needing solution were excess height and size of barrels, and reduced life and reliability, resulting from excess wear beCause of the relatively low-quality steels now Used. The gains, through solution to these Problems, were found to be increased range, a~Curacy> and rates of fire, plus the obvious ttects of longer barrel life, with its corresPonding long-term reduction in gun system Costs. Other areas where materials technology Can improve naval gun fire were in gun m°unts and ammunition.
mcrease in recoil. Mounts could be im
Prot,
tio
mrnended included the ength-to-weight materials,
0 new damping materials.
*he ammunition handling requirement
was determined to be that of handling, conveying, storing, and expending ammunition in the most efficient manner. Problems were: slowness of strike-down systems following replenishment, inability for quick-change inventory upon receipt of a new mission, excess weight in hoist and power machinery, and lack of flexibility to accept different sizes of ammunition.
The handling group recommended that immediate improvement can be made in maintenance, ship alterations to accept various ammunition sizes, and analyses of present methods to identify areas of particular strength or weakness. It was necessary for the group to proceed to near future improvements of systems under development before any major improvements could be identified. They recommended remote order ammunition selection, modular ammunition handling, automatically updated ammunition report, with a readout capability, and use of better lubricants to reduce maintenance problems. The group pointed out areas where develop-
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ment improvements would be of most benefit: reducing power requirements through the technique of harnessing recoil energy, automated replenishment systems, and the handling of new types of ammunition that may be anticipated.
In the power drive and controls area, the requirement is for rapid and highly accurate gun laying, using lightweight, reliable mechanisms, which need minimum power. The existing problems were determined to be: poor pointing accuracy, because of obsolete servomechanisms and excessive backlash; a difficult system of battery alignment; nonstandard interfaces between mounts/launch- ers and fire control systems; excess weight motion, and limited high-angle capabilities, all critically important to ordnance design.
Immediate recommended corrections were the installation of new type servo controls, and overhaul of gear reducers to improve pointing accuracy; provide newly developed portable alignment equipment to ships with old systems, and simplify the procedures used in their employment.
Improvements recommended by the group to be included in systems currently in development were the installation of improved gearing, and the use of newly developed servo techniques to improve pointing accuracy- Battery alignment could be improved by including integral monitoring and compensation equipment, and mount control enhanced through the use of solid state electronics with digital processing techniques.
Areas where future developments in power drives and controls could prove most advantageous were: the use of space-oriented position orders, rather than deck-oriented position orders, and the development of a three- axis mount. This last development, if successful, would greatly enhance the ability 10 track high-altitude, high-speed targets.
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• Ammunition. In both the payload and design, the requirement was one of planned step-increases in ammunition effectiveness) against the total target spectrum. This in' eluded improvements in increased range, accuracy, higher efficiency, and easier delivera- bility. The problem areas evident were: the
high cost of present-day ammunition, failure ’° use optimum materials, poor payload-to- 'yeight ratios, and finally, the lack of operational data on accuracy, lethality, and vulnerability.
Immediate improvements recommended included broader use of “brittle metal” technology, adaptation of new U. S. Army munition developments to 5- to 8-inch ammunition, and better illumination projectiles, through the provision of a much higher intensity material.
Ammunition under development was examined. Here, possible improvements were: better warheads, through the technology of explosively formed warheads, and use of Army ■jUmition development ideas in the production of Navy ammunition.
A critical need cited, to ensure future development of improved ammunition with °Ptimum lethality, was the development of target vulnerability models, and improved Methods of gathering operational data on naval gun firing.
As the ranges of naval guns are greatly in- leased, the requirement for guidance of proJectiles becomes evident. The guidance work- lng group felt that the major problem in Projectile guidance was the building of a guidance package to withstand the acceleration forces when launched from a gun. Until is problem is solved, the group felt that the aPplication of rocket technology provided the 'nost achievable gain in accuracy. They rec- °rHniended the use of rocket assistance to correct variations in initial velocity, and the Possible use of a timed impulse rocket assist *Urnish range corrections during mid-flight. emphasized the need to harden the components of guidance packages, so they could and high acceleration loads. However, the bnidance group related its activities to the fire V'Ontrol systems area, since they must be de- °ped together. The need to develop ade- , ate initial velocity measuring equipment as emphasized.
The fuzing sub-group faced a simply stated, c extremely difficult to achieve, require- ent— that of determining means to assure P iittum fuze performance, and maximum l.’ability, combined with safety and flexi- uty-The pressing needs in fuze developments e: inadequate time ranges on mechanical
time fuzes, accompanied by excessive variations in the height of burst; use of outdated electronics techniques in fuzes; and failure to optimize fuzes for their shore bombardment role. These problems can be largely overcome, through the use of electric timers, solid state electronics, and application of state-of-the art firing delays.
Propulsion requirements centered on applying technology to projectiles, in order to increase range and accuracy. The application of this technology excited the imagination of the Conclave members, because of the magnitude of the improvements that seemed feasible. The major constraints that appeared to delay the implementation of new propulsion techniques were rocket reliability, excess cost, sensitivity of fuels, and introduction of new aerodynamic shapes.
Propulsion was recommended for immediate use in rocket-assisted projectiles for ammunition larger than 5-inch, and also for improvement of the Navy’s existing bombardment rockets.
• Fire Control. Over-all requirements were identified as the blending of sensor information, inputs from external ancillary equipment, and decisions from a responsive command and control system, to deliver, as an end-product, the best fire control solution possible.
In the sensor sub-area, the major problems were the difficulty of target location and classification, and determining where the shot fell in relation to the target. Immediate recommendations for sensors, both on boai d ship and ashore were: improvement of visual devices using lasers, better optics, and low light-level TV, together with improvement of active electromagnetic devices; better ties between air-search radars and fire control systems; and use of an improved tracking beacon for employment by ground units.
Suggested for current development of sensors were: phased array radar, passive sensors (i.e., acoustic or seismic), and laser range finders. Future developments were: radar round tracking, to provide possible mid-flight corrections; devices on board ship to measure mount and platform flexure; and numerous improved target location devices.
The primary goal in the area of fire control and ancillary equipment, was reduction of
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errors in reaching the fire control solution, and elimination of the many unknowns that affectthatsolution. Some immediately applicable items were: measuring initial velocity; providing best estimates of ship flexure; ensuring that shipboard benchmarks are undisturbed; and providing accurate offset references for shore bombardment grid reference points.
The most promising means of improving fire control solutions in the near future were: the use of track-while-scan radars; the employment of non-linear techniques and gaming theory in fire control calculations; improved stable reference data; development of an at-sea battery alignment capability; and use of improved navigation equipment (i.e., reduction of gyroscope drift, satellite navigation aids, and doppler sonar). Needed for the future was a method for getting true and relative target locations at ranges beyond 100 miles, rather than, improvements in equipment; automatic fire control system monitoring and fault isolation; automatic damage assessment and neutralization prediction, together with the application of advanced nonlinear techniques; and war gaming theory to the fire control solution.
The fire control group had a sub-group examining command and control problems. While not necessarily a “gunnery” area, they felt that this was necessary to provide a rounded look at the problem. The group felt it should first define naval gunfire command and control, and reached the following definition:
The totality of requirements to locate targets, call for fire on such targets, select the
best type of weapon to respond, select the proper ordnance, firing units and method of attack with consideration given to a balance of the combat consumable inventory and fire support co-ordination.
Two items recommended by the group, as immediate steps, to improve the command and control system were: compacted use of communication nets, through use of high speed digital transmissions, and wide dissemination of data, through the application of a hard copy print-out and re-transmission capability.
Future improvements for command and control systems included: large screen situation displays, status displays, query consoles) improved computers, and digital communication links, with automatic switching. Mos1 items were known to be under development with the large screen display being the most difficult to achieve. The group pointed out that technology does not appear to be the constraint on improvement of command and control systems, but rather, the limitations are evident in interfaces with the other systems and equipment.
Firing ammunition developed in the 1930s, through guns developed in the 1920s, controlled by fire control systems of the 1940s, does not appear to be the best situation for 3 war in the late 1960s. There have been improvements, and some new ordnance developments are underway at present, but these developments only scratch the surface. The First Gunnery Conclave was long overdue, but can serve as a starting point for a continuing surface weapons improvement pr°' gram, properly guided by periodic conclaves- From the co-operation received at this Firs1 Naval Gunnery Conclave, industry can, and rightly should be a part of the continuing ef' fort to improve the U. S. Navy’s surface weapons systems.
The capabilities demonstrated at the Conclave leave no doubt that the Navy of the future can have weapons systems possessing such marked improvement over those now u1 existence that failure to pursue vigorously th® Conclave results would be virtually a crimin3 mistake. Now is the time to generate, an0 support, a program for developing the Navyi most significant step forward in surface weap' ons since World War II.
PIRAZ is a new Navy acronym for Positive dentification Radar Advisory Zone. A computerized guided missile ship performs this PlRAZ task. The most important mission of he PIRAZ ship is maintaining positive iden- UtV> on a continuous basis, of all aircraft "uthin the radar advisory zone. Radar is the Primary aid used in making the detection and Performing the identification process.
Those who have watched the increased lrend of attack carrier participation in operations duri
supporting our national objectives, ring and following World War II, can aPpreciate the vital assistance now provided 0 the U. S. attack carrier task force by the PI1*AZ ship.
j ^ter the USS Maddox (DD-731) incident of . o4, the decision was made to bomb targets ^°rth Vietnam. Yankee Station was moved c user to the North Vietnam targets, which lleant that our carrier aircraft sortie rate l°ud be significantly increased, without . lcreasing the attack carrier or strike aircraft entory. The requirement for in-flight . ueling could be decreased. However, mov- th° ^'e carr'ers closer to their targets made yCru more vulnerable to attack by the North letnainese. This brought about a greater for the carrier force commander to keep ^uuself completely informed, at all times, of a a*r P^cture over the Gulf of Tonkin,
Ij1 Vietnam. With large numbers of
W ‘ Planes employed over the Gulf of Ton- t|^n and over targets in North Vietnam, the 0l^eat Posed by possible use of planes against It i °rces created a cause for grave concern.
erefore became vital to positively identify 311 aircraft.
to C ^rSt i°o‘cal step was to devise a system aU'^aiutain the identity, and to keep track of • S. planes in the radar advisorv zone.
Once such a positive identification procedure, around-the-clock, was established, the identity of all other aircraft then became a much simpler matter.
Keeping status boards updated, and routinely handling the several hundred airplanes in such a vital area, immediately saturates the conventional combat information center (CIC). Computerized automation with direct read-outs was needed, with a radical reorganization of the conventional combat information center taking place. The realignment of personnel was necessary, and even our recently converted CLGs were not capable of performing the PIRAZ function.
The call was sent out to the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) ships to perform this vital task. The USS King (DLG-10) and the USS Mahan (DLG-ll), with NTDS and their missile defense, began doing the job. In addition, the bigger ships, the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) and the USS Chicago (CG-ll), with
larger CICs and more automatic data processing equipment, manned the PIRAZ station. Their greater capability significantly expanded the PIRAZ functions, and provided even greater support and efficiency to Seventh Fleet carrier operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Navy’s newest class of guided missile ships, with the most sophisticated CICs, NTDS, and weapons, began PIRAZ functions in June 1967, when the first of these new ships, the USS Wainwright (DLG-28), relieved the Long Beach. Following the Wainwright were the USS Fox (DLG-33), USS Belknap (DLG-26), and USS Biddle (DLG-34).
The ship’s combat information center is still the heart of PIRAZ. The new CIC is built in a series of modules. Each module houses a specific function: surface operations, air control, electronics warfare, sonar, underwater battery fire control, detection and tracking, weapons control, and display and decision. Inside CIC, 35 to 40 highly trained officers and men are on duty around the clock. The ship’s commanding officer spends
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Bibliography
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most of his time in this space, rather than on the bridge. The ship fights from CIC, not from the bridge, as has been the custom of the past. The PIRAZ ship’s radars detect the targets, and this activity is displayed on the NTDS consoles in geometric symbols. The operators determine the identity of the targets as friendly or hostile. This information is then fed into the computer. The symbol on the console changes from a square (designation for an unknown) to a circle (friendly), or to a diamond (hostile). Most attack carriers are now equipped with computers, and so the information can be simultaneously displayed on their NTDS consoles.
The operator can interrogate the computer by simply pushing a button on any of the computer consoles, and receive instantaneously: course, speed, altitude, range, and bearing information on any target. The computer provides recommendations, such as the course and speed needed to steer a friendly fighter in order to intercept a specific target. It also provides valuable threat information. If a plane needs refueling, the same controllers direct it to the nearest inflight tanker aircraft. The state of fuel supply’) and the number and types of weapons on board a friendly plane can be ascertained- When a jet aircraft makes a turn, the symbol on the computer console duplicates the maneuver, providing a “real-time” picture and a solution.
The NTDS does away with the old problems of grease pencil bookkeeping, vertical plo* tracking, and display of enemy and friendly forces. It gives the commander a capability of understanding, instantly, the threats and the various alternatives to tactical problems or situations. The NTDS allows the ships commander to sit back and think how he would react to the various attacks that migb1 endanger his ship, or the forces he is protecting. The NTDS permits the PIRAZ ship to be the task force lone wolf, far away from the task force itself. If NTDS is installed in several ships, it is even more effective than in just one ship. In the task force concept, a data lm^ constantly passes information between ship8 several hundred miles apart, providing tbe task force commander with needed data.
Future task force tactical pictures may be relayed back to the Pentagon, or to an area
I
air
hinds
of air control, advisory control and
do:
air
Shi
or other means to fix his position. 0l,ld the air controller wish to adjust
KNOTTING^ SPLICING:
command headquarters, by bouncing the data link signal off a relay satellite. This will Provide the President, the Pentagon, or an area commander, with the complete picture, and immediate control from any part of the '''orld, should it be needed. It is conceivable diat in the White House and the Pentagon, there will eventually be a computer complex Vvith consoles, which will present the status °f all deployed forces throughout the world.
The identification of unknown aircraft is lriade easier by first keeping track of, and accounting for, the numerous friendly fixed- track aircraft and sorties destined for enemy targets. The process of keeping track of riendly aircraft usually starts 12 to 18 hours before the commencement of their specific thghts on a particular day. Flight intentions are passed to the PIRAZ ship by the Air Force, ^Tavy, and Marine Corps. The PIRAZ ship then prepares the necessary advisories for all *>ose in her CIC team who must assist with the checking in, identifying, monitoring, and checking-out process. Thus, by having such lnformation instantly available and in a readily usable form, the identification, communications, bookkeeping, tracking, con- tr°lling, and monitoring processes, are signifi- eantly simplified. If the PIRAZ ship adequately P ans for, and keeps up with, all of the lendly planes, the more difficult chore of etecting, tracking, and providing necessary ai?t| adequate warning on enemy planes,
. *ch may seriously hazard our own aircraft, made much easier. If the enemy fighters do mlenge our forces, the air intercept con- r° lers, manning the NTDS consoles, direct ^rolling Navy fighters in for the kill.
^ f he PIRAZ ship off Vietnam has frequently .een referred to as the Seventh Fleet’s floating control tower. There are, basically, two
ISe control. In advisory control, the ship’s t controller watches the plane being con- 0 led on the NTDS console, and advises the
\vlv °n^ as to a Seneral area or limit, in clch he must keep his aircraft. This type of tr°l is normally used for barrier combat a- Patrol, area patrol aircraft, early warning self ra^’ °r ^°r tar*hers- The pilot keeps him- Senerally ;n the correct area by using station, this can be done by simply advising the pilot of the new dimensions of his station.
Close or positive control requires that the air controller provide specific altitudes, courses, and speeds to the pilot he is controlling. Positive control is necessary, in order to vector his plane to a specific point, for a specific purpose, such as identification of an unknown target or interception of a hostile contact. Here again, the NTDS system provides the computerized recommendations required to make the intercept.
With NTDS employment and the more sophisticated airborne weapons, the fighter pilot is not required to actually see his target. This is particularly true at night or in bad weather. He fires by radar, which will then guide the missile to its target. In this type of modern air warfare, the air intercept controller on the PIRAZ ship, many miles away, can assist the intercept pilots in downing enemy planes.
The PIRAZ ship can monitor the sorties of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
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strikes, and during a heavy operation, over 150 planes may be in the air at the same time. The services offered may include communications, vectors to tankers for any aircraft in a low-fuel state, relaying many types of operational or combat information, providing continuous navigation, or search and rescue (SAR) information.
In addition to the air contact capability, the PIRAZ ship is also fitted with the latest in surface and sub-surface detection equipment, thus making her contribution literally threedimensional.
One look at the map of Southeast Asia shows the closeness of the Communist China border to the north, and the close proximity of the Chinese island of Hainan to the east. With U. S. jet fighters flying within seconds of the Chinese border, the PIRAZ ship must issue border warnings to help them from crossing over the border and perhaps triggering an international incident. This mission can become extremely delicate, when an enemy target, near a border, is to be attacked. The PIRAZ ship provides for preciseness in this task, which only superior radar and the NTDS can provide.
The PIRAZ ship is a guided missile ship. When planes are identified as hostile, and pose a threat to friendly forces, the missile systems of the ship are in readiness. In addition to her missile systems, she can employ her other defensive surface and antisubmarine missiles.
Another function of the PIRAZ ship is the stationing and controlling of the barrier combat air patrol. This may be an advisory or positive type of control. During routine operations, advisory control on a pre-arranged barrier, is all that is required. However, when friendly forces are threatened, positive control is exercised, and the combat air patrol is repositioned in altitude, and vectored on the proper course and speed to the best intercept position. This patrol may also be used to determine the positive identity of surface craft in the area.
Maintaining communications and position
of aircraft during an air strike, is another important PIRAZ task. This is done by an air controller aboard the ship, called a “flight follower,” who maintains radio and radar contact, on his NTDS console, with the planes from each carrier (one flight follower per CVA or Air Force strike). By concentrating on a single carrier’s strike aircraft, the flight follower can assist more readily with the many specific details surrounding the flight.
The NTDS console allows the flight follower to keep informed as to the specific details of the strike aircraft, from the time the strike is launched, checked into PIRAZ, during inflight refueling (either way) arrival at the coast-in point, while over the target, the coast-out point, checking out of PIRAZ, and finally, return to the carrier. The flight follower, in effect, rides with the strike leader to the target, and returns, while providing any required information, including surface- to-air missile (SAM) and MiG warnings.
The flight follower can, in most cases, provide the exact position of damaged or shot down aircraft. The flight follower may pass positions to the SAR commander, vector planes to an in-flight tanker, or to geographic reference point along a coastline.
All PIRAZ ships are equipped with helicopter platforms, providing a base for operations. The ships are also equipped to perform minor maintenance and upkeep for the SH3A or UH2 helicopters. The PIRAZ ships also provide a fueling station for both on-deck or in-flight refueling to Navy and Air Force helicopters.
The PIRAZ ship broadcasts computer track information to non-computer ships and stations, and provides surface and sub-surface surveillance information to the surface and sub-surface surveillance commander.
The PIRAZ functions entail all the aspects of antiair warfare, air traffic control, air- surveillance, and positive identification. The operation stresses a ship, her equipment, and her personnel, perhaps like no other cruiser d destroyer assignment of the past—but the undertaking is as satisfying as it is challenging'
★
Progress
| k. |
| «______ h | m Ml |
—» | k ____________ | L 1 |
I
An End ... of a distinguished 24-year carrier career was marked on 13 February, with the decommissioning of the USS Randolph (CVS-15) shown here in Boston Naval Shipyard as she received final repairs prior to joining the reserve fleet at Philadelphia.
And a Beginning ... of another naval career was in the offing for the XJSS John F. Kennedy (CVA-67) shown here in Norfolk, Virginia, as she awaited her first deployment, to the Mediterranean, early in April.
Self-propelled Drill Ship— Named Offshore Mercury, this 276-foot craft, under construction in Scotland, will have diesel-electric propulsion of 8,000 h.p. with drilling power of 9,000 h.p. The four triangular legs of this first self-elevating drill ship will exceed 354 feet in length. Air conditioned quarters will accommodate 75 persons. The craft, scheduled for delivery this year, will be capable of remaining at sea for about 45 days without replenishment, and will have a heliport.
Nuclear Research Sub— The nation’s first nuclear- powered research submarine, the NR-1, which was launched in January, is 140 feet long, 12 feet in diameter, has a submerged displacement of 400 tons, and will have a crew of five, plus two observers. She will be propelled by twin screws, and will be maneuvered by four ducted thrusters, two located in the bow and two in the stern.
New Navy Fighter—This is a full-scale mockup of the Navy’s newest carrier-based fighter, the F-14A. Powered by two Pratt and Whitney TF - 3 0 - P-12 afterburning type turbofan engines, the Grumman-built plane will have a crew of two, seated in tandem. It was designed to provide high speed and fast acceleration, and is expected to be in the Fleet by 1973.
Notebook
U. S. Navy
Q U. S.-U.S.S.R. Admirals Comment
(.Marine Engineering/Log, December 1968) It is hoped that President Nixon and his Secretary of Defense are cognizant of two recent statements by the commanding admirals of the two largest naval fleets in the world— that of the United States and of the Soviet Union.
First, the Russian admiral: “The flag of the Soviet Navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the U. S. will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas.”
And, the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy, has said of his possible adversary: “The Soviet Union is embarked on a program which reveals a singular awareness of the importance of sea power and an unmistakable resolve to become the most powerful maritime force in the world. Obviously, the Soviets demonstrate a thorough understanding of the basic elements of sea power: knowledge of the seas, a strong merchant marine, and a powerful Navy.” He said that Russia is “Surging forth with a maritime program nothing short of miraculous.”
The naval confrontation in the Mediterranean Sea continues. Mare Nostrum is criss-crossed by the tracks of more than 60 naval units from each side, always shadowing, and sometimes harassing each other. Spain has requested to both governments that they withdraw their fleets, but this is unlikely as the Russians would only go into the nearby Black Sea, and the Americans would have to go all the way to Norfolk, Virginia.
The Asian colossus is holding the moon up for all to see, but his other hand, holding control of the seas, he keeps behind his back.
s Navy Fleet Bill Necessary
(Charles W. Corddry in The Baltimore Sun, 9 January 1969) High officials say a long-range naval shipbuilding program costing “several” billion dollars a year will be necessary to modernize America’s rapidly aging fleet.
The Navy has borne the enormous strains and stresses of the Vietnam war and continued its other worldwide commitments with very little expansion in numbers of ships and a manpower increase of just over 12 per cent.
Military quarters, accordingly, judge that the end of the war will not—or should not—- make way for much of a reduction in the size of the Fleet. Its role as a first line of defense is likely to be undiminished, particularly as ground forces, now spread around the world, are reduced.
The issue of Fleet rehabilitation and modernization is one of those major ones that confronts the new Secretary of Defense.
Representative L. Mendel Rivers (Democrat, South Carolina), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has guaranteed that development by taking the unusual step of introducing a bill on the opening day of Congress which would authorize a $3.8- billion shipbuilding program.
The Rivers proposal, calling for a nuclear- powered aircraft carrier, and several other nuclear ships, as well as various conventional types, naturally caused elation in the Navy. The service has only about a third as much money for ships this fiscal year as the River bill would authorize for next year.
In stating that large numbers of ships must be built in the 1970s, officials note that 60 per cent of the 894 ships, now afloat, are 20 or more years old.
The Navy received $821 million in new money for shipbuilding and conversion. With carryover money from prior years and some
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reallocation of funds, it has a total—as estimated by Mr. Rivers—of $1.3 billion available this year.
0 U. S. Patrol Boats Shield Saigon
(Joseph B. Treaster in The New York Times, 6 January 1969) The U. S. Navy has announced that it had established the final link *n a network of interlocking water patrols along the Cambodian border.
The patrols now cover approximately 150 miles of the border, extending from the Gulf °f Siam to Tayninh City, the capital of Tayninh Province, northwest of Saigon.
The U. S. command believes that enemy forces intent upon attacking Saigon would have to fight their way through these patrols. Credence was given to this belief by a capered enemy soldier, who said his unit had been told to make a special effort to destroy file patrols.
Navy boats began patrolling a stretch of the border from the Gulf of Siam to about 50 miles inland in mid-October. In early December, they began covering about as much territory southward from Tayninh. The latest series of patrols cover the middle area and , ring to more than 100 the number of boats
involved.
More than 60 of the craft are swift and i heavily armed 31-foot fiber glass boats. The rest are a variety of modified armed landing Craft designed for earlier wars.
53 First of 17 LSTs Launched
'Marine Engineering/Log, December, 1968) Resigned with a destroyer-type bow, the nfiire USSFwtzo (LST-1182), the first of 17 new tank ships started under a $250-million Navy contract, was recently launched from the finys of National Steel and Shipbuilding °mpany, San Diego, California.
These “fifth generation” LST ships are expected to be faster, brawnier, and more each efficient than their predecessors be- jfiuse of the new bows. The Fresno is scheduled 0r delivery in April 1969.
The vessel is equipped with a 112-foot-long
aluminum landing ramp that will permit vehicles to be loaded or off-loaded over the bow. When stowed, the one-piece ramp rests on the main deck forward between guide tracks, attached to the inboard side of two permanently installed derrick arms protruding over the bow.
A stern ramp, which also serves as a watertight stern closure when retracted, is designed to launch or retrieve amphibian craft from the open sea. It can also be employed as a vehicular bridge between the vessel and various utility landing crafts or a pier.
The Fresno is 522 feet long. She has a beam of 69 feet 6 inches, a draft of 15 feet, and a displacement of 8,302 tons. Six diesel engines will provide the propulsion and she is expected to average 20 knots with 16,000 s.h.p. NASSCO’s contract price was $14.6 million.
s Marines to Buy 12 British Fighters
(Aviation Week, 16 December 1968) The Secretary of Defense has approved a Marine Corps request to include provisions for the purchase of 12 British Hawker Siddeley Harrier vectored-thrust V/STOL fighters in its fiscal 1970 budget submission to Congress.
Marines plan to use the aircraft for evaluation in a tactical environment to test their effectiveness as quick-reaction, close-support V/STOL fighters. Eventual purchase by the Marine Corps could be for approximately 100 of an advanced version of the Harrier.
Other U. S. Services
s Coast Guard Stresses Science[1]
(The New York Times, 1 January 1969) The Coast Guard looks to 1969 as the first year in a 30-year period during which it expects an increasingly larger role in its scientific involvements in atmospheric and ocean studies.
The growing emphasis on science, although not at the expense of maritime safety and other testimonial roles, was noted by the service’s commandant, Admiral Willard J. Smith, U.S. Coast Guard.
In a report on activities in 1968, he said:
“These dynamic times demand that we plan not just for tomorrow but for the closing years of our century. “To that end, we are formulating programs to put the Coast Guard in the vanguard of scientific and technological progress.”
Admiral Smith said that as a result of Congressional approval of the construction of the Western world’s most modern oceanographic vessel, the service had made “significant” progress in its involvement in ocean sciences.
That vessel, the cutter WHEO-701, is expected to be completed in 1972. She will displace 3,945 long tons, and will be equipped with a fully automated steam-propulsion system. As a result, the engine room can be operated without a crew.
Featured in her design are the most laboratories ever installed in a U.S. vessel for carrying out studies in marine biology, geology, geophysics, chemistry, and meteorology. The cutter will have a crew of 133, including 14 to 16 scientists.
s Survey Vessel Becomes Classroom
(The Washington Post, 21 November 1968) A 1,900-ton hydrographic survey vessel, the Explorer, has been decommissioned and transferred to the U. S. Office of Education for the training of hardcore unemployed for jobs in oceanography.
The Explorer, 28 years old and 219 feet long, was turned over to its new operators by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in Norfolk.
Arrangements are being made to tow her to Washington, where she will be berthed at the former Naval Gun Factory on the Anacostia
River. About 120 unemployed, disadvantaged young men between 16 and 22 from the Washington area will be trained as oceanographic aides for government and private industry. The 15-month program is believed to be the first such project in oceanography.
@ R.O.T.C. Challenged on Campuses2
(David E. Rosenbaum in The New York Times, 5 January 1969) At campuses around the country—from Flarvard to Stanford and from Tulane to Michigan State—the place of the Reserve Officers Training Corps in the college curriculum is being challenged.
At most schools, the challenge is being led by the student radicals. But in many instances, moderate students and faculty members are lending their voices to the objections to the military program.
The attacks on ROTC are not something new. A generation ago, members of the Corps at City College of New York were heckled as they paraded. Even in the late 1950s—supposedly the apathetic era of college students—Dartmouth men were throwing eggs at marching student-soldiers.
But as opposition to the war in Vietnam has risen on the campuses in recent years, resentment over the Corps’ programs has become more open and more widespread.
The argument of the moderate students and professors has been more widely accepted- It is that military courses should not be given credit in a curriculum devoted to the arts and sciences and that teachers, hired by the military and not by the university, do not deserve faculty status.
These critics of the Corps would not object to military training taking its place with other extracurricular, nonacademic activities on the college campus.
Widespread military training on campus had its genesis during the Civil War. The Morrill Act of 1862, which provided states with grants of public land for colleges, required each land-grant college to offer a course in military tactics. The law did not require the course to be compulsory, but many of the schools did make it mandatory for patriotic reasons.
2 See Comment and Discussion, “Why ROTC?” pp. 120-122, this issue.
Notebook 159
The National Defense Act of 1916, created the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps as a means of standardizing the military train- 'tig courses at the different schools. The Navy Program was established in 1926 and the Air Force program in 1946.
Despite the criticism of the military train- tog in colleges, Corps programs are thriving °n nearly every major campus in the country, and military officers here are confident that the ROTC programs are here to stay in their Present form.
There are more than 270,000 men enrolled 'o Corps programs this school year at more than 300 campuses. No school has unilater- ahy dropped the program from its curriculum 'n recent years, although at George Washington and Franklin and Marshall Universities, the Air Force program was cancelled, when the Air Force decided they were not productive. There is a waiting list of 15 or 20 schools that have applied for the establishment of an kOTC program.
The military is dependent on the programs i°r a large percentage of its officers. Fifty per Cent of the Army’s officers, 35 per cent of the Navy’s, and 30 per cent of the Air Force’s arc commissioned through Corps programs.
Each of the 330-pl us universities with P r ,
J°rps programs, signs its own contract with
the service involved, and the contracts differ 1(1 the number of courses required and in °ther aspects. The contracts obligate the uniVersities to give “appropriate credit” for the courses, and no school offers the programs 'v’ithout course credit.
Some schools offer only two years of the Program; others four years. The course load ranges from six credit hours over two years
some schools, to 30 hours over four years at other schools.
At about 90 of the colleges, two years of !<Otc is compulsory for all physically quali- c'cd men. Whether the program is compul- spry, depends on state law or on the regula- hons of the university involved.
At the end of a two-year program and a six-week summer camp, or a four-year program and a four-week summer camp, the ftudent is commissioned a second lieutenant 'n the Army or Air Force, or an ensign in the
avy. He is then obligated to serve two years 111 the Army, three years in the Navy, and four years in the Air Force. A small percentage of Marine officers come from the Navy’s ROTC program.
Pentagon officials do not believe the attacks and demonstrations against the program represent any considerable degree of opposition. “It’s the goons and beatniks that are doing the protesting, not the good students,” one official said.
The military men argue that the Corps takes up a considerable portion of the student’s time and that the student should receive due academic credit for this time. “If you give credit for courses that prepare a man for a career in business or law,” an Army officer asked, “why not give him credit for one that prepares him for a career in the military?”
The officials acknowledge that a move to take away academic credit from the ROTC courses, could considerably harm the program’s future.
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Merchant Marine
s Norway Enters Big-ship Building
(Marine Engineering/Log, December 1968) Norway has taken a giant step in big-ship building through the Aker Group of Shipyards that has received additional orders for 222,000-dwt-ton tankers. Total orders now are for 16 ships. Also Haugesund Mekaniske Verksted A/S has an order for five 24,000- dwt-ton bulk carriers and other yards also are busy on new vessels. Israel will get some of the super-tankers, and seven will go to a Norwegian shipowner.
s Bigger Borincano
{Marine Engineering/Log, December 1968) The world’s largest all-aluminum seagoing cargo ship—South Atlantic and Caribbean Lines’ Sacal Borincano—is being jumboized. The 226-foot vessel, placed in service last year, is now at Avondale Shipyards in New Orleans to be “stretched” to a new overall length of 306 feet.
The Borincano, built entirely of Reynolds aluminum, will get a new midbody being prefabricated of 110 tons of the light metal. The new section will be inserted just forward of the superstructure. When the jumboizing job has been completed, the trailership will have a capacity of 68 trailers which will be 30- and 40-foot lengths.
s Tankers to Burn Crude Oil
{Marine Engineering/Log, November 1968) Astilleros de Cadiz S. A. and World Wide Transport, Inc., have signed a contract for construction of two 115,000-dwt-ton tankers. A noteworthy feature of these vessels is that they will be the first motor ships in the world to burn crude oil directly. Main propulsion plant for each ship will be a Manises/Sulzer diesel, developing 23,220 b.h.p. Astilleros will build these engines at its Manises works.
Another special feature is that each will be fitted with one of the largest variable-pitch propellers ever manufactured. For improved maneuverability, each ship will also be fitted with a bow thruster.
Other installations include the CONOCO free-flow loading/unloading system, which eliminates loading piping and provides an unloading capability of 10,000 tons per hour,
and stern loading and unloading facilities.
World Wide is a subsidiary of Continental Oil Company. The new tankers will carry crude from Libya to the Tetney terminal in the United Kingdom, where CONOCO is building a big refinery.
Foreign
0 Soviet Ship Has ASW Helicopters3
{Flying Review International, December 1968)
It is now known that the 30-helicopter complement of the Soviet Navy’s carrier, the Moskva (and presumably her sistership, the Leningradskif), includes the Kamov KA-20 (Harp) ASW helicopter and its assault helicopter counterpart, the KA-25 (Hormone)- The existence of the KA-20 was first revealed in 1961, since which time it has allegedly been manufactured for use by the Aviatsiya Vo- enno-morskovo Flota, the Soviet naval ait arm, from platforms aboard the larger units of the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern, and Pacific fleets. The KA-25 is an essentially similar twin- turbine helicopter with power-folding, superimposed co-axial glassfiber-reinforced plastic rotor blades, and accommodation for 10-12 assault troops. The appearance of the Moskva in the Mediterranean, together with numerous other vessels of the Black Sea Fleet, has resulted in the hurried formation of a new NATO command, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, to which have been assigned U.S.j British, and Italian forces. The Moskva is estimated to have a speed in excess of 25 knots (46 km/h), its armament includes Goa antiaircraft missiles, and its primary missions are ASW and amphibious assault.
s French Have Missile Frigates
{Flying Review International, December 1968) The French missile frigate Duquesne, 5,100 tons, has begun sea trials. A sister ship; the Suffren, became operational in July. These vessels, relatively light, highly mobile, and well armed, carry Masurca MK 2 anti-aircraft missiles, torpedo-carrying Malafon antisubmarine missiles, and four torpedo launchers. \ Advanced electronics include three-dimensional radar and new sonars.
3 See Comment and Discussion, “The Moskva Joins the Soviet Navy,” pp. 107-109, this issue.