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Since its creation on 8 September 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has been criticized continuously and severely from many quarters. Verbal attacks on SEATO emanating from Moscow and Peking have continued unabated though the Sino- Soviet schism has widened. Neutralist and nonaligned states have frequendy berated the alliance. In addition, SEATO’s adequacy and effectiveness as a military alliance have been openly questioned within the United States and by its allies. Here, criticisms have intensified with SEATO’s apparent inability 1 respond effectively to conditions presented ' the Vietnam conflict.
It is clear that SEATO’s value as a mih^y alliance in the current Southeast Asian strate gic environment should be evaluated.
When Secretary of State John Foste^ Dulles pressed for the formation of an allia® that would extend to Southeast Asia the P° of containing Soviet and Asian Comniu0 ^ expansion, the aggressive intent of Gomrnun China was apparent. Following its vict°
am0.
aUies, the strategic importance of Southeast Sla was widely recognized. The need to Pr°tect the region’s large population and Onerous resources from Communist domina
Was evident. It was also apparent that
in 1949, the Peking regime had exhorted the Peoples of Asia to follow “the path of Mao Ise-tung.” Tibet had been invaded and colored in 1950. Chinese Communist aid and support of the Indochinese Communists were openly evident, as were increased Red Chinese ambitions in Burma. Recurring Verbal warnings and threats were directed |°ward the Thai government from Peking. n addition, Communist China’s massive totervention in the Korean War was uppermost in the minds of those who viewed China’s Vast population as the potential source of aruied hordes that could overwhelm South- jtost Asia at will. Such fears were reinforced y evidence that the Soviet Union intended to support Chinese appetite in Asia.
Southeast Asia was in chaos. The region was ITlade up of newly independent nation- fates-—only Thailand had been independent ^ctore World War II. The French defeat at uinbienphu and the 1954 Geneva accords mded significant French influence in Asia, j raditional British power in South Asia, °ng centered in India, had been reduced.
tthin this power vacuum widespread anti- tolonial attitudes created conditions ripe for 0,nrnunist exploitation.
Though a degree of disagreement over sPecific elements of Asian policy existed ng the United States and its European
tion
^Offimunist hegemony there would mean ^ottiniunist control of the strategic gateways etvveen the Pacific and Indian Oceans and at South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand ’ud be more directly threatened.
/hat Secretary Dulles would seek to con- ^to Communist ambitions in Southeast S)a through the creation of a military alliCe Was not unusual. Facing expansionist ^,°ves of the Soviet Union following World C ar II, the United States has sponsored the °rrUation of a host of mutual security ^rangements and collective security treaties. lth the Soviet veto ever-present in the U. N. ecUrity Council to block collective action to |;,nter aggression, these pacts were estab- under the collective self-defense provision of the UN Charter. SEATO, then, was envisaged as an integral part of this worldwide interlocking chain of alliances. It was, however, plagued with significant defects at the outset—defects that remain fundamental to the alliance’s difficulties today.
Strategic dejects. Since only three Asian states—Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan—expressed interest in joining a defensive alliance in Southeast Asia, the regional character of the organization was suspect at the outset. Additionally, the indigenous regional military capability was weak. The latter defect was not significantly remedied by including Australia and New Zealand, whose capabilities for military operations other than in national defense were limited. Nor did membership of France and Britain, both increasingly unable to fulfill military commitments in regions remote from Europe, relieve this defect. Thus, SEATO became a regional defense alliance with its locus of power outside the region as the United States assumed the role of a protective ally. As a result, from its beginning, the strategy and military capabilities of the alliance have been directly linked to the strategic emphasis and military capabilities of the United States.
Modifications of U. S. strategic concepts and military capabilities have affected SEATO’s stature and image. The substantial reduction of U. S. conventional military capabilities which resulted from the adoption of the “massive retaliation” strategy by the budget-minded Eisenhower administration, combined with the intangible nature of that strategy—e.g., what specific conditions would trigger the employment of nuclear weapons? —to create widespread doubt regarding SEATO’s viability as a military alliance.
During the 1950s, as threats of Communist- inspired-and-supported subversion and insurgency increased, alliance strategy remained primarily geared to conventional warfare within the framework of the U. S. nuclear capability. During that decade, bilateral U. S. military assistance to Thailand, the Philippines, Laos, and South Vietnam totalled more than one billion dollars. Directly influenced by U. S. strategic emphasis, SEATO planning and exercises stressed conventional warfare operations—e.g., air support to
deployed units, support of land operations by naval forces, and command post exercises. Some observers viewed these as attempts to impose World War II weapons and tactics upon an area wherein antisubversion or anti-insurgency assistance would have been more appropriate. Indeed, during this period when increased capabilities to defend against indirect aggression were required in Southeast Asia, the ability of the United States to provide such assistance was severely limited by its de-emphasis and cutback of nonstrategic or “nonretaliatory” forces.
With the advent of the Kennedy administration’s “flexible response” strategy, U. S. military forces were structured in a manner which broadened the spectrum of possible participation in SEATO operations. Yet, the possibility has been remote that these forces could be employed in collective action in defense of Southeast Asia as envisaged by the founders of SEATO, because of additional basic defects in the alliance.
Treaty Limitations. The Manila Treaty, which created SEATO, includes a “Pacific Charter,” a protocol on Indochina, and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The “Pacific Charter” lists the principles underlying the Treaty, stressing self-determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic progress. The assertion of these principles was not unimportant since it related to a region where anticolonial attitudes were widespread and to a pact that included ex-colonial powers as members. The protocol on Indochina extended a mantle of protection to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, which were debarred by the Geneva agreement of 1954 from entering military commitments.
Reluctant to become involved in intraregional disputes which were deeply rooted in Southeast Asia’s heritage, the United States attached an “understanding” to the Treaty, stating that its recognition of aggression and armed attack applied only to “Communist aggression.” It did, however, agree to consult with other members in the case of “other aggression or armed attack.”
The triggering article of the Treaty provides that each signatory will regard “aggression by means of armed attack” in the treaty area as endangering its own peace and safety and “agrees that it will in that event act to ^ meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Here, it should be noted that statesmen and governments have disagreed over the precise definition of “aggression” for centuries. The United Nations has failed in all attempts to gain consensus on its definition. Similar difficulties arise with respect to the term “armed attack.” Also, this proviso only obligates me®' bers to “act to meet the common danger -j' an obligation open to widespread ind1' vidual interpretation. Gaining effective collective SEATO response to an “act of aggres' sion” therefore depends primarily on the mutuality of interests in a given situation-
Even when the Treaty was signed, the mutual interests of members were tenuous, and the interests and attitudes of some me®' bers have become increasingly divergent during SEATO’s 14-year lifetime. France 1 initially viewed SEATO as a means to pre' serve a position of influence in the region- During the past decade this position haS continued to decline. Currently, President Charles deGaulle’s differences with the United States and other SEATO member8 over Asian policy has effectively reduced the French role in the alliance to that of a re” i luctant observer.
Pakistan’s major interest in joining SEAT was to strengthen its position vis-a-vis Ind'^j As Pakistani-Indian relations have worsene over the Kashmir dispute in recent years tbe government of Pakistan has beome increa8 ingly friendly to Peking while frequent!, expressing reservations about SEATO poliO'
Britain initially saw the alliance as a wa) to maintain a presence in Southeast As®- With the decline of her empire, however- Britain’s strategic concern in Asia ba8 lessened, and the continuing reduction 0 ,
her commitments and military forces the® have limited potential military contribution8 to any SEATO military effort.
Australia and New Zealand welcomed tl® Manila Treaty commitment of the Unite States to strengthen their outer defer1® perimeter, and this attitude still prevai s- Thailand, directly threatened by Red Chine® ambitions, was anxious to gain a Southea Asian commitment of the United States an
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gency or indirect aggression in Southeast provisions for coping with these were
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°nnc stagnation and social unrest pro- r,pe targets for Communist exploitation, Was not intended that the organization ^ ack such problems in a dramatic manner. s a result, SEATO’s economic and cultural
today continues its strong support of the alliance. The Philippines maintained its Pr°-U. S. policy by joining SEATO, seeing this as a further opportunity to strengthen the Philippine-United States relationship, •nevertheless, the Philippine government has appeared to be more concerned with its 'lateral ties with the United States than with the miltilateral SEATO alliance.
For the United States, SEATO when formed '-'tnbodied the belief that formal open alliances, under the shield of U. S. nuclear Power, was the most effective method to eter Communist aggression. In recent years, owever, the alliance has been viewed by Washington as a legal basis for direct U. S. assistance to threatened countries in Southeast Asia. In this regard, a joint statement jssued by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and hai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman on March 1962 declared that SEATO obliga- hons of members were “individual as well as collective,” and that this obligation was not dependent upon “prior agreement” by all ° the other members. U. S. assistance to °uth Vietnam has been repeatedly justified y current administration spokesmen under is interpretation of Treaty obligations.
Thus, when SEATO was formed, its inner Core of solidarity was weak. This essential Unifying element has become even weaker—• Particularly with respect to France and Pakistan as attitudes, interests, and capabilities have changed.
Though the Manila Treaty signatories r< f °"nized the growing threat of subversion,
yague, commiting members only to “consult ’airnediately in order to agree on the measures ich would be taken for common defense.” In retrospect, it seems clear that SEATO’s ^ lncipal objective since its beginning has TCn defense against overt aggression. This supported by the weakness of treaty pro- k 10ns dealing with indirect aggression and y jhe absence of emphasis on economic and °cial aspects. While it was recognized that
activities have been quite modest. This is not wholly unrealistic, as the restricted Asian membership of the alliance prevents it from being an effective vehicle for attacking such problems on a regional basis.
Organizational limitations. While SEATO’s structure has often been compared to that of NATO, their similarities beyond the alphabetical abbreviations are few. SEATO has no unified military command or military forces assigned. Each member only pledges that its own armed forces will assist in resisting aggression. At the outset, the United States, confronted with worldwide responsibilities, opposed the creation of a unified military command and a standing SEATO force which would tie down major U. S. military resources in Southeast Asia. This view prevailed, and the Manila Treaty established a minimum of formal machinery—only a Council which would “provide for consultation with regard to military and other planning.” Thus, the establishment of a central decision-making authority was avoided.
Nevertheless, a large organization was soon developed to support and assist the Council. Subordinate bodies were established on both sides of a parallel political-military structure. The SEATO Council, composed of member’s Foreign Ministers, remains at the apex. It has met only about once a year to perform over-all review and guidance functions.
On the political side, the Council Representatives—member’s ambassadors in Bangkok—normally meet once a month. This group is aided by a Permanent Working Group—senior members of Representative’s diplomatic staffs—that can meet more frequently. Additionally, three expert committees report to the Council Representatives on economic, social, and countersubversion activities in the SEATO area.
On the military side of the organization, the Military Advisers (members’ officers at the level of chief-of-staff or theater commander) co-ordinate military planning and are responsible to the Council for all SEATO military activities. The U. S. Military Adviser is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC) whose headquarters in Honolulu is directly concerned with U. S. military relationships with SEATO. Each Military
Military Accomplishments. SEATO’s defects and limitations as a military alliance discussed above are significant. Nevertheless, a* entries on the alliance’s ledger have not been
as a significant deterring factor.
Here, however, it should be noted that t degree of a member’s support of SEATO exer cises and planning functions has been deter mined by its political interests. Thus, to Sa; that France and Pakistan have been less thaa enthusiastic in this regard during recent yea would probably understate the case. .
While the alliance has been less success in combatting indirect aggression, some cou tributions have been made. SEATO has a'°C£j by exchanging and pooling information aa in providing a forum for discussion of t subversive threat. Its general role has be ^ to co-ordinate reports of subversive actW1
Adviser is represented at the SEATO Military Planning Office (SEATO MPO) in Bangkok by a senior officer who assists in SEATO military planning and joint exercise scheduling.
This somewhat impressive structure which has evolved to meet SEATO organizational needs is, however, deceptive in terms of alliance effectiveness. The avoidance of a central decision-making authority is a technique not unusual to multilateral organizations. But when applied to SEATO, the resulting unanimity requirement for decisions pertaining to collective action is a major limitation because of the increasing divergence of member’s attitudes and interests.
Reduction of the Effective Treaty Area. As defined in the Manila Treaty, the area to be protected includes all of non-Communist mainland and insular Southeast Asia. Since 1954, however, it has been difficult to envisage SEATO military operations in defense of states other than the Asian signatories and those included in the protocol. Unanimous agreement of members and either invitation or consent of a threatened government is specified before action may be taken to defend other Southeast Asian states. During SEATO’s existence, the likelihood that the region’s nonmembers would request SEATO protection has been remote. The government of Burma, plagued by domestic problems and concerned over antagonizing Communist China, has remained indifferent to the alliance. Until the October 1965 abortive Indonesian coup, Indonesia’s President Sukarno was openly critical of SEATO. In addition, the government of Malaya conspicuously avoided SEATO association upon becoming independent in 1957, as has the subsequent government of Malaysia.
During recent years, the effective area of the alliance has been further limited. The 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos contained a Statement of Neutrality by the Laos government indicating that protection of that country by SEATO would not be recognized. Then, at the 1964 and 1965 SEATO Council meetings, Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk, who has continually shown hostility to SEATO, formally requested that the organization remove its protective mantle over his country.
Thus, in technical terms, the effective
area of SEATO’s Southeast Asian defensive responsibilities is limited to the territories of the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, and South Vietnam (a protocol state). It lS interesting to note that this listing includes no states on mainland Southeast Asia with contiguous borders—a condition not unrelated to traditional national hostilities in the region.
on the debit side.
Though it is difficult to assess the specific contributing effect of SEATO, the Chinese Communists have been deterred from open aggression in Southeast Asia during lts existence. Had the organization not been being it is quite possible that Peking woul have taken greater, more overt risks in the region. Twenty-nine joint SEATO militarf exercises have been held, resulting in un proved understanding, co-operation, aD co-ordination among participating forces- The severity of Peking’s denunciations 0 these indicates that the Red Chinese reghlie has viewed the exercises with concern.
Additionally, members have develope contingency plans for the defense of Southeast Asia against overt Communist aggression- Basic to the formulation of these have bee11 co-operative efforts in intelligence and logisjj cal matters—principal endeavors of the M11 tary Advisers and the Military Planning Office. This process has not gone undetecte^ in Peking, and it may, in itself, have serve
l
tfs in the various countries, analyze current Communist themes, targets, and tactics, and to make recommendations for action by Member governments. Though limited, this Contribution is not an unimportant one, and as resulted in a wider appreciation of the nature of the threat to Southeast Asia.
Options. Weighing SEATO’s significant de- ects and limitations against the rather modest accomplishments of the alliance, one is forced to conclude that it has become increasingly obsolete with respect to the changing strate- Sjc realities of Southeast Asia. Yet, it is evident aat a deterrent to both overt and indirect ornmunist aggression will be required in ae region for some time. The threat to the j^gion posed by a militant and aggressive °mmunist China must not be underrated. ed China’s growing nuclear and missile capability provides Peking with an increasing capacity to threaten and blackmail its non. ommunist neighbors, thereby broadening lts Potential span of maneuver within Southeast Asia. Though most informed analysts estimate that there is little likelihood of overt ninese Communist aggression in the foreSeeable future, military preparations and contingency planning cannot be based on that assUmption. Recent events within Com- j^nnist China have demonstrated that Pe- 1(ln§’s policy choices do not necessarily fit Western rationality” patterns.
Some critics of SEATO maintain that the nance’s part in deterring Chinese Com- ^unist aggressive acts in Southeast Asia has een a very minor one. They point to U. S. b°Wer and resoluteness as the principal cterring factor and would therefore disband while maintaining a system wherein o*ted States assistance would continue to be £ ailable on a bilateral basis to a threatened ^°Utheast Asian nation. Such a course would, °Wever, be counterproductive. It would be 0j, erPreted by friend and foe alike as evidence Weakened non-Communist unity in a §>on where the creation of further inter, Vernmental co-operation is essential. In. eh, it seems that the mere existence of a bilateral security alliance provides more c, er'all deterrent effect than a piecemeal eairi of bilateral military commitments, eri though U. S. power provides the main
element of deterrence in both cases.
Other critics note that, for reasons previously discussed, SEATO has been less than effective in preventing indirect aggression. They suggest that under existing conditions, where economic and social instability are readily exploitable by Communist subversive efforts military alliances are irrelevant to the threat. In the view of one observer, “ . . . the challenge in Asia is primarily political, economic, and social and only when there is a failure to meet the challenge does it become military.” In practical terms, however, such recommendations are, by themselves, largely idealistic. “Massive economic assistance,” such as proposed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in his April 1965 Johns Hopkins University speech (one billion dollars for a Southeast Asian development program), is certainly essential, but it will be decades, if not generations, before the desired large- scale economic and social progress is achieved.
This is not to ignore the political, economic, and social aspects of preventing and combating indirect aggression, but rather to point out the necessity for security in which meaningful political, economic, and social advances can be made. In this regard, a regional alliance of SEATO’s nature with strengthened countersubversion advisory, training, and operational capabilities could provide valuable assistance to a threatened government.
Still other critics point out the need for “truly Asian regional arrangements.” Such arrangements would be highly desirable, but when the historical national animosities and traditional conflicts within the region are considered, it is difficult to envisage the creation of a “truly regional” arrangement there in the foreseeable future. It should also be noted that the security interests of Australia and New Zealand are intimately aligned with those of the non-Communist Southeast Asian nations in the current strategic environment. Additionally, an effective military alliance in this region must include a commitment of U. S. power as a counterweight to Communist China. Indeed, in today’s smaller world, increased co-operation between Asians and “Westerners” appears increasingly relevant.
On balance, there are only two practical alternatives facing SEATO: To continue the alliance in its increasingly obsolete form, or
to strengthen the alliance by correcting its defects whenever and wherever possible. The latter seems to be the most desirable.
A Strengthened Alliance. No alliance is permanent in nature, and an effective one must evolve to meet changing circumstances. As previously discussed, the lack of a unifying core of common regional interests among all members is a fundamental defect of SEATO. Reducing its membership to those states having a principal concern in the region and who have the capability and willingness to participate in collective regional security efforts would no doubt strengthen the alliance. Of the current members, this would include Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
Britain’s strategic concern has dramatically shifted away from global commitments and has assumed a predominantly European emphasis. Domestic economic difficulties have caused a British consensus for membership in the European Economic Community and participation in future European integration moves. The recent London announcement of a steady withdrawal of forces east of the Suez Canal over the next five years clearly demonstrates this realignment of interests. Since future British capabilities will continue to be limited, it is increasingly difficult to envisage significant contributions of that government to future SEATO military efforts.
The membership of France in SEATO has provided President De Gaulle with opportunities to effectively demonstrate his opposition to U. S. and Allied efforts in Vietnam. A few years ago this hostility was made apparent as France’s alliance representatives attended SEATO meetings in an observer-only status. More recently, open boycotts of these meetings have enabled the Paris government to further disrupt SEATO efforts. Though De Gaulle will eventually pass from the scene, there is little to indicate that future French policy in Asia will undergo significant modification. Like Britain, France now finds herself limited in capacity to project power and influence in this remote region.
Similarly, Pakistan has boycotted SEATO meetings at will, and has demonstrated friendship for Red China whenever the Chinese actively confront India. Pakistani
A graduate of the University of Mississippi in 1961, Co®' mander Miller had been commissioned in 1949 un<kr the Holloway Aviation M* ' shipman program. He serve in Atlantic and Pacific Fleet attack squadrons from 194910 1952, with two combat tout® of duty in Korea. A F% Instructor for three years,
was Assistant Navigator in the USS Wasp (CVA-1 I from 1955 to 1957. From 1958 to 1960, he was 3s signed to Atlantic Fleet Heavy Attack Squadron*’ Following two years as student/instructor at 1 Naval War College, he served three years on the Jo1 Staff, CINCPAC. He attended the Army War College before becoming Navigator, USS KecrsCS (CVS-33). He is now assigned to the Office of Ue Chief of Naval Operations (Op-60).
policy remains predominantly inspired by hel tendency to define all international relation in terms of the India-Pakistan conflict.
It is clear that while Britain is progressive) losing the capability to participate in colleC tive Southeast Asian security efforts, Franft and Pakistan possess neither the capability n°j the willingness to do so. The withdrawal 0 these countries from SEATO would theref°r_e strengthen the collective nature of the al ance. In this regard, however, political m culties arise, as the Treaty technically rC mains in force “indefinitely,” requiring “notice of denunciation” for a member withdraw. Diplomatic efforts should theref°rt be initiated to encourage the formal separa tion of these countries from the alliance whj-1 political conditions are suitable. Then, 1 door should remain open for future assoc>a tion of additional non-Communist Asia1 countries with the alliance. ,
The demonstrated past reluctance of Sou east Asian states to become associated vV1 _ SEATO should not automatically be no11^ sidered as indicative of their future intenti0 ^ and actions. This is a dynamic region vvhe^ in national attitudes and intraregional re _ tionships are in constant flux. Recent state ments by leaders of Malaysia and Singap0^ indicate their support for current efforts t halt Communist aggression in Southe ^ Asia. Indonesia’s present government has turned that country to an independent cou after Sukarno’s serious flirtation with Pekn -
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ne government of Burma, recently threatened directly by the Red Chinese, has been °rced to conduct a foreign policy reappraisal, hough it may now be too early to actively recruit these states for alliance membership, ftey and other Asian countries may well be attracted to the alliance as it achieves a new, appearance of increased cohesion and unity, his should be encouraged.
6n additional SEATO defect noted previ- °usly has been the necessary reliance of alliance strategy upon U. S. strategic concepts a°d military capabilities which have been a*ned primarily on a global balance of Power basis—a basis not completely applica- e to Southeast Asia during SEATO’s exis- nce- It is apparent, however, that U. S. Slrategy ancj capabilities have become inCreasingly attuned to the Southeast Asian strategic environment in recent years. It is s° evident that the alliance must include a c°irimitment of U. S. power as a counterweight to Communist China for the foresee- a_Jc future. A revitalized SEATO would more <, ectively integrate this commitment into the °ntheast Asian strategic environment. ^EATo should continue its efforts to im- lQ0Ve the collective capability of the alliance ^ defend against overt Communist attack, should also place added emphasis on an exuded SEATO role in countering indirect ag- j. ssion. The collection and exchange of initiation is not enough. A restructured e,tibership, bound together by a strength- trec* core of mutual interests, should be able Crcate a meaningful training, advisory, and
combat Communist subversion should such assistance be requested in the future. This, in itself, might serve to attract some nonmembers in the region toward alliance association.
Clearly, these recommended efforts to improve the security of Southeast Asia through strengthened collective military capacities are not, in themselves, sufficient. Simultaneous progress must be made in eliminating hunger, ignorance, and disease—conditions readily exploitable by Communist subversion. Major efforts to achieve widespread economic and social progress must be pursued. These, however, must remain largely outside SEATO’s scope while the alliance remains restricted in Asian membership.
Economic and social development is the long-term goal in Southeast Asia. Increased regional co-operation is essential if meaningful advances are to be made. As recently expressed by Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, “regional economic cooperation is the clearly indicated pattern of the future and should begin now.” The embryo economic association of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore with Thailand and the Philippines in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is but one of several indications that other Southeast Asian states agree with this sentiment. There appears to be a general consensus that conditions in the region are becoming more favorable for concerted efforts of economic development.
------------------------- ■ ★ ‘
Hail to the Chief
Each time my wife took our son to the Marine Barracks barber shop just happened to coincide with the practice time of the Marine Drum and Bugle Corps. This went on for two or three months and then our family schedule was changed.
On arrival at the barber shop, my four-year-old climbed into the chair and announced in a loud voice, “Well Mom, I’m here. Where’s the band?”
------------------------------ Contributed by Lieutenant James S. Tierney, U. S. Navy
Yet, the threat of Communist aggression, both overt and indirect, will persist. A strengthened SEATO, aligned to the current Southeast Asian strategic environment, would contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in that dynamic area, thereby permitting and encouraging further co-operative developmental efforts.