Noted naval historian Bernard Ireland takes a fresh look at the long and bitter struggle waged by the Allies against Nazi U-boats in the Atlantic. After sifting through the evidence—some just recently released—he questions the popular theory that the Allies triumphed by the narrowest of margins. Calling attention to the massive resources the United States brought to bear both at sea and in American shipyards, as well as advances in technology and the breaking of German enigma codes, he argues that the Allied victory was a foregone conclusion. Ireland cites statistics to show that there were relatively few U-boats and that they suffered a relatively high loss rate despite the terror they provoked on the high seas for some five years. With one in three U-boats being sunk on their first patrol toward the end of the war, he also shows that once the Allies had organized an efficient convoy system that system proved to be the nemesis of the U-boat. Far from revisionist history, this is a closely argued work that provides an important reappraisal of well-established views. Its publication coincides with the sixtieth anniversary of the crisis of the battle.