This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
There will be four types of mid-range objectives: doctrinal, training, structure, and equipment. If a sponsor finds that a doctrinal change will help to achieve a long-range goal, it will take priority over other objectives. The least desirable fix would be new equipment: it is usually the most expensive solution and generally takes the longest to
• • nnsed °n
field. There is, however, no cost constraint imp ^ the development of the objectives or upon their^pn _ Objectives are listed only in priority of their relative fit to the Corps. A combination of the four objective may be required to create many capabilities. ^
It is at this point in our OTH planning process a
Proponents of the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft call it the “Transport of the Future,” “A New Way to Fly,” and “Tough Enough to be a Marine Machine.’ ’1 But have we looked closely enough at the historical data on helicopter survivability in combat? Can the MV-22 survive on the battlefield in the 1990s?
Let us examine five cases in which helicopters flew in combat.
► “In Vietnam, large scale helicopter operations were confined to the south. HH-53 Jolly Green Giant choppers ventured into Laos and North Vietnam only at great risk from ground defenses.”2 It was also in Vietnam, “without any air-to-air threat, and keeping helicopters out of
• |i
high threat areas, that the United States Army st,‘ aged to lose over 17,700 helicopters.”30 tie
► In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, helicopters ProV w-///aft highly vulnerable. Martin van Creveld wrote in ">l Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical PefsPe
“Considering the newly-found effectiveness of an^e(- craft defense, particularly that of the light sh°u ^ fired missile such as the SAM-7 ... it is mote ^ doubtful that helicopters could survive on a m° ^ battlefield .... Rather than playing a great role o e battlefield, therefore, helicopters are likely to con to be used on its edge . . . ,”4
38
Proceedings
/ Novemb*1”
19*1
Pie thS^r\1SOr wou^ identify his deficiencies. For examine th t ^P^.^hief of Staff for Aviation might deter- needed t* u'S a^'n® ^eet °f CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters the ran?° tf- reP'ace^ because the helos could not provide the Ion?' sPee<^’ ar>d other capabilities called for in 8 range concepts. He would identify a mid-range | aviation objective to overcome this deficiency. A description of the aircraft’s design, components, and the like would not be appropriate in a plan of this type, because that level of specificity would preclude alternate designs. The aviation sponsor would also identify structure, doctrine, development, and training objectives. These objec- |
ation ’ tbe Waited States launched a rescue oper- crew ?n amb°dia seized the SS Mayaguez and her U. s a - e^ulf °f Thailand. The operation involved 11 which lanj ?rce ^H-53 and HH-53 helicopters, nine of the nine ,c at K°h Tang Island on the first mission. “Of eight cam eKlcoPters that actually landed at Koh Tang, Only 0n6 vv'tb battle damage, or were lost entirely, mission “5 tbose n*ne was capable of a second ^f§hanktre*at'Ve^ Mw-threat environment of the war in fly (hejran’ Mujahedin forces have forced the Soviets to bigh altit t ^ blind and Mi-8 Hip helicopters either at been high- T °r a'0n® nap-of-the-earth. “Losses have c°ncede 1 ’ h ^efense Intelligence Agency has privately enerny r tbat .UP.t0 ^50 Hinds had been lost, mostly to invasion^’ W*tb'n the first 18 months after the Soviet ^ In the 1 Qwi ■ • pi. .f3 lnvasion of Grenada, U. S. forces lost seven 10% Qj-aj“ bawk and two AH-1 Cobra helicopters—about ble (0e ^ combat helicopters.7 This rate is compara- War p e Prohibitive daylight bomber loss rate in World Th almnctSe examples point to low helicopter survivability on battlefield. ^verai Ct Us M°k at the MV-22 Osprey. This aircraft has
^ It h- V'r‘Ual|y self-deployable to all parts of the world. CH,4filthree bmes the combat radius of a fully loaded
tanCe r auncb preassault operations at an offshore dis- put nautical miles, i.e., over the horizon. ^he n" tbese capabilities guarantee tactical success? t°uted j sPrey’s speed and maneuverability are highly for ft' ts top speed is 250 knots compared to 120 knots to t|le pbI-46, and the Osprey can pull four Gs compared signif H'46’s two. But what threats are eliminated or knotS7Caatiy reduced when you move from 120 to 250 _^°ne- At 250 knots with a four-G capability, the (S/\jyj ^3-mm. ZU-23 cannon, all surface-to-air missiles Or kjj. and most antiaircraft artillery can easily damage en0 the Osprey. Speed is life, but 250 knots is not fixed Sf>ecd to defeat today’s antiaircraft threats. Most kootsWing pilots believe that a minimum of 450-500 any ar|d 5-7 Gs are needed to operate successfully in •p. °dern combat threat environment. foote 0sPrey’s size is cause for concern. Its deck-spot the (yu1 *s larger than the CH-53E’s, and twice the size of quireH'46’s. The Osprey’s medium-lift capability relift .s a landing zone larger than that of the CH-53 heavy- WgeriCoPter- Thus, the Navy will have to build more or amphibious assault ships if vertical assault capabil- / November 1987 | ity is not to be reduced. The Iwo Jima (LPH-2)-class amphibious assault ships can carry 27 CH-46s or 11 CH-53s— or 10 MV-22s. The Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious assault ships can carry 38 CH-46s or 15 CH-53s—or 15 MV-22s. Bigger is not better. True, the Osprey’s speed could allow it to make more lifts in a given period of time. But the loss of one Osprey has a greater impact on the force’s total lift capability than would the loss of a CH-46. Though the Osprey has the latest infrared signature suppressors, SAMs also have improved infrared capabilities. Thus, while the ground threat is gaining in its ability to detect and kill helicopters, the MV-22 is being introduced as the largest helicopter target on the battlefield. The Osprey’s strategic capabilities will be of little use if it cannot survive tactically. The Osprey’s superior speed, range, and maneuverability will get it to the battlefield sooner, only to be killed once when it gets there. Reportedly, “the USAF judges that by the early 1990s the A-10 will not be able to live on the central front.”8 If this is true, then how can a helicopter, which is one-half as fast and flies no lower, survive? If the Osprey is employed on the battlefield of the 1990s in a “low air war environment against a Soviet aggressor,” it is likely to fail.9 The Osprey is a transport helicopter, not an air-to-air or air-to-ground combat aircraft. If the MV-22 Osprey is to be successful, it will not be because its technological capabilities will revolutionize helicopter employment. The Osprey will be successful because Marines will begin to experiment with new ideas for helicopter employment. It is time to start thinking. 'Selected titles, Amphibious Warfare Review, Fall/Winter 1986, p. 5 2Maj. Ed Cobleigh, USAFR, “Combat Helicopters: The New Zeppelins,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 January 1987, p. 114. 3Ibid., p. 115 (Figures on helicopter losses in Vietnam are not specific, but range from 6,000 to 17,700.) 4Martin van Creveld, Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War, selected reprinted edition, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1986), p. 29. 5David R. Mets, Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crises (Maxwell Air Force Base, Air University Press, 1986), p. 47 6Andrew Cockbum, The Threat (New York, Vintage Books, 1984), p. 243. Unconfirmed sources indicate that total helicopter losses in Grenada may have been as many as 16. 8Cobleigh. 9Col. Jim Creech, USMCR, “The Tilt-Rotor MV-22 Osprey: Transport Vehicle of the Future,” Amphibious Warfare Review, Fall/Winter 1986, p. 29. Major Etter is an instructor at the Amphibious Warfare School in Quan- tico, Virginia. A naval flight officer in the F-4 Phantom, he served an infantry tour in Vietnam in 1967-68. He was operations officer for Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333 in 1984-85. 39 |
Colonel Weeks, former head of the Service Plans and Policies Bra2 ^t
; Corp-
tives will be submitted to a Marine Corps evaluation group, which will prioritize all objectives regardless of mission area.
When the objectives of the mid-range plan are approved by the Assistant Commandant’s committee, most of the planning effort has been completed. The documentation that led to the development of the objectives—long-range concepts and goals, mid-range threat, and strategy—is combined with the objectives and other planning data to form the plan. The plan then serves as the starting point for resource decisions and as the document for expressing Marine Corps direction for service input to the Defense Guidance and joint planning.
Implementation: Though implementing mid-range objectives is the sponsor’s responsibility, it is usually accomplished by others, including the FMF. Sponsors rely on external commands and agencies to develop the desired capabilities for the active and reserve forces.
The Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) at Quantico plays a big role in creating new capabilities. With relatively minor changes in tasking and organization, the commanding general of MCDEC could become the CMC’s principal agent in molding the Corps’s future. He controls three organizations that are needed to reach most objectives: the Doctrine Center, the Development Center, and the Education Center. The key is integrating the activities of these centers.
Two inexpensive capabilities are needed to realize the MCDEC’s potential. First, an ability to identify and use lessons learned from exercises and actual engagements is required if we are to avoid past mistakes. Disseminating this information will assist the active and reserve forces before they are committed, and will provide immediate updates for doctrine and training, obviating the need to generate mid-range plan objectives to overcome these deficiencies. Second, MCDEC needs a mechanism for evaluating existing and experimental operational concepts, doctrine tactics, variations of structure, and equipment.
The Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), a tenant organization at Quantico, provides an independent operational evaluation for developmental and acquisition programs. To evaluate current doctrine, equipment, structure, and training requirements, or to experiment with existing resources, MCOTEA’s scope must be expanded and the commanding general of MCDEC must be given tasking authority over it for the purpose of evaluating existing capabilities and their variations.
Additional authority for the commanding general of MCDEC may be necessary if he is to be the CMC’s agent. He must be able to schedule and coordinate tests and evaluations at key installations such as Twentynine Palms, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, and at our amphibious bases. Using Marine forces assigned to unified commanders would require careful planning, because an increase in operational tempo would not be desirable. But MCDEC tests and evaluations could coincide with planned events like those scheduled at Twentynine Palms. Sufficient JCS exercises are available for selected evaluation of joint and combined doctrine. The Defense Department Reorganization Act requires the JCS to evaluate doctrine as w .
How would MCDEC muster its new tools to imple our planning and programming? At some point in P ^ grammed development, we would conduct an °Pen!' . test for the fast, developmental, long-legged, assau g port aircraft cited earlier as an example of a long- goal. MCDEC could coordinate a portion of this op tional test with a part of a Twentynine Palms corn J-tera arms exercise, or could conduct its test immediately a regularly scheduled combined-arms exercise. °eC OTH aircraft must have long legs, MCDEC could arr ^ for a joint exercise/evaluation with the Army an Force, the units of which exercise routinely at the j National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California—'2^, area north of Twentynine Palms. Both areas can ac ^ modate brigade-sized units. Reserve training coU ^ linked with the Army’s new Joint Readiness Training ter at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, where 14-day exercise^ focus on operational training against insurgent fore -
MCDEC could also dispatch evaluation teams serve combined exercises in the North Atlantic and terranean. Because Selected Marine Corps Reserve ^ usually participate in these exercises, much coU ,baCk learned about integrating the “total force.” FeeolU- from these efforts will help us to continue refinin"^ent planning and programming as we key on the develop ^ of a Marine Corps total force that fits into the na military strategy. the
With expanded tasking and the ability to emp1 ? facilities of Twentynine Palms, MCDEC could also portion of the long-range concept for OTH assault exercises. The operational test results from the air ^ equipment, tactics, and structure employed in these could help us improve our programmatic decisions- ^
Using our new service planning methodology t0vVjth programming and other force development decisions national military strategy will: . and
- Ensure that each CMC, his principal staff o^12^'’’ure FMF commanders get a chance early in the CMC’s t
to guide the development of the Corps. 0[u-
- Develop Marine Corps capabilities in a coherent. e
tionary way to meet the needs of the nation. u„i-
- Provide FMFs that are tailored to the needs of1
fied commanders, who must plan for their deploymen employment. ^
- Justify our programming efforts in accordance
presidential directive and congressional intent. ^
- Prevent inadvertent deviations from our missionse
lished by law, e.g., keep the Marine Corps from beco - a second land army. jp
The Marine Corps still produces the finest fighte^y the world. They will continue to win our battles. Bu far-sighted and detailed planning will ensure that N 2 are properly prepared for combat.
Deputy Director, Plans Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine the time this article was prepared, Lieutenant Colonel Pelli waS sion’s Long- and Mid-Range Plans Officer.
the
div>'
40
Proceedings / Novel
nibrr I