War on (Buzz)Words
(See K. Bateman, pp. 20-23, August 2008 Proceedings)
Commander William B. Young, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Kate Bateman's article said it all. When I was going through basic jet training at NAS Pensacola in 1967, the manual on air-to-air gunnery dictated that "Gunnery flights shall consist of a maximum of four aircraft and not less than three." When innocent Ensign Young asked why it couldn't read "either three or four aircraft," I was told that the simpler phraseology "wasn't precise enough." A lot of Navy writing (and speaking) is done by ordinary people who try to sound like lawyers so that they will (they think) be taken seriously. Simple answer: Say what you mean, and mean what you say!
Captain Edmund Shimberg, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I enjoyed reading Kate Bateman's article in the August issue. Right on the money! And I was titillated to read an article later in the issue that, sure enough, used "leverage" when really meaning "use."
The author's well-taken point is not exclusively a problem for DOD and the services. Harry Stack Sullivan, who founded a new way of understanding people and pathology, once wrote words to the effect of, "We speak in a language so obscure that we are unable to communicate with anyone outside of the profession and only have the illusion of communicating with each other."
I have a T-shirt that I wear to the gym from time to time. It reads, "Eschew Obfuscation." People look, read it, and eyes widen. Few ask what it means. Oh well.
Paul J. Madden—The August issue's "War on (Buzz)Words" is timely. Next year's new administration will bring with it a new set of buzz words. The military services will compete with each other by slapping transformational lipstick on their next-generation pigs in hopes that a constituency will spirally develop within the new inner circle.
However, we need more obfuscation, not less. The services should mutually agree to make everything incomprehensible to everyone but themselves (like the old computerese). The executives and politicians will be too embarrassed to admit that it's over their heads.
The Bitter Cost of Business
(See K. S. J. Eyer, pp. 44-49, July 2008; J. T. Rooney, p. 6, August 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Jeffrey B. Barta, U.S. Navy—Regarding Captain Eyer's comments on the Navy's O-6 shortfalls, he states that the service is 439 O-6 billets short and quotes Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral John C. Harvey Jr.: "We cannot produce additional O-6s at the pace the demand signal for them is projected to grow." He then provides a list of retention incentives that may or may not be effective for those already wearing four stripes. When doing so, he forgets that the Navy can indeed "grow" more O-6s by removing the "command screen" barrier for O-5s who have not had command. Many qualified officers would gladly serve as captains and do well given the chance, but are prevented from doing so simply because they did not hold command.
Although there has been much talk of late regarding promotion of "non-traditional" (including non-command pin wearing) officers, this year's Navy O-6 line promotion board selected only one such officer for captain. Unless and until the Navy comes to grips with losing valuable O-5 talent and addresses that issue, the O-6 shortfalls will continue.
Captain John E. O'Neil Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Eyer's article begins with the Chief of Naval Personnel complaining that "the primary officer retention challenge we face today [is] sustaining our O-6 inventory," and that caught my eye. At first glance this read as a serious concern, but then it struck me: Could we have a bunch of self-absorbed money hunters as captains in our Navy? Reviewing the 2008 pay chart, an O-6 with 26 years of service receives a monthly pay of $9,351.90 ($112,222.80 per year) plus the usual tax-free allowances. Additionally, many captains bailing out at 26 years or earlier are not finding the civilian pay scales as generous as they receive on active duty.
My first year of commissioned service?back in the dark ages of the Vietnam War?was a year in country. I was a volunteer, as was almost every senior officer I met there. I subsequently served at sea on eight ships with ten six-month or greater deployments, but in full disclosure I was never asked to take an overseas assignment after my O-6 command.
I am often asked by my former junior officers who have risen to captain what they should do once their O-6 command tour is over. I tell them to consider staying in and working hard at whatever the Navy gives them because the junior Sailors and officers need their skills and leadership. I always told them I stayed on active duty for as long as I did because I liked it, it was fun, and the pay wasn't too bad.
I think the key to Captain Eyer's lengthy description of the O-6 shortage dilemma is that the Chief of Naval Personnel has not made a case for programming (funding) the individual augmentee (IA) billets into the O-6 officer file. If we are going to continue to send all ranks and pay grades to those challenging IA assignments?and apparently many O-6 non-programmed billets overseas?then we need to find a flag officer in the personnel business who is experienced enough to program and fund those billets. Next we can select enough O-6s to take those billets, do the job, and return home to assume a senior staff or training billet to put his/her experiences to work!
The Navy leadership must fund the IA billets and adjust the O-6 selection rate accordingly. Finally, fellow captains, suck it up and take up the challenge of the assignments that our Navy and nation need in this lengthy time of war!
Commander Milton Gussow, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Eyer does an excellent job dissecting the mind of the post-major command captain and the business attitude of the Navy as the two coupling factors leading to many of these O-6s retiring from the service and, thus, causing a critical shortage of needed experience.
Among the retired Navy captains I know in the defense industry, most had a major command, often as commanding officer of an Aegis cruiser. They left the Navy when passed over for flag rank, as there was no longer any incentive for them to stay. The "promotion up or retirement out" policy is long standing. As a group, major-command captains are talented, workaholic, fluent in naval matters, and knowledgeable in the Navy's most advanced combat systems. It is not surprising, therefore, that they are eagerly sought by industry.
As Captain Eyer has pointed out, there is no simple solution to retain captains who have had a major command. The sentiment after World War II that "I love the Navy and will stay in until they kick me out" is no longer prevalent. He presents four approaches by which the Navy could mitigate the problem: (1) offer a bonus, (2) provide choices for post-command billets, (3) limit micromanaging them, and (4) link major command to a post-command billet. I would offer a fifth approach over which the captain and the Navy have no control.
I would suggest reinstating a Statement of Employment (DD Form 1357 dated 1 May 63), which I was obligated to sign when I retired in 1967 and sign again when I changed employment in 1978 (DD Form 1357 dated 1 Jan 77) to ensure that I was not engaged in any activity, real or perceived, that sold a product or advanced the interests of my defense employer to the military services. This restriction began with the era of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who was very emphatic that there should be no conflict of interest between the military establishment and defense industry. This factor, I believe, contributed to fewer retired naval officers being hired by industry from 1961 to about 1985, compared with the number today.
If a similar document were imposed on retirees now, the captains may have an incentive to stay in the Navy longer. The notion that this event may occur is not far-fetched in light of ongoing discussions within the government on curbing the current frequency of the "revolving door" syndrome.
Supporting the Services
(See J. F. Kelly Jr., p. 8, August 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas A. Davis, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Kelly's argument that "civilianizing" Navy (or Defense Department-wide) non-combat functions and organizing them on the business model allows active duty personnel to concentrate on performing combat functions appears fundamentally flawed.
First, it seems like fiscal hocus-pocus that the functions of personnel acquisition, training, and support could be more efficiently carried out by assigning them to civilian companies. Hypothetically, it might be argued that civilianizing could be done more economically, but in my view the advantages are mostly imaginary. A system cost is a cost no matter what name it is given.
The personnel training function, from acquisition to assignment to a combat unit, is a nearly fixed cost no matter if it is solely contained within military funding or performed by a civilianized component and funded from another pocket. The funding disappears from direct military funding and reappears somewhere else, but in any case it does not come free.
Second, the now discredited principle of a self-contained training organization in the Navy (and the other services as well) had its foundation in the belief that there were no better teachers to train personnel for combat than combat-experienced military personnel—ask the Marines about that. The civilianization process can only rely on teachers who are retired combat veterans or have left the combat forces early to perform the training function for a civilian organization. This civilianization approach only works in peacetime or pseudo peacetime, such as exists now. As an added benefit, the self-contained model allowed combat personnel time off the front lines to rest and recuperate between combat tours while passing their combat experience on to trainees.
Captain Kelly mentions that "traditional functions, such as seamanship, shiphandling, and navigation training have been contracted out to civilian companies," and also the operation of support ships. This, he says, is because the "smaller, leaner Navy doesn't have experienced officers to spare from operational duties to conduct such training." This Wizard of Oz stuff—"don't pay any attention to the man behind the curtain"—may reflect the kind of thing Congress buys off on these days, but it is no substitute for preparing for war.
The American automobile industry has argued itself into much the same corner with respect to foreign competition as the Navy has regarding combat training. The auto industry has tried to be cost efficient through, among other things, automation and novel management philosophies. So essential has this approach become that auto company management and goals have been taken over by management specialists who know little about automobiles, the primary product of the industry. As a result, GM, Ford, and Chrysler now "efficiently" turn out inferior products that fall far short of what the foreign competition offers and buyers want. As applied to the U.S. Navy, the leaders have become focused only on what are defined as "combat functions." As a result, the personnel are being worn out through continuous assignment to the cutting edge of military operations which, in my view, threatens to break the blade itself.
Widen the Lens for JHSV
(See R. K. Morrison III and P. E. Pournelle, pp. 54-58, June 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Glenn Macario, U.S. Navy Reserve—Commander Morrsion and Lieutenant Commander Pournelle made many excellent and valid points regarding the HSV-2 Swift in their article. Unfortunately, they restated some common inaccuracies about civilian-manned naval vessels.
On page 57 the article states, "civilian-manned ships will not be expected to contribute to maritime domain awareness, enter potential combat zones, or board and search suspected vessels."
On the contrary, Military Sealift Command's owned and contracted vessels (all manned by civilians) contribute extensively to maritime domain awareness. From the ocean surveillance vessels with their SURTSS arrays and oceanographic survey ships, to a SOSUS cable layer and the Observation Island, there are at least 15 civilian-manned vessels that routinely contribute and have done so for decades.
As far as entering potential combat zones, from 1775 to the present day, the U.S. Merchant Marine has always answered the call of duty in transporting war materiel to hostile waters. The past 30 years alone have seen civilian mariners consistently enter harm's way, such as the Operation Earnest Will convoys of the 1980s when Bridgeton struck a mine and Sea Isle City was hit by a missile; Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when more than 100 U.S. civilian-manned ships entered the declared war zone to dodge mines and Scud missiles; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where dozens of these same ships faced the same hazards in the same area. I challenge any reader to produce evidence of a single U.S.-flagged and -manned merchant vessel or USNS that refused to enter a war zone or hazardous area.
The last comment about not being able to board a suspect vessel is true, but there is no problem with having civilians operate the mother ship that launches the small boat with the boarding team. Precedent has already been set. A converted ocean surveillance vessel has been used to carry a rigid-hull inflatable boat and a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment for boarding drug vessels. The USNS Catawba (T-ATF-168) launched a boarding team in the Persian Gulf in 2000.
A final comment in the same sentence says the civilian crews "will not be able to carry out the wide range of missions the Swift has already carried out" (or may carry out). Many of these missions are listed on page 57. Suffice it to say, civilian-manned ships have already "been there, done that" with most of the missions listed. Some probably have more experience than their military-manned counterparts.
Civilian crews are not the answer to everything. I can't see the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) painted bright blue with "MAERSK LINE LIMITED" down her side. Combat roles are exclusively for the military component. But for much of what is left, the civilian world offers a very flexible, experienced, professional, and cost-effective alternative.
Let's Have One Book for Every Sailor, Too
(See S. F. Davis Jr., p. 14, April 2008; G. R. Nugent, pp. 11, 46, May 2008 Proceedings)
Captain John E. Jackson, U.S. Navy (Retired), Director, Navy Professional Reading Program—No one in the Fleet was a more ardent supporter of the Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) than the late Captain Stephen F. Davis Jr., whose "Nobody Asked Me, But. . ." in the April issue raised several issues that deserve a little clarification. His outstanding initiatives as CO of the Vella Gulf (CG-72) to promote reading included encouragement, rewards, and public recognition. As such, he demonstrated the exact type of deck-plate leadership that is needed Navy-wide to inculcate a habit of reading in all Sailors. His article takes issue, however, with several of the design elements that, we believe, make the Navy program stand out from the literally thousands of reading lists that are found by a quick Google search of the Internet.
We would agree that, were all 60 titles in the NPRP intended to be read by an individual, it would indeed be daunting. In reality, the complete NPRP library consists of five distinct 12-book collections, each tailored to a specific experience-level. The program does include 60 titles, but no one is expected to read all of them. The library has been segmented by subject area and stratified by experience level as a service to readers who desire an indication of where they might begin. All books are open and available to all Sailors, and the program's structure should be viewed merely as an aid to finding a book that fits the reader's interests and experience.
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead recently expressed his total commitment to the NPRP, but went on to state that Sailors "should not limit themselves to only these books . . . but should use these titles as a starting point to expand their intellectual horizons." He believes "reading, discussing, and understanding the concepts found in these books will improve our ability to think critically and fight smarter."
The NPRP as a whole, and the books in the "Naval and Military Heritage" section in particular, exist to help Sailors identify with their proud history and centuries of selfless service. The late Captain Davis embraced this idea, as noted in his eulogy that was so eloquently spoken by his friend and shipmate Captain Gerry Roncolato:
Steve looked at history as a tool to help shape our perspectives on today's events; to dampen the variations in our outlook as we are buffeted by the winds and seas of daily crises; to provide a guiding star to get us through the long nights when our sense of direction is assaulted by pressures seen and unseen. He taught us that history matters; that getting and staying connected with our past and our heritage is important, even more so in times of great change and uncertainly like today.
The NPRP is intended to be an evolving program, and five additional books will be distributed later this year to update the libraries with recently published books relevant to Navy professionals at all levels. We hope everyone will take the time to become a frequent reader. As the old adage goes: "Reading is to the mind what exercise is to the body."
Seagoing Rails
(See E. J. Walsh, p. 86, April 2008 Proceedings)
C. Henry Depew—Ed Walsh's April column is the harbinger of the demise of airborne military assets of all types. The electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG) that was successfully test-fired is the equivalent to gun powder development in terms of maximum striking power for minimal effort. Like the development of an effective firearm, it will take some time to get a portable EMRG and develop the electrical generation/storage capacity. But the development will happen in the near future, and the success of that development will have an impact on any target in range (and the range will increase with time).
If the defender ties an effective targeting radar system to the EMRG, any aircraft or missile in range is no longer an effective weapon platform or weapon. Even if the EMRG can only project at 1,000 mph, what you see is what you hit. The higher the carry speed of the launched projectile, the less time to impact and the more kinetic energy transfer to the target. The major development problem that comes to mind is an effective ablative to coat the projectile to decrease the "melting" thereof as it moves quickly through the atmosphere.