The triumph of maneuver is, it seems, complete. Not only do the military academies of the West echo to the vocabulary of maneuver, but the doctrine also has achieved its apotheosis in the flawless victory of the Gulf War. The visionaries of the interwar period-mainly British-and the post-Vietnam era mainly American-have been admitted into the pantheon of military orthodoxy: they now receive the plaudits that their prescience and acuity deserve. A self-congratulatory glance at the military landscape would suggest we have discovered a military doctrine that exactly fits our flair for exploiting technology, the native wit of our commanders, and an inherent capacity for thinking faster than any prospective enemy. If so-and to paraphrase Wavell-we are in the enviable position of having discovered the military philosopher's stone. If, however, there is a crack somewhere in this apparently seamless facade, we could be guilty of gross self-delusion, and a hubris that will be revealed only by the salutary lessons of future conflict. This second-and darker-prognosis deserves its voice because the consequences of doctrinal failure are potentially disastrous. Moreover, if we lose the intellectual curiosity that accompanies informed debate, we also will lose the independence of thought that lies at the heart of mission tactics.