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E-mail PageDespite its reputation as the most impressive naval force in the world, the U.S. Navy is in trouble, according to the author of this book, and systemic weaknesses could be its undoing. Here, military sociologist Roger Thompson provides a compelling, often scathing, assessment of the U.S. Navy and its learning disabilities and then presents a convincing argument for reform.
Thompson points to the U.S. Navy's "up or out" promotion system, massive personnel turnover, inexperienced crews, and drug and alcohol abuse as problems that make it difficult for the Navy to build cohesive, well-trained fighting units. In a review of the Navy's recent history, he finds that its ships, submarines, and aircraft are often outperformed in competitions and exercises with other navies—and its failures are either denied altogether or perfunctorily excused. Diesel submarines—so quiet that they are rarely detected until it's too late to prevent an attack—routinely surpass expensive U.S. nuclear subs and put U.S. aircraft carriers in danger. American naval pilots, whose weapons are often improperly tested, are frequently bested by military pilots from other countries. Because the U.S. Navy doesn't have enough surface ships to protect its capital ships, American carrier strike groups now use Canadian ships as escorts. Shortcomings like these, Thompson argues, undermine the Navy's potential and should be cause for national concern.
In presenting a side of the U.S. Navy that's rarely discussed, this book spells out lessons the Navy must learn if it is going to succeed in an era of asymmetrical warfare—of David-versus-Goliath conflicts. In his conclusion, the author puts forth a twelve-step program that calls on the U.S. Navy to rethink its naval strategy, to lose some weight, and to focus on the fundamentals.
"Lessons Not Learned is more than a brilliant book. It's an irrefutable case for reform and change in the United States Navy, a service that maintains itself almost exclusively to fight. In the aftermath of America's misguided occupation of Iraq, the United States will rely more than ever on the reach and effectiveness of its naval power. Thompson points the way ahead. The question is will anyone in the Navy Staff listen?" —Douglas Macgregor, PhD, Colonel (Ret.) US Army, author of Transformation under Fire and Breaking the Phalanx
"I was in the Persian Gulf in 1990 as a reporter with the amphibious ready group aboard the USS Gunston Hall, and the World War I–era mines deployed by the Iraqis caused the mighty U.S. Navy to lose command of the sea. As for dealing with small, fast-attack boats, our vaunted Aegis-class cruisers have neither 30mm stabilized guns nor searchlights. The problem is not want of money but want of thought about the real threats facing our fleet. As Roger Thompson argues so eloquently in Lessons Not Learned, big carriers, big submarines, and the admirals who lead them are blocking funds and needed training for capabilities the Navy really needs." —Lt. Col. David Evans, USMC (Ret.), former defense correspondent with the Chicago Tribune
"Roger Thompson raises crucial questions about choices made by the United States with respect to national defense matters. While readers may not agree with every point made here, due regard for the truth demands that each be critically debated. Thompson questions whether investment in technology and sheer size has come at the expense of investment in tactics, strategy, and war-fighting skills—and shows that other navies are superior. He further questions whether adverse psychological and social-political factors inherent in the United States are the reason for its weakness. Is the U.S. Navy learning from its failures? This is a debate of absolute necessity among friends, and well done in this important book." —Prof. Guntram F. A. Werther, Homeland Security Defense University
"Thompson has written the most important military reform book in almost a decade and certainly the most important book for the post-20th century U.S. Navy, ever. The USN is on a collision course with disaster and to try to save it, Thompson ambushes the reader immediately with a flurry of covered-up facts and incidents not unlike the missiles, bombs, torpedoes and sea mines that are going to overwhelm the Navy in real life as it goes down overcome by events (OBE). This book is a slap-in-the-face to make the USN wake up before it's indeed too late since there is no internal constructive criticism taking place now." —Mike Sparks, 1LT, U.S. Army Reserve, editor of Air-Mech-Strike: Asymmetric Maneuver Warfare for the 21st Century
"For nearly a century, the U.S. Navy has been plagued by a self-imposed albatross, an approach to personnel management known as the individual replacement system and the 'up or out' promotion system, also hampered by a force structure developed for warfare of the past and an out-of-date doctrine of mobilization. This has created a culture where only the positive is seen, thus no learning takes place. It encourages a culture of corruption, where only 'yes-men' survive, and adaptation only exists on power point slides. Roger Thompson has conducted a masterpiece of research. Lessons Not Learned tells the story of this self-inflicted wound—how it prevents the Navy as well as the entire U.S. military from evolving and being prepared to fight in the 21st Century. True leaders of our Republic, if there are any, need to take this as the beginning blue print toward revolutionary reform." —Donald E. Vandergriff, author of Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War
"Expertise, independence, and intellectual courage... Roger Thompson, a respected scholar of military and especially US Naval organisation, has all of these things, and the outcome is a thought provoking, and occasionally sobering, contribution to current naval literature... This is a book which will infuriate many people for different reasons, but it is scholarly, well meaning, obviously written by someone who cares, and is therefore hard to dismiss lightly. It is to the credit of the Naval Institute Press that it has been published. May it encourage constructive debate. Recommended."
Thompson cuts through the Navy's massive ego like a knife through butter. He goes back sixty years and points out how luck and the mistakes of adversaries are the main reason why this overrated force has somehow managed to become the world's largest navy. He tells how the U.S. Navy is routinely outclassed, outfoxed and outperformed by other navies and how the Navy has failed to learn from its many mistakes. This book is essential reading for all USN officers, especially those who are more concerned with military effectiveness than their own careers.
Besides the Guide, I've been reading Roger Thompson's recently-released and provocative Lessons Not Learned: The Navy's Status Quo Culture. In detailing what he sees as the Navy's shortcomings—from expensive ships and aircraft that often don't perform up to expectations to serious personnel problems—and offering a twelve-step program for fixing the problems, Thompson opens an important debate on an issue that's crucial to national security in the twenty-first century. The Naval Institute Press regularly publishes such titles. To read this www.Military.com review: http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,133343,00.html
Roger Thompson's thoroughly researched new book fires a warning shot across the Navy's bows. It's a wake-up call for senior military officers and DoD officials. Insightful and thought-provoking, this book provides much food for thought. U.S. Navy officers should heed the problems pointed out by Professor Thompson, and take the necessary corrective steps to set the USN back on course. The USN is the tip of the spear in U.S. military power, and must focus on personnel excellence and combat readiness if it is to survive in the rugged environment of littoral warfare.
"Roger Thompson has spent decades thinking about military culture and the bureaucracy that hampers effectiveness. He has reduced his commentaries, questioning aspects of how the U.S. Navy conducts itself, into a single volume. This book is not for those with delusions of invincibility. It takes a realistic look at adversaries both conventional and asymmetric that could undermine if not defeat U.S. Navy combat platforms. The book ends with 12 suggestions that include learning from best practices of other navies and restoring mine counter-measure warfare capabilities to a level commensurate to a great power. One may disagree with Thompson’s observations and recommendations, however, for those passionate about our Navy, it is necessary to read criticism that is constructive and offers readers a way to reflect on how to solve problems that undermine the United States Navy."
