Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark has given the design and procurement of the littoral combat ship (LCS) the Navy's number one program priority for the next fiscal year. The lead ship is scheduled for authorization in fiscal year (FY) 2004, with an operational ship in the fleet by 2007.
The LCS program has made considerable progress in passing through the various Navy and Department of Defense wickets, primarily on the strength of Admiral Clark's commitment, but numerous technical and operational issues have not yet been resolved. What, for example, is the basis for the 50-knot speed requirement, and what are the relative merits versus speeds of 45 or 40 knots? What are the costs of attaining those speeds and how do they compare with costs for additional missile decoys, countermeasures, and protective coatings—or even active defenses, such as additional close-in gun and missile systems?
The early ships will have priority for "mission packages" for mine countermeasures (MCM), antisubmarine warfare, and to counter "swarming," attacks by potentially numerous hostile small craft, armed or possibly loaded with explosives for suicide attacks.
How will the much larger LCS differ in mine warfare capabilities from the Navy's existing Avenger (MCM-1) and Osprey (MHC-51) classes? The LCS is intended to operate the 10-ton MH-60R, a multipurpose helicopter that will be capable of antisubmarine warfare, missile targeting, missile attack, maritime interdiction, and search and rescue, as well as MCM. However, no towed MCM systems are being procured for the MH60, and existing countermeasures equipment, designed for the larger and more powerful MH-53E Sea Dragon, is not compatible with the MH-60. Beyond the helicopter, the LCS will not have the range of mine detection or neutralization capabilities of the Avenger class. Rather, it will employ the organic MCM equipment now in development that, in theory, could be employed from any surface combatant.
Other LCS issues yet to be resolved include such basic questions as hull configuration and propulsion. Six firms have put forward different configurations that are now being evaluated. Some are catamaran and trimaran designs, the former including the 45-knot high-speed vehicle (HSV) from Australia.
The Joint Venture (HSV-Xl) is being employed by the U.S. armed forces in a series of evaluations, primarily as a fast-deploying transport for troops and vehicles, and the similar Spearhead (TSV-IX) has been chartered by the Army. A third ship of this design, the HSV-X2, will be used as an interim MCM support ship following disposal of the USS Inchon (MCS-12).1 The HSV demonstrates both speed and carrying capacity, but it lacks the ability to operate large helicopters (i.e., the MH53E) and, like several other candidate designs, presents a large radar cross section, a fatal flaw if the LCS is to operate within coastal waters where the enemy has antiship missiles, either land- or sea-launched.2
Another factor working against the LCS concept is the U.S. Navy's stovepiped structure and culture. Each warfare community is concerned primarily (some cynics would say only) with its own programs: naval aviation is fighting for the next supercarrier—which will have a price tag in excess of $10 billion; the submarine community is fighting for an increase in attack submarine construction rates and to ensure the conversions of four Trident submarines to guided missile ships (SSGNs) are not derailed; the amphibious warfare subcommunity wants to ensure that the behind-schedule, over-cost San Antonio (LPD-17) class is built and the increasingly controversial advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) is procured.
Within the surface community there appears to be confusion and consternation following the preemptory cancellation of the Zumwalt (DD-21) land-attack destroyer, and the substitution of the amorphous DDX program.
Still, the LCS program offers the Navy the opportunity to have a more significant role in the littoral and regional operations that are expected to be the hallmark of the U.S. military of the foreseeable future. The LCS concept holds promise as a multipurpose platform that can (1) operate in the important area between amphibious ready groups or carrier battle groups—which are expected to operate 50 miles or more offshore—and the beach; and (2) operate in coastal areas where there is a need for a warship, but not the larger Aegis cruisers and destroyers that already are the majority of the Navy's surface combatants.
In addition, the LCS appears to more closely fit the definition of "transformational" being proffered by Department of Defense officials than most other Navy platforms. Indeed, the LCS would give the Navy an opportunity to carry out certain forward operations with a cheaper platform and with far fewer personnel than possible in today's Navy.
Thus, there appears to be a valid requirement for the LCS. The most recent endorsement comes from two retired flag officers who have held major fleet commands as well as key surface warfare positions, and are known for their innovative outlooks, Vice Admirals Henry Mustin and Douglas Katz. They conclude that the "LCS must be built, and built now, even faster than the current plan."
Unfortunately, the existing ship design and procurement procedures work against the further acceleration of LCS acquisition. Also, past experience has shown that new warship concepts that incorporate new hull configurations, new propulsion, and new weapons and other systems invariably encounter unforeseen difficulties. An alternative may be to take to sea those LCS components that could be evaluated in situ as soon as possible, both to identify potential problems and to train maintenance personnel and operators.
This has been done successfully in the past—the AN/SPY-I radar, the Mk 41 vertical launch system, and many of the Navy's surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles were tested on the USS Norton Sound (AVM-1); the Navy's Polaris missile was launched at sea from the USS Observation Island (EAG-154) before it went into a submarine; and the 76-mm OTO Melara gun and Mk 92 fire control system were tested in the USS Talbot (FFG-4) for the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class.
Accordingly, a proposal has been put forward to convert an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate to the LCS test bed role. With a full load displacement of approximately 4,000 tons, the Oliver Hazard Perrys appear to be only slightly larger than the size range now being considered for the LCS. The FFG force is being reduced rapidly; however, 27 remain in active commission and 8 are assigned to the Naval Reserve Force. Thus, there is a large logistics/training base to support such an undertaking.
The principal modifications envisioned are:
- Replacement of the Mk 13 Standard-MR missile launcher with the RAM launcher
- Installation of low-light-level television (LLLTV), infrared, and electro-optical sensors
- Provision of high-resolution, anticlutter radar
- Upgrade of communications intercept or electronic warfare support measures (ESM) equipment
- Installation of folding crane on the starboard side to handle unmanned vehicles (UV) and rigid rubber craft
- Replacement of starboard Mk 32 torpedo tubes with UV handling gear
- Modification of starboard helicopter hangar to maintain and stow various types of UVs
- Installation of UV recovery ramp, "notched" into starboard side of stem; the port hangar would be retained for supporting H-60 or Army OH-58D special operations helicopters, and possibly unmanned aerial vehicles
These modifications should take no more than three to four months to accomplish while an FFG is in shipyard overhaul. Additional systems could be installed as they become available.
The RAM launcher and Mk 16 Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS), the latter already fitted in the FFG, are both planned for the LCS, as well as the advanced radar and sensors. Those are known as the "core suite" for the LCS.
In addition, consideration should be given to replacing the AN/SQS-56 keel-mounted sonar with an advanced mine-hunting sonar. Removal of the Mk 13 launcher with its 40-round magazine would provide additional space below decks even after installation of the RAM system. A sonar replacement would require more time and funding. Also, that space may be needed for additional berthing.
Figure 1 shows the Mk 75 OTO Melara gun retained amidships. That weapon and its magazine could be removed if topside weight and moment become a problem because of other modifications. Regardless of whether the Mk 75 gun is retained, it is envisioned that two or more 25-mm or 30-mm Bushmaster/chain guns would be installed topside for close-in action.
An FFG/LCS test bed would, in a relatively short time, permit the Navy to deploy and evaluate—and use—the systems planned for the LCS. This could facilitate deployment of the LCS and evaluation of the concept while publicizing that the Navy is serious about the important LCS program.