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The Six-Day War”
Kotsch, pp. 72-81, June, and pp. 113-114, ^Ptember 1968 Proceedings)
Captain Wycliffe D. Toole, Jr., U. S. Navy—On 5 June 1967, war broke out between Israel and the Arab World. Just as 111 the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Suez Canal was closed and the power of the Sixth Fleet was effectively cut off from the Red Sea and udian Ocean.
The isolation of the Red Sea and Indian ^cean areas from our stated national strangle policy of “flexible response” results from ,°fft political and geographic factors. The hsing tide of nationalism has made the acceptance of foreign forces in the territory of ''ewly-emerging or developing nations politicly untenable for nationalistic leaders living to assert their prestige and independence. The arc of nations guarding the |Vestern approaches to the Middle East argely fit into this category. Geographically, 'v't;h the closure of the Suez Canal, this politiC reality cuts the most feasible route to the
area.
Since World War II, this problem has been c°ntinually explored and discussed by naval Strategists. Solutions have ranged from at°mic-powered fleets cruising the areas free 0 support from local land bases, to the devel- °Pnient of regional advance stations to sup- ^0rt an additional conventional fleet. An :;Xcdlent example of such proposals can be °nnd in an article by Lieutenant Coin- rtlander John E. Withrow, Jr., U. S. Navy,
entitled “Needed: A Credible Presence” in the March 1966 issue of the Proceedings. However, the U. S. has been continually able to defer a decision on exactly what action to take, largely because of the British military presence “east of Suez.”
This “breathing space” in the history of the Middle East that has been given to the United States since World War II is about over. Inexorably, under the pressures of nationalism, self-determination, the realities of a highly unfavorable balance of payments problem and the recent devaluation of the British pound, Britain is leaving the Middle East to those who can afford it and who are willing to pay the price. Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal Navy (Ret.) covered this situation very well in an article entitled “Sentinels at the Bridge” in the October 1967 issue of the Proceedings.
Whether our national interests will allow us to accept this situation without some action is doubtful; for, even though the United States is a relative newcomer to the area, it has developed strategic interests in the transit routes, the unimpeded flow of oil, the freedom and stability of regional governments and the exclusion of any control over the Middle East by hostile powers.
These interests are a direct outgrowth of America’s status as a super power. One of the basic responsibilities of such a position is the necessity to assume the interests of your allies and to protect the political viability of weaker nations. This requirement becomes even more pressing in the Middle East if
there is validity—as there appears to be—• in the concept that protection of strategic interests and policies is a luxury that only rich nations can afford. And we are the only Western power with the resources available to work effectively in the political instability, the remoteness and the hostile environment of the Middle East.
Therefore, regardless of the present situation that exists between Israel and the Arabs and the eventual outcome of this conflict, the United States will continue to face a most difficult problem. A major portion of the Middle East appears to be in the hands of politically hostile or neutral leaders and is remote from conventional American military power. Further, the stabilizing influence that has long been provided by a trusted ally is gradually deteriorating, leaving a political and military power vacuum that can be exploited by hostile ideologies.
Underscoring the inherent dangers to U. S. interests in the Middle East are the strides that the Soviet Union has made in identifying itself with the Arab cause. Russian warships now make frequent visits to Egyptian ports. The Soviet bloc is the major source of arms for the Arab nationalists. Soviet technicians are welcomed into nearly every part of the Middle East, including Turkey and Iran. And after years of exclusion from the Red Sea area, the Russians now have potential bases in the Yemen. The Yemeni port of Hodeida was modernized by and is staffed with Russian technicians. Further, just north of San’a, an 11,500-foot airstrip has been completed under Soviet supervision. It is the longest airstrip on the Middle East and its location makes all points in the Mediterranean, Africa and India accessible to Russia. Then, should British fears of a pro-Egyptian takeover of South Arabia occur, the port of Aden would become closed to the Western powers, but readily available to Russian ships.
The political solution to this highly complex dilemma is not a matter for the military. The military problem is to seek methods of maintaining a military parity or stability in the area that will provide our Government with the time and space in which to resolve the political problems.
In seeking answers to the question of how the United States can project its enormous power into the Indian Ocean and Red Sea areas in order to accomplish this mission, ll would appear that it is not feasible to count on land-based air and ground forces for this purpose. There are few nations in the critical area that seem willing at present to allow large units of conventional American forces to enter their territory or even fly over it. The local political situations will just not supp°rt such actions.
This, then leaves us with seapower as the primary, if not the only, method of maintain' ing a formidable military presence in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea areas. Howeveh the present size of our Fleet will not supp°rt such a presence on a continuing basis, be' cause of other pressing national commitments' Consequently, if vital national interests 0 the United States must be protected in those areas, an additional naval force must be created to support the effort.
Until such a naval force is created—'anCj lead time would be considerable—any nava force that the United States does introduce into the area will, of necessity, be a token one' And the less time that our national strategy must depend upon token forces, the bettet'
"The Principles of War:
A Thesis For Change”
(See B. Keener, pp. 26-36, November 1967; pp- ^ 109, March, and pp. 116-117, August, 1968 Proceedings)
Anthony Sas—One feels that Command11 Keener has merely substituted one set 0 principles of war for another—the one he enumerates at the end of the article—so tha > title and opening paragraphs to the contrary’ nothing really new has been added to the voluminous literature on the subject. It ^ apropos to compare them with those liste in NWP 10(a) as well as with those enumer ated by two recognized students of warfa'1' Burne and Jomini. The author simply rC duced a longer list of principles to a shorn1 one. A comparison will also refute his state‘s inent: “Unlike the heretofore tradition3 principles, it is submitted here that the abo'
. . . [five principles] . . . are almost inmlU table laws of conduct, independent of tin'e or place or weapon. . . .” •’ .
With the exception of the fifth principle
as
'guous or faulty guides to action:’
7. Exploitation;
8. Mobility;
9. Surprise;
10. Simplicity;
11. Control.
G
0rnmander Keener to reduce their number
j. S. p, Ingram, pp. 26-31, May 1968, and pp. J'U0, August 1968 Proceedings)
Captain Alfred J. Whittle, Jr., U. S. Navy Whe conclusions reached by Captain InCam are not the same ones that I derived °tri the evidence he cites.
. Why is it clear that systems analysis can ^ Ve no answers? In many cases, an analysis of Problem involving human values, motiva
Unorthodox, this list can be accepted. AH the author has done is to combine established and accepted principles into a few °thers.
Consider, for instance, the U. S. Navy’s Naval Warfare” publication NWP 10(a), 'vhich lists 11 principles of war, eight of which Commander Keener dismisses b
Offensive;
Security;
Objective; Readiness; Concentration; Economy of Force;
Or, comtemplate the list of principles as it aPpears in Chapter II of The Art of War on l-and by Lieutenant Colonel Alfred H. Burne, ^•A. (Retired):
Maintenance of the Objective;
Offensive Action;
Security;
Concentration;
Economy of Force, incl. Reserves;
Co-operation;
Surprise;
Mobility.
When comparing the three lists, it is seen lhat there is but little difference as far as the hr‘nciples are concerned, except as stated j^ffier for the tendency on the part of the hrough combination.
. Although credit is due to Commander Wener for having added to the literature on vyarfare through his principles of war list, rie inescapable conclusion is that, contrary lt) the author’s statements, other lists are no rt'0re nor less ambiguous than the one he has
Resented.
Civilian Command or Control?”
We
tion, or intentions can give us insights and understanding which may help to provide solutions to the problem. This insight or understanding may not be quantifiable and in many cases it should not be.
The author is in my view making a case against the misuse of systems analysis rather than systems analysis itself. I submit that systems analysis is not good or bad, it is the way in which it is used that is good or bad. Bad use of it is caused by our own lack of understanding of the proper methods through which to apply systems analysis; some of it appears to be a form of chicanery. James R. Schlesinger has recently made headlines as a result of his paper on systems analysis prepared for Congress, entitled “Uses and Abuses of Analysis.” In spite of his criticisms, Mr. Schlesinger remains “an unabashed, if qualified, defender of the value of analysis in policy formation.” Would that we could all learn to use systems analysis for the purposes Mr. Schlesinger listed in his article “Organizational Structure and Planning” in Issues in Defense Economics. He said:
Its purpose is to gather evidence, to improve the quality of discussion and to sharpen the intuitions of the decision-maker. By themselves the analyses ignore complexities and intangibles, which the military rightly stress, and the decision-maker will appropriately take into account. While every effort should be made to reduce dependence on sheer intuition, the role of intuition at the conclusion remains embarrassingly large.
I fail to see how the measures Captain Ingram proposes in this discussion of the vitiating effects of civilian “command” would serve to correct the problem he describes. He recommends that the systems analysis technique not be used in problem areas where manifestly it cannot give answers or even guidance. I submit that most people who have been associated with an objective analysis will agree that, until the evidence is gathered and the problem discussed from many points of view, the right questions are not known, much less the answers. How can it be decided whether or not the systems analysis “technique” should be used?
I quite agree that the Armed Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should perform the military study and analyses. This is why it is
If
not seen this most interesting volume.
imperative that the military services develop expert personnel who are both analytically and operationally qualified to do such studies. In those studies performed by the Navy to date in which OSD has actively participated, the results have appeared to be much more palatable to the Department of Defense. In addition, it is possible that OSD participation has made those studies more objective.
The author says “Systems analysis should not be used as a decision machine where economic values are given pre-eminence and where cost is always computed but value is not.” I would go further and say that systems analysis should never be used as a “decision machine.”
The author says “Let the economic [cost] factor take its proper place with all other factors—social, cultural, and political.” No one can argue with this statement; the question is, what is the proper place of the economic factor? Until all the costs are clearly shown, no one knows where to place the economic factor in the hierarchy of factors affecting final decisions. He further says, “Recognize that there is a difference between what people think is going to happen in war and what actually happens.” Again we cannot argue with him. One of the functions which systems analysis should perform for the decision-maker is to highlight the uncertainties and to reduce them insofar as practicable.
The author’s final recommendation is to “Recognize that war is not quantifiable, that it is inherently inefficient and uncertain, that, in the final analysis, military decisions must still be made against a background of judgment, experience, and even intuition.” No question about it. This does not mean, however, that those aspects of war which are in fact quantifiable should not be quantified and the results used with “judgment, experience and intuition.” "For Sugar Boats or Submarines?”
{See Masatake Okumiya, pp. 66-73, August 1968 Proceedings)
Colonel C. E. B. Peeke, U. S. Army (Ret.) —There are many books dealing with what General Okumiya brands as an “unfounded allegation” that the Japanese had fortified the Mandated Islands. One such book was
Ten Tears in Japan, published in 1944 by the Hon. Joseph C. Grew, the U. S. Ambassador to Japan (1932-1942), and based on his diaries, as well as private and official papers- Since this book was published while the United States and Japan were at war, it lS quite possible that General Okumiya has he had, perhaps he would not have termed this an “unfounded allegation.” Here is wha1 Ambassador Grew wrote under date of ^ March 1933:
As for Japan’s action in fortifying Yap and the other mandated islands in contravention to express treaty stipulations, of which we have abundant firsthand evidence, it is perhaps difficult to see how even Japanese mentality can square this with their solemn undertakings and contractual obligations, but here again there enters the unquestioned fact that the Oriental conception of such obligations is not our conception. This whole question of the mandated islands is full of potential dynamite and may yet cause as much trouble as Manchuria.
Incidentally, the Japanese Government has solved with the wisdom of Solomon the awkward question of permitting foreign astronomical expeditions to visit these very islands for the total eclipse of the sun next year. They have decided to send them all down on a Japanese warship as the guests of Japan! They will be honored guests but mighty carefully chaperoned guests too. The invitation, °r order—as you will—-was conveyed to us offic*" ally in reply to our application on behalf of an American expedition for permission to visit the islands.
In spite of what General Okumiya says> ^ feel sure that the records of the State Depart ment contain the “firsthand evidence” that the islands were fortified, as referred to Ambassador Grew.
"American Harbor Defenses:
The Final Era”
{See D. P. Kirchner and E. R. Lewis, pp. 8-4—9^’ January 1968; p. 106, May 1968; and pp. 114—1 ’ June 1968 Proceedings)
Alfred W. Harris—Ceremonies dedicate the installation of two 10-inch coastal defeU'’ guns were held August 11th at Fort Casw Coastal Defense Heritage Site, a part 0
I- by the
jassador
on his papers, bile the ar, it is iya has nme. termed is what e of 27
ch we
is per-
; men-
in unis, but ed fact ibliga" ; ques- poten- much
;nt has e awk- onoffl' nds for . They aJaP'
! They irefuUy on, or i offici- If of an o visit
i says, * Depaf'" ;e» tha1 d to W
dicath1® defend t Casey part
B;
in the Philippines. Two other guns from °rt Wint, 3-inch rapid-fire guns, are now mounted at Fort Casey.
An Interpretive Center is located in the Jo Admiralty Point Lighthouse. Interesting exhibits include diagrams of gun mecha- msrns, a 10-inch projectile, diagrams showing ^Os’ range, and historical photos. A park ahger is also available to help visitors with rther facts and information.
Washington State Parks system. Fort Casey, established on Whidbey Island in 1900, commanded the entrance to Puget Sound, together with her sister forts, Flagler and Worden, situated on the opposite shore some four miles to the west.
At one time Fort Casey boasted of seven W-inch rifles mounted on disappearing carriages located behind heavy concrete °rtifications. In addition, there were six 'foch disappearing rifles, two 5-inch rapid- re guns on pedestal mounts, four 3-inch mpid-fire guns, plus sixteen 12-inch mortars.
The two newly installed guns are near JlJplicates of the original guns. Both weapons ^ere originally installed at Fort Wint on Subic
deserve Officers and Promotion”
is
f, " G. D. Saunders, pp. 67-71, June 1968 OCEEDINGs)
^ Commander Robert C. Steensma, U. S. j. aval Reserve—It is certainly true that the ^ Ure validity and efficiency of the Naval (^Serve officer corps seems threatened by the nbnuance of current policies, but I submit that the solution to this problem lies elsewhere than through promotion by examination instead of by selection board. Several reasons may be suggested why the method proposed by Lieutenant Saunders would be ineffective, undesirable, and in the end much less effective than the present process of selection.
First, in terms of administration, the examination of even as few as 15,000 officers a year (120,000 examinations) would impose an extremely heavy load on the Naval Examining Center and the local Naval Reserve Training Centers, both of which are already burdened to the extreme with the requisitioning, administration, grading, and interpretation involved in any Navy examination procedure.
Secondly, the validity of such officer examinations for developing and identifying those skills most needed in a naval officer is questionable. While examinations may readily test immediate levels of skill in professional areas (navigation, gunnery, engineering, etc.), they cannot and do not identify those personal traits which are most important to the development of the superior officer: leadership, flexibility, resourcefulness, physical and mental stamina, as well as moral fibre. Highly technical skills developed through self study and examination are rapidly dulled when the officer has no opportunity for using them daily in a meaningful context. Because most officers are deeply involved in the administration and training of enlisted reservists and
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identifying poor performers, but serioii
isiy
deficient at the opposite end of the scale. T llj. derives from the widespread practice ^ inflationary grading, which biases and o torts any plot of performance distribm1
res
portion of the evaluation scale, and the va of the system is assessing relative stam
among the better officers is badly degrade I suspect that in the case of very senior 0 cers, this effect completely destroys the va of grades in judging the performers.
because they are also heavily committed to their civilian professions, they have little opportunity to practice these skills, even on their annual training duty. Thus, in terms of genuine training, promotional examinations for Reserve officers would probably prove an exercise in futility.
Finally, and most importantly, such an innovation might well prove to be the proverbial straw on the camel’s back in terms of officer morale and the future of many Reserve units. Most Reserve officers are already stretched to the limits of their available time, and the effort needed to prepare for eight or more examinations in addition to continuing their heavy administrative and leadership duties in their divisions would drive them to the wall, forcing them out of the Reserve program and thus quickly decimating it of leadership. Since a majority of Reserve divisions at present are at less than two-thirds authorized officer strength, a further and needless loss of officers is unthinkable.
Granted that one may point to occasional injustices under the selection board system,
it has nevertheless worked well. The Naval Reserve officer would be well advised to make more effective use of NavPers 1210 (Annual Qualifications Questionnaire: Inactive Duty Reserve) to assist his selection board m evaluating his promotion potential. This questionnaire, together with conscientiously written and detailed fitness reports, is a more effective indicator of promotion potential than the long series of exams proposed by Lieutenant Saunders.
In spite of the infeasibility of his plan Lieutenant Saunders, by implication, suggest a great deal that could be done to improve the i professional knowledge and morale of the Naval Reserve officer: more stimulating correspondence courses, better patterns of active duty for training, more opportunities fc>r officer professional training within the dM' sions, and a greater number of billets f°r young commanders and captains. While the attention paid to the training of enlisted niea has increased tremendously in the last - years, officer training is as sporadic and ineffectual as it was in 1948. Consequently, h lS little wonder that one must look far and l°n^ to find a junior officer in a division these da)s-
1
"A New Way for Officer Fitness Report*
(See D. R. Ayers, p. 108, December 1967, p- 1^’ September 1968 Proceedings)
Captain C. D. Allen, Jr., U. S. Navy Recent experience as a member of a l'ne officer selection board, reinforces a convict^11 long held regarding the weakness of 1 existing fitness report system. Namely, the current system is more than adequate >
within any group of contemporaries. N result of this distortion, the spread in sco for the good, the excellent, and the trl j outstanding is compressed into a very sllJ^e
dial?
Naval o make Annual e Duty
ard if
. This itiously a more □tential jsed by
the
eports
114,
lonest” is a Bureau-calculated corrective
bi
•dude in identifying both excellence and ^comings.
Rr a 1S n0t ProPoseci that all of the numerous I es on the standard fitness report form
e hr " -
Vh
The root cause of this distortion is the Widely acknowledged and well-founded belief that under current procedures it is ncces- Sary to grade high (and thereby perpetuate problem) in order to avoid penalizing °ne’s own officers. Not only are the graded °fticers in competition with one another, but their reporting seniors are also, in a sense, c°tnpeting to determine who can write the m°st glowing reports. Whenever a reporting j’enior, through ignorance or misplaced °nesty, writes a report that is literally correct, without recourse to inflation or rhetoric, he penalizes his officers, frequently . th disastrous results to their careers. This ls common knowledge to most reporting Ser>iors and, since they will in most cases be jl'otivated by loyalty to their officers over 'terary honesty, the problem can only be s°lved by removing the penalty that is now attached to honest reporting.
To do this would require establishing a cOfnmon reference for all fitness reports, and aninating the motivation for competition 5nd inflationary grading among reporting Sefiiors. This can be done if a rigorous ac- (Wnting of grades is made by the Bureau of ' aval Personnel, and all reporting seniors JUd responsible for maintaining the average all grades assigned by them at or close to established reference norm. The device l(”Jposed for keeping reporting seniors
, las> periodically computed for each reportS senior and applied to grades assigned by lIri to bring their average down or up to the v*ce-wide norm. It is felt that simple aware- sSs Che existence of this procedure would 'io^ t0 e^m*nate any incentive for infla- anary grading. In fact, the incentive would t|T y nt the opposite direction, since reducing vJjlr assigned bias to the smallest possible lat^c w°uld give reporting seniors the most
sh,
-- oiunuuiu nu icm I tpui l 1U1 111
handled in this manner, but rather, a ^ , 1 smaller, more manageable, number ^ ived from an average of these grades. jrifhorting seniors would, of course, be kept ^ °rnied of their current grading bias. Auto- lc accounting techniques are readily
applicable to this sort of system. To illustrate how such a system would work, consider the following example. In the interest of brevity, only one grade is used, on a scale of 0 to 100 per cent. Two reporting seniors’ grades on the same group of ten officers are shown, before and after application of a compensating bias. Reporting senior “A” spreads his grades over the total available grading spectrum (it being assumed that the 10 officers in question perform roughly in consonance with his grades), while reporting senior “B” grades in accordance with the commonly- accepted inflationary practice.
While it is difficult to describe the absolute worth of the 10 officers used in this example, in general terms it can be said that number one is deep selection material, numbers two through five are assured of promotion, numbers six and seven are steady workers and probably selectees, numbers eight and nine are in the grey zone, and number 10 is unsatisfactory.
Reporting Reporting
Senior A Senior B
Graded | Raw | Ad- | Raw | Ad- |
Officer | Grade | justed | Grade | justed |
1. | 95.0 | 95.0 | 99.0 | 65.4 |
2. | 80.0 | 80.0 | 98.0 | 64.4 |
3. | 69.0 | 69.0 | 95.0 | 61.4 |
4. | 60.0 | 60.0 | 93.0 | 59.4 |
5. | 53.0 | 53.0 | 90.0 | 56.4 |
6. | 46.0 | 46.0 | 85.0 | 51.4 |
7. | 41.0 | 41.0 | 83.0 | 49.4 |
8. | 32.0 | 32.0 | 77.0 | 43.4 |
9. | 19.0 | 19.0 | 75.0 | 41.4 |
10. | 5.0 | 5.0 | 41.0 | 7.4 |
Average |
|
|
|
|
grade: | 50.0 |
| 83.6 |
|
Bias |
|
|
|
|
correction: | 0 |
| -33.6 |
|
(Assuming | a |
|
|
|
“norm” of 50.0) |
|
|
|
Under the proposed system, if “B” persists in his old marking habits he will acquire a strong negative corrective bias, and will penalize his better officers, hence the incentive to utilize the new grading system. The argument can be made, on the strength of this example, that “B” will probably succeed
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ments to the effect that “only outs tan1
ding
ntiy
this
r)i°r
in getting more “grey zone” officers promoted than “A” (since the cutoff grade for most selection boards would be somewhere between 20 and 30, rather than the much higher score required under the present system). However, it is equally true that none of his officers will get by many more selection boards, he will have condenmed them all to mediocrity.
Several problem areas immediately come to mind, and others surely exist. For example, what should be the service-wide norm, and what should be considered the minimum acceptable grade for a satisfactory report? It is doubtful that grades should fall on the truly bell-shaped (Gaussian) curve. What should the distribution be across the performance spectrum?
These are questions that should properly be addressed to statisticians and similar people in the Performance Division of the Bureau. At what point in time will a repoi ting senior’s corrective bias first be applied to his fitness reports? If this bias is calculated and applied immediately from all reports submitted, the bizarre situation could arise wherein a new reporting senior would be powerless to give an adjusted grade other than the service-wide norm to the first officer he reports on (in the case where he reports on only one officer.) While it would be desirable for new reporting seniors to strive from the outset to have their grades average out at the service-wide norm, it is ridiculous to expect this to occur for very small sample sizes. It would appear that a new C.O. ought to prepare upwards of ten fitness reports before any meaningful bias could be assign^ Perhaps the weighting of this bias woulo proceed from zero to unity as the number ° reports prepared by him increases from °ne to some acceptably high number. Here again, a problem for the statisticians.
Is it logical to expect the average gradeS) after adjustment, to be the same for a activities? The answer is obviously in negative, otherwise officers in activities ha bitually staffed by top performers would b unfairly penalized by the bias system, and t reverse would occur in stations most aC curately referred to as “dead ends.” To pr^ vent this, the only solution seems to be 1 application of an “activity bias,” which vV°u. acknowledge that the talent is not unifom1 distributed throughout the service. State
officers are assigned here” appear freque in fitness reports, sometimes with good reaS°^c The Bureau of Naval Personnel ought to in the best position to assign biases of 1 type to all activities. Certainly the Bureau better qualified to do so and would be m objective than the commanding oflicers those activities
Finally, it must be emphasized that method would not force a reporting sen' to produce grades at any one time averag . out to the norm, only that over a prolong period of time they should arrive at that va as they properly should (allowing f°r tivity bias” and similiar factors).
In conclusion, it is not the intent human judgement be taken out of then ^ report system, but only that judgemen aided and supported by a mechanics ^ counting method to provide a more usuj* sg distribution of performance grades. . grades would, as now, derive from the °P
Li
£
l0ns of the reporting seniors, and would con- hnue to be evaluated by selection boards of officers applying their judgement to the affirmation presented to them.
Moonlighting Toward a Master’s”
j&e T. W. Goad, pp. 59-65, August 1968
Proceedings)
Bernard D. Williams—Copies of Lieutenant Goad’s article should be brought to the Mention of graduate schools located in jiiajor military areas to examine the possi- ffity of establishing programs described in Oe article. Graduate deans would probably e interested in the article considering the act that they are now worried about the dumber of graduate students that may be rafted as a result of Vietnam, and the conse- 'ffient problem of retaining their graduate Professors.
When a young officer recognizes the importance that an advanced degree may have ,0r promotion and finds out how difficult 11 may be in obtaining one while at a duty Nation, he may decide to leave the Navy ar>d take advantage of the G.I. Bill. The Navy Jl'ould certainly benefit in the long run by aving more officers with advanced degrees, atld also encourage a number of them to t)iake the Navy a career.
* * *
•eutenant Commander T. E. Sharp, Li. S. Navy (Retired)-—Lieutenant Goad attempted to over-simplify the acquisi- n of an advanced degree by an officer erving on active duty in the Navy. While ^ doubtedly some have been able to complete Sree requirements for an advanced degree an off-duty, part-time basis, the belief ^at such an achievement is commonplace can become widespread is erroneous, tli Cre are some °f the important obstacles 1 must be surmounted before an officer aa aspire to this goal:
fficers would have to arrive at a new duty ton early enough before the start of a . ster to become settled and acclimated in eir new duties. In other words, you can’t ret and rush out to class the next day. oe officer would have to visit nearby
colleges and universities to determine whether they offer graduate programs that interest him or are beneficial to him.
The officer must then determine whether he would be admissible to a master’s degree program. This involves an evaluation of his undergraduate degree performance. Graduate schools are becoming more and more selective.
The officer must determine whether, in the prospects of his length of stay at the new duty station, he can complete the requirements for the degree. A master’s degree usually takes 30 semester hours of course work plus a thesis or equivalent. If the course work can be completed during the tour of duty, the thesis may be written at the next duty station. But if the next duty station is afloat, he may be denied the use of libraries and research facilities.
Lieutenant Goad did not emphasize the amount of out-of-classroom work in libraries and laboratories that are expected from graduate students. If an officer can arrange to attend class regularly, he must also arrange study, research, and reading time. His family may have some ideas about this.
"The National Insurance Policy,
ASW Coverage”
(See T. D. McGrath, pp. 46-56, May 1968 Proceedings)
Captain A. Winslow, U. S. Naval Reserve —I can only surmise that Captain McGrath fell under the all-pervading influence to quantify—that numbers however arrived at, as long as they appear to be duly weighted and reflect so-called “probabilities,” provide viable answers.
One trouble is that probabilities assume certain approximations which are quite true from an average point of view which is precisely what actuarial figures are all about. Although incorrect in any particular instance, they are viable for insurance purposes because they average out to certain values which are useful in determining premium rates so that the insurance business as a whole may function and prosper.
But you can’t apply this to ASW and really believe in the answers, because essentially, there are too many variables. To illustrate,
consider the problem to search, locate, and track possible hostile submarines in area X and deny passage to area Y, both large Pacific Ocean areas. The problem here is deployment of the right kind as well as number of forces with the right kind of equipment to be effective. No problem, you may say; a hunter-killer group with one CVS and two divisions of Fram II destroyers with SQS-23 sonar, would do the trick. Perhaps, during the winter months when isothermal water prevails and sonar ranges may be up to ten miles or so with enough power. But what happens in the same area in July through September? You’re lucky if you get 1,000 yards range with SQS-23 or 26. Thermoclines and layer effect have rendered surface sonar ineffective. You may have to go to 500 feet to find the channel. But this means working VDS or attack submarines, which probably means in turn a redeployment of forces and consequent reshuffling of operating schedules and logistic planning. These are certainly not problems which can’t be dealt with. 1° fact, they are dealt with and can be planned for under the tried and true methodology the Naval War College, which used to be known as the “Estimate of the Situation. This method considers all factors in a situation: economic, political, military, cultural, ethnic, religious, intelligence, hydrography, oceanography, own forces, opposing forces ' as appropriate. It deals in numbers in weighing alternate courses of action available, and comes up with specifics. Of course, it lS limited to a specific goal, objective, or longer range plan which must be carefully defined' I would not wish to detract from the overall excellence of Captain McGrath’s presentation, which shows a broad and deep grasp 0 the problem, but only to comment on some o the traps of analysis by quantifying and the danger of accepting arbitrarily weighted numbers for probability purposes. This lS fine for actuarial averaging, but in AS^ everything may be “180 degrees different- I just can’t believe the numbers.
"The Causeway Barge Method”
The American full-rigged ship Aristides painting by Mr. Robert Salmon which appeared on the cover of the Proceedings for April 1965 is available in full color as a large- size print (26" X22") suitable for framing. List price $5.00 per print. Member’s price $1.00 per print.
Prints Available
(See J. W. Corey, pp. 142-144, August 1968 Proceedings)
Commander Calhoun Bond, U. S. Nava* Reserve—Lieutenant Corey describes two end causeway sections being married to gether and unloading vehicles from LSTs-
Twenty-four years is a long time but it lS hoped that the lessons of Omaha Beach are still remembered. As an ensign on the LSL 498 at Normandy, I have a distinct recolleC lion of the majority of the LSTs off that beac^ being unloaded by such a procedure on o" June 1944. I believe only one or two actually reached the beacli during the ind1 invasion. The rest were unloaded by dlC method Lieutenant Corey describes. ,
that
method
These self-propelled craft were then cahc Rhinoferrys and were manned by SeaBees' These Rhinoferrys were not always able make long and carefully controlled aP proaches because of rough seas and othe conditions; however, they did a magnified1 job during the first crucial days of vasion and it would appear that this - of off loading LSTs would seem to need l*tl further “evaluation” as to its efficiency-
No Contest On The Fishing Grounds’
A. L. Lonsdale, pp. 63-70, July 1968
to
Clent, and hence cheaper, for Norwegians catch herring on the Grand Banks, return catch to Norway for processing, then ship to New York for retailing, than it is for
' S. fishermen to bring the same catch
Proceedings)
Commander T. G. Martin, U. S. Navy— Ihe United States is one of the major consumers of meat products in the world, perhaps the leader among the largest nations. ts needs for marine nutriment are limited, '/hat fish is eaten is mainly for a change of Iet or to tantalize the palate, not as a primary Protein source. Shrimp is our biggest money ^r°P and comes from the Gulf of Mexico, obster and tuna are other favorites with us, ut are not sought in great quantity by the °viets, as can be seen in Commander Tisdale’s catch comparison table.
Aside from the secondary position fish °ccupy in our diet, our fishing industry Suffers today from what yesterday was an ^vantage: proximity of the fishing grounds.
aving to travel only a few miles before Setting his nets, the U. S. fisherman is acCustomed to owning and operating his own SrnaH boat on relatively short trips, often ►phh sons, cousins, and nephews for a crew. 0(lay, the industralization of fishing methods the improvements in the transportation 0 targe perishable cargoes have rendered his l['(>th°ds obsolescent. Quite simply, it is more
the i
u
l^ctly into Boston.
^ the Soviet fishing industry, on the other ,and) is striving to fulfill a long-standing j Potency in the nutrition of its people. P addition, fish by-products provide fodder o fertilizer. From a small flotilla of used tjieam trawlers provided by UNRRA in 1946, rr°ugh the opportunity provided by war Parations and subsequent “favored nation” p rangements with East Germany and 4 and, the Soviets have acquired more than r’ . P vessels that total some 4.5 million gross ' Cstered tons.
jj Cie worldwide operations of the Red ^fillas have been engendered by a need to (j. where the fish are. Among the many Advantages with which geography has essed” the Soviet Union is that of having
few good fishing grounds in contiguous seas. Only in the dying currents of the Gulf Stream in the Barents Sea does there exist any potential; the Okhotsk, Caspian, and Black Seas are not very good, and the Baltic already is fished to the limit that can be sustained. This is the obverse of the coin held by the American fisherman, with his proximate bountiful grounds. Thus the two come in collision. Despite the menace many people in the U. S. have seen in these operations, the Soviets generally have fished for those species of lesser interest to our industry. Generally, the Soviets have observed good conservation practices, and have become signatories to a number of bilateral and multilateral regulatory treaties and conventions in this regard.
Our fishing industry is antiquated and badly in need of a new lease on life. While the Soviets have the world’s most modern long distant fishing fleet, our’s can be the finest ever devised for working the rich grounds on our doorstep—provided a realistic, coherent program for its development is pursued.
"Modern Destroyer Bridge Design”
(See R. L. Scott, pp. 44-50, March, and pp. 102-105, September 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John D. Purl, U. S. Navy— Commander Scott’s article on the shortcomings of the modern destroyer bridge and his excellent ideas for improvement make me feel he has spent some time in the conning tower of a submarine.
The submarine OOD watch is a unique watch. The OOD of a submerged submarine is, in fact, many watches. In addition to being OOD, he is the JOOD, CIC watch officer, engineering officer of the watch, communications watch officer, and lookout. He must be constantly aware of both the complex internal workings of his submarine and the ever- changing external tactical situation. He, and he alone, must receive, evaluate and be ready to act instantly on many entirely different stimili. His three dimensional environment makes the significance of his responsibility a world apart from his counterpart in the destroyer above him. His failure to make an immediate response to any of a
comes worse than it is.
Today, a turnover of 50 to 60 per cent o crew is quite commonplace. The Vietna ^ war has put a tremendous load on the tailer for a large number of experienced pet' officers in all rates. ,
This puts us in the position of regretting 1 forthcoming refresher training rather tn greeting it with an open mind.
The purpose of refresher training lS permit ships to develop fundamental, dividual and team skills in accordance an established standard under close guidad of highly qualified personnel. e
The observers at refresher training a,, taking the words “established standar ^ too much to heart. Established standa doesn’t mean the amount of men you have your repair party must be an exact stand figure set up by refresher training. It toe
hundred demands could mean the loss of a favorable attack position, detection by the enemy, loss of vital intelligence, or, even loss of the ship to an internal casualty (flooding, fire, submerged collision, etc.).
Yet in spite of these demands on the OOD, the submarine conning tower is arranged to make it as convenient as possible for him to meet them. MC systems and sound powered phones give him instant and direct communications with vital areas and key personnel in the submarine. Depth gauges, angle indications, gyro repeaters, speed indicators, and motor order repeaters give him constant indication of his passage through the three dimensional ocean. Underwater telephones, radio amplifiers and speakers allow him to monitor tactical circuits and communicate with other ships and forces. Radar repeaters let him look over the shoulder of the radarman. Sonar repeaters, recorders and speakers put him “in sonar.” The periscope allows him to maintain visual contact with the outside world. A single, search periscope can give him visual and radar ranging, passive wideband ECM detection, a communications antenna, a sextant, a camera, and visual observation of one and one-half or six power magnification. His watch space is fully air conditioned—it’s always “warm and dry on the bridge.” The ship’s weapon control system is available to him for almost instant use. The position keeper section of the fire control console can give him a visual display of his own ship in relation to a contact of interest. Vital controls and switches are shape- coded for easy recognition in the dark. The ship’s navigation system is immediately at hand for consultation. Simple, highly- effective plotting systems can be readily
ENTER THE FORUM
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manned to give him graphic displays of sonar, radar, and visual contacts. In short, the submarine OOD has all the information needed within the conning tower to make those decisions which he must make in an informed and intelligent manner. And this information is within ear, eye, and hand range only a few feet from the OOD.
Commander Scott’s “shipcontrol” can give the destroyer OOD this same advantage’
Refresher Training
Lieutenant C. W. Fisher, U. S. Navy'' How many times in the past have you hear statements like this from the CO just before refresher training: “What is EPDOPAC doing to me? Here it is a couple of months before refresher training and they keep taking rny experienced men and replacing them 'Vlt new people. How am I supposed to get 3 decent grade with all new men?” Or, maybe this from a department head or divisi0'1 officer, “I don’t care if Smith is due for d‘s' charge two weeks after refresher training- I don’t intend to break in a new CIC talked at this time. After refresher training we talk about who the new talker will be.”
Do such statements ring a bell? These questions have been repeated over and ove‘ at all levels of command for over a decad ■ Unless we re-evaluate refresher training, tblS problem will continue until the matter o
to
id'
\vitb
or
^ ny ruin the purpose of refresher training
y flaking it competitive?
1 Oh;
y°ur repair parties’ methods of fighting fires sWild be graded by established standards. I believe that refresher training observers fhould come aboard ready to train the men ln the billet assignments made up by that ship’s CO. They should forget that some ships flaye X number of men in their repair party and put all their concentrated efforts into taking this ship’s repair party effective, re- 's'ardless of the number of men in it. This is lhe real purpose of refresher training.
If We will agree that the situation we have today is not the desired one, then we should tonk about what steps are necessary to cor- re« it.
First we must change the attitude of the Fp who looks on refresher training with . lstaste. Obviously we must first rid him of his lf^ea that a high grade is all he is there for. We toust get him to realize that refresher training properly handled) with its weeks of concentrated training: is good for his ship with new Funnel.
Also, eliminate refresher training from any cornpetition. We don’t grade a ship on how
e did at attack teacher, CIC team training, any of the other fine Navy schools offered.
The second thing that must be done is to ange the grading method. Numerical ^ades should continue to be given out on the „ ’P for individual drills and exercises. The nal grade, that which is reported to the Te commander, should be an adjective jd'ade of either satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
* lists of discrepancies, comments on areas eding improvement, and recommendations °tild be given only to the CO. A grade of ^satisfactory should only be given in the ent that no progress or improvement was lade between the first battle problem and the
final problem. Before an unsatisfactory grade is awarded, refresher training personnel should review their assignment of instructors to ensure that a proper amount of supervised training was given in the areas where added training was indicated.
With the two recommended changes in effect, the CO will then welcome refresher training and accept it for its intended purpose. The crew will benefit, in that they will know that learning and improvement is more important than the grade, and the division officer will be able to make more sensible assignments of new personnel.
In order to complete this changeover of attitudes for those undergoing refresher training, the second, and just as important change, must take place in the attitude of the fleet training group personnel.
The Fleet Training Group must take steps to ensure that ships receive the proper amount of supervised training where the training battle problem (TBP) indicated the ship to be weakest. In a recent refresher training, a ship with an undermanned radio gang with an unqualified leading petty officer received a very low grade. No other instruction was given after the TBP or by FTG personnel. Did FTG think that in two more weeks the radio gang, without further instruction, would all of a sudden go from a grade of below average to excellent?
Secondly, FTG must take steps to ensure that the attitude of the observer is that of an instructor and not that of just an inspector. When he comes aboard he should be prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to assist that ship in correcting her discrepancies, and ensure that his training properly covers the indicated low areas. He must be more than an expert inspector. He must be an expert instructor also.
—★ 1 Well Indoctrinated
Shortly after the beginning of the academic year, a Naval Academy English instructor was involved in one of the introductory lessons of his plebe English course. In the process °f illustrating a point, he happened to ask one of the students what his father did for a living. The reply came in a very embarrassed tone,
“Oh sir, he’s only a civilian!”
----------------------------------------- Contributed by Lieutenant Wallace E. Tobin, III, U. S. Navy
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each ancedote published in the Proceedings.)