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he nHablllty of the Lockheed P-3 Orion, c Pnmarv AC\\r „• .. . .. ’
as an ASW weapon
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Navy :mfy ASW aircraft of the U. S. in# A„n, ™any allied countries, includ- Nether|S rfa’ Canada, Japan, and the ^ful/V’ t0 Per^orm *ts mission suc- U. s M has recently been questioned. A rtator w 3Va' ^eserve P-3 tactical coordi- ings thart°te ln the October 1986 Proceed-
t0 pu'0day. the P-3 finds itself unable of ;t/SUe *ts wartime mission because face 'rCreased defenselessness in the Sovi ? ^odl surface and subsurface on\i m'Ssile treats. . . . [The Ori in J Usefulness as an / ar no longer exists.
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ASty aj ’tfle effectiveness of land-based all natiorCraft das L°rced submariners of gies, tac.ns t0 develop defensive strate- Ofion m-1CS’ and Weapons. Accordingly, a'rcraft\a^ need t0 adapt to survive. The ual av- caPability—ensured by contin- sLou](] nn,a uPdates—is such that it alarly as°!,ye Prematurely retired, partic- Platfonj, ,C Use submarines as ASW reali$tic 2 aPPears to be becoming less fhc p_3
Was primarily developed to
meet the threat posed by the Soviet Navy, which, although possessing some impressive surface units, is mainly a submarine force.3 The Soviets apparently intend to use their naval aircraft and surface vessels to assist their submarine force by destroying Western ASW units. Former Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov believed that one of the main reasons why the World War II German submarine force did not win the Battle of the Atlantic was that German surface and air units made no attempt to interfere with British and U. S. ASW assets.4 Gorshkov developed the modern Soviet Navy accordingly, as he wrote in 1976:
“To give our submarines reliability in combat and all round protection, our Navy includes surface ships of various types and aircraft to deal with the enemy’s . . . anti-submarine forces.”5
This strategy is effective as no Western ASW aircraft could perform its mission satisfactorily within range of many types of Soviet naval aircraft or within the surface-to-air missile (SAM) envelopes of Soviet surface ships.6
ASW aircraft are now also once more under threat from the weapons carried by submarines. In World War II, submarines carried extensive antiaircraft guns, intended to allow surfaced submarines to fend off aircraft. However, while the defensive guns helped, the ASW aircraft still retained the advantage. Postwar technology emphasized making submarines more difficult to locate rather than more survivable when found. In recent years, though, some interest has been shown in fitting submarines with an integral SAM system.
The British have developed the submarine-launched antiaircraft missile (SLAM) system, using the Blowpipe missile. A television sight system in the submarine attack periscope allows an
This Soviet Victor III nuclear- powered attack submarine would be a sitting duck for the Orion and her crew (inset) in wartime. But some Soviet submarines may be toting a surface-to-air missile system that could easily turn the tables.
BOEING AEROSPACE COMPANY
n8s / October 1987
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operator to search for a hostile aircraft and guide a missile to intercept it. Sea trials of the system were conducted on a Royal Navy Oberon-class diesel submarine in 1972; a number of navies reportedly have the SLAM system.7
The Swedish Kockums and the German Ingenieurkontor Liibeck and Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft companies have proposed SAM systems for their new diesel submarines. Kockums has been experimenting with underwater- launched antiaircraft missile systems and has suggested employing a modified AIM-9L Sidewinder missile. The missile is ejected from the submerged submarine in a buoyant capsule and launched on the surface. Mid-course guidance is achieved using target location data provided from the submarine sensors before launch; the missiles’ own infrared seeker is used for terminal homing.8
P-3 aircraft, therefore, now face a multidimensional threat that needs to be countered by fleet-wide changes in strategy, tactics, and technology. Land-based ASW aircraft can no longer be considered as independent platforms requiring no support from other surface and air units. The Orion cannot be expected to perform the ASW mission while defending itself from hostile air and surface threats.
In a conflict, hostile ships with SAM systems or fighter direction radars should be attacked and neutralized as rapidly as possible. Without surface ship assistance, aircraft attempting to intercept a P-3 far out at sea would rely heavily on airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft or possibly over-the-horizon (OTH) radars. The Soviets have limited numbers of AEW aircraft and are unlikely to be able to allocate many to ASW aircraft detection. Using intelligence and information from reconnaissance assets, it may be possible to mount a “Yamamoto” style air intercept mission and destroy the few available Soviet AEW aircraft.9
The protection of friendly ASW aircraft would be further assisted by nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) firing cruise missiles against enemy air bases supporting naval AEW aircraft. The cruise missiles could either attempt to destroy the aircraft in their revetments or paralyze air base operations. SSN- fired cruise missiles and long-range U. S.
When the shooting starts, the P-3’s future will rely on coordinated assistance from friendly surface ships and SSNs (firing cruise missiles) to take out enemy ships, aircraft, and their support bases.
Air Force aircraft, such as the ATB, B-1B, or F-111, may also be employed to destroy OTH radar sites, providing air- intercept direction.
This coordinated “rollback” strategy would safeguard P-3 ASW aircraft against the majority of Soviet air and surface threats in particular limited areas. This war may need to be won first before effective P-3 ASW operations can be mounted.
Even with a successful rollback strategy, however, P-3 aircraft will probably still be up against submarine-launched systems. A minor modification to tactical techniques may be necessary to counter this threat.
Submarines are more likely to employ small, non-radar-guided SAM missiles than long-range, all-weather, radar- guided systems. The latter would require the submarine to surface to activate large, complex target acquisition and tracking
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radars needed to guide radar-horni ^ sites. Such a defensive system tend to make the submarine more able, because the necessary ia a ,jne’s sions would highlight the su wafI) location. These emissions wou jtj0n. the Orion of the submarine s P allowing the P-3 to fly outside ef a of its SAM system and safely Harpoon missile attack. systenl
Moreover, such a radar-guide0’^, would be particularly suscepti e^ ^vy tronic countermeasures. The U. , jec0y is developing a 600-pound, 75-in^ system based on the LAU " ^id rocket launcher pod.10 This sys^euid^ be effective against the few ra a^ at a missiles a submarine could 1°° range°r P-3 before the aircraft was out 0 able to retaliate. . iaUnchel*
The most likely submarine fange, SAM system would be a s 0ept to similar in c°nL f
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160
Patrolling at high altitudes above SAM ranges and delivering multiple Mk-46 torpedoes fitted with steerable parachute systems would reduce the P-3’s vulnerability while ensuring its usefulness as an ASW platform.
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^eam-riHreCl'®U^eci Sidewinder, the laser ?uided Rln^ ^S-70, or the television- easiiv rapiCr' Such systems can be most aircraft "te^ed keeping ASW patrol above lnannr?igher Etudes, certainly 20,000 f’ ^ ^eet’ Out preferably above lierggd 66t' snch altitudes, a sub- to detec|U|jmar'ne wou'd ^nd it difficult °Ver> be 6 i5atro**in8 aircraft. More- aircraft'Ca.Use °f uncertainty about the b>r a ddtde, it would be impossible rately> inSUhmarine to determine accusation d'mensions, the aircraft’s Sential f0 *S 'nf°rrnation would be es- Suidancef operating a missile mid -course Ptbposeo S^StCm °f lke type Kockums Sdhermo
Qs have a maximum effective
'ion is inh 0r|iy 10,000 feet. This restric- en,Ploye{|Crent ln t*le type of technologies hy patrnii-n non'radar-guided missiles.
sSld h at high altitude, a P-3 n,.- De able »« „.—= j
weapon must be delivered
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attack it ^jto a submarine to detect and tUde‘8h deli
I Ues niav. hVery accuracy fr°m high alti- 0rPedo w- ? achievable by equipping the r^'°hom' 2 steerahle parachute and a a'r''launch'T device- Current lightweight
''ANl Svore> most of the short-range alum 1 ^ havf* o tion 6
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tl'arine’s\?a»Dle t0 remain outside a sub-
C°U(ls, aConditions, such as haze or ra9ge, nQre a'so ahle to defeat short- °f infrared radar guided missiles. Visual 'nay ajSQ aircraft camouflage schemes Snature6 used t0 i°wer the Orion’s farticm ’ and kence its vulnerability, to The cliff11188116 systems.
°nsly a(lculty with operating continu- ^nn°t 'S'1 altitudes is that the Orion n°niin„ CUrately drop its current ASW S is ■ 0rPedoes. High delivery accu- USe an anP°?ant since Soviet submarines ^ing tnCCa°'C iluH coating to reduce Search Carf>6do acquisition ranges." The jnportedi^aiiity of a homing torpedo is Cr>ce 0n|y about 2,500 yards, and
Vgp. me WM„„. , • , ,. , ,r°8Ue d torpedoes employ a small e[ttry. a ute to ensure correct water r. te svsf0r^edo W'tf* a steerable paramo si,,n6rn could “home” onto the .as in ca emitted by the sonobuoy that >e Sl6ntact with and closest to the nttte Systrnarine. Such steerable para- erns have already been devel-
"8S 1 °rtober 1987
oped to deliver stores on target to special action forces by transport aircraft.
Steerable parachutes also provide some new weapon employment options. A number of torpedoes could be launched in a ripple release by the P-3. Each torpedo’s homing system could be programmed to fly to a point relative to the contact sonobuoy and thus form a particular entrapment pattern. Four to six torpedoes could be delivered to bracket the area where a submarine is believed to be hiding. With careful pattern design, the search area could be considerably expanded.
While a number of torpedoes active in a small area increases dramatically the chance of submarine acquisition, this situation also raises the potential for torpedo mutual interference. An acoustic guidance system with a range of selectable frequencies could be one way of keeping the torpedoes apart.
The almost simultaneous delivery of a number of torpedoes around the tracking sonobuoy may also overcome some current difficulties with lightweight homing torpedoes. The reliability of these torpedoes in wartime is very uncertain.13 If only one torpedo is launched it may, or may not, function correctly, thus the P-3 may miss its only chance to destroy a hostile submarine. With a number of torpedoes in the water, at least some should function, giving a reduced chance, but still a chance, of destroying the target.
Soviet submarine tactics apparently emphasize acoustic decoys and jammers.14 These may be effective in defeating a single torpedo attack but would be markedly less useful against an attack by multiple torpedoes coming from different directions.
The delivery of a torpedo pattern will, however, need to be restricted to acoustic contacts, which are almost certainly submarines. The British experience in the Falklands Conflict was that in wartime there is a tendency to “classify a contact with a torpedo.”15 This propensity is most understandable in the inner ASW zone around surface ships, which, because of their vulnerability to close-range torpedo attack, tend to launch torpedoes whenever there is the possibility of a submarine contact. A P-3, on the other hand, operating in distant support or area operations, would have more time to ascertain whether a contact is, or is not, a hostile submarine before it expends its eight torpedoes in a pattern delivery option against imprecise contacts.
The P-3 Orion is vulnerable to a wide array of threats. However, as the only land-based ASW aircraft operated by the United States and many allied nations, it is too valuable an asset to be lightly discarded. A combination of a rollback strategy, a minor change in tactical employment, and some straightforward homing torpedo modifications should ensure that the P-3 remains a viable ASW platform into the next century.
'LCdr. Kenneth B. Sherman, USNR, “Orion the Hunted,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1986, p. 91.
2LCdr. Ralph E. Chatham, USN, “A Quiet Revolution,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1984, pp. 41-46.
3Capt. Thomas A. Brooks, USN, “Their Submarines,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1984, p. 48.
4Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, translation of articles originally published in Morskoy Sbornik, U. S. Naval Institute. 1974, p. 103.’
5Brooks, p. 49.
'‘Hamlin A. Caldwell, “Using and Fighting Submarines,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1984, p. 68.
7Bill Gunston, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of the World's Rockets and Missiles. London: Salamander Books, 1979, pp. 194-195.
SP. Lewis Young, “The RAN’s New Submarine Project,” Asian Defence Journal, 10/86, pp. 7-10. 9Caldwell, p. 68.
10Marc Liebman, “Expendable Decoys Counter Missiles With New Technology,” Defense Electronics, October 1986, pp. 69-77.
"Norman Polmar, “The American Submarine, 1984-2014,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings Naval Review, 1984, p. 200.
"Norman Polmar and Donald M. KerT. “Nuclear Torpedoes,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1986, p. 67.
"Caldwell, p. 64.
"Polmar, “The American Submarine."
"Caldwell, p. 64.
Flight Lieutenant Layton has been a navigator in the Royal Australian Air Force since 1975. He has served as a tactical coordinator in P-3B aircraft and as a weapon systems officer in F-l 11C attack and RF- 111C reconnaissance aircraft. He is currently the lecturer on weapon effects at the RAAF Weapons Establishment, School of Air Navigation, RAAF Base East Sale.
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