Marine Corps Harriers flew from forward expeditionary airfields and amphibious assault ship decks in Desert Storm to shorten response times—and eliminate the need for aerial refueling. These VMA-542 Harriers, each carrying six Rockeyes and a defensive ECM pod, are just south of Khafji as they head for Kuwait.
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were hardly the first time the world got a look at the distinctive capabilities of Harriers and their telling effectiveness in combat—British Harriers in the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict had proved the aircraft’s versatility more than a decade ago.
Yet these expeditionary Marine Corps aircraft received far less recognition than they deserved, returning home to a barrage of criticism from the conventional aviation community for doing exactly what they were designed to do: operate in an expeditionary environment on tactical parity with conventional jets.
U.S. Air Force aircraft conducted the majority of Desert Storm sorties—flying long, aerial-refueled missions from large, distant bases—and television created the impression that smart weapons and stealth fighters won the air war. In actual fact, tons of simple iron bombs and thousands of individual sorties by all services helped beat the Iraqis into submission.
Virtually unknown to the general public, Marine Harriers were in the fray from beginning to end. They based close to the battle, on land and at sea, as they had always advertised they would, and delivered significant amounts of ordnance. Their missions were varied: battlefield air interdiction, helicopter escort, battlefield preparation, and close air support. Flying every mission for which they were tasked, they never required aerial refueling as they ranged over Kuwait.1
Emerging data are slowly bringing into perspective just what they accomplished. In the Department of Defense’s Gulf War final report, General Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, who commanded all Coalition forces in the war, selected the Harrier as one of the six most significant weapon systems of the Gulf War. Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney narrowed that list to just three—including the Harrier.
Seventeen days after Iraq invaded Kuwait during the summer of 1990, 60 AV-8Bs, assigned to the 7th and 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), deployed to the Persian Gulf. Forty U.S.-based AV-8Bs from Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)-311 and VMA-542, aerial refueled by U.S. Air Force KC-10 tankers, were the first Marine fixed-wing jet aircraft to deploy. They landed at Sheik Isa Airfield in Bahrain—which was rapidly filling up—awaiting resolution of basing assignments. VMA-331 (20 AV-8Bs), attached to the 4th MEB, arrived in the Persian Gulf on board the USS Nassau (LHA-4) during the first week of September.
In expeditionary fashion, the Sheik Isa-based Harriers parked along the taxiways and their maintenance crews worked out of tents—an arrangement that opened parking spaces for some of the more than 120 Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force fighter and attack aircraft operating there.
At the end of August, VMA-311 moved to King Abdul Aziz Air Base (KAAAB) on the Saudi Arabian coast, approximately 100 miles south of the Kuwaiti border; VMA-542 followed two months later, joining the newly formed Marine Aircraft Group 13 (Forward). The farthest forward fixed-wing base on the coast, this austere site was ideally suited for the short takeoff-vertical landing (STOVL) AV-8Bs plus the short field-capable OV-10Ds. The Marine Corps based its helicopters at Jubayl International Airport five miles north. Staging AV-8Bs and OV-10s at KAAAB provided relief for the few bases in the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO) and allowed the Commander, First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), to spread his aviation assets effectively.
In late December 1990, VMA-231 arrived from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, after flying 18,000 miles. On arrival, only two jets needed unscheduled maintenance. Two weeks later, the squadron began combat operations, flying 904 hours during January 1991 and 966 hours in February—and availability improved. VMA-513 Detachment “B” brought its six AV-8Bs ashore from the USS Tarawa (LHA-1) during February; ultimately, 66 AV-8Bs and 20 OV-10s operated from Abdul Aziz while VMA-331’s 20 aircraft operated from the sea.
An expeditionary control tower, a tactical air navigation (TACAN) system, and an all-weather landing system provided complete day-and-night capability. An eight-point tactical aviation fuel-dispensing system refueled returning aircraft. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron-14 installed mobile maintenance and supply vans around the soccer stadium. These, which had been unloaded from the USS Wright (T-AVB-3), gave the group a self-contained intermediate maintenance activity. Ordnance was built up and stored at the airfield and along the flight line.
The runway adjacent to a soccer stadium was an 8,000-foot stretch of badly deteriorated asphalt. Its small turnaround/parking area was in sad shape and barely sufficient for a 20-plane squadron. Overall, the potential for foreign object damage (FOD) would have been unacceptable during peacetime. U.S. Navy SeaBees built a 3,500-foot AM-2 aluminum-matting parallel taxiway-parking area that provided parking with direct access to the runway for 50 aircraft. When Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991, the base provided around-the-clock operations for the Harriers and OV-10s, turnaround fueling for helicopters, and an emergency divert base for other aircraft.
Maintenance crews operated out of tents. Engine changes and all other maintenance were performed on the ramp until four expeditionary cocoon (clamshell) hangars were constructed on cement slabs. These eased maintenance during the inclement winter weather and gave protection from the choking shamal winds. The hangars’ lights gave them an eerie yellow glow visible for miles at night—a point of camouflage discipline for future operations.
Marines were quartered in wood-framed tents set up in the parking lot and the infield of the soccer stadium. Press boxes and glass-enclosed viewing stands in the stadium served as office spaces and ready rooms for the squadrons. Basic living conditions were pretty good for the KAAAB Marines.
Short interval take-offs, short landing patterns, and the ability to mix with any type of traffic made for efficient operations. During an exercise, 24 AV-8Bs recovered in three and one-half minutes on this single runway. The OV-10s and Harriers mixed easily in the traffic pattern since they shared short-field capabilities. Occasional slowdowns occurred when a KC-130 or a conventional jet landed and had to back-taxi to clear the runway. Had an accident fouled the runway, Harriers still could have operated normally on the remaining runway.
Parking alongside the runway gave the jets direct access from their spots to begin their take-off rolls. Takeoffs were normally made at 120 knots with auto-flaps (25°) to preserve the rotted runway surface and reduce the number of foreign objects blown onto the parked aircraft. Since the roll was less than 1,500 feet regardless of the combat load, we could start from virtually any spot on the runway. Vertical landings on a pad or 60-knot landings on the first half of the runway were standard.
A combination of airborne and hot-pad AV-8Bs provided continuous support during the height of Desert Storm. A section (two aircraft) launched or recovered from KAAAB every 15 minutes while other Harriers were on ground loiter at Tanajib with a ten-minute response time. AV-8Bs routinely carried six Rockeyes and a full load of 25-mm. ammunition.
Airborne, they used secure voice radios to check in with the tactical air operations center (TAOC) for a threat update en route to a control point before switching off to the direct air support center (DASC). By the time they were over the Kuwait border at 20,000 to 25,000 feet, the DASC had briefed them on their target and switched them over to a forward air controller (airborne)—FAC(A). Nearing the target, everyone switched into clear voice for better terminal control.
FAC(A)s in F/A-18Ds marked targets with five-inch Zuni white phosphorous rockets, and the Harriers rolled into 45° dives from about 20,000 feet. Bomb release between 13,000 and 8,000 feet kept the aircraft clear of ground fire and allowed the FAC(A) or wingman to watch for surface-to-air missiles. Early on, we learned that firing decoy flares during roll-in was a bad idea; they gave away our position. The omnipresent heavy, thick haze, which usually hid the aircraft until about 7,000 feet, was our best defense and we began releasing flares only when jinking off target—trying to lead the gunners away from our following wingman as he made his pass.
Close air support dive angles and release altitudes were lowered to ease control for the ground FACs in the smoke and haze and guarantee target identification. On 21 February, we began conducting low-level napalm attacks (the first time in the war we released below 8,000 feet) on Iraqi trench lines in preparation for the 2d Marine Division’s assault and breaching operations on the first day of the ground war. We used a 10°-dive angle, releasing at 1,000 feet above ground level at 500 knots—and jinking hard off target. Our 25-mm. guns with 300 rounds also proved lethal on these attacks.
The F/A-18Ds were a real asset. The OV-10s, our old standby FAC(A)s, weren’t fast enough, responsive enough, or survivable enough for this phase of battlefield preparation. The OV-10s proved their worth during this period, however, using their forward-looking infrared systems to maintain 24-hour surveillance. When the ground war began, they picked up the FAC(A) mission once again.
Off target, aircraft rejoined in the climb, switched to secure voice to pass a bomb damage assessment to the DASC, and then headed home under control of the TAOC. Aircraft launching from KAAAB generally were airborne for one hour; flights from Tanajib lasted 35 to 45 minutes. Communications, command, and control were effective throughout the operation.
SeaBees and Marines built an expeditionary forward site for 12 AV-8Bs at one end of the narrow 6,000-foot runway at Tanajib, an Arabian American Oil Company helicopter base 40 miles south of the Kuwaiti border. They installed an expeditionary fueling system and a rearming capability-plus an operations facility and a living area, all tents. Trucks brought in fuel and ordnance along the well-maintained Saudi highways. Additional sites along the main north-south highway to Kuwait and the Tap-line road were identified for possible use. These were typically truck stops that could provide aircraft parking off the main road and easy access by fuelers and ordnance trucks.
Flight operations from Tanajib showcased the advantages of dispersed forward basing—rarely done since World War II. Aircraft landed after their first sortie from KAAAB, refueled, rearmed, and flew one or two more sorties before returning to KAAAB, increasing the responsiveness and amount of air support available to Coalition ground forces. Refueling and rearming at Tanajib also freed KAAAB crews to perform maintenance uninhibited by launch and recovery requirements. Helicopter and Harrier operations at Tanajib continued under 200-foot ceilings and half-mile visibility using a portable ground-controlled approach facility operated by the Marine air traffic control squadron.
Plans were developed to use Al Jaber airfield in Southwestern Kuwait once ground forces had opened it up. Although Coalition aircraft had inflicted heavy damage on the field, remaining runways and taxiways were serviceable enough to provide the 1,500 to 2,500 feet of runway needed for unrestricted Harrier operations. The Harriers planned to move to the sound of the guns to continue support as the ground forces advanced.
Harriers were scheduled to be held in reserve for close air support missions during the heavy fighting forecast for the ground phases of Desert Storm, but the enemy forced them into the fray at the very start of the air war. When Iraqi artillery batteries began shelling Marine positions at the border town of Khafji on the morning of 17 January, VMA-311 launched its alert division (four aircraft), followed by a division each from VMA-542 and VMA-231. The aircraft destroyed the Iraqi artillery, and AV-8Bs flew day and night throughout the rest of the war.
VMA-331 was held in reserve on the Nassau in expectation of an assault from the sea (Operation Desert Saber); in mid-February, the squadron supported the assault on Failaka Island (Operations Desert Dagger/Slash). On 25 February, the squadron scheduled 74 sorties daily in support of the Desert Storm.
Marine Aircraft Group-13 (Forward) Harriers initially flew deep air strikes into Kuwait, ranging up to 210 miles one way, without tankers or drop tanks. Later, AV-8Bs escorted helicopters and flew armed reconnaissance and close air support missions. Normal ordnance loads consisted of fully loaded guns, plus Mk 20 Rock- eyes, Mk 82 500-pound bombs, or two laser-guided Maverick missiles. The aircraft carried AIM-9M Sidewinder air-to-air missiles initially but unloaded them after the air threat disappeared in the first week of the war.
Harriers delivered 5.9 million pounds of ordnance; high sortie rates contributed to the tonnage. If no targets were found, the aircraft returned with the bombs, refueled, and launched once more.
Five AV-8Bs and two aviators were lost to direct enemy action. Four aircraft were victims of unobserved surface- to-air missiles (SAMs); one flew into the ground during a night weapons delivery. Apparently, none of the pilots of the downed AV-8s saw the missiles coming. In every case where a pilot saw a SAM, he was able to evade it.
Three of the losses were to unobserved, smokeless SAMs. Two of the aircraft were hit while over a target that had been worked for an hour with no reaction; the other was a “learning curve/loss of situational awareness” where a pilot on his third combat mission became preoccupied with an aircraft problem and was hit while passing for the third time over the same point on the beach.
The fourth aircraft was lost to a shoulder-fired SA-7 when the pilot either ignored or did not hear a warning call from his wingman.
Unfortunately, the technology that gives the Harrier its STOVL capability—its centrally located nozzles— makes it vulnerable to infrared-guided missiles. High-technology flares, cooler nozzles, and missile proximity warning systems currently under development will reduce the vulnerability to smokeless heat-seeking SAMs. Although it is not within the scope of this article to compare different aircraft, the Harrier loss rate was comparable to that of other single-engine—and some twin-engine—jets, given pilot learning curves and the threat.
After 23 February, when the ground forces breached the barriers and stormed into Kuwait, the Harriers concentrated on close air support. Bombing, and on occasion just plain scaring the enemy into keeping their heads down with dummy strafing passes, the AV-8s were in their element.
Early in the morning of 26 February, a section of Harriers and a section of A-6Es caught the Iraqis abandoning Kuwait City. Well-placed bombs blocked the northern highway and set the stage for two days of nonstop, high- tempo attacks on forces retreating along the “Highway of Death.” Hostilities abruptly ceased during the afternoon on 27 February while the Harriers were heavily engaged in supporting Marines on the ground and pounding the retreating Iraqi forces along the northern highway to Iraq.
VMA-311 stayed in place for a month after the ceasefire to support remaining ground units. VMA-513 Detachment “B,” back on board the Tarawa, and VMA-331 on the Nassau sailed for home. The rest of the squadrons redeployed to the United States behind KC-10 tankers or on U.S. Navy carriers.
After one field carrier landing practice (FCLP) period per pilot, VMA-231 and most of VMA-542 flew to Rota, Spain, to board the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and the USS Saratoga (CV-60) for a ten-day, non-flying transit to the United States. Since landing the AV-8B aboard ship is no different from landing it on a pad, it was business as usual for the Harrier pilots—and the boarding rate was an easy 100%. Two hundred miles from the U.S. coast, the AV-8Bs deck launched for their final leg home.
AV-8Bs flew 9,353 sorties and logged 11,120 hours during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Mission-capable rates averaged 90% throughout the war. Maintenance crews were able to hold five to ten aircraft per squadron in maintenance reserve and still meet the flight schedule. Turnaround times between sorties averaged 20 minutes for gas and arming. The land-based AV-8Bs consistently flew as many as 120 sorties a day with highs of 160.
The full number of sorties scheduled by the Joint Forces air tasking order (ATO) was rarely flown—many were canceled as the Joint Forces Commander’s requirements were satisfied throughout the day. On one occasion, however, with only 45 minutes notice, 30 additional AV-8B sorties were launched from KAAAB to counter Iraqi forces. No other tactical aircraft were available to react on such short notice. Such a surge was possible because living and maintenance spaces were close to the aircraft and the base was only 20 minutes from Kuwait.
FOD had very little effect on aircraft availability. Throughout the course of operations, only three engines incurred minor, blendable (file, polish, and balance the blade) damage and were immediately returned to the flight schedule; two other engines incurred FOD through maintenance error or materiel failure. The anticipated accelerated wear and damage from sand ingestion never occurred, nor did sand and dust adversely affect avionics equipment.
Responsive, flexible, and lethal, an expeditionary STOVL force is a force multiplier. The current generation of STOVL jets, led by the Harrier II Plus, provides lethal and all-around expeditionary capability with savings in operating costs and support. Based on years of successful Harrier operations—and considering the demands of littoral warfare—the role of expeditionary, forward-based, tactical, STOVL aviation can only increase.
1 U.S. Marine Corps KC-130 tankers usually were available on established in-flight refueling tracks, primarily for use by Marine EA-6Bs and F/A-18s based at Sheik Isa Air Base. AV-8Bs could use them if required, but our standard operating procedure was to leave them for the other aircraft; with the Tanajib forward site so close, we did not need them.
Colonel Herman manages Spanish and Italian Navy logistics programs at McDonnell Douglas. A career Marine Corps aviator, he commanded VMA-542 during Operations Desert Shield-Desert Storm.