"'Open the Gates'"
(See B. Greeley. pp. 52-60, June 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Michael Collins, U.S. Naval Reserve—Congratulations to Colonel Greeley on his fascinating and comprehensive article. The U.S. Naval Institute has done its members a great service by bringing the candid, high-level discussions of the Cantigny Seminar to the public forum.
Of all the thought-provoking things in Colonel Greeley's article, I was appalled by the fact that some members of Congress do not fill their allotted nominations to the service academies.
My appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy changed my life forever, and for the better. It was an unexpected bolt from the blue, in part because I found little support from my high school counselors, and because, as the child of a lifelong Democrat and union man with no political connections, I received my nomination from a Republican, Congresswoman Margaret Heckler (R-MA).
When I asked my guidance counselor (with a Ph.D., no less!) about the U.S. Naval Academy, at first he confused it with the Massachusetts Maritime Academy, then shrugged his shoulders and said, "You're smart enough to go to college. You don't have to join the Navy." He had no information and sent me to the Navy recruiter. I found the information I needed through other channels.
I was a good student-athlete who was recruited for top-shelf institutions such as Harvard and Boston College. The enthusiasm of those schools changed, however, when they saw my financial aid needs. Being the third of six kids born to working parents meant my folks earned too much to qualify me for most financial aid, but not enough to actually afford college. One by one those hot recruiting pitches turned into waiting lists.
The Naval Academy's admissions staff was not concerned about my family's connections, or finances, or anything else. They were concerned with me as an individual, and my ability to become a naval officer.
Sure, I attended school with the sons and daughters of privilege. But I also attended school with the kids of mailmen, and public school teachers, and police officers. The five federal service academies (Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine) offered then—and offer today—an opportunity for unlimited personal growth and achievement that transcends class, race, and wealth. They have prep schools, too. For members of Congress to fail to offer such opportunities to their constituents is poor constituent service indeed.
"The Marines Have Quit Their Posts"
(See W. Holland, p. 112, June 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—This article shows that for years the Marines have been in the vanguard of "transformation" by dumping unnecessary legacy systems. For 200 years they guarded the Navy's yards and boats and never lost one! It was time to move on. Continue to fire on the uproll, Admiral.
"Broaden the SSBN's Punch"
(See K. Perry, pp. 34-36, June 2002 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Miles B. Wachendorf, U.S. Navy, Directory, Strategy and Policy (N51)—Commander Perry advocates arming some of the 24 Trident missiles on ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with conventional warheads. There are several serious issues that need to be resolved before the Navy should consider this course of action. These include:
- What is the unique capability that conventional submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) offer? Commander Perry correctly states that the SSBN launch platform has a very high degree of stealth and reliability, but what new military capability do conventional SLBMs give to the joint force commander? As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated repeatedly before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May during his explanation of why he recommended terminating the Crusader artillery program, there already are a wide range of overlapping conventional strike capabilities in the U.S. military.
- If conventional SLBMs are justified by a unique military capability, why not place these conventional warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) rather than SSBNs? Land-based ICBMs are significantly cheaper to operate than SLBMs on SSBNs.
- What is the cost of using conventional warheads on SLBMs? The initial unit procurement cost of an unimproved accuracy Trident D-5 missile without any warhead is about $35 million. The unit cost of an Army tactical missile (ATACM) with similar flight characteristics and better accuracy in the final phase of flight is $700,000. The ATACM is an operational weapon system. There would be significant additional cost associated with improved accuracy or hardened, deeply buried target warhead design and flight testing for an improved conventional SLBM.
- What is the impact on nuclear weapon targeting of removing nuclear warheads from some of the 24 SLBMs carried on Trident subs? The Treaty of Moscow has not yet been ratified by the Senate and Duma, but it calls for reducing operational strategic nuclear warheads by more than half. The value of each remaining operational strategic warhead would increase at these lower levels.
- What is the risk that the launch of a conventional SLBM might be interpreted as a nuclear strategic strike that could result in an adversary or even a third party conducting its own nuclear strategic strike? Remember that scenarios involving use of SLBMs are almost certain to involve increased tensions between belligerent states. Also consider that space-based infrared sensors that detect the large amount of heat released during missile boost do not provide accurate trajectory track predictions. There is also the issue of over-flight of nuclear states. For these and other reasons, SLBMs and their launchers are regulated by several international notification and arms control agreements that are not applicable to conventional weapon systems.
- What are the risks of collateral damage from missile component fallback along the SLBM flight path? Details of this risk are classified, but the warhead (conventional or nuclear) is not the only destructive part of an SLBM that strikes the earth.
The author suggests that potential adversaries believe that the United States must delay responding to an attack to reposition military forces. This may be true for garrison forces, but the U.S. Navy is not a garrison force. In fact, almost immediately after the attacks of 11 September, the U.S. Navy had two carrier battle groups and a large number of Tomahawk missiles within strike range of Afghanistan. The Navy-Marine Corps team also had a combat-ready amphibious ready group with a Marine expeditionary unit embarked on station. Although Afghanistan was not the focus of major theater war plans, these mobile, flexible, credible, and lethal forces were ready to attack targets more than 700 miles inland in a matter of hours after the first plane hit the World Trade Center.
The author also describes SSBNs as the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. That may have been true when the article was written, but the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review redefined the U.S. Strategic Triad to consist of nuclear and nonnuclear strike, defenses, and responsive infrastructure.
"The Shoal Waters of Homeland Security"
(See M. Kelley, pp 65-70, May 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Paul J. Roden, U.S. Coast Guard, Deputy, Office of Systems Deepwater Integration—I'd like to congratulate and thank Commander Kelley for adding his excellent article to the discussion regarding the Coast Guard's role as the lead agency in maritime homeland security. My only concern is with the subtitle, which suggests that the homeland security mission could threaten funding for the Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) Program.
On the contrary, a broader understanding of how Deepwater assets contribute to the Coast Guard's homeland security strategy leads to the conclusion that the homeland security mission should drive increased funding for this program. It will become apparent to the Department of Defense, Congress, and the U.S. taxpayers that a fully funded IDS program will be the best investment to property equip and fully prepare the Coast Guard to meet every maritime challenge of the 21st century.
The Coast Guard has taken enormous strides to protect our ports and waterways, but the front lines of our homeland security efforts lie far from our ports and harbors. The Coast Guard must have the capability to meet threats and challenges before they reach our shores. We need the ability to detect, intercept, and interdict potential threats on the high seas, using a layered defense of major cutters, patrol boats, and maritime patrol aircraft, and Deepwater is a key element in this equation. I'd like to summarize just some of the expected benefits that Deepwater will bring to the Coast Guard mission of homeland security both in active surveillance and interdiction, as well as in reactive response.
Deepwater is already a flexible, multimission, multi-asset, system of systems program that will acquire and/or modernize the Coast Guard's tools necessary for homeland security. The contract will most likely be in place by the time this goes to print. The anticipated benefits of improved interoperability, situational awareness, and intelligence/information sharing will benefit all of the more than 14 federally mandated Deepwater missions, including our new priority of homeland security. The Deepwater solutions proposed by the competing industry teams were built on the task sequence of surveil, detect, classify, identify, and prosecute. This sequence is carried out in the successful completion of all Coast Guard missions whether search and rescue, general defense, alien migration interdiction, or homeland security.
The requirements document for the IDS program, the Integrated Deepwater System Performance Specification (SPS), was developed in 1997 with incredible forethought. The SPS is intentionally broad to include the widest range of possible future scenarios. Deepwater requirements were developed with consideration to numerous studies that identified the rise in terrorism and asymmetric threats.
Deepwater assets, and an Integrated Deepwater System, will directly contribute to each of the five principles of the Coast Guard's Homeland Security Strategy:
- Build maritime domain awareness
- Ensure controlled movement of high-interest vessels
- Enhance presence and response capabilities
- Protect critical infrastructure and enhance Coast Guard force protection
- Increase domestic and international outreach
The improved command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities will contribute directly to the Coast Guard's ability to achieve maritime domain awareness—the effective knowledge and understanding of the vessels, cargoes, and people within the maritime environment (as well as their activities and intent). This allows the Coast Guard to anticipate and respond to potential threats in a timely fashion. In addition, Deepwater's improved C4ISR capabilities will be interoperable with Navy systems and other domestic agencies in providing maritime domain awareness and improved domestic interagency communication and coordination. IDS assets are designed to provide enhanced speed and weaponry to interdict identified threats. The multimission design of Deepwater assets enables the Coast Guard to respond to the gamut of threats, protecting our infrastructure in our ports and harbors as well as far out to sea. Deepwater assets are designed to maintain an extended on-scene presence and provide the optimal command-and-control capability. Finally, not only is international engagement primarily a Deepwater mission, but the IDS solution also provides an affordable means for our allies to purchase interoperability via foreign military sales.
The IDS program will provide best value to the American public through a bold, innovative, and flexible acquisition philosophy. The Coast Guard will establish a long-term partnership with a system integrator and together we will use systems engineering and modeling to design and implement the most cost-effective integrated system within the given constraints of acquisition and operating expense funds.
"John F. Kennedy: Where Were the Chiefs?"
(See R. Jackson, p. 73, April 2002; F. Klinkenberger, pp. 10-12, May 2002; P. Pierce, A. McLean, pp. 14-18, June 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Chris Johnson, U.S. Navy (Retired)—As I read it, many of the comments regarding this article coming from active-duty chief petty officers are, at their essence, urging that the article's title should become "John F Kennedy: Where Was the Fleet Commander?" I am quite willing to agree with such a (theoretical) change; in fact, I would like to see an article from the Atlantic Fleet maintenance office on this subject. The chief petty officer (CPO) community, however, has no right to gripe about the current article's focus if the CPO mess in the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) cannot convincingly answer "yes" to each of the following questions:
- Did the CPO mess understand the depth and breadth of material problems on the ship?
- Did the chiefs do everything within their power to remedy them?
- Did the CPO mess foresee the coming Board of Inspection and Survey review debacle?
- Did the chiefs, individually and collectively, do their duty to tell command, in courageous, candid, and persuasive ways, that a disaster was looming?
If not, then the article's title is appropriate, regardless of the failings of the chain of command outside the ship.
Midshipman Michael J. Campbell, U.S. Navy—While the failure of a unit to fulfill expectations during an inspection is the failure of the unit as a whole, blame certainly can be assigned. In this article, the chiefs were blamed whole-heartedly for egregious mistakes in judgment and leadership, and yet the commanding officer was summarily relieved. The commanding officer of any ship is ultimately responsible for the well-being of that ship, but the subordinates are individually responsible for their shares of the operation of the unit. I concede that the points made about the good qualities of a chief are accurate in this article, but I would add that most of those qualities must be present in the officer leadership that is above the chiefs. If the junior enlisted are lax in their responsibilities, the chiefs are to blame, but when the chiefs themselves are the problem, the next place to look is the junior officers and division officers. A chief must have principles, responsibility, and initiative, but an officer must have the same qualities to a greater extent.
The officers on board a ship are the leaders of the leaders, so to speak. The chiefs are responsible to their duties, but the officers are doubly responsible for ensuring that the chiefs are successful in their assigned tasks. A comment was made that over time chiefs have complained about the lack of responsibility and the lack of respect from the wardroom. This is a debacle of leadership from the officer ranks, not the chiefs. When the chiefs are failing, and straining to fulfill their duties, it is the officer's duty to correct the problem. Officers are trained to lead the enlisted, and make each division operate smoothly, and thus, if the division is not operating smoothly, then ultimate responsibility lies in the division officers' hands. Responsibility is not a trait that is merely decided on, it is learned and ingrained through the trial of being given the larger and more prominent responsibilities and given the proper leadership to be guided through to success. The lack of responsibility is as much a product of the chiefs as it is a product of the shortcomings of the officers.
I maintain that the officers are as much to blame for the failure of the ship as the chiefs are. The relationship between the senior enlisted and the officers is symbiotic. One cannot survive, much less succeed, without the other. Not only are the successes limited by the actions of the other, but the shortcomings are also defined by the shortcomings of the partner in the relationship. A well-run ship is operated by both the officers and the enlisted, and can prosper only if this relationship is maintained. Leadership is the job of the officers; the initiative to act on that leadership is the responsibility of the enlisted. In response to the question "Where Were the Chiefs?" I counter with the question of "Where Were the Officers?" Officers are given rank because they are to lead. If there is a consistent failure in the lower ranks, the blame falls on the shoulders of the leader. The chiefs are not wholly to blame, but neither are the officers. Both groups had their discrepancies, and therefore, both have claim to the problem.
"Cashiering Freedom for Security"
(See J. Brower, p. 42, November 2001 Proceedings)
Dale Shantz—The terrorists could achieve their objectives, no matter what the outcome of the counterattack, if the words of people like the author are heeded. Mr. Brower advocates a prescription for destroying the legitimacy of government, in the same way that the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East and Central Asia have forgone the respect and loyalty of their own citizens, and bred terrorists such as bin Laden.
It is analogous to what was advocated by the central government in London in the mid-1700s to deal with violent activities by the Indians, French, and other interests hostile to the security of the colonies. Many agreed, as they do now, but others had the interesting notion that ordinary citizens were at least as competent in assessing security risks as was the bureaucracy, especially when the bureaucrats never seemed to quite find a limit to what security risk happened to be.
The resultant revolution established the longest-lasting stable free society the world has ever seen. If we were to follow the author's advice, we would give up the only thing that differentiates us from societies that have not enjoyed such stability, making us like those societies which are attacking us.
Fortunately, we have ignored such suggestions when dealing with earlier terrorist attacks. There was a time when we pledged "our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor" in defense of the freedoms that Mr. Brower proposes we surrender in the face of a band of scruffy radicals. Should his ends be achieved, I suspect we will once again deal with the issue as we have done before, on a new Lexington Green. No doubt that action would be called a "terrorist action" by such as Mr. Brower.
"It's Time for Universal National Service"
(See S. Cohen, p. 4, May 2002 Proceedings)
"Learn to Love the Gap"
(See S. Tangredi, pp. 36-39, May 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Joe Fanning, U.S. Navy—This article by Mr. Cohen inverts and perverts the relationship between the citizens and state envisioned by our country's founders. The state is the citizens' servant, not the other way around; the citizens are not a pool of people waiting "to be trained, organized, and disciplined" by the federal government.
It is contradictory, if not Orwellian, for Cohen to assert that in depriving people of their liberty by requiring two years of universal national service we "would go a long way toward protecting and strengthening our country." His proposal would undoubtedly strengthen the federal government; "government," however, is not synonymous with "the country."
His idea of involuntary servitude on behalf of the state is the antithesis of "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness," the individual-rights philosophy under which our country was founded. Moreover, the Constitution—that quaint document that all officers swear to uphold—provides no authority to compel universal national service.
The author's main argument in favor of universal national service is that it will counter the civil-military gap. As Captain Tangredi points out, the significance of the gap is debatable. In any event, the perception—if not truth—that the U.S. Left does not like the military is not an overwhelming national emergency worthy of the mass deprivation of liberty that Cohen suggests.
Cohen believes "young people... will be exposed to discipline and experience the demands and satisfaction of teamwork . .bringing alive the ideals of citizenship." Why is it the federal government's job to indoctrinate anyone, no matter how virtuous the ideals might be? This liberty-- loving American naturally recoils from the notion of federal programming or social engineering; I suspect others feel the same way.
The sorts of service Cohen suggests—"domestic, social-service" and the military—clearly are laudable. Keep in mind, however, that we live in a free country, one predicated on individual choice. Those who share this view will voluntarily pursue these tasks. Those who vote "no," however, should not be compelled to labor against their will. We must not destroy liberty to save it.
Commander Albert P. Beltrami, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—This commentary was right on point. Even without 9/11, it has been time for a serious discussion and action relating to universal national service for all U.S. youth. With changing demands and pressures, the opportunity for high school graduates (or drop-outs) to serve in a national structured environment, military or not, provides the chance to broaden experiences and acquaintances, become more mature in a positive setting, and give service to the national interest, while still exerting personal decision.
The need for greater national experience with the military is more evident than ever, but the need to serve one's nation and fellow citizens is even greater, especially today in the light of foreign ideologies and beliefs that can only be termed bizarre.
Congratulations to Mr. Cohen for raising the issue forthrightly. As a precrazy University of California at Berkeley grad, I find his "elite" eastern private school reference a bit of a bore, but our kids can compare academics in the new universal national service setting. It may even open minds to new information away from the political correctness of the "elite" schools and Berkeley.
"Bring Back the Privateer"
(See D. Winters, p. 112, April 2002; R. Bollinger, p. 20, May 2002 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral T D. Beard III, New Jersey State Guard, Commander, New Jersey Naval Militia Joint Command—The author's concerns about illegal immigration, illegal drugs, contraband, and terrorists are very real in today's world. I am not sure that a privateer organization would give us the results desired, and could resuit in uncontrolled boardings and illegal activities carried out for the good of the nation.
I think we should look into the concept of 1776—the volunteer naval militia, which are organized at the state level, are legal by their states and the federal government, and are a recognized part of the state military system, contributing to homeland defense and coastal security.
An outstanding example is the New Jersey Naval Militia, Joint Command, a volunteer force under the direction and control of the governor and the adjutant general of New Jersey. It has functioned in total harmony with the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and New Jersey National Guard since 9/11, providing water-borne support on federal and state projects, guarding nuclear power plants, naval facilities, bridges and waterways. These volunteers are effective. They know the coasts and commercial waterways, and best of all, they are serving their fellow citizens of New Jersey, their homes and their families. That is a true vested interest. Also, they have proved to all that they can and are doing the job, shoulder-to-shoulder with reserve and active-duty personnel.
"We Are Lifesavers, Guardians, and Warriors"
(See B. Stubbs, pp. 50-53, April 2002; R. Desh, pp. 20-22, June 2002 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Steven J. Gulitti, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—I must take issue with the claim that we are naval warriors. Captain Stubbs himself points out that the participation rate of officers with afloat experience is at 12% of the total officer corps, with the marine safety career field having the largest concentration of commissioned officers. The April edition of Coast Guard, our in-house organ, pointed out that only 2% of the enlisted force request sea duty on their "dream sheets" after their initial assignments out of boot camp. Many enlisted people in the Coast Guard do whatever they can to avoid a shipboard billet. It is evident in the difficulty we have had in our radioman rating, where there is a high proportion of afloat billets to the overall number of billets within a rating. It is evident in the large numbers of chief electricians' mates who chose not to compete for senior chief because it meant an afloat billet on a high-endurance cutter.
Over the past decade, the dollar amounts allocated within the yearly Coast Guard budget that go to military readiness have been the smallest portion by category among all the various mission segments. Moreover, all of our medium-endurance cutters are too old or slow for the fast pace of modern naval operations. As the author himself points out, we stripped much of the weapon systems off of our large cutters. Our 110-foot patrol boat has a practical "at sea" staying power of less than one week. Such limitations would make any serious use of Coast Guard cutters within a high-threat environment questionable if not altogether too high in unacceptable risks. The fact that cutters accompany naval battle groups overseas from time to time in a peacetime environment says nothing about their suitability or staying power in a hot war zone.
While I have no doubt about the level of patriotism and devotion among the rank and file, our traditionally humanitarian orientation is opposed to the mind-set of a warrior. People who join the Coast Guard are drawn to the lifesaving appeal of the service. Likewise, a large number of recruits see the law enforcement aspect of the Coast Guard as a stepping-stone to a career in civilian law enforcement. To be a warrior one must be trained in the arts of warfare and socialized into a group that has war fighting as its reason for existing. The role and behavior of the warrior must be constantly reinforced. This is not likely to occur in a service, albeit military that spends most of its time dealing in an environment that is regulatory by nature and whose contra parties are civilians engaged in maritime and commercial endeavors.
Contrast the persona of a young Marine or Army Ranger to that of a Coast Guardsman and I think one will see what I mean when I speak about what it means to be a warrior. Policemen, firefighters, and construction workers all are exceptionally patriotic and loyal citizens, but none are warriors as a byproduct of those social attitudes and orientation. There is much more to being a warrior than being in a military service and having taken an oath to defend the nation against enemies both foreign and domestic.
The watershed events of 9/11 have thrust many of our organizations away from certain roles and toward others made all the more urgent by the scope and stealth of the terror attacks. The shape our organization takes in the next few years certainly will be determined by what course the nation pursues in the war on terror. Absent another dramatic and disastrous attack, it likely will resemble an anticrime campaign at the domestic level with little in the way of real naval warfare. If that is the course that events take, we will be more than able to fulfill our role in domestic counterterrorism by playing out our part as guardians rather than in attempting to be naval warriors. Theoretically, we are closer to the FBI agent or the state trooper than we are to the person of a warrior.
If events lead us in the direction of naval warfare, the Coast Guard will need to recruit and train, at all levels, a body of sailors who are at home at sea as well as ashore. These sailors will need up-to-date platforms, adequate sustained funding, and most important, a true Coast Guard naval warfare doctrine with which to guide future operations.
"Sunk Costs Sink Innovation"
(See T. Pierce, pp. 32-35, May 2002; M. Mathis, pp. 12-14, June 2002 Proceedings)
"CEC Provides Theater Air Dominance"
(See P. Balisle, T. Bush, pp. 60-62, May 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Ken Conklin, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Pierce has collected titillating tidbits and headlines from many unsubstantiated news articles and passed them off as "fact" in his article. This article belongs in the National Enquirer, not Proceedings.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) allows real-time integrated antiair warfare (AAW) by netting battle force AAW sensor data into a single real-time composite view of the battle space. The CEC development process has been long and rigorous. CEC has undergone 11 major underway test periods leading to one of the most impressive operational evaluation's ever seen. CEC provides major advances in the way we fight time-critical AAW. When our ships face cruise missiles in a highly cluttered littoral scenario, the superior performance of CEC extends the battle space, removes the fog of battle, and significantly improves the targeting of weapons. Just what the war fighter wants!
This level of performance has not been proven by the tactical component network (TCN). TCN's performance is limited by its design and not configured for the stressing AAW scenario. TCN's performance is strongly overstated in the article. TCN has never been demonstrated in the aggressive CEC test scenarios. Warren Citrin broke away from the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (APL) to create a business. His salesman-like comments about CEC and APL are intended to sell his products and should not be considered fact. Comments about CEC are also in error. CEC processors are far above Commodore 64 vintage and are in the process of being updated, again. CEC unit costs are misstated by a factor of ten.
I admit, I am a card-carrying CECer and surface warrior. I have worked surface warfare air dominance for more than 35 years and have worked CEC for the majority of its life. I enjoy the fact that CEC is designed to do battle in the most stressing scenarios. If it were my son going into battle, I would want him to have CEC.
Lieutenant Commander Steven S. Aronson, U.S. Naval Reserve—Admiral Balisle, Captain Bush, and Captain Pierce offer an insightful and provocative vision of our evolving Navy. Captain Pierce, however, is premature in his assessment that the tactical component network (TCN) is ready to replace the cooperative engagement capability (CEC).
Although command and control (C&C) systems and integrated combat systems (ICS) may overlap in function and operation, we risk the success of our mission and lives of our sailors by confusing them. C&C systems are tools that decision makers use to understand and influence the battle space. ICS is the tool an operator uses to employ weapons effectively against targets.
Rapid innovation of ICS is inherently more challenging and risky then C&C systems. Admiral Balisle described the evolution of CEC to become an element of the ICS extending air dominance operationally beyond the lifelines. CEC followed the rigorous path of test and evaluation that must be adhered to in allowing safe and effective employment of sophisticated lethal weapons. New C&C systems can be quickly fielded as demonstration projects during exercises with little risk. The danger of an ineffective decision during an exercise pales in comparison to losing control of a supersonic missile. Captain Pierce promotes TCN as ready to replace CEC. He demonstrates the C&C ability of TCN and speculates its ICS potential. Captain Pierce proves his argument that TCN may be the next step for the Navy's network-centric warfare revolution. He does not, however, demonstrate that it is ready to become an element of an ICS. If TCN's C&C ability merits acceptance onto our ships, incremental rigorous testing of its ICS potential will become cost effective.
TCN may be the combined command-and-control integrated combat system of the future. CEC is the multiship ICS for today.
"Match Missile Defense & Tridents"
(See D. Vaughn, p. 2, January 2002 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral James H. Doyle Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Vaughn is on target when he refers to Aegis ships employed in homeland defense against ballistic missiles. But his vision of employing Trident submarines as launchers for ballistic missile interceptors is flawed and distracting.
The ballistic missile threat is real, growing, and spreading. Reacting to this threat, the Secretary of Defense has mandated pressing on with fielding a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system "that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight against all ranges of threats." There no longer is a distinction between theater and national missile defense. The at-sea component of BMD vitality rests in its mobility at all times on the international oceans of the world and employed in mutual defense in depth with other naval components and with landand space-based components.
The quickest and most cost-effective way to achieve a ship-based BMD is to capitalize on the Navy's 50 years of experience in air defense systems engineering and operations in peace and war. That experience now resides in more than 60 standing Aegis cruisers and destroyers, with another 25 destroyers on the building ways. This fleet has all the infrastructure, seasoned personnel, and engineering and training resources required to transform to the BMD mission. The Navy is making and proofing the necessary modifications to this fleet, including radars, computer programs, auxiliary systems, instrumentation, training base, and Standard surface-to-air missiles in several flavors. The fire control systems are being engineered to operate across the entire trajectory of attacking missiles, beginning when the missile is first detected—all within the operational framework of reaction time, firepower, coverage, countermeasures, and availability.
On 25 January and again on 13 June, in trials off the Hawaiian Islands, the USS Lake Erie (CG-70), equipped with the Aegis Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile computer programs and equipment, rapidly detected a ballistic missile target with her long-range SPY-1 phased array radar, achieved a prompt fire control track and solution, and engaged with the newly developed Standard missile 3 (SM-3). Immediately "captured" by the Lake Erie's system, the SM-3 acquired, tracked, and diverted toward the target, proofing its fourth-stage kinetic warhead, guidance, navigation, and control.
Thus, an enemy ballistic missile can be intercepted and destroyed by an Aegis warship. These were defining events. An aggressive program with the continuous commitment of the Navy, the laboratories, and industry, can ensure the ship-based component of BMD has operational capability in the near-term.
The author expressed concern about justifying a role in homeland defense that might involve the "subordination of mobile naval forces to commands intent on tethering surface ships to interceptor launch stations in the far reaches of the Pacific." But combat-proven destroyers, capitalizing on air defense picket duty in the battles of Leyte Gulf and Okinawa, rapidly deployed in the 1950s to protect U.S. seaward flanks against Soviet long-range bombers. Then, the number one priority of homeland defense was continental air defense. There was no question that capable naval forces would be used. Showcasing joint operations, DERs (Destroyer Escort Radar) with SPS-6 (long range) and SPS-8 (height finding) radars, combined with Lockheed WV-2s (Willie Victors) with the APS-20 radar, under the operational control of the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD, later NORAD) at Colorado Springs, were on station in the Atlantic and, later, the Pacific barrier extensions of the DEW line (Distant Early Warning). From 1954-1965, more than 30 DERs were engaged in homeland continental air defense. When required for ballistic missile defense, transformed Aegis cruisers and destroyers can he deployed to areas best suited to defend the homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends.
The author's vision to convert four to six Tridents for BMD, to justify the funds for guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), runs aground on several false bearings. First, a "12 to 14 year" program, optimistic at best, does not respond to the urgency of achieving a near-term sea-based BMD capability. Second, the inherent stealth of the SSGN is fundamental to its offensive mission and covert operations and should not be compromised. The funds required to sustain SSGNs as additional cruise missile shooters will stand on its own merit. An incompatible BMD mission does not warrant additional resources. Third, submarine warfare and its supporting infrastructure have been and are devoted to offensive operations. There is no reservoir of operators, developers, engineers, and trainers experienced in submarine air defense. To establish the necessary infrastructure along with overcoming the formidable technical challenges in engineering SSGNs and associated missiles for BMD would require a significant diversion of scarce funds better utilized for higher priorities. Fourth, the article acknowledges, but understates, the technical challenges in the submarine and missile interface and does not address the fundamental requirement to have an organic warship capability to detect (at long range), control, and engage ballistic missiles, irrespective of or in addition to assistance from command, control, communications, computers intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, space, and cooperative engagement capability-like data exchange.
The way ahead in sea-based BMD resides in transformed Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
"Changes in Naval Battle Forces"
(See S. Morrison, pp. 178-182, May 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Andrew F Smith, U.S. Navy—The reference made to CVW-11 being assigned to the USS Nimitz (CVN-68). This is in error. CVW-11 was embarked on the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) on 31 December 2001 in transit home from Operation Enduring Freedom. As a member of the Carl Vinson's crew, I know this to be a fact.
"Keep the Military Neutral"
(See J. Garcia, pp. 82-84, June 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David Douglas Winters, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Garcia falls into a trap often encountered by liberally educated lawyers. He fails to discern between political and moral neutrality. He confuses moral outrage with partisanship. (This is a natural result of legal training that teaches law as a morally neutral subject. I know because I went through it, too.)
A professional military officer must know better. No officer who deserves his stripes turns off his sense of right and wrong as soon as he "crosses the brow," no matter how nonpolitical he might be.
When I enlisted in the Navy in 1973, we were pressed into social awareness classes that taught us, among other things, that "perception is reality." Tragically, at the same time, the United States was trying to fight a Southeast Asian war on that morally untenable premise. That premise manifested itself in the daily, inflated body count "score card" presented on the nightly news. By the time it was over, our services had lost the trust and respect of an entire generation of Americans. By the time I was commissioned, we had decades of damage repair ahead of us.
Our senior officers must have known the truth. Senior U.S. officers could have stood up, or if necessary, resigned and dissented to the insane death spiral of U.S. policy in Vietnam. If they had, they might have saved our reputations, not to mention 30,000 or 40,000 priceless young American lives. But they didn't. That is only one example. History is strewn with the wreckage of many others.
Right is right and wrong is wrong. Recognizing this is not partisanship. And to deny the difference or pass responsibility up the chain of command is not professionalism or courage. It is cowardice.
That does not mean we should question every order. Nor does it mean that we should go campaigning in uniform. It does mean, however, that we cannot avoid responsibility by claiming "neutrality" in matters of unquestionable moral failure at any level. We already know where that leads.
"The U.S. Merchant Marine and Maritime Industry in Review"
(See R. Pouch, pp. 104-110, May 2002 Proceedings)
George D. Saunders—It is doubtful a better review of our maritime situation could have been written. Everything of importance was there in sufficient detail. While our maritime position is not great, it also is far from the brink of disaster.
Of particular concern is the Maritime Security Program, which receives ten-year subsidy payments for 47 ships—36 of which are container ships, the type least likely to contribute a transport capability in the event of an emergency. At $2.1 million a year per ship, this program will cost $75.6 million annually just for the container ships. With three more years to go, multiplied by 36 ships, the bill comes to $226.8 million dollars.
These statements will not sit well with those who see the container ship as a mobilization asset and the answer to an array of military transport needs. The modern container ship is probably the most advanced ship ever built for the transportation of dry and refrigerated cargo.
Basically, the ship operates on the closed loop principle, linking a range of ports in one part of the world with that in another. General cargo moves in both directions between the major ports in each range. Military container shipping, in contrast, is primarily a one-way movement from a U.S. supply point to an overseas destination.
A container ship operation requires a support train of equipment: containers and chassis, terminals with gantry cranes, management teams, and reliable communication systems. Though costly, it is well within our capabilities—but would it be worthwhile when compared to the uncomplicated and high-tempo delivery provided by a roll-on/roll-off ship?
This question should be studied before continuing subsidy payments for 36 container ships beyond 2005. Can the container ship contribute a service sufficient to justify paying the subsidy? The answer is almost certainly no. It does not have the cargo accommodation flexibility and the rapid off-load capability of a roll-on/roll-off ship.
But the container ship does have a role to play. Should a major combat area develop, a fleet of three or four container ships could provide a second-level scheduled service from either coast for non-priority military supplies and humanitarian cargo. For this type of service, ships could be chartered and support equipment leased. Because of the surplus of container ships on the world market, there would be little difficulty in obtaining sufficient tonnage.
The USNS Bob Hope (T-AKR-300) class, operated by the Military Sealift Command, has demonstrated what the modern roll-on/roll-off ship can do. For military logistic support, this type of ship, with few exceptions, is the answer.
"The U.S.-Japan Alliance Is Vital"
(See A. Cummings, pp. 58-61, March 2002; P. Stanek, p. 30, June 2002 Proceedings)
Andrew Cummings—I am gratified that Mr. Stanek believes that Japan does have a role to play in fostering regional security. As I explained in my essay, however, it is Article 9 that affects the debate on security issues in Japan. Though he did not mention it by name, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Admiral Toru Ishikawa also noted the importance of Article 9 to Japanese security policy in his contribution to the "We Stand By You" international naval commanders' section of the April 2002 issue of Proceedings (p. 46).
The Japanese government has begun to acknowledge and has apologized for its past actions several times, including Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's apology in August 1995. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine caused considerable discussion and debate in Japan. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan alliance is based on shared values of democracy and free-market economics, so the Yasukuni issue will not derail this alliance, any more than German Holocaust-- deniers and Neo-Nazis could derail the U.S.-German relationship, because the same fundamental values are there. How many of Japan's critics have ever walked into a Japanese bookstore, or have read a Japanese-language history book? If they had, they would find that different historical viewpoints are represented, including some that they would no doubt find offensive. Japan's historical awareness is not as one-sided as it is sometimes inaccurately portrayed.
When thinking about history, I am sometimes guided by the experience of my great-uncle—a survivor of the Bataan Death March and of subsequent years of captivity. Around Japanese people, I have seen him display nothing but friendliness and warmth, without a trace of anger or hate. I am also moved by the experience of men such as Admiral Arleigh Burke, who became a legend for his exploits in World War II, and then was stationed in Japan after the war, where he became what Japanese author Naoyuki Agawa referred to as one of the "parents" of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Finally, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung won a Nobel Peace Prize for his summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, but his Nobel Prize also cited his reaching out to improve relations with Japan, despite deep misgivings in his country about Japan's wartime history.3
The claim that Japan has paid no reparations is false. According to the U.S. government's view, the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty settled the issue of war reparations, but Japan did reach bilateral settlements with various Asian nations. China renounced any reparations claims in exchange for Japanese investment. Japan pays enormous sums as one of the world's top foreign aid donors, much of it to help develop nations that Japan fought against in World War II. Furthermore, even decades of historical self-examination and reparations have not bought Germany total absolution from ongoing historical scrutiny and criticism. The transatlantic controversy surrounding Daniel Goldhagen's best-selling 1996 book, Hitler's Willing Executioners (New York: Knopf, 1996), is but one example. In 1982, I visited the Dachau concentration camp in what was then West Germany. I have seen that Germany is open about its history, but not everyone seems to have gotten the message, as a recent spate of Neo-Nazi violence against foreigners in Germany and rising Neo-Nazi sentiment among German youth demonstrate. Germany's answer has been to ban expressions of Nazi symbolism and attempt to ban a far-right party! Such acts would be unacceptable and illegal in both the United States and in Japan.
The answer to offensive political sentiments is not censorship—the answer is free speech, as typified by the June 2002 issue of Proceedings. That issue contained an interview with Captain Charlie Rush, who recounted a terrifying ordeal on board a submarine in World War II. Admiral Vern Clark wrote a tribute to those who fought at the Battle of Midway. Then, in the same issue, Admiral Ishikawa described the JMSDF's ongoing efforts to contribute to security in Asia. This is the proper way to examine history—by looking at all of it, good and bad. How ironic that those who criticize Japan's historical outlook themselves devalue the past 50 years of Japan's history.
If younger Japanese have a responsibility to ensure that the past is not repeated, then those who are members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are putting their lives on the line to do just that, by contributing to regional security. The modem JSDF strictly adheres to the principle of civilian control over the military, just like the United States. This system is totally different from the system of the 19th century, when the Imperial Japanese military could bypass the civilian government completely. Japan and Germany have a shared 50-year history of standing in defense of freedom against communism, and now against terrorism. Together with their U.S. counterparts, young Japanese and German service members serve with the international antiterrorist coalition in defense of human civilization, yet there are those who would still unjustly hold them morally responsible for the deeds of their forebears. Their accomplishments should be allowed to speak for themselves.