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"The Mine as a Tool of Limited War”
(See pages 50-62, February 1967 Proceedings)
Captain Charles G. McIlwraith, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—In our thinking, mines have always been low grade weapons. The engineer dislikes them because they have rarely been perfected to such high technical standards as more glamorous weapons. The tactician resents their use because it denies him the waters in which they were planted. Operational forces hate them because they require difficult and dangerous missions without even the psychological reward of seeing the weapon explode. And to the operations analyst they are anathema because, as Commander Meacham so well points out, their chief virtues defy quantification.
It is quite shocking that of the nine mines with which the paper was illustrated, one was of World War I vintage and only three were post-World War II types. And the USS Terror, while admittedly the only real mine layer in the fleet, is over-age, obsolete, and too big for the job.
Using modern design and production techniques, both the capabilities and the reliabil- tty of mines could be greatly increased. For example, an underwater command and control system whose feasibility has been demonstrated would permit arming, temporary disablement or complete sterilization at any time after laying. At present, the dates of arming °r sterilization must be set before mines are Uid. Such a system could also be used in lieu °f cables for a controlled mine field. This could be an effective weapon against small craft in rivers or canals.
It seems quite feasible to design an acoustic mine with minimal sensitivity to surface targets but with normal sensitivity to submerged targets.
These are but a few of the capabilities mines could have, if a moderate effort were expended. They may help to dispel the common idea that mines are inflexible, unreliable and stupid weapons, useful mainly if you expect to lose the naval war. If properly developed and employed, mines could be the most versatile weapons, greatly increasing the options available to us.
★ ★ ★
Norman Polmar (Mr. Polmar is a former assistant editor of the Proceedings.)—There may be a one-ship solution for two problems described in this issue. Commander James A. Meacham, in “The Mine as a Tool of Limited War,” states that the U. S. Navy does “not today have the lift capability required to lay a good-sized minefield,” and that “we have today only a few part-time delivery vehicles and no surface layers at all.”
In the same issue, Captain L. D. Caney (see Comment and Discussion, pages 110-112, February 1967 Proceedings) laments the construction of large numbers of one- and two-gun escort ships replacement.
The ten Smith-class destroyer minelayers (DM) now in the reserve fleet could solve both problems, and could be made available in a relatively short period of time and at a relatively small cost. These ten ships were converted to fast minelayers while under construction as Sumner-class destroyers and all joined the Fleet during 1944. As built, the ships are 376.5 feet over-all in length, have a full-load displacement of 3,290 tons, and have two geared turbines turning twin screws which can drive them at 34 knots.
Each of the ten Smith-class ships carry about 80 moored mines. At first appraisal this seems almost ludicrous in comparison with the 930-mine capacity of the U. S. Navy’s only fleet minelayer, the USS Terror (MMF-5). However, in the context of the Vietnamese War, we are advocating blockade rather than destruction. If the United States were to mine North Vietnam’s ports to deter merchantmen from delivering their cargoes to the Communists, a relatively sparse minefield and the announcement of its existence would probably bring about the desired results. If the purpose of such minefields were to destroy shipping going to North Vietnam, then direct attacks against North Vietnamese port facilities and the merchant ships themselves would be faster and more effective than the use of mines. In the former context, the 80- mine capability of one or more of the destroyer-minelayers would be adequate.
More significant, the Smiths could provide several advantages and a high degree of flexibility not available with the Terror. The Terror is one ship and a distinctive one at that; her silhouette resembles no other ship afloat today. Her appearance in an area would automatically advertise that the United States was considering mining operations. In contrast, the Smith-class ships are basically destroyers and could be employed as such. With several of these ships periodically appearing in operational areas in their destroyer role, the prerogative would be left to the discretion of the commander concerned whether or not to publicize their mine-laying capability.
The number of Smith-class ships ensures that several could be maintained on station during a crisis period.
Also, in a comparison of the Terror and the Smith-class minelayers, the factor of speed becomes significant. While the Smiths have a trial speed of just over 34 knots, the Terror is a 20-knot ship with inherent operational limitations. With regard to Captain Caney’s plea for a ship with four guns, four boilers, and two turbines, the Smith-class ships meet all of his requirements and have the added advantage of mounting six 5-inch/38-cali- ber guns. Thus, when not engaged in minelaying operations—which is only a small percentage of a minelayer’s time—the Smith- class ships could be employed in routine destroyer duties, but with significant advantages in firepower, speed, and endurance over the new escort ships.
Perhaps, even at the expense of two of their 5-inch guns, these ships could be con-
A Navy minesweeper, passing an oil tanker on the Long Tao River in Vietnam, streams her minesweeping equipment. The float that supports the cable attached to this equipment is plainly visible in the foreground.
verted to a FRAM configuration and fitted with modern sonar (SQS-23 and possibly even SQS-26) and an improved ASW weapons delivery system. The incorporation of such features in the Smith-class destroyer minelayer would provide the Fleet more striking power and flexibility than the Terror.
* ★ ★
Captain Lawrence Wainwright, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mines have a history of being too much neglected by our Navy. It is hoped that the right persons will “read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest” the article.
Forty years ago, I was staff gunnery officer of MinRon One and accordingly was concerned principally with mining and mine sweeping. Our only type of mine was the Mark VI, left over from the Northern Barrage of World War I. We exercised with it in two configurations: as a moored mine as it had been used in the North Sea and, slightly modified, as a drifter. The drifting mine was suspended a fathom or two below the surface from a float that was practically visible to surface vessels.
Providing the complexity is not too objectionable, I should like to suggest a possible extension of one mine characteristic which Commander Meacham mentioned: selectivity. My idea is to make the selectivity active, or, to put it differently, to provide controlled Selectivity. For instance, a mine would respond to a friendly sonar signal to become inactive for a specified time or until a further signal, or it might be instructed to render Rself inert and to surface by discharging ballast. These signals, of course, would be coded or otherwise secured against enemy interference. Our own forces could then freely traverse our own mine fields. Later the mines’ inactivation and recovery would be simplified.
A most refreshing aspect of this fine article is the way its author quotes chapter and verse to demolish some particular excesses of the cost-effectiveness cult. He makes it utterly clear how such pseudo-logic can lead to catastrophic stupidities. In fact, he establishes the background for an identification of some overdone facets of cost-effectiveness with technocracy, but does not mention the latter, probably because he is too young to have experienced that mass madness of the Thirties.
"Captain David Porter: Pioneer Pacific Strategist”
(See pages 158-160, February 1967 Proceedings)
Richard A. Doubleday—I must disagree with the paragraph dealing with the destruction of the 32-gun frigate Essex. She was not sunk, but in reality was damaged and captured by the British frigate Phoebe (36) and the ship sloop Cherub (18). During numerous overhauls in American yards, the Essex’s armament had been radically altered by the removal of many of her long guns which were replaced with carronades. This enabled the British to pound the Essex into submission from long range. Had these changes not been made to the frigate, the Essex surely would have made a better showing for herself in Valparaiso harbor. At the time of her capture, she was armed with 40 carronades and six long 18-pounders. These did give her superior fire power over any one of her British adversaries at Valparaiso. Following capture, she was taken over by the British Navy, rearmed, and refitted.
★ ★ ★
Carlos U. Lopez (Chairman, Department of Foreign Languages, Menlo School and College, Menlo Park, California.)—Unfortunately, the most brilliant exploits of Captain David Porter are summarized in a couple of lines and his greatest achievement, the goodwill he created on the West coast of South America, is not even mentioned.
Porter arrived with his ship at Valparaiso on 13 March 1813. It was thought that Spain had joined England in her war against the United States and that the frigate Essex had arrived as an ally to lend much needed maritime help to the Chileans. When the news of her arrival reached Santiago, the bells were rung. The Aurora de Chile, the only newspaper, stated that “the purpose of her trip is to protect the ships of the United States against British and Spanish privateers.”
Some of the details of the cruise of the Essex were given in Professor Robert Johnson’s book Thence Round Cape Horn. The Essex was accomplishing her mission with great success. She had captured many English whalers and had attacked any privateers, Spanish or English, that interfered with Amer-
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ican vessels. This campaign had reopened Chilean ports to foreign commerce. Captain Porter had even threatened the Viceroy of Peru, demanding that there be no interference with American merchant vessels. The prizes taken by the Essex were sold at Valparaiso, this giving new impetus to the dawning commercial enterprises of the newly opened port.
On 8 March 1814, two British warships arrived at Valparaiso under the command of Captain Hyllyar. They were the Phoebe with 36 guns and the Cherub with 18 guns. They found their enemy quietly anchored in the bay. Vicuna Mackenna adds:
For forty days the two ships kept a menacing close look at each other as a continuous challenge. From the yard arms at dusk, the Americans would sing Yankee-Doodle and the English would answer back with God Save the King. After the exchange of songs, more popular insults and threats were hurled. During the day the ships insulted each other by signaling with flags. The same thing happened on the beach. But, on several occasions, when Hyllyar met Porter at the house of the Chilean Governor Lastra, they greeted each other with respect. War had not lost its gentlemanly manner.
Unfortunately, the day came when the voices gave way to the roaring of cannon. And Perez Rosales tells us:
I remember very well that on the afternoon of the 28th of March, several officers of the Essex were at my house when the sudden fire of cannon made them dive for their hats and without further good-bye than a fantastic ‘farewell for ever,’ they ran for their boats with cheer and confidence, yelling ‘hurras’ as they went. Many families had climbed the hills in order to see the action better and we could observe that the Essex taking advantage of a fresh wind, and confident of her superior speed, was ready to force the blockade. It was not possible for her to engage in combat because the odds against her were too great. The English ships were afraid that the Americans might escape and attacked her inside the port. The wind was not enough for the Essex to maneuver and in the second attack she was left in such a defenceless position that we thought she had run aground. In spite of the firing from the forts who wanted to keep the neutrality of the Chilean waters, the Essex was badly damaged and was forced to surrender.
The people of Valparaiso took care of the wounded. There was no house that failed to open its doors to the defeated Americans. Porter had taken refuge in the small village of Las Tablas, and the Chileans offered him escape through the Andes and into Argentina. An agreement was reached with the English, however, and Porter was allowed to return to the United States in the schooner Essex Junior, one of the Essex prizes. Porter was so moved by the friendly attitude of the Chileans that he never forgot Chile. He took with him on board the Essex Junior Mateo and Luis Blanco, sons of a distinguished Chilean family and obtained for them appointments at West Point. These two young men were the first Chileans to be educated in an American college and the first foreign students to enroll at the U. S. Military Academy.
Later, Porter helped General Jose Miguel Carrera in the organization of an expedition to assist the Chileans in their War of Independence. He was also instrumental in arming
the corvette Curacio, which under the name Independence became a ship of the Chilean Navy. Later, Porter obtained from President James Monroe an appointment for Pedro Valdez Carrera in the U. S. Navy.
Porter, like the Chilean historians, considered the highlights of his career his services to Chilean independence as well as the opening of Chilean ports to foreign commerce. It is said that in the garden of his house overlooking the Potomac was a marble slab with the legend: “Valparaiso, 28 de marzo de 1814.”
"Not Too Near—Not Too Far”
(See Comment and Discussion, pages 110-111, March 1967; and Professional Notes pages 157-159, November 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander P. Godefroy, U. S. Navy—A big Bravo Zulu for Lieutenant Commander L. W. Roop and his comment. Let’s not ruin a beautiful evolution by being overly precise. Going alongside is a simple evolution which requires a reasonable amount of skill, and confidence in your judgment. Besides, it is a hell of a lot of fun. Let it be!
"Canada’s First”
(See page 148, March 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant P. T. Haydon, Royal Canadian Navy—A photograph in “Progress” was captioned HMCS Ojibwa, discussing RCN “O”- class submarines. The photograph depicts the Royal Navy submarine Acheron and not HMCS Ojibwa with pennant number S61. HMS/M Acheron with pennant number 72 has been serving on loan with the First Canadian Submarine Squadron in Halifax.
"Postgraduate Education and Promotion: A Significant Relationship?”
(See pages 56-61, January 1967 Proceedings)
Commander E. M. Avallone, U. S. Navy—I must disagree with the authors on the point that “BuPers does not—and indeed should not—legislate the relationship between promotion and educational experience.” In fact, the Bureau of Personnel must and should determine the Navy’s need for postgraduate training among its officers. Officers must attend postgraduate courses to meet the Navy’s future needs in filling specific billets. Those officers selected for advanced education should and must be chosen from the top performers among the junior officers. Then, selection boards must be given precepts to ensure that postgraduate achievements by officers be recognized as enhancing promotional opportunities.
Unfortunately, what is ideal in theory is not being practiced by the Navy. Officer shortages have superimposed illogical decisions upon the Bureau. Top performers are, in fact, “not available” for postgraduate training. Most nuclear trained officers are seldom afforded the opportunity. Aviators who may attend postgraduate training are not able to obtain sufficient cockpit time to compete for squadron commander jobs. Many junior surface officers are offered postgraduate training before being released from active duty as an enticement to remaining in the Navy. Many of these officers refuse the opportunity for high-paying jobs in industry.
On page 60, the authors state that Naval Academy graduates probably do better at promotion than do their non-Naval Academy contemporaries. This is really an unfounded opinion. Prior to World War II very few naval officers were given the opportunity to attend postgraduate training. There were, during this period, not enough vacancies in the Navy to accept all the Naval Academy graduates into the Navy. Therefore, only Naval Academy graduates existed as officers in the Navy. Of course, during the War large numbers of officers were taken into the Navy from other sources than the Naval Academy, and many of them stayed on after the war. A study to determine the following points would be necessary to complete the authors’ analyses and substantiate their results:
(1) Number of Naval Academy graduates in the Navy by rank and degree status.
(2) Number of non-Naval Academy graduates in the Navy by rank and degree status.
(3) Number of each category leaving the Navy by resignation and retirement and degree status.
A recommended procedure for a Navy postgraduate training policy is also very important. The authors carefully avoided this thorny and controversial area to prove their point. The following is submitted as a logical way of running the postgraduate program:
(1)Select best performers and the most
qualified for postgraduate training.
(2) Send them to postgraduate training two years after commissioning.
(3) A master’s degree program of one year’s duration vice the three years at present.
(4) Return graduates to warfare specialty after postgraduate training.
(5) On a second shore tour, assign them to their degree specialty ashore.
Such a policy would break up the first extended sea tour, which is the present practice. The return to graduate school at the two- year point has been shown by studies conducted at Massachusetts Institute of Technology to be soon enough so that the student is still capable of using the material learned as an undergraduate without extensive review. In fact, return to school any time before the four-year point after college is satisfactory. Extra courses, which have been part of the Navy’s graduate program, should be eliminated. A one-year civilian school curriculum for a master’s program should be adapted in lieu of the three-year programs presently in vogue. This will not just happen. It must be designed by the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations and implemented by the Bureau to meet the Navy’s needs. Selection boards must then be instructed as to the needs of the service. Then, and then only, will the authors be able to demonstrate, without many assumptions, that the attainment of an advanced degree is career enhancing. The Navy must prove such a policy by taking positive action—not by making public announcements that such is the case.
The Rambler
(See Proceedings Cover for October 1966; pages 123— 125, May 1967; page 97, January 1967)
William S. Bedal, II—The photograph shows the painting of the privateer hermaphrodite brig Rambler, owned by the Peabody Museum, Salem, Massachusetts. Mr. Charles H. Taylor who donated it to the Museum in 1939 thought it was “by one Burton, an English artist.”
He also believed that the scene represented is in the West Indies, and that the harbor entrance might be the strait at the southwest
corner of Trinidad, between Trinidad and the mainland.
The Rambler was built by C. Turner of Medford, Massachusetts. She was commanded by Captain J Appleby, carried a crew of 88 men, and was captured by the Thais, 31 March 1813 off Sierra Leone, West Africa.
Marine paintings often depict the Rambler on one or two other points of sailing, usually receding in the distance. In this one, she is also shown on the port tack standing smartly out of the roadstead. It should be noted, however, that in the interval between her arrival and departure, her gunport stripe has been repainted solid white.
Letter to a Division Officer’s Wife
Lieutenant (jg) Dale E. Haan, U. S. Naval Reserve My Darling Wife:
We’ve been at sea for three months now and it’s apparent that we forgot one very important thing—teaching wives what to say in letters to their shipboard husbands.
A ship is a peculiar world—all men, lots of work, and little entertainment or diversion. It’s a lopsided world, and for many of us, the only contacts with normality are the letters from home. Most of the letters are everything we could ask for, but the remaining few ....
Perhaps a letter guide for Navy wives would give you an idea of some of the problems we run into and ways to avoid them:
(1) It normally takes a minimum of two weeks to send a letter and to receive an answer. In many cases it could take appreciably longer. Plan your letters accordingly and expect delays.
(2) The diversions from daily routine are slight, and if a man does anything different on board ship, it is to think a lot. After “lights out” or maybe on Sunday mornings, he is likely to lie in bed thinking about his family or maybe just day-dreaming. Give him something nice to think about.
(3) Write often. Tell him that the children are doing great, the dog has learned a new trick, you love him, and you will always remember how wonderful it was the first time he kissed you on your honeymoon. Tell him you wish he was at home so you could love him. This in a hundred variations is what he is always ready and eager to hear.
(4) If you have problems that would worry a husband and that he can’t do anything about, please keep them to yourself. At sea everything worries him to some extent. All he can do in some cases is to think and worry and worry and think.
(5) Reading a letter isn’t the same as a pillow talk with your wife. A letter is a lot of words on paper that are easy to misinterpret. They lack the softness, quality, and nearness of real conversation. Remember, if you give him the wrong impression, he’ll have a couple of weeks to dwell on it, whereas at home a kiss would settle everything.
(6) Don’t talk of his shortcomings. It’s so easy to magnify something of that sort out of proportion. After all, everybody is a little bit vain. Men like to think of themselves as lord and master, so it is no sin to encourage it, even if you have to refrain from saying that you could have done better.
(7) Never say that some other man—no matter who he is—can do anything better than your own husband.
(8) If you have financial problems, by all means write; he can probably help. But keep in mind that it might be a while before his letter gets back to you.
(9) Please take good care of your husbands, ladies. You would be surprised to know how large a part a man’s wife and family actually play in his life.
If all the wives would think for themselves and follow this guideline, half my problems as a division officer would be solved. And, there would be much less stress and strain placed on many marriages.
"Destroyers at the Crossroads”
(See Comment and Discussion, pages 110-112, February 1967 Proceedings)
Seaman William J. Blackburn, Jr., U. S. Navy—Due to the age of destroyers in the U. S. Navy, it would be advisable to develop a new type of destroyer or again begin building the Forrest Sherman class (DD-931). They were fast—in excess of 33 knots, very maneuverable, and heavily armed. The new destroyer escorts are, in comparison, very weak in fire power. The Forrest Sherman-class destroyer has both the fire-control equipment and guns to fight simultaneously air and surface targets. The Mark 68 gunfire control
system is an outstanding system for use with the 5-inch, 54-caliber gun, because of its longer target acquisition range and fine surface computing mode. It can also be used effectively for anti-aircraft fire. The Mark 56 system is the most accurate, quick-computing system for antiaircraft fire that we possess. The destroyer also carried two twin sets of torpedo tubes mounted port and starboard, which were set permanently to fire on an oblique. With the installation of antisubmarine rockets (ASROC) on board these vessels, they would become the most versatile ship in the Navy’s arsenal.
With the loss of our destroyer force, we shall be in a desperate situation. If the war in Vietnam escalates, the support of destroyers will be urgently needed. What might a force commander do in such a situation? Send in his new DEs armed with old guns of World War II vintage? Highly unlikely. What then?
"The Merchant Marine: Subsidies and Competition”
(See pages 70-80, January 1967 Proceedings)
Captain Howard W. Dawson, U. S. Navy—Revitalizing the merchant marine is not so amenable to solution. Total U. S. foreign trade approximates $30 billion instead of the $20 billion mentioned. The value of the total import-export trade varies between 4 per cent and 6 per cent of the gross national product (GNP)—4 per cent of the $738.5 billion gross for 1966 would equal $29.5 billion.
There is a provision in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 for the government to make loans for the purchase of ships at 3.5 per cent interest. This has never been done, however. Instead, the government will insure mortgages for one-half per cent, which will then make it possible for approved firms to borrow capital for the purchase of ships at about 5 per cent
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
plus the one-half of one per cent insurance charge. It is misleading to state that the government contracts to lend a ship buyer money at 3 per cent.
The fact that ships must be of U. S. registry to qualify for operating subsidy is only half of the story. Equally important is the fact that nonsubsidized ships built abroad are not eligible for cargo preference cargoes until three years after their acquisition and registry under the U. S. flag. With the Congress unlikely to terminate the cargo preference laws (PI 664 of 26 August 1954, Public Resolution 17 of 26 March 1934 and the Act of 28 April 1904), it is equally unlikely that the guaranteeing of 50 per cent of government-impelled cargoes to U. S. flag ships will cease to be a major influence militating against the purchase of ships abroad.
The proposal to mothball some shipyards for use upon M-day activation has a serious defect: people cannot be mothballed. The skilled people who would man such a shipyard, moreover, are needed under conditions short of a declared national emergency when they are more difficult to attract than they would be in a controlled economy in the wake of a declared national emergency.
Two basic conditions are proposed by the authors to qualify for operating subsidy. The administration and management have been striving to reduce manning. They have not succeeded and would fare no better under the proposal of Doctors Clark and Norton, because there is no means “to enforce” as opposed “to strive.” The government can get an agreement on manning schedules, but the schedules they can get agreement on would not reduce manning.
The problem is more basic: labor, has opposed recently and apparently will continue in the future successfully to oppose job losses due to automating a shrinking fleet. Union leaders say bluntly, “We will not automate a corpse.” A new maritime policy was promised by the President in January 1965 and until some kind of long-range program is announced, there is not going to be an atmosphere that will encourage labor-management-government harmony. Recently constructed ships have a manning level of 38 crewmen, as compared to 47 in older ships. Further progress is contingent upon arresting
the steady decline in seagoing jobs.
No consideration has been given by the authors to Agency for International Development (AID) shipments, which are almost as large as all military requirements today, to PL 480 shipments which are considerably larger, nor to the requirements of the U. S. industrial base, which consumes raw materials in quantities about 20 times our total military shipments.
Paying operating subsidy only to shipping judged indispensable to national defense misses the mark in its concept. Instead, we should subsidize only the most efficient and productive ships. Our goal should be to make the merchant marine more competitive. This can be done with ships already designed and ships with smaller crews that have four times the productivity of existing ships.
The method of computing the subsidy should be changed. The subsidy should be paid on the basis of revenue produced to reward the more efficient. It should provide encouragement for larger capital investments. The subsidy can and should be substantially reduced. The goal would be, of course, to eliminate subsidy. If it cannot be eliminated, the country should at least get the most for its tax dollars by subsidizing the most efficient merchant marine that technology can provide.
"The Long, Hard Climb to Professionalism”
(See pages 85-92, February 1967 Proceedings)
Commander Robert N. Rea, U. S. Coast Guard—In the article, the words “indoctrination,” “education,” and “intellectual” are used without adequate definition. Indoctrination involves a teacher with a preset and formed conception, including values. The measure of teaching and learning successes is the ability of the student to reproduce, upon demand, the values or actions indicative of the values. In military terms, it is the problem of having students learn to implement regulations, command decisions, policies, customs, etc., to predetermined standards and specifications.
Education in its purest sense, to use the Colonel’s term, involves a teacher whose function is to help the student form his own conceptions and values. The teacher’s already formed convictions are used only as leverage devices to prod the student to do his own thinking. The end result is an educated man who, in the areas in which he is educated, makes his own judgments, decisions, policies, and who accepts personal responsibility for them.
It is axiomatic that these definitions are too abstract to stand precise empirical testing. It is hard to conceive of a teacher-pupil relationship in which only indoctrination or only education would occur.
Colonel Guelzo suggests that emphasis should be on indoctrination early in the military professional’s career, with a shift to an educational emphasis later. These are two different modes of thinking. The skilled technician responds to a problem seeking the “authority” for the answer. Military procedures are most often thoroughly conceived, tested, documented and crystallized. The executive mind, by which I mean one whose function is to execute the already conceived plan, is a sine qua non of the military style.
The educated man does not so much avoid consideration of the established way as he approaches it with openness to accept or reject, amplify or modify, not only willing but determined to apply his best intellectual powers to the problem.
I am attempting to suggest that there is a fundamental difference here in the manner of the person approaching a problem. The man whose training and survival in an organization are based on indoctrination and compliance may not have experienced the challenge and anxieties of the educated man, who knows and accepts personal responsibility.
Colonel Guelzo rightly suggests that the alternative is equally true. The “immediacy of combat” supports the necessity of a quick, accurate, predictable response from subordinates, which is obtained only through indoctrination. The man dedicated to exercising personal values compulsively is probably not an effective person in the military environment.
My question is whether or not an early and major emphasis on the indoctrination approach without an accompanying educational experience may hamper a later shift to the education approach as proposed by Colonel Guelzo. Why not attempt to develop these
WINGS FOR THE FLEET
By Rear Admiral George van Deurs, U. S. Navy (Retired). A narrative of Naval aviation’s early development, 1910 1916. The story of the trials, tragedies, and triumphs of the men who ventured into the air in the Navy’s first frail aircraft. They patched cooling systems with chewing gum, they lived by “crash, repair, and fly again,” but they succeeded in developing this new service into «an effective arm of the Fleet. Over 100 photographs were selected from official and private sources to illustrate this book.
two capabilities simultaneously?
This raises the question of the objectives of developing the educated man, as distinct from the indoctrinated man. Colonel Guelzo characterizes the professional military man as placing “service above personal and material benefits.” How convenient it is to dismiss ineptness, disregard of personal rights, vestigial, ceremonial, and traditional practices no longer grounded in reality, as part of the inevitable sacrifice of the career military man! And how handy to justify low pay with patriotism and service!
For example, Colonel Guelzo suggests emphasis on indoctrination since that best meets the needs of the service. It may also be asked, if this best serves the needs of the man? If it does, then a happy conjunction exists. If it does not, then we should be prepared to recognize and justify the sacrifice asked of the man, unless we can somehow change things so both his needs and those of the service can be met.
It is my tentative but steadily firming opinion that education better opens up a man’s potential to the fullness of experience than does indoctrination. To look at this another way, some management theorists impose a burden on a supervisor that he help a subordinate develop to his fullest, with an implication that this does not mean merely toward the organization’s task but also toward the man’s personal fulfillment. Job stability is the objective from the organization’s viewpoint; it is incidental if it also means job satisfaction to the man.
Does the service have an obligation to help a career man develop and enjoy his highest potential? If so, is education a better way than indoctrination? It is my opinion that material benefits, above a certain minimum level, are in fact not prime factors in job satisfaction, but personal involvement, self-awareness and consciousness of intellectual processes are paramount. I do not so much propose that education vs. indoctrination be scheduled oflier than as Colonel Guelzo suggests. There must be, however, adequate justification based upon the best analysis possible with today’s knowledge of personality, before asking a man to sacrifice development of himself in depth.
The military services would have to survey
both the formal and informal authoritarian practices which are in effect today, to weed out those no longer really necessary. A greater degree of acceptance of the maverick, the thinker who is not as comfortable to the military as the conformer, may have to be achieved, or else the man most subject to being educated will not reach the level of the war college!
To The or Not to The; In or On a Ship
Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Everybody loves a good argument, especially on whether one serves in or °n a ship, and whether or not the ship’s name is preceded by the.
In the February 1967 issue of Direction, published by the Navy’s Office of Information, four old salts took strong issue with the editor’s previously stated intention to root for elimination of the and promote in.
Rear Admiral G. W. McCormick, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired) seems to be neutral toward in vs. on. As for the, he points out that what was good enough for Mahan, Dudley Rnox, Leland Lovette (Naval Customs, Traditions and Usage), and Hanson Baldwin—all consistent the men—is good enough for him, adding that as a youngster, he [McCormick] would have caused Victor Blue to turn over m his grave had he mentioned the Texas without the the.
Captain Philip J. Rush, U. S. Navy, recalls that some years ago BuPers’ All Hands editor found himself trapped in the middle of outraged groups of the and anti-/Ae partisans until be finally managed to call a truce by suggest- lng that the individual use his own judgment. All Hands took the line that there was no positive evidence of Navy tradition one way or the other, thus guaranteeing the opprobrium of both sides.
Captain Rush explained why the the is used in the U. S. Navy and not in the Royal Navy. Obviously, when written out in full, we have “The United States Ship Constitution rendezvoused with Her Majesty’s Ship Indefatigable.” When abbreviated, we have “The USS Constitution rendezvoused with HMS Indefatigable.” And when shortened still further, “The Constitution rendezvoused with Indefatigable.” Thus, we can properly say “The Constitution,” but neither “Her Indefatigable” nor “The Her Majesty’s Ship” is correct.
Rear Admiral R. E. Melling, U. S. Navy (Retired) believes the fell victim to our postWorld War I tendency toward adulation of the Royal Navy, copying their uniforms and converting to caps that looked more like Lord Beatty’s and less like pillboxes. Thus, reasons Admiral Melling, in addition to Geives uniform styles and Hong Kong tennis togs, much other traditional British usage rubbed off on us—in for on and sporadic elimination of the.
“Let us keep our American tradition and call our ships the USS Tiddlywind, for example!” says Admiral Melling. “Then when I say that I served ‘on the Texas,' no one will imagine that I passed around barbecue at the LBJ ranch!”
Captain Francis S. Craven, U. S. Navy (Retired), agrees with Admiral Melling that the British are behind this nefarious scheme to wipe out the and substitute in. He quotes Truxtun as referring to the Constellation, and cites similar cases in official naval histories of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Captain Craven is also an on man, except in the case of submarines; he adds that the connotation is, “on board.”
Basically, the United States is not a seafaring country, which might influence a tendency toward use of on rather than in a ship. Witness the reaction of a congressman some years ago when taken on board a man-o- war. “My God! The thing is hollow!” he said.
I am inclined to be an on the type myself, the weight of time being on that side. But who can say? After all, a ship is a living thing, like a horse. Preface either’s name with the and that sense of animation is somehow lost.
[Editor s Note: The Proceedings inclines toward the use of in tke.\
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