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ance the potential for a state using a nu- ar weapon as its last-ditch defense or
retaliate for a massive conventional or
mical weapons attack.
The latest nuclear threat Thickly was denied
e«Hi
re,
ry vehicles.[1] In addition, Ukraine is ^ Ported by international arms negotia- ^.rs to have 41 strategic bombers with b nuclear bombs and air-to-surface ttissiies
la ^hese weapons make Ukraine the third ar§est nuclear power, after Russia and e United States. (About 2,600 tactical
The Bosnian-Serb leader is quoted as threatening Europe with nuclear ^rikes if Western states intervene in the Jugoslav civil war. Ukraine is technically world’s third-ranking nuclear power. ^°me Japanese are considering the deVelopment of nuclear weapons to counter tbe anticipated nuclear threat from North Korea.
These and other nuclear developments ^re causing increased concern among . S- and other Western political and mil- '!ary leaders. Further, civil wars and other
['ghting in a dozen areas of the world en-
hr
ole; to
die;
which
. —j „„„ reportedly came
rorti the head of the Bosnian-Serb forces, Radovan Kradzic. He was quoted by Aus- ^*a’s Der Standard newspaper on 12 August 1993 as threatening to use nuclear Capons if Western countries intervene ln lhe bloody civil war:
We are not prepared to give up our °Wn self-defense. It is no problem to buy nuclear weapons on the world Market. We will really carry it through, have nothing to lose.1
Meanwhile, a few hundred miles t0rtheast of Bosnia-Serbia, Ukraine’s sta- as a nuclear power remains in limbo. n[il September 1993, there were a re- j0rted 1,656 strategic nuclear warheads ^Ukraine. Of those, 1,240 were on bal- stlc missiles deployed in silos in the for- aer Soviet republic: 130 SS-19 Stiletto I ad 46 ss_24 Scalpel intercontinental bailee m‘ss''es (ICBMs), respectively fit- a with six and up to ten separate renuclear weapons and some air-launched strategic weapons had been removed from Ukraine to Russia by June 1992.)
The Ukrainian parliament has not ratified international disarmament agreements that would terminate Ukraine’s nuclear forces, although Ukraine previously had agreed that all strategic nuclear warheads would be handed over to Russia, to be placed under joint control by the Commonwealth of Independent States, by 1 July 1992. Subsequently, President Leonid Kravchuk has declared that he favors a compromise agreement in which Ukraine would pledge to become a nonnuclear state eventually but would “temporarily” keep some ICBMs. Incentive includes $175 million promised by the Clinton administration if Ukraine gives up nuclear weapons. But being a nuclear power gives Ukraine international prestige and a certain amount of leverage with the West and with Russia for resolving some of its many problems.
On 15 July 1993, a regiment with ten SS-19 missiles located at Pervomaysk in Ukraine stood down from combat alert: the missiles now have been dismantled. At least one more regiment will follow this year. The missile warheads, for the present at least, will remain on Ukrainian territory. At this rate, it would take about two years to dismantle fully the Ukrainian ICBM force, if the decision were made to do so.
Significantly, the ICBMs in Ukraine are under the operational control of Russian missile crews. The missiles themselves are claimed as property of Ukraine, and the country has the potential for producing its own launch mechanisms at the Shevchenko factory—one of two facilities that apparently made such devices in the Soviet Union.
The strategic bombers in Ukraine are not believed to be fully operational. The composition of their crews is unknown, but the maintenance personnel were mainly Russian. Also, their home bases were in Russia; those available in Ukraine were forward bases with limited support capabilities. Some of their weapons may
no longer be operational, as well.
The Russians continue to dismantle nuclear weapons, in accord with international agreements and promises. The massive size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, however, means that thousands of nuclear weapons will be in storage for many years before they can be broken down properly. And there is increasing concern over the state of those storage facilities. The Russian newspaper Izvestia reported that storage facilities in Ukraine for already removed nuclear warheads are so overloaded that radiation levels outside of them had risen to at least double the acceptable limits. The report also said that leaky Ukrainian missile silos were in danger of short-circuiting “with unforeseen consequences” and that security systems at 20 weapon complexes were broken.[2]
Also, technical and security personnel involved in the storage and dismantling of nuclear weapons are under considerable stress as pay checks are being delayed, inflation is rampant, and there is ample evidence that a black market in nuclear technology—and possibly weapons—exists. A Russian newspaper recently reported,
You can obtain them complete, or if you are short of money or really want to build one yourself, piece by piece. . . .
We were offered a bomb very easily .... If you don’t like the californium and the antiradar coating, the salesman said, I have another complete warhead. From an SS-20 [Saber intermediate-range ballistic missile].[3]
The asking price in U.S. dollars? “$150,000 and its yours...its here in Moscow. . . ,’’ the paper reported.
Hyperbole? Possibly. But, like Kradzic’s alleged threat, it reflects a state of mind that nuclear weapons are readily available.
In addition to Russia and Ukraine, smaller remnants of the Soviet nuclear arsenal are held by Kazakhstan, which has 104 large SS-18 Satan missiles and
105
Russia | 15,000 |
United States | 10,500 |
Ukraine | 1,536 |
Kazakhstan | 1,040 |
France | 540 |
China | 450 |
Great Britain | 200 |
Israel | 50-100 |
India | several |
Pakistan | few |
Another 18,000 awaiting disassembly Another 6,000 awaiting disassembly Another 120 from SS-19s in storage Plus possibly some air-launched weapons
Source: Robert S. Nonis and William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Pursuits.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Sci enlists. May 1993, pp. 48-49; and other published materials.
Approximate Country Number
Table 1: Countries with Nuclear Weapons
Notes
to bear against would-be nuclear state5.
Tbf
; derived from the Russian Scud-C missile-
about 40 strategic bombers.[4] 2 3 4 [5] The SS-18 missiles—with a range of more than 6,000 miles—were the largest ICBMs produced by the Soviet Union. They also apparently are operated by Russian crews and are not being fully maintained. Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan are strained at this writing.
A final point concerning the nuclear aspects of the breakdown of the Soviet Union is the recent termination of the military structure of the CIS. The Commonwealth was an effort to give the former Soviet republics a share in control of the strategic nuclear forces, all of which were to have all been turned over to Russia. But the CIS concept failed and the head of CIS military forces, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, the former Russian minister of defense, has resigned.
Including Russia and the other former Soviet republics, there are now ten countries ac- ' knowledged by their governments or the U.S. intelligence community to have nuclear weapons (see Table 1).
North Korea is known to have an active nuclear weapons program but has been “playing games” with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with respect to allowing international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In early August the North Korean government allowed three IAEA inspectors to visit some facilities.
The on-again-off-again attitude of North Korea with regard to inspections, its known nuclear weapons program, and the flight tests of a missile last May have “shocked” officials in the Japanese defense agency.[6] The missile, called Nodong 1, is estimated to have a range of about 600 miles—sufficient to reach Osaka, Japan’s second largest city, from a launch site in North Korea.[7] (In the May tests at least one of two Nodong missiles traveled some 300 miles from a launch site near Wonsan.)
The missiles tests are causing Japanese officials to reevaluate defense policies. Japan already is embarked on procurement of the U.S.-developed Aegis air defense system in four Kongo-class missile destroyers. This system already has some antiballistic missile capability, and this can be upgraded.[8] The Japanese also are considering an upgrade of the land-based Patriot air defense missiles, and at least some Japanese are rethinking the nation’s
policy of “never” having nuclear weapons. A recent report from Japan states:
Some Japanese officials say that Japan must keep its options open to become a nuclear power, either because North Korea might become a nuclear threat or the U.S. could someday withdraw its forces from Asia and fail to protect Japan. Other officials say their hesitation is only to put pressure on the nuclear powers to cut back their arsenals.[9]
Reportedly, the United States learned of the pending North Korean missile test from Israeli officials. They had been in that country establishing trade relationships with the Pyongyang government while dissuading the North Korean sales of military equipment—including missiles—to Middle Eastern states.
Israel, in the meantime, remains silent about its nuclear program. Most credible sources cite a minimum of 50 nuclear weapons and a maximum of about 100, although much higher estimates are sometimes voiced. Israeli nuclear weapons are in the form of aerial bombs and warheads for the Jerico 2 ballistic missile, estimated to have a range of some 900 miles with an inertial navigation system. (Reports persist of Israeli interest in a strap-on, submarine-launched missile with a nuclear warhead as a deterrence weapon; with the greatly reduced military threat to Israel it is unlikely that such a concept is now being pursued.)
Although today Israel is the only Middle Eastern state with nuclear weapons, Iran has an active weapons program. Iraq’s program has been disrupted twice: by an Israeli air strike in 1981 and by Coalition air strikes ten years later in the Gulf War. International inspection polices will deter Iraqi nuclear development further—at least in the near term. There is
little doubt, however, that Iraqi leadd Saddam Hussein sees a successful nuclei program returning his state to prominent* as a Middle East political-military power A final state in the area with nuclei interests is Libya, although it is probabl) years away from a nuclear capability.
Among the smaller nuclear powers- both India and Pakistan now are know" to have produced weapons. India ma) have mated them with its l,500-mile-pluS Agni missile, while Pakistan has onl) short-range missiles, on the order of 30® miles, which are not suitable for nuclei warheads. India has a much more robus[10] missile program, being openly aided W Russia. Pakistan and India can deliver nit clear weapons by aircraft.
There is some good news with resped to nuclear weapons proliferation: A® gentina, Brazil, and Taiwan—which al various times had announced or at leas1 indicated interest in nuclei weapons development'' have backed off of weap[11] efforts. And the SotH® African government, whie® had announced in 1991 that it would abandon i,s nuclear program, recently revealed that it had pr°' duced six nuclear weapo®' in the 1970s and 1980s. 0" 24 March 1993, South African President Freder^ W. de Klerk stated that hi* government had order6" them disassembled.
Thus, while nuclei weapons are being reduce" by the major nuclear po"’ ers, more nations have nuclear weapon5 today than did during the Cold W*® More proliferation can be anticipated u®' less the United States and its allies bri®* strong political and economic sanctio®8
106
Proceedings / November
177
[1]These are U.S.-NATO designations; the Russian ignations are RS-18 and RS-22, respectively. j
[2]Mary Mycio, “Safety of Ex-Soviet A-Ats^ Doubted,” Los Angeles Times, 2 March 1993.
[3]“Atomic Bombs Can Be Acquired Privately in
‘Reuter’s news service, 13 August 1993.
sia,” Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 22 July The Russian designation for the SS-18 missile is ^ 20. The designation for the SS-25 is not known- ‘David E. Sanger, “Missile Is Tested by North ^ reans,” The New York Times (International), 13 ™ 1993.
The Nodong missile—sometimes given as RodonJ'
name is of Western origin, for the town on the of Japan where the missile was first sighted.
[8]See Capt. Rodney P. Rempt, USN, “Killing ScU( From the Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed'ifl&
June 1993, pp. 52-58. _
[9]Clayton Jones, “Korea Prompts Japan to Review ^
Nukes Policy,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 *
gust 1993.