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ftate its nl- ° Tecent Marine Corps efforts to interactive,, P ^nning process with national strategic Jr., Ca ’ Commandant General Alfred M. Gray, •color Marine green planning with the p,e hue of joint service planning.
variety 1 (CNA)
Some U. S. Marines believe that the Corps is too heavily equipped; others say we are too lightly armed. Proposals to restructure the Fleet Marine Forces (FMFs) into permanent Marine amphibious brigades have produced lively debate. Where should the Marine Corps be heading?
A way to answer these and other force development questions is at hand. In 1986, a new service planning process was defined at Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps (HQMC), to link national military strategy and future warfighting capabilities—the right blend of doctrine, training, structure, and equipment. External and internal pressures forced the Marine Corps to link—formally—its actions with its plans, particularly those associated with the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS).
External Pressure
President Ronald Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, also known as the Packard Commission, recommended that new procedures be established to help the executive branch and Congress do a better job of long-range planning—i.e., linking strategy with programming—for the development, funding, and implementation of a national military program that meets national security objectives. National Security Decision Directive 219, which virtually implements all of the recommendations presented by the Commission, was signed by President Reagan. In the past, we have been programming experts; we will now be required to plan wisely for the future, as well.
Senate Armed Services Committee hearings earlier this
year indicate that Congress intends to spend nlonej,strat- on those forces and programs that support a nationa egy. This message and the specter of the Gramm-Ku Hollings Act, which mandates deficit reduction, meaas jf we must be able to justify our programs in specific te ^ we expect to find executive branch and congressmen source support. The Reagan administration and Cone^ have served warning that each service must Pr0§r^jL.jne budget its future in the context of a joint effort.
Corps force development plans must, therefore, sU" fl. our claim that the Corps continues to make a unique tribution to national defense, and thus remains the buy in town.
Internal Pressure
According to the Marine Corps Manual, the main ^ tion of the Corps’s long-and mid-range plans is the es tionary development of Marine Corps forces. TheseP^ ^ have been inadequate for several years, for a reasons:
- In October 1984, a Center for Naval Analyses , ^ at
study observed that the mid-range plan—produc HQMC—was not formally linked to the long-rang® (then produced at Quantico). If action officers at made a connection between these plans, it was ° coincidence. Mc,
- The mid-range plan, even though produced at 1?vcon- was, in turn, treated with disdain by those primari y j, cemed with programming. The mid-range plan waij 0. low: There was no justification for the objectives an r |( grams listed. At best, it was a wish list. Nothing
Figure 1 Service Planning and Programming Documents
1987-
1988
1989-
M
M
M
M
N
M
M
Next MLRA July 1991
CMC Guidance
☆ ☆☆☆
Marine Corps Long-Range Assessment [MLRA]
Start Oct. 1986
Marine Corps Long-Range Plan [MLRP] Development
Next MLRP Sept. 1992
Defense
Guidance
POM
1992-93 ^
Development
Next MMROP, May 1991
Marine Corps Mid-Range Plan [MMROP] Development
34
Proceedings / NoveniS
felled action.
the *" ®arlier long- and mid-range plans failed to resolve MeithJ1 ln,U’n^ stru8gle over the Corps’s future direction, guidance^ 30 Prov'^cc' adequate top-down programming
Plannin^ WaS 0n^ symptomatic of the real problem. The to ensu^ S^ftem bac^ no definition, i.e., no methodology, implemented '°n^"ran®e 80a*s and concepts would be Critics
uui iviariiie L-orps pr(
were disjointed
ments,u8Sested that Marine Corps program develop- n the decisions that flowed from it 1
and uns • iT indl nowea irom it were disjointed
defense1**' 6 ^°r tbe Corps’s role in the broader national quicks fCtUre' S°' ^Ur abilitY t0 cut red taPe an<f major °kfe *nterna* consensus on future needs solved Com, ^rob ems before they became known outside the
orps.
ment is*1 °r not’ tb's free-wheeling style of force develop- Scrutin 0Utm°dc<d in an era of increasing congressional insisted’ S^lr'n^.'nS defense budgets, and administration must cl £ °n-ioint Planning. From now on, our programs aiudit (rsuPPort the national military strategy. An and un'/ °F eacb Program must appear in our joint plans ent ‘at-al service plans. These plans must be consist- f^efense ^U'^ance ar*d policy provided by the Secretary of
T’L "
avoid V° tbe Corps’s small size, we have managed to now „ barrassment and major program cuts. But from
now
Co,
°n, we
major program must provide the Commandant of the Marine
rec-
'-Orps (pivtp' . v-uauiMiiuaiu ui uie
0mmen,iw'rh comprehensive force development the me •atlons- Political decision makers must see clearly Port * S sustaining an amphibious force in readiness. Pl°rin ,Unutely’ tbe Marine Corps had already begun ex- egy A? le Unk between programming and national strat- tions |Cn tbe Packard Commission began its delibera- Conve ^ *n 1985, officers from HQMC and Quantico range | t0. examine means to better link long- and mid- PUrpos^ annm8 with programming and budgeting, for the (levelSC determining where the guidance for doctrine a ServPmem should originate. This examination produced ning ,'CCj Panning model that better ensures that our plan- and „dna Programming are consistent with administration c°ngressional guidance.
The Hew
Planning Process
Whc
ment
Center every four years, will be delivered to each
°1° en We defined the new long- and mid-range method- goVg ’ We recognized that the new process would help to fjghjjn Puture size, composition, doctrine, and war-
ces,^ abilities of the Corps. We also recognized the ne- f0Ur ^ P°r linking each of the principal elements in this CMcyear planning cycle: the long-range assessment, auh 8U|dance, the long-range plan, the mid-range plan, aten 6 Program objective memorandum (POM), associ- ^i'v'th the Defense Guidance. (See Figures 1 and 2.) P()lvjSeiiWeW: The new planning evolution (under way for ran *2) commences with the preparation of the long- r^^sessment, which attempts to describe the environ- 2(j 'n which the Marine Corps is likely to be operating in b years. This assessment, prepared by the Developnew CMC shortly after he takes office to obtain top-down guidance for plan development. The long-range assessment is a synthesis of three efforts:
- A joint feature, combining the intelligence staffs of HQMC and the Development Center, will produce a threat assessment of likely foreign technology bases and other data. Data from JCS and intelligence community documents will be useful.
- A contracted assessment will determine what technologies will be available. Ideas drawn from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency will serve as the basis for this study.
- The Development Center will appraise international environments in which we might have to operate. This economical, political, and geographical appraisal will
35
'"SS / November 1987
ning—the production of concepts for employment
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). At this P1
draw on the JCS Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal and a future environment study conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
CMC Guidance: The comprehensive technological and environmental forecasts will be delivered to the CMC after he has been in office for a few months. He, in turn, will provide planning guidance for the development of long- range planning. In essence, this will be CMC’s opportunity to set the future course for the Marine Corps and to outline his operational views. Broad guidance from the CMC is necessary for the first phase of long-range plan
of the
loinf
the Secretary of the Navy—through the CMC-—will have an impact. The Secretary’s strategic vision ^ naval services is fundamental for a coordinated sea-s effort. jonlI.
Long-range Plan: Produced every four years, the range plan starts with the CMC’s guidance and Ll^e;\ uS long-range assessment and the long-range amp 1 strategy as foundation documents. This plan is a key ence for all planning and programming to follow-
d ^
The long-range amphibious strategy, develop® ^ HQMC in coordination with the Department of the is of necessity very general. However, it will be p upon national strategic planning, by a prestigious g ^ composed of former members of the JCS, secretary ^ State, and the like. This group, recently formed ^ g direction of the President, will develop long-range • strategies. This kind of long-range planning has some -s itations, e.g., in the availability of research data, b far better than the less-formal crystal ball approac ■ 0
The Advanced Amphibious Study Group at Qua^ will develop the first of two long-range products t central to the plan. It will develop four concepts o ^ ployment for the MAGTF: a general concept for t e
36
Proceedings
/ N(iveinber
cepts for h a Wllu‘c, anu more specmc con
serve CaCh °f its elements—ground, air, and combat Magtf PPOrt' an illustration, we will track a CaPabilityC?uCe'Dt t*lat futures an over-the-horizon (OTH) mentation ArJ)u^^ t*le planning process and into imple- exactly h ^ough the MAGTF concept could convey w°uld ^^GTF is deployed and employed, it
opment 0j- ‘l - ?ac^ the specificity needed for the devel- l°rce octrine, training, equipment evaluation, and Envis? C modification.
c°inbat SLa concePt f°r the employment of the ground
shoi " ‘ ‘
°P lift
^cUcsW We would also have to develop new doctrine tore and °r SUC^ 3 revo'ut'onary capability. Force struc- training changes are also implied, the go21),1*1? concepts for the MAGTF are approved and into tv,9 S distilled from them, both will be incorporated
I I VllipiUJlllWll Ol liiv/ giuuuu
reward6016111 ^CE) that would describe exactly the air Erom rvm Vement across the surface and through the t° traverSe ” sh'PP>ng. It would have to enable the GCE vide Co6 §reat distances with minimum exposure, pro- °f-sigi1t .rnand,and control capabilities to overcome line- get acqu;lrnitat'ons’ and protect personnel against the tar- range pgSlt'0n capabilities that are projected for the mid- ^fg-ran?0^ sPec't*city of the concept would reflect cepts Wo^ ,techn°logical forecasts. Similar, detailed con- v'ce SUpU provided for the aviation and combat ser- 'Vou]d be<)rt e^ements- Descriptions of how Marine forces aPPropri Cmpl°yed 1° sustained operations would also be endeavor Cf Pccause we are apt to remain a part of a joint attempt a tCr amphibious assault. (But we are not structur ^ l° descr‘he the specific solutions to hardware, The a’ °r other problems at this point.)
C°mmandSlStant Commandant’s committee (with the FMF *fy, an , ers m attendance) will be asked to review, mod- endorse3pProve these four concepts. The committee’s being j016!11 should confirm that the CMC’s guidance is pr°Ved n.1r ernented. After the concepts have been ap- tilling j 6 development Center will analyze them, disand C] , ng'range goals to serve as benchmarks for mid- 0ne sS!'rv,ange Programming.
sUrfacgCp goal from our illustration would be to develop P°intsaad aviation transport from over the horizon to goal; jjSPore- This, of course, is not just an equipment Toon ,:rWe had fast, long-range air and surface craft for
**HQ II Ivs 111 y UWlll Will Uv lllvUl pul UlLU
toinn, e *ong-range plan, and mid-range planning will ^nence.
'range Plan: This plan accounts for considerable
joint, combined, and departmental (Navy and Defense) influence. It will be developed every two years, ahead of POM development. The mid-range planning period will reach out to the end of the extended planning annex period—ten years beyond the POM period, a total of 15 years. This places more emphasis on the long-range goals that are to be achieved during the mid-range period.
The main purpose of the mid-range plan is to derive mid-range objectives from the long-range plan. These objectives, in turn, serve as benchmarks along the long- range time line for program decisions (and others) affecting FMF capabilities. The mid-range plan establishes essential linkage among Marine Corps planning, programming, and budgeting efforts; the Joint Strategic Planning System; and the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
To begin the mid-range planning process, three Marine Corps documents are provided to functional sponsors at HQMC: long-range MAGTF concepts and attendant goals, a mid-range threat, and a mid-range strategy. The sponsors manage specific warfare areas and are principal staff officers for the CMC (for example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation). The long-range concepts and goals are fundamental for mid-range planning because they establish a framework within which all functional sponsors can develop more detailed concepts for employing combat, combat support, and combat service support elements, as well as the key components of each element: e.g., infantry, artillery, assault support, engineer support, bulk fuel systems.
The threat for the mid-range period will be more clearly defined than that of the long-range period because we will be able to describe more than foreign technology bases— although awareness of such technology is very valuable in our own mid-range research and development activities. JCS intelligence documents will be key to this threat development. The mid-range threat will also have some geopolitical information and detailed descriptions of weapon capabilities, known military strategies, and order of battle sketches, as appropriate.
The prospect of working with current and mid-range strategies that provide direct ties between joint and service planning efforts is exciting. If we were to develop brilliant concepts for the employment of the MAGTFs and create FMF capabilities to overcome potential threats, but in the process ignored the JCS national military strategy and the campaign plans of the unified commanders under whom our Marines will be employed, our proposed force capabilities would likely be inappropriate or incomplete.
Sponsors of mission areas (divisions of combat functions, e.g., fire support, engineering, air reconnaissance) at HQMC will develop specific mid-range objectives, based on their analysis of what it will take to achieve the long-range goals within the defined concepts of employment. All of this must be developed against the postulated threat and within the framework of the amphibious strategy. The sponsors will then identify deficiencies in our current force capabilities. The mid-range objectives, published in the mid-range plan, are nothing more than capabilities desired to overcome these deficiencies.
8s / November 1987
37