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Tomahawk Equals True Value
By the Staff of Carrier Group Seven, U.S. Pacific Fleet
The time has come to reevaluate fleet weapon systems to determine where the Navy can generate tactical leverage. The Tomahawk missile, with its current capability and ever-increasing deployable numbers, can make the difference in a wide range of tactical situations. Both the Tomahawk antiship missile (TASM) and the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) provide the battle group with the necessary flexibility to keep a potential adversary at a tactical disadvantage.
While initial and superficial analysis of the TASM/TLAM capability may indicate that only the antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC) and the strike warfare commander (STWC) may reap benefits from the Tomahawk, full integration of this capability by all commanders will serve as a significant force multiplier for the battle group.
A TLAM mission package can be designed to deliver a tailored result. A combination of various target types yields results that will serve the respective commanders and increase the overall effectiveness of each TLAM/TASM mission.
Before examining the advantages Tomahawk brings to the battle group, two important adjuncts must be discussed: First, the role of the battle group’s force over-the-horizon track coordinator (FOTC) and second, the role of the cruise missile support activity (CMSA). Only with these two supporting functions working efficiently can the battle group realize the true value of the Tomahawk.
Force OTH Track Coordinator
The FOTC performs three vital functions for the battle group. First, he maintains a surface and subsurface database that includes both potential threats and friendly surface traffic, to ensure accurate targeting. Second, the FOTC is a vital link in monitoring the flow of nonorganic intelligence information to the battle group for generation of new tracks and for updating and correlating new data. Finally, he provides targeting data for all battle group war-at-sea strikes.
The theater-wide database maintained by FOTC is critical for Tomahawk planning. Over-the-horizon tracks are impor-
Since the United States adopted the Tomahawk concept in 1972, it has evolved into one of the most effective force multipliers in the Navy.
tant not only to ensure that they can be targeted as required but also that friendly casualties can be avoided during a TLAM strike. The ability of FOTC to work with the ASUWC to generate an adequate surface surveillance picture is central to the success of Tomahawk. Equally important is the interaction between FOTC and the STWC for surface track coordination.
Timely integration of nonorganic intelligence information to the FOTC database is essential in providing warfare commanders with the latest tactical picture. An accurate update in order-of- battle asset location can have a strong impact on planned war-at-sea or deep interdiction strikes. The full value of nonorganic theater and national sensors cannot be realized without centralized, evaluation of FOTC information.
Finally, as a warfare coordinator, the FOTC must provide the battle group in general, and Tomahawk-capable units in particular, with a targeting quality tactical database. The information should be used by all warfare commanders in making tactical decisions. War at sea, overland strikes, underway replenishment, carrier/battleship operations, antisubmarine warfare exercises, and every other major battle group evolution should be undertaken only after the plot from the FOTC database has been factored in.
Cruise Missile Support Activity
The CMSA role in employing the Tomahawk weapon system is vital. It is the TLAM mission repository. Without discussing the cruise missile C3I architecture and associated hardware, suffice it to say that these missions are time-consum-
ing and labor-intensive. While a library of missions exists, every battle group staff should become familiar with the current planning status and consider a wide variety of contingency strike packages prior to deployment. After reviewing the various existing targeting options, commanders should make recommendations to CMSA early for improvement and required target planning. This should result in planning for the most likely missions and should generate a list of future planning requirements consistent with those of subsequent battle groups. Existing missions can also be modified to facilitate minor changes in target location or missile route of flight. Battle group staffs must ensure that subordinate warfare commanders provide input to CMSA. Every contingency operation, whether it is over-the-beach or war-at-sea, has its own unique set of requirements. All warfare commanders | should make the most of the variety of other missions. delivery platforms and options at their In addition to fleet air defense consid- disposal erations, the strike factors in AAW must ' be kept in mind. For over-the-beach air Antiair Warfare Force Multipliers superiority, the AAWC should ensure -------------- —--------------------------------- that the TLAM package initially me- The complexities and time require- ludes C3I facilities, threat airfields, and ments of outer air battle drive battlegroup early warning/ground-controlled interoperations in most threat scenarios. The cept (GCI) sites. Damage to these would antiair warfare commander (AAWC) decrease the size of potential raids, cut should address several key considera- the number of hostile fighter-interceptions. tors, and limit the effectiveness of threat
sensors. Local air superiority may be generated
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COURTESY USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-6S) With the battleships’ Tomahawks (here the Missouri [BB-63] and the New Jersey [BB-62]) added to the Enterprise’s (CVN-65) air wing, the battle-group commander has more war-fighting options available. | tion This requirement could predicate mop-up and suppression. Conversely, the number of aircraft available for fleet TLAM variants can deliver submunitions „ir to multiple targets. The submunitions can ► Defense of shore-based units. During serve either as aircraft busters or soft- an amphibious operation, barrier/target target anti-C I weapons, combat air patrol requirements may draw As a function of planning and lead against assets otherwise available for time, TLAM-capable submarines may be |
able to move covertly to launch positions and fire missiles that can deliver either of two conventional warhead variants (unitary or submunition).
Strike Warfare Force Multipliers
The TLAM strike that works effectively on day one of a scenario may not be effective on day six. Target dispersal and the value of a given target will change, once hostilities commence. In the case of follow-on strikes, dispersal and previous damage may result in a less- coordinated air defense, obviating the need for a strike mission. The STWC may want to evaluate the number of TLAMs available and take one of two possible approaches:
- The STWC may choose to use the TLAM missions as a “buy in" for follow-on tactical aircraft (TACA1R) strikes. In a high-threat environment, a sophisticated IADS may require several successful TLAM strikes before reaching a risk level acceptable to tactical aircraft. TLAM used in this manner can be used against high-leverage targets—C’l, GCI sites, and communications facilities.
- TLAM missions may be used to broaden the scope of a strike. A long- range warhead can deliver a substantial punch from a Tomahawk platform that may present a second or even third threat axis to the enemy. This is particularly significant when determining the best tactics to thin out hostile IADS.
Antisi<rface Warfare Force Multipliers
Using Tomahawk as a force multiplier in antisurface warfare requires a threefold approach. First, the TASM can serve as a defense suppression weapon or as decoy prior to a TACAIR strike. Second, TASM may be used to present multiple threat axes to an adversary. Third, TASM may act as a stand-alone, long-range ASUW weapon in a high-threat environment. In each case, TASM serves as a force multiplier, allowing a battle group to increase the size of its engagement zone while maintaining AAW/ASW screen integrity.
TASM has the capability to fly attack profiles using a multitude of way points to complicate the hostile force’s AAW solution. In this way, one ship can launch a salvo of missiles in a multi-axis attack, and eliminate the possibility of an enemy aligning his forces as he might to defend against a single-axis threat. Not only does the waypoint function allow the multiaxis attack, but it also reduces the counterdetection risk to the firing unit. This is a critical factor in surface warfare; available battle group force levels do not support or permit a firepower attrition model in many key areas of the world.
AW Force Multipliers
The ASWC is traditionally thought to be interested primarily in screen composition, screen size, limited lines ot approach for a given subsurface threat, and other defense-oriented ASW functions. Battle group staffs should seriously consider dedicating a limited number of TLAM/TASM missions to support ASW operations. While this would seem out ot the realm of the normal cruise missile mission profiles, consider the following:
- Submarines have relatively low search speeds. Any TLAM/TASM mission that degrades the hostile submarine’s command and control systems greatly assists the ASWC in protecting the battle group.
- Targeting units that support submarine forces such as tenders and surface markers for submarine attack works for the ASWC; as it limits the possible submarine forces he may be required to counter.
- Any potential target that can deter U.S. fast attack nuclear submarines (SSNs) in accomplishing their missions is a force multiplier par excellence once it is destroyed. Targets in this category may include minclaying units, C3I nodes, and enemy ASW forces themselves.
Electronic Warfare Force Multipliers
In most large general war scenarios large groups of aircraft originating front a few airfields conduct electronic warfare at sea. The EWC can minimize the tactical problem by minimizing the adversary's capabilities. In that regard, the following targets would most benefit the EWC: "
- Hostile jammers on deck provide the most viable targets for the EWC. Reducing the number of jammers (and electronic intelligence aircraft) will simplify the defense of the battle group.
- TASM has a unique capability to serve as an “exciter” to hostile ships in a strict emission control posture. With the active homer serving as a “screaming meemie” enemy units may be forced to counter the perceived threat posed by the searching TASM. Once enemy forces have activated their search radars, a follow-on strike can take advantage of the newly available locating information.
- Tomahawk has the capability to home on units with selected active radars. In this mode, the missile classifies and prioritizes targets to attack hostile high- value units. Sophisticated computer logic uses the seeker in a verify/fallback mode, should the adversary be in a period of restricted electronic emissions.
► An attack on hostile ground jamming or electronic intelligence-gathering units will provide an edge to attack aircraft and ease the tactical problem for anti-radiation-missile shooters. The classification and jamming by the EA-6B will be simplified by removal of hostile EW units.
Nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
The nuclear version of the Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM-N) is very likely the most flexible nuclear-capable weapon in the U.S. inventory. A precise guidance system, coupled with a powerful warhead, yields a very capable weapon system. To maximize the options available in battle group nuclear operations, TLAM-N must be fully integrated into battle group planning. While this may be the least likely weapon to be used, its capability should be understood by all staffs and warfare commanders. The TLAM-N has all the capabilities for targeting as the TLAM-C and D plus the additional ability through Bight logic extension (FLEX) to By to updated target position. With its ability to attack relocatable targets, FLEX provides a great capability against emergent or surviving tactical or strategic targets.
Conclusion
Tomahawk is a weapon system yet to be understood totally for its role as a force multiplier. With many other new weapon procurement programs in limbo, TLAM/TASM provides current battle group commanders with the edge they need now and in the future. By working all warfare commanders into the Tomahawk planning process, the battle group commander can integrate and realize the synergistic capabilities of his assigned units. Existing courses at tactical training groups provide excellent background and instruction for battle group staffs and their warfare commanders. An obvious logical extension of TLAM’s force- multiplier capability is coordination with U.S. or allied forces ashore, through increased and cooperative target planning. In every warfare area, we will have to be more creative and tactically interactive within the Navy to accomplish our numerous warfare missions with a reduced force structure. Tomahawk provides the means to do this with off-the-shelf technology.
Carrier Group Seven is commanded by Rear Admiral T.A. Mercer.