After World War II, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz stated that nothing happened during the war that was a surprise to the Navy save the kamikaze tactics. Unlike the World War II admirals who had studied the principles of naval strategy and naval operational art, today's naval leaders are shortchanged in those vital areas.
Last year, as a Naval War College student, I was standing in a hallway in McCarty Little Hall with some of my classmates. We gazed in amazement at the 1930s photos of Admirals Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, and Raymond Spruance as they moved fleets of ships on a game board that must have been the size of a gymnasium. We were at the completion of the joint military operations (JMO) portion of the College of Naval Command and Staff. Having finished both the strategic—and operational—level courses, we found ourselves in an operational-level war game, just like Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance; each of us wondered when we were going to be educated in the principles of naval strategy and naval operational art as these admirals had been. As the 2001 school year ended, many of my classmates and I had come to realize that the largest and most powerful navy in the world does not provide its officer corps an opportunity to study, discuss, war game, or reflect on strategy or operational art from a naval perspective. We asked ourselves whether our performance today would be as effective in strategic and operational war fighting as that of our forefathers, whether the joint professional military education (JPME) we had just completed was satisfactory for us to apply our tactical knowledge on a naval staff. Our answer was no. Unanimously, we felt shortchanged. We had spent months studying strategy and operations at the Naval War College and none of it was from a naval perspective.
Continuing to stress tactical entry-level education, postgraduate master's programs, and if time permits national strategic and joint professional military education, the U.S. Navy has all but abandoned courses aimed at educating naval officers in the fundamentals of naval operational art and strategy. Line and staff officers who will fill operational and staff positions at the operational through strategic levels must be provided specific naval and joint education prior to assuming those planning and decision-making billets.
Education the Navy Way
As early as 1884, U.S. Navy leaders recognized the importance of postgraduate education for officers. This resulted in the establishment of the Naval War College (NWC) on 6 October 1884 and the School of Marine Engineering, later to become the Naval Postgraduate School, on 9 June 1909. Over the next 118 years, Navy postgraduate education would follow a rocky road, driven by a leadership culture that believed anything worthwhile could be learned at sea. Navy leaders struggled and failed to implement education policies to maintain any long-term coherency.
The Navy's culture of resisting formal education stretches back to its early years and continues in many forms today. Navy ship and squadron captains pride themselves on autonomy. Such modern doctrine as command by negation comes directly from the same Navy culture. As officers today continue to resist formalized officer education, some leaders strive to shorten or completely remove the surface basic division officer course, which is a modern product of the learn-everything-at-sea culture. Military education makes up less than one-third of the postgraduate education completed by more than 95% of all Navy flag officers. Most top Navy leaders have not been educated at service colleges, much less the Naval War College. Less than 25% of current admirals and vice admirals leading our Navy have service school educations, and only one Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral J. M. Boorda) attended the Naval War College in the past 30 years. Many Navy officers fill key senior joint and naval commander positions without military education.
After all of today's officers receive some form of initial tactical education, Navy education policies begin to resemble a scattergram. In spite of officer retention crises, Navy leadership has introduced multiple master's degree programs to satisfy junior officer postgraduate education desires. Some communities stress civilian university postgraduate education. Others stress the Naval Postgraduate School. Some communities require their officers to complete master's programs to remain competitive; some encourage military education at service schools. Other communities, especially within the unrestricted line, place little emphasis on postgraduate education. The career officer publication Perspective provides no prioritized policy, but only describes programs. With the years of educational experience the U.S. Navy has, education policies within all communities should be prioritized and clearly disseminated.
The responsibility for Navy military education resides within its service college, the Naval War College. The most recent significant alterations to the NWC's curriculum came in 1992 with the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. The naval operations course was changed to joint military operations, replacing the naval curriculum with a joint curriculum to satisfy JPME Phase I requirements. Naval strategy and naval operational art no longer were taught at any Navy school. Not until 1999, with the implementation of the naval operational planners course (NOPC), did a handful of Navy midgrade unrestricted line officers receive education in strategy and operational art from a naval perspective. NOPC, established as the Navy's advanced warfighting course, was designed to support numbered fleets and analogous warfighting staffs with experts in naval warfare. With only six Navy officer graduates per year, this goal is unachievable. Furthermore, NOPC does not try to provide a replacement for naval officer professional military education.
A Strategic Imperative
With an education policy that does not recognize a need for naval warfare education, does not reward or encourage joint education, and only recently has begun to stress graduate education, one questions whether the Navy's postgraduate education policy supports the National Military Strategy and Naval Strategy. Does the National Military Strategy require naval forces and geographic operational-level staffs? Do the naval forces and geographic operational-level staffs require officers trained in naval warfare (open-ocean and littoral)? Is JPME sufficient for officers to plan and employ naval forces effectively? Is previous on-the-job tactical training sufficient for officers to plan and employ naval forces effectively? How can naval officers without naval and joint education effectively command naval and joint forces?
The National Military Strategy requires Navy and Marine Corps forces to participate in all aspects of "Shape, Respond and Prepare Now." Involved in every element of this strategy, naval forces and geographic naval staffs prepare and execute the full range of military missions, from peacetime engagement to fighting and winning multiple major-theater wars. In a "Shape, Respond and Prepare Now" strategy, staff structure in the geographic theater of operations is a critical element to ensure the smooth operation of tactical forces in that theater. Aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups provide day-today presence, deterrence, and power projection as tasked by the President and the Secretary of Defense through geographic commanders-in-chief (CinCs), naval component CinCs, and numbered fleets.
Supporting the National Military Strategy, naval strategy that is described in ". . . From the Sea" states that "a Naval Force commander can command the joint task force while the operation is primarily maritime; and shift that command ashore if the campaign shifts landward at the discretion of the Unified Commander."' With significant forward presence, naval forces influencing multispectrum, operational-level warfare (naval component CinCs, numbered fleets, aircraft carrier battle groups, and amphibious ready groups) must support "Joint Vision 2010" and "Joint Vision 2020" requirements. Education policies in "Joint Vision 2010" stipulate the need for joint and naval proficiency to "emphasize integration of joint capabilities and develop skills that increase individual and organizational effectiveness. ... Our education and training programs must prepare joint warriors to meet the challenges of the future battlespace."
Removal of naval warfare education from the NWC in 1992 put Navy education policy at odds with the sister services' policy. Less than one-third of all Navy officers ever study what Clausewitz called the art of war (JPME Phase I), and only six Navy officers annually specialize in naval strategy (NOPC). Conversely, the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps offer all officers education in tactical through strategic levels of warfare, both joint and service specific. Officers who do not complete intermediate- and senior-level PME are not promoted. Although the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps education policies may not be the most effective use of assets, service and joint education for all field-grade officers and above is a known constant in these services.
The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps populate their service operational staffs' and joint staffs' billets with officers educated in full-spectrum service and joint warfare. With only one-third of Navy officers JPME Phase I educated, billets on Navy and joint staffs often are filled by officers who do not understand joint terminology, the basics of operational art, or most important, the fundamentals and employment of sea control and sea denial in a full-spectrum military operation or campaign.
The Navy's leadership must recognize that Cold War and post-Cold War education policies are insufficient to meet the needs of an increasingly joint and technological military. Tactical, operational, and strategic decisions must be made more quickly and efficiently. Officers making decisions not only must be skilled in the technology and tactics of specific ship systems, but also must be proficient in the most effective employment of forces over the entire range of conflict. The military-wide effort to leverage technology to increase the speed of reaction, intelligence, and lethality of effects will make joint and service education more relevant in the future.
Do senior Navy leaders realize that the Naval War College no longer teaches naval warfare, but only joint warfare? The Goldwater-Nichols Act and "Joint Vision 2010" could not have intended this. "Joint Vision 2010" states, "It is essential that our Joint Professional Military Education programs provide our warfighters with an understanding of strategic concepts in the future environment where military force will be applied, as well as an in-depth understanding of individual Service systems and how the integration of these systems enhances joint operations." JPME Phase I is not a replacement for naval warfare education; it is the base from which to begin studying the art of naval strategy.
Education Alternatives
As the Navy's leaders grapple with the type and distribution of postgraduate education for 53,000 Navy officers, joint and naval military and community-specific requirements must be identified, prioritized, and billeted. Officers must be educated and billeted to fill positions that take best advantage of their skills. Military combat effectiveness should be the determining factor when prioritizing the right mix of officers to specific postgraduate programs. This mix could take a number of forms, ranging from today's structure, which has no naval PME, one-third JPME, and community-specific postgraduate education (e.g., engineering, business, human resources), to something similar to that of our sister services, in which 100% of career officers receive joint and service-specific professional military education with community postgraduate education requirements.
The most efficient and economical postgraduate officer education policy resides somewhere between educating almost none of the force and all of the force. Without diminishing the importance of community postgraduate requirements we must first fulfill our strategic, operational, and tactical requirements for joint and naval warfare education. Joint and naval education at the strategic and operational levels of warfare must be required for all officers assigned to billets where joint and naval policy is established and exercised. This includes Washington, D.C., joint and naval staffs, geographic commanders-in-chief and naval staffs, sea commands (including numbered fleets all the way down to ship and squadron commanding and executive officers), and logistics and intelligence staffs. Joint education is achievable with today's education infrastructure through carefully planned officer billeting to service schools, maximizing the use of the Naval War College's seminar program, and service school correspondence courses.
Providing naval education, on the other hand, will require significant effort and assets, both financial and human. Completing joint education will provide an understanding of the art and science of war. Establishing a naval strategy and operations course will provide the essential tools for officers to excel in all naval and joint environments. A four-month course would be composed of historical studies of naval strategy and operational art, naval strategy and operations in modern warfare, and war gaming from a naval and maritime component commander perspective. Officers would study works of classic and modern naval strategists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Dr. Milan Vego. Offering the course in fleet concentration areas such as Norfolk, San Diego, Pearl Harbor, Mayport, and Newport would reduce the financial cost of temporary duty and allow Navy lieutenants and lieutenant commanders on sea and shore duty to take the course part-time in a seminar program with a structure similar to current Naval War College programs.
Acceptance of a military education program requires a top-down change in perception and priority. Senior leaders must embrace naval warfare education as a necessary discipline for the future of our Navy. Education policies must direct requirements, not other choices. Tying promotion to commander and above to completion of joint and naval education for unrestricted line and certain restricted line and staff communities makes clear the policy that military education is not "nice to have" but something we all must have.
Sir Winston Churchill's advice concerning military education is as valid today as it was in 1946:
I shall always urge that the tendency in the future should be to prolong courses of instruction at the colleges rather than to abridge them, equip our young officers with that special professional ... knowledge which soldiers have a right to expect from those who must give them orders if necessary to go to their deaths. Professional attainment based upon study, rank by rank, and age by age-those are the title deeds of the commanders, and the secret of future victories.
The Navy's operational and strategic education fails to support national military and naval strategies. The Navy can improve its combat capability through organizational education. The costs associated with the education of Navy midlevel officers in JPME and naval warfare are worth the return on investment. Ships, squadrons, battle groups, and fleets will benefit from having officers with superior operational education and preparation. Leveraging improving technology to reduce costs and educate while on sea and shore duty, the Navy can provide the required joint and naval education for officers to master naval planning and execution to support the joint effort. Navy officers must be proficient at naval strategy and operations and how they support the art of war.