. . . must lie the appropriate shore support to keep it going. If the Navy wants to maintain the readiness of its operating forces, it must recognize this link—here, the carriers Kitty Hawk (CV-63), America (CV-66), and Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), upper left, at Naval Station, Norfolk—and commit to the long-term improvement of shore facilities.
With the recent announcement of base closures, the Navy has arrived at its final round of shore infrastructure reductions and realignments. Those bases and infrastructure that remain intact upon completion of this round will be the ones with which the Navy will operate well into the next century. As a result, the Navy has the opportunity—indeed, the obligation—to look beyond downsizing and reallocating resources to examine the larger issue of how we intend to operate, maintain, and recapitalize the shore infrastructure that is left.
At the outset of such an examination, we must recognize that the paradigm under which naval station shore support has evolved is flawed. Over the years, we have consciously or subconsciously assumed
► That ships and submarines are relatively uncomplicated to support
► That the shore support infrastructure does not require significant resources to operate and maintain
► That shore infrastructure does not need to be replaced or recapitalized on a recurring, long-term basis
► That the support structure provided by a shore station is transparent in its impact on the ability of ships and submarines to operate effectively or the ability of supporting shore commands to function effectively
Indeed, naval stations largely have been taken for granted by a Navy that traditionally has focused its resources on ships, aircraft, and submarines, and the weapon and engineering systems they carry. That portion of the shore structure that directly affects repair and modernization of operating units has received significant attention and resources commensurate with its perceived impact on the ability of those units to accomplish their missions. The more indirect and less visible—yet equally significant—impact of naval stations on readiness, how ever, has not been so well-perceived and thus has not received similar resources.
The fact is, however, that shore support infrastructure is a capital investment, just like ships, aircraft, and submarines. No one would design a ship without postulating a total life cycle, including significant maintenance and modernization periods and periodic upgrades to its warfighting capability. Throughout the ship’s life cycle, resources would be programmed to maintain operational readiness and relevance. Ultimately, it would be replaced by a new ship incorporating the latest technology. But naval station support infrastructure, such as piers, buildings, facilities, and the services provided from them, has never consistently received this type of orchestrated maintenance and recapitalization. In the case of Naval Station Norfolk, for example, this has resulted in berthing piers of more than 50 years average age with ship support services that are increasingly costly to maintain and that are being rapidly outpaced by the demands of our most modem ships.
This situation—where ships’ requirements are exceeding the ability of shore facilities to support them—must be reversed. To do this, we must acknowledge and understand the factors that have brought the Navy’s shore support structure to this point:
► The shore support resourcing process for the fleet has lacked its own culture similar to that enjoyed by the surface, air, and submarine warfare communities. Ships, submarines, and aircraft have their own bases of advocacy, both in operational and organizational terms. Until recently, the “warfare barons” of surface, air, and subsurface forces also were the resource sponsors for their respective shore bases. As a consequence, shore bases tended to be resourced last, after procurement, operations, and platform maintenance and modernization bills were paid.
At the same time, the hardware systems commands that support ships, submarines, and aircraft—Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea Systems Command—typically have enjoyed a seat above the salt at the resource table, compared to the advocates for the shore establishment. In addition, shore support infrastructure has not enjoyed the same visibility as the operating forces. You can’t walk the deck of a naval station the way you can a cruiser, aircraft carrier, or submarine. Yet those operating forces largely would be unable to carry out their missions were it not for solid bases of operations that send them forthfully armed, provisioned, equipped, and supported.
By comparison, the Army and Air Force have long and well-established records of support for their infrastructures. This may be attributable in large measure to their traditions as “garrison” forces. They have tended to “live where they fight” and thus have accorded substantial resources to maintaining and recapitalizing the base structure that supports their operations. The Navy, on the other hand, operates and fights from platforms that typically deploy for long periods away from their bases, creating a tendency to take bases for granted as an important aspect of readiness.
- The budget and resource allocation process in Washington is tuned to the support of operating forces. Specifically, ship construction, aircraft procurement, and major maintenance costs for operating platforms are prominent in Navy budget submissions. By contrast, shore stations generally enjoy only limited visibility, mostly in military construction (MilCon) budgets. Major maintenance and recapitalization funding for shore projects other than MilCon ultimately become submerged in the common pot of operations and maintenance (O&M) funding allocated to major fleet claimants. Shore stations historically have had to compete with fleet and type commander maintenance requirements for these O&M dollars—and they typically have not fared well in this competition for resources.
- We design and procure ships, aircraft, and submarines to a finite life span of 30 to 40 years, which encompasses repetitive maintenance cycles and system upgrades. These platforms thereby sustain their operational relevance and reliability across their life spans—and at the end of this span, they are replaced or recapitalized with well-designed service-life extension efforts. The shore infrastructure has enjoyed no such coherent and effective maintenance and recapitalization process. Indeed, by some reports, the shore infrastructure will require more than 150 years to be reconstituted at the current rate of investment.
In addition, the cost of doing business in the operating forces largely has been subsumed by the resource allocation process. That is, warfare type commanders historically have paid for routine repair and upkeep for their ships, submarines, and aircraft, thus shielding their operational units from the burden of directly funding routine readiness. For many shore stations, operations and maintenance costs are paid up front from the stations’ relatively small discretionary O&M budgets to support elements within the Navy’s facilities maintenance organization.
► Command of our major fleet support installations typically has been allotted to senior officers who have considerable experience in warfare arenas but who receive only a short indoctrination in the management of shore facilities just prior to reporting. The professionalism and fleet experience of these officers is excellent, but they have a steeper learning curve than if they were returning to command in their career-long warfare area of expertise. In addition, the typical two-year tour does not provide them sufficient time to learn the job and make a positive, long- term impact before they rotate. Thus, there has been little opportunity or inclination for a shore command culture to develop.
In sum, the shore support structure has suffered from a long-term institutional lack of priority. This is reflected in declining quality, reliability, and responsiveness to the steady and even increasing requirements of the operating forces. We now face the very real possibility of having a rightsized, modernized, and recapitalized operating force for the next century that will be insufficiently supported from shore because we have not adequately funded the maintenance and modernization of its shore support structure.
To get a fresh start in organizing, resourcing, and recapitalizing the fleet support infrastructure, we must put aside the way we have done business in the past. We should be prepared to put every rice bowl, every process, and every command on the table to determine where and how value is added in supporting the operating forces from shore. In particular, we should recognize that the support provided by fleet support bases to ships, aircraft, and submarines is integral to the ability of those units to perform their missions. Resource allocation should directly reflect this linkage.
There are indications that a new perspective is developing regarding the importance of maintaining, modernizing, and recapitalizing the shore infrastructure. The recent establishment of shore support divisions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, as well as in the fleet commanders’ staffs, is a first step toward providing the needed coordination of resources and the advocacy and articulation of shore support requirements in the resource allocation process. Similarly, strategic infrastructure planning—such as that reflected in Atlantic Fleet’s “Vision 2010” for Naval Base Norfolk—can reverse many decades of unmanaged base land use and low prioritization of shore facilities recapitalization. A change in tour lengths for some naval station commanding officers from two to three years should help correct the institutional lack of continuity that has inhibited shore infrastructure improvement. The establishment of the fleet support community within the restricted line (designator 1700) in the long term should bridge the Navy’s historical shortfall in expertise in shore-station management. Finally, the renewed interest of high-level Defense officials, including Secretary William Perry, in family and bachelor housing; morale, welfare, and recreation; and family services is helping to focus the resource debate on a significant portion of the shore support framework.
But renewed interest in the shore infrastructure and its link to fleet readiness is occurring very late in the lives of many shore stations. Much of the more abundant resources of the 1980s that could have been used to recapitalize the older bases’ infrastructures were applied to newer strategic home ports or were used to procure new ships, aircraft, or submarines. In the post-Cold War 1990s, we are faced with significantly smaller budgets and much more critical choices of where we will spend the money, material, and people we do have. At the same time, old base infrastructure has gotten older and the cost of modernization and recapitalization has gotten larger. In the case of Naval Station Norfolk, some 30%-35% of the Navy’s operating forces—including half its aircraft carriers—and more than 80 shore commands are now or soon will be home ported at a location with one of the oldest infrastructures. It would be an enormous miscalculation to fund the construction, maintenance, modernization, and operation of ships for the 21st century, costing hundreds of millions of dollars, only to home port many of them where they do not have sufficient support to sustain their basic material and personnel requirements.
In human terms, the historical reluctance to allocate recapitalization resources to the shore structure affects the quality of life for the people we rely on to maintain the readiness of our forces. Sailors—ashore and afloat—and their families should be afforded a quality working and living environment that includes efficient transit to and from work, adequate parking while at work, reasonable bachelor and family housing arrangements and recreational opportunities, and services for themselves and their families. Similarly, the civilian personnel who contribute to shore support cannot be forgotten in calculating readiness. Thus, the human factor is probably the most serious hidden cost of a failure to provide an adequate and properly maintained shore support structure, in proportion and balance with the operating forces and their associated shore commands.
Problems in shore infrastructure have evolved over many years, and it will not be easy or quick to reverse those things that are deficient. But recognizing the cultural and historical biases and blind spots that have shaped the Navy’s attitudes toward shore facilities in the past is a good start toward improving this critical component of fleet operating readiness and the quality of life for our people.
Captain Weaver is Commanding Officer, Naval Station Norfolk.