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ASW was the runt of the litter in post-World War II naval developments, and is still crowded out at feeding time by its bigger, healthier siblings—carrier air and the submarine force. Recent rhetoric notwithstanding, it is time to get ASW out of the doghouse and on a competitive footing for assets, people, and command attention in the Navy’s battle group combat information centers.
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'hantwo °St Part’ coordinated in name only. A little more 0fficer d years ago, I heard a highly respected senior ASW PretendeHeStC[1]e those years thusty: “Back then, we only >n J ‘ Surface and air ASW units—the
-proved to be an
tf only everyone else could realize that and
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% t?° away. The fact of the matter was (and remains e^meritaU with the exception of the submarine, no one ^Utfgi^0' the ASW forces has the capability by itself to e the submarine threat. Cooperation and coordi-
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By the end of World War II, the U. S. Navy’s ASW capabilities against the diesel submarine had been
U-boat fl t0 ■ near Per^ect'on- Germany’s vaunted the Atla f61’ W^'CU Uad nearly succeeded in choking off the wan[2] *u suPP'y routes to England in the early years of driven f' ^ ^een effectively destroyed, its remnants
tttclear™01 ^ Sea ^anes' The subsequent development of chanperHr,Wer an<^ 'ts application to submarine propulsion disarma & ent*rc nature of ASW. Caught up in postwar c°rnneti(T'ent’ United resources, and intense program came a ] *°n ^°r Unuted congressional funding, ASW be- and wg °W Priority and failed to keep pace. New systems SuUicien{30nS Were developed, but never, it seemed, in subma • qUality or quantity to contain the ever-expanding ^ dt|ne threat.
defiCieai^Uer of factors caused and perpetuated this ASW t\v0 prin?' Nayy’s strategic and tactical policies have
With its - ^°Ca' P°ints: the aircraft carrier battle group
It is ^ a tack and fighter capabilities, and the submarine. Pr°motin "V SUrPr‘s'n8 that submariners had little interest in hand, th ^ a'f anU surface ASW capabilities. On the other P^gr'a^6 arcUitects and leaders of the carrier battle group fighter a ^aS are today) almost exclusively from Plied the*1 attacU backgrounds and, not surprisingly, ap- fight an(,niselves diligently to developing the capability to contemntW*n t*le a'r ancl surface war. Whether through simple n ’ 1^norance, prejudicial setting of priorities, or Sefious fessity *n the face of limited funding, very little The sa tention was given to ASW.
Vari°Us AUatl°n Was not helped by competition within the h->r thP _ w communities. Coordinated exercises were,
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the ****** hour f°r ASW occurred in deSj ^r|1970s, when the CVS and CVA c°j!Cp afU°ns were eliminated and the CV pt was adopted.”
nation of the distinct strengths offered by each ASW arm provide the only realistic chance for successful ASW.
The age of the large-deck aircraft carrier began with the Forrestal (CV-59). As more large-deck carriers came on line, some of the older, small-deck carriers were dedicated to ASW. These ASW carriers (CVSs)—manned by ASW professionals—were a logical follow-on of the highly successful hunter-killer groups developed during World War
“No matter how you cut it, the SH-60 is an adaptation of an airframe that was designed for the Army. Unlike more visible naval air missions, the helicopter community does not operate aircraft that were designed for their mission—they make do with hand-me-downs.”
II, and provided a dedicated ASW platform for fixed- and rotary-wing ASW aircraft in support of the battle group ASW commander. The large-deck carriers (CVAs) were left unencumbered for their attack and fighter missions. The darkest hour for ASW occurred in the early 1970s, when the CVS and CVA designations were eliminated and the CV concept was adopted. All carriers became primarily tasked with the attack and fighter missions, but carried some VS and HS aircraft.
Abandoning the CVS/CVA concept was purely an economic move welcomed neither by the carrier nor the ASW community. No carrier battle group or carrier commanding officer could be expected to enthusiastically take deck space away from his fighter and attack aircraft and give it to ASW aircraft. And no ASW aviation unit would be eager to operate from a platform on which they were considered an unwanted add-on.
Perhaps the greatest boon to both aviation and surface ASW was the implementation of the LAMPS concept. Aviation and surface ship ASW was consolidated within the ASW destroyer, and surface and aviation ASW personnel became intimately familiar with both capabilities. Destroyer crews now had a system that not only significantly enhanced their own ASW capability, but extended it to ranges well over the horizon. LAMPS helicopter crews, now linked to the destroyer’s on-board systems and personnel expertise, found their effectiveness increased geometrically. Both ship and air personnel began to jealously protect the ASW mission availability of the LAMPS helicopter, enabling the LAMPS crews to escape the fate of their HS cousins. While most HS flight hours were devoted to plane guard, chaplain flights, and logistics runs, LAMPS crews were logging ASW flight hours. The term “coordinated exercise” was no longer the convenient punchline for a joke at the club.
Recently there was a shift in attitude at the higher levels of the Navy’s chain of command. Why is subject to debate, but a plausible explanation is that, confident of the
149
fleet’s ability to fight and win the air and surface war, senior officers can no longer ignore the far-less-certain ASW battle. Increased attention to battle group ASW manifested itself in a number of ways during my tour on the Constellation (CV-64) as officer-in-charge of the ASW module—the combat display center (CDC) function that supports the air wing’s VS and HS squadrons.
Commander Carrier Group 1, the flag on board the Constellation during my tour, had three ASW officers on his staff. The senior of the three was a captain who had spent his previous tour as the commanding officer (CO) of a Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack submarine. The ship’s CDC officer, whose roots were in the fighter community, was remarkably knowledgeable in ASW and consistently provided me with the strongest possible support. Surprisingly, the operations officer came from the VS community. Our CO, who had an attack background, displayed an almost uncanny knowledge of, and sincere interest in, ASW. Our CO knew where the ASW module was, understood its function, and frequently called on the module for briefings and recommendations. During predeployment workup ASW exercises—within the constraints of launch and recovery cycles—-our CO enthusiastically followed and participated in the ASW evolutions, skillfully using the ship’s speed and maneuverability to
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prospect of losing a logistics aircraft had to do vvi Introducing the LAMPS Mk-III SH-60B and t e^ ^ 60F dipping sonar version—to replace the SH-3--"1-
couraging, but there is a basic flaw. The SH
■60 is an &
cellent airframe and SH-60B and F versions will un ^ edly prove to be excellent adaptations. But no mat e ^ you cut it, the SH-60 is an adaptation of an airfram^ ^ was designed for the Army. Unlike more visible na
-)Cta
-they make <
missions, the helicopter community does not °PeratfeC)o craft that were designed for their mission—.t^e^t^payerS
the
with hand-me-downs. This may save money, but someday it may cost us a vital edge w need it most. (orjes.
Another major problem is our sonobuoy *nveI1cXpen- Stockpiles of all sonobuoys, especially the more sive and sophisticated types used to quickly conv tacts to attack criteria, are very limited and m a protracted naval conflict would be rapidly deplete ■ ^
out them, there will be little if any way to Preve adversary submarine from performing its mission-
Our ability to attack and destroy adversary su 111^
• and sw
is another area of vital concern. The main air
tk
, it can
ASW weapon is the reliable Mk-46 torpedo.^ ^ ^jps
launched from every ASW air platform-
-surfawiic»r
“The antisubmarine rocket (ASROC), touted as an ASW standoff weapon for surface ships, is not standoff at all.”
help foil the opposing submarine. In the scramble for limited time blocks and aircraft, ASW, while not given the highest priority, was nevertheless given a fair share of the operational pie and allowed timely completion of all predeployment requirements.
Though ASW improvements are positive and encouraging, the outlook is neither bright nor certain. Soviet submarine technology is improving at an alarming rate: the newest Soviet nuclear submarines can go deep, run fast, and are much quieter. Our detection capabilities simply must keep pace. To do this, we must restructure our approach to ASW.
Some commitments and improvements to the ASW mission have been half-measures and some, I suspect, made for the wrong reasons. For example, during the 1970s, there was speculation that the HS mission was to be replaced by LAMPS. In fact, Naval Reserve pilots in what was then HS-74 were once told by a visiting senior officer that they were “old pilots flying obsolete aircraft [the SH-3] in the performance of an obsolete mission.” However, HS came back stronger than ever owing, strangely enough, to the carrier community. The need to retain a dipping sonar capability is often cited as the carrier folks’ motive for fighting for the HS mission, but I wonder how much the prospect of launching and recovering aircraft without the plane guard helicopter and the
remote sites, and hover-launched from dipping ‘7 tsaY ters. However, the Mk-46 is old. In fact, you nW^ of that technology is literally running away from it- ^,46 the newer Soviet submarines can outrun most ^ ^ shots. The antisubmarine rocket (ASROC), touten(joff 31 ASW standoff weapon for surface ships, is not sta all. The maximum ASROC range is well within t (j,e of modem submarine-launched weapons. *er almost glaring weakness of the Mk-46 is its small pulls,3,1 Some classes of Soviet submarines have titaniun g jn- are double-hulled, and size and displacement ^ed1 creased dramatically. The Soviet Typhoon SSBfs ^ j.er3 compared in terms of displacement to World pest major surface combatants. It is questionable tof whether a single Mk-46 could put such submarine action, even with shaped charges in the warhea •
“The ASW module on a carrier is gen^ ally considered by the chain of comma to be a ‘body locker’ from which to draw officers to fill various administra positions.”
Replacement torpedoes for the Mk-46 are stages of development. However, available >n indicates that, though their weight will signi '^iudi^ crease over the Mk-46, their performance x
-the size of the
speed) will not and—incredibly- will remain comparable. t
Effective ASW depends on effective employ111® ^ ASW personnel. We must have qualified and c ASW personnel assigned to the ASW billets m
of*
,ete"
c#
150
Proceedings
I Oc*°
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the fni' Troy
Commander Brown has a B.S. degree in civil engineering
from
riers. They must come from surface, VS, HS, and HSL communities—not entirely or mostly from VP, as is often the case. And they must be allowed to use their acquired talents.
Unfortunately, aviation ASW officers fight hardest to avoid a carrier tour, and the reasons are easy to understand. The ASW module” on a carrier is generally considered by the chain of command to be a “body locker” from which to draw officers to fill various administrative positions. Although these positions must be filled, authorized billets often do not exist. The result is a frustrated officer who is not allowed to perform in his area of expertise.
Those officers allowed to serve in the ASW billet to which they were assigned, serve under a lengthy chain of command that with rare exception—from the CDC function head to the CO—will not have a single officer with more than a smattering of knowledge of, or experience in, ASW. The senior officers in the chain of command who will decide where that ASW officer will break out in his fitness reports will often make that decision with very little, and in many cases no, knowledge of the nature and importance of that officer’s job. It is small wonder that
aviation ASW personnel are not beating down the tl°°r get into carrier ASW module billets. That situation ^ f change if we are to get the necessary numbers and ca ^ of ASW officers into those jobs, and if ASW is trulyt0 taken seriously by the carrier community. ^
The challenges facing ASW are great indeed, bu ^ talent to meet them is in the fleet. All that is needed is vision and the will.
from
versity of Rhode Island, an M.S. in international relations the State University, and was in the first group of officers accept® ^ Navy’s Aviation Duty Officer program. He was commissions through the Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate program and ^jic0pter nated a naval aviator in 1969. He served on active duty with- <jqUad' Attack (Light) Squadron 3 in Vietnam; Helicopter Antisubmann ron 6; NAS Bermuda; and as officer-in-charge of the ASW m0 gro*'11 Constellation (CV-64). Between active duty tours, Comman^ clir. served in Reserve Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 74. ^ging rently assigned to Helicopter Training Squadron IS, safety0^1’ Field, Florida, where he has served as administrative officer, cer, and operations officer.
---------------------------------------------------- Rambo’s Splinter Fleet____________________
When Headquarters inspectors boarded the CG 83486 in Cape Cod Bay, Boatswain’s Mate First Class Hatcher was officer of the deck. One of the inspectors approached Hatcher and asked, “What would you do if an enemy submarine surfaced 200 yards off your port bow now?”
Hatcher thought a second and replied, “Sir, I think I would dip the colors, pipe attention to port, hand salute, and try to get the hell out of here while he’s still confused.”
“Wrong,” said the inspector.
Hatcher tried again. “Throw potatoes at him?”
“No,” said the inspector. “You would ram him.”
Discussing this afterwards, we concluded it could work. Hitting the strongest hull in the world with a wooden boat might result in the sub’s crew laughing themselves to death.
CWO Floyd L. Stormer, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)
Best Foot Forward
Back in those gentler days along the California coast in the autumn of 1939, the ensign—with a full year of fleet experience and a reputation for being a bit of a dandy—was ready to go ashore for a formal evening engagement. Resplendent in full evening dress, he came momentarily to attention for a final inspection by a mildly envious Junior Officer of the Deck before descending the battleship’s forward accommodation ladder to the waiting liberty boat.
Hours later, the evening’s last scheduled boat returned and discharged its sole passenger—the resplendent ensign, who climbed the ladder to the quarterdeck, saluted, reported his return on board, and disappeared in the shadows en route to officers’ country, still the epitome of correct military bearing. The deck log entry reflected the dignity of the moment:
0030—ENSIGN_____________________________ RETURNED FROM LIBERTY UNDER
OWN POWER. APPEARANCE: IMMACULATE W/MINOR DISCREPANCY, TO WIT, UNEXPLAINED FOOTPRINT ON FRONT OF STARCHED DRESS SHIRT.
Captain Harry A. Seymour, U. S. Navy (Retired)
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(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in Proceedings.)
Proceedings
Octo|H’r
19«7
[1]Cr' Landau1011 c°mmunity, cooperation was no easy mating na, ased> fixed-wing patrol (VP), shipboard, fixed- %s a|| r°l (VS), and shipboard helicopter (HS) squad- ?roblernSeei?eU t0 believe that they had the answer to the
>8s 1 October 1987
■° Prove auCr m!xture. Each seemed bound and determined "tterfgrg taat they could do the job without benefit of, or Syer Prom, the other. Pilots were convinced that all • e the Crews knew how to do was close the datum and Pil°ts whC°ntaCt' ^ip drivers did not think very much of a0 c°uW not stay out of their way. Even within the