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Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Always There—Always Ready
Just a few days after Iraq shocked the world by rolling over Kuwait, a United States Navy aircraft carrier took station in the Gulf of Oman. She carried the first—and for a time the only— U.S. air power available for action. Once again, the world witnessed the responsiveness of naval forces, particularly naval air forces.
Not only was the Independence on station near the potential scene of action, but the Ike was in the Eastern Mediterranean about to transit the Suez Canal to join Indy, and the Saratoga had sortied from May port to the Med. The aircraft embarked in these ships totaled more than the entire air forces of many nations; the
air wings surpassed in quality of equipment and crew training anything Iraq might have thrown at them. Evening news coverage of the carriers’ flight decks packed with Tomcats, Hornets, and Intruders was concrete evidence to Saddam Hussein that his forces had already lost control of the air over the battlefield. The arrival of the carriers limited his military options and exposed his forces to attack—24 hours a day in all weather from several different directions. Once again the carrier and her embarked aircraft had done the job just by showing up.
Not only did the carriers promptly assure air dominance, they also made it safe for the deployment of follow-on elements of the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. Had Navy carriers not been early on the scene, Saudi authorities would have had no visible assurance of our commitment upon which to base their request for U.S. land forces; had Navy carriers not been early on the scene, it would have been difficult to provide safe cover to move these land-based forces into Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, the carriers were there, and the Air Force was soon in position to do what it does best: conduct air operations from fixed bases. The carriers were then freed to do what they do best: employ their mobility and flexibility to exploit the speed and range of their aircraft—all in an environment unfettered by international territorial claims or dependence upon foreign overflight or base rights.
But the three carriers near or en route to the Middle East in early August are not the whole story. At the same time they were center stage on the nightly news, two more carriers were at sea in the Western Pacific and a sixth was training off our own East Coast: six of the nation’s 14 deployable aircraft carriers were at sea simultaneously, an operating tempo very close to the maximum set by the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. True, had there been a need, five or six more could have put to sea, but not without violating the OpTempo rules and setting themselves up for a breakdown of people and equipment—■ sooner rather than later. Fortunately, because our carrier forces have thus far been reduced by only one—from 15 to 14—there were ships available nearby. Fortunately, all this happened before those who would reduce even more the nation’s carrier forces prevailed. Had the carrier force level been down to 12 or fewer, as some have proposed, there might not have been any carrier air power, which for a time would have meant no air power, available to deter Saddam Hussein. How would we have encouraged our allies to commit their forces or ensured the safe transit of other U.S. forces?
The simple facts are that any force of fewer than 15 carriers equates to gaps in coverage. Given the complacency prevailing in late July, some of those gaps would probably have been in the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Mediterranean—precisely where the Indy and Ike were steaming when they received the call to head for the Middle East.
On the other hand, how can anyone determine just when or where the next call for help will occur? Will it be the Northwest Pacific near Korea? Will it be in the South China Sea off the Philippines? The Caribbean? West Africa? Southeast Asia? Anywhere around the globe? With nations understandably sensitive about foreign bases on their soil and nervous about foreign military aircraft overhead, only naval forces can guarantee an immediate response in support of allies, other friendly nations, and U.S. national strategy. Only naval forces have the mobility, flexibility, and global reach to do this. Naval forces built around large-deck aircraft carriers in numbers sufficient to cover simultaneously the world’s many troubled areas will do the job best.
We had barely enough carriers in commission—14—and some were fortuitously deployed when Saddam Hussein grabbed Kuwait. We must maintain at least that number into the uncertain future of the 21st century. The events of early August reinforced lessons learned long ago, before some misguided pundit invented the concept of a peace dividend.
The world news, however, moves on. New headlines splash across the front pages and anchormen gaze earnestly into the television monitors as they analyze new problems, conflicts, and atrocities, local and international. All the while, the men who man the carriers and the ships that go with them ply distant waters—training, watching, and waiting. Time and again they have preserved the peace merely by their presence. On the rare occasions when this has failed, they have remained—first on the scene—to make the way less painful and risky for follow-on forces.
After World War II there was a saying: “Keep the fleet to keep the peace.” Today, “the fleet” means carriers. The number is 15 because of our global responsibilities and interests. The United States cannot settle for less.
Admiral Dunn commanded VA-146 during the Vietnam War, and later commanded an attack carrier air wing, the USS Saratoga (CV-60), Carrier Group Eight, and Naval Air Forces, Atlantic. He was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare (OP-05) when he retired in 1989. A former chairman of the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board, he is a Senior Advisor to the Naval Institute.
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Proceedings / October 1990