The surface Navy's effort to improve junior officer (JO) retention by offering monetary incentives such as the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Continuation Pay is a very commendable policy that has been highly successful. But we can do more to change some of the negative aspects of the SWO culture: a "zero defects" mentality that leads to a low tolerance for risk; leaders sacrificing their subordinates' welfare to succeed at their mission; and placing an emphasis on form over function. Increasing the number of lieutenant-commander commands immediately, and beginning the process of shifting command at sea opportunity downward to more junior officers ultimately will help reduce JO retention problems, and simultaneously address the negative aspects of SWO culture.
I had made my decision to remain in the surface Navy for my department head tours prior to being offered educational or pay incentives. Although I have benefited greatly from these programs, I have found that few of my peers are remaining on active duty solely as a result of these incentives. Why does a SWO lieutenant stay on active duty? It all comes down to one simple desire: the opportunity to lead, and one day to command a ship. From patrol coastals for lieutenants to cruisers for captains, officers could hold command at sea four times by the time they reach captain. This is a great retention tool that should be used to the maximum. For the typical JO, however, the wait between being a lieutenant and being a commander may be too long. Thirteen patrol coastals and 25 minehunters/mine countermeasures ships provide limited opportunities for early command. In addition, such commands may be perceived as somewhat less than optimal on the route to success. If there were mainstream SWO lieutenant-commander commands on frigates or destroyers, this would help change SWO culture for the better.
The idea of mainstream lieutenant-commander commands has come and gone with the ebb and flow of resources available to the fleet. In the pinch for resources at the end of the Cold War, it became too risky to leave a vital ship in the hands of inexperienced junior officers. JO commands became available only on platforms that might be considered "lower risk." These junior commands still provide excellent opportunities, and should be recognized for their importance. If the community were to return some lieutenant-commander commands to the SWO mainstream, however, we really would be doing something to help change the "zero defect" mentality, and generate a dynamic risk-taking environment. It would mean a greater opportunity for JOs to lead and command closer to the end of initial obligated service, rather than forcing officers to endure the ten-to-twelve-year wait most experience now.
There are some ways to mitigate the level of risk associated with such a shift. Certainly not all frigates or destroyers need to become lieutenant-commander commands. One solution could involve transitioning a select group of Commander, Western Hemisphere Group frigates into such commands. Most of these ships, however, will be decomissioned by 2010. One way to ensure that there is a continuing source of these commands in the SWO mainstream is to build DD-21 with a lieutenant commander in command from the inception of the program.
In various DD-21 briefs over the past three years, I have yet to bear this ship's commander designated. Does the surface Navy leadership assume it is going to be a full commander? Similar to the 82 officers and crew on mine countermeasures ships, DD-21 will be manned at 95 personnel—or an equivalent for lieutenant-commander command. With the rise of network-centric warfare in the coming century, decision cycles will be compressed and removed from the hands of a single, lone commander acting out "on the tip of the spear." So it is quite feasible for a lieutenant commander to take these platforms to sea, because they never will be alone in making a decision on the battlefield. Some may ask, what happens to command opportunity for commanders? One possibility is make all Aegis platforms such commands, providing 24 more command opportunities in the first quarter of the 21st century
Ultimately, all of this is not just about retention, but changing how we fight. In the future, the command of most physical weapon and sensor platforms could be given to lieutenants and lieutenant commanders, allowing more senior officers to reside in remote command-and-control nodes. Giving junior officers command opportunities now will help the Navy keep those officers it needs so badly, and put us on the road to a new kind of war fighting.
Lieutenant Williams is assigned as a department head on board a surface combatant.