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gian Sea under the operational control of the area commander (Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic or Commander Task Force 84, depending on the defense readiness condition) and the striking fleet’s ASW force, Commander ASW Strike Force. Their priority targets will be the submarines that target long-range missiles against the striking fleet. Area ASW forces generally depend on passive sensors, and have enjoyed a fair amount of success, though recent Soviet advances in quieting ensure that much treasure and effort will be required to maintain U. S. advantages.
------------------- Battle Group ASW____________
The direct defense of the battle group is carried out by units directly under the control of the battle group commander. Generally speaking, he takes responsibility for a certain area around his battle group and the area commander takes everything else. Close coordination is required at the interface for the turnover of contacts and the like. The U. S. Navy has never done well at battle group ASW. Whenever the same tactical platforms that do well at area ASW—MPA, SSNs, towed-array frigates, etc.—
are employed by the battle group commander, the resu are very different. •
Because battle group ASW is so important to the ma time strategy, we must look at problem areas.
SSNs: The Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack sub w procured mainly to defend the battle group in t*'reCtp()(ir port operations, working directly for the commander^ ^ ^ results forced this type of operation to be abandone tactical option in tire Atlantic. SSNs are most effec ^ while searching at a relatively slow pace, at depth, an^_ from the noise created by battle group ships. This. ^ bined with their inability to communicate on a rea ^ basis, invariably put the SSNs out of position owing numerous and unpredictable changes to battle group V tion and intended movement. In short, they end up se ing areas where the battle group is not going to be, oi' end up under foot in blue-on-blue encounters. „ problem is SSN communications after gaining con ^ The SSN must come to communication depth an ^ losing contact, or use a slot buoy with the risk that n ^ is around to copy it. Overall, the inability of the $
communicate reliably while it is doing its job PreC
Reopen the S-3 Line
Our ability to prosecute the carrier battle group (CVBG) outer air battle is largely unquestioned, and the surface threat’s relatively short-range missile capability seems to be controllable. But the ability to survive a determined undersea attack is quite another matter. Soviet battle tactics indicate that the lone wolf Charlie or Victor submarine taking on the CVBG is a thing of the past. Multiple submarines operating in a coordinated attack, most likely in concert with a massive air assault, appears to be the current Soviet standard operating procedure.
The S-3A Viking ASW aircraft is the carrier battle group’s primary defense against the middle- and outer-zone submarine threat. Working in concert with the SH-3 Sea King and LAMPS Mk-I and Mk-III helicopters, it also plays a vital role in the inner-zone ASW problem. An extremely capable aircraft, the S-3 is also a true force multiplier, serving in ASW, surface surveillance, electronic warfare, and over-the-horizon targeting roles. With recent funding authorized to configure the airframe for the D-704 buddy store, it will provide valuable tanking services as well. The updated S-3B, with its unique imaging radar and Harpoon missile capability will also allow for an aggressive antisurface warfare capability.
Round-the-clock submarine prosecution is arduous for maintenance and aircrew personnel alike, requiring four or five aircraft and flexibility from the entire air department. Secondary missions are sidelined to ensure 24-hour coverage, a frequent requirement from the CVBG commander. If the submarine is within 100 miles, the embarked ASW helicopter squadron is also hard- pressed, dividing scarce assets between ASW and plane guard requirements.
All this, for one submarine.
The 15-CVBG concept is soon to become a reality. To provide ASW aircraft for each carrier, S-3 squadrons may shrink to eight aircraft each. Seagoing squadrons could be augmented to ten aircraft by those returning from deployment, but this will decrease airframe life and adversely affect shore- based squadron readiness. The number of squadrons could be decreased, resulting in greater frequency of deployment for those remaining, but that would also decrease airframe life and adversely affect personnel retention.
Replacing the venerable A-7 Corsair with the F/A-18 Hornet enhanCf^ carriers’ strike and fighter caPa. ^ [n-
but not without compromises- trader and A-7 squadrons have vided tanker services for the ti§ ^.g_ and for each other during stri _e^e sions. With the introduction o
F/A-18, not only will the A- ^_jgs
be lost, but two squadrons ot ^ will also require tanking servie ^ probably will relegate the A- ^ dedicated tanking role and fo& ^l S-3 squadron to provide the a ^ tankers required. In support o ,ef strike mission, the CAG detail air group, who, by the way. u„i- from the fighter and attack c0aS- ties only) will demand that tan ^ sets be made available. It p0sture believe that an effective AS other can be maintained with all t e important tasking. fpn„vear'°|d
The natural attrition of a ; airframe—the use of which wjjy greatly increased—will un^°ueadactie 3 create a massive availability " few years down the road. T 5.3 official position has been tha g wib line will not be reopened, so be no replacement aircraft- the
S-3s were produced ten years prognosis is not encouraging-
,l9«7
/ Octobef
Proceeding* /
a^e §rouP direct support.
defe 5 atU^ ^ Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) employ SubcnS1!C acoust'c buoy fields when prosecuting nuclear sub °ntacts’ ar|d radar search and active buoys for diesel deneC?|ntaCtS ^bere these search modes are carried out and th S °n env‘ronmental factors (range of the day, etc.) pered u ^reat. Unlike the SSN, MPA are not ham- grou ^ *ach °f real-time communications with the battle °Perat COmrnan(*er' l^e normat context of battle group cess n!ns’ the MPA community suffers from its own suc- MPy\ essed with good sensors, speed, and endurance, Niand ^ 3Ctively sought by the antisurface warfare com- (ASWn(ASUWC) aS we^ as commander
things therein lies the problem: MPA cannot do two fly h. Wel1 at once. A P-3 or S-3 cannot at the same time ally ja t0 monitor an acoustic buoy field and low to visu- giVena surface contact. This is an old problem, but Mp^ e current and (likely) future aircraft shortages, PfoblJ^0 • w'ti continue to be double-tasked. Other thend S Inc^e huoy channelization and identification- ters „ -?,r‘foe Procedures to prevent blue-on-blue encoun- * Wlth the battle group.
Surface Combatant Towed Array (SCTA): Like the SSN, the surface combatant with towed array sonar works best at a slow pace, far from the noise of the battle group. Unlike the SSN, the SCTA can—like the MPA— communicate in real-time with the battle group commander. In area ASW operations, the SCTA and MPA have proven to be a formidable detection-attack combination. This has not been the case in battle group ASW. In fact, of all the long-range sensors of the outer battle group defenses, the SCTA track record is the worst by far. The main reasons are that they are employed at too fast a search speed or too close to the battle group ships and thus suffer from noise interference.
Superficially, it would appear that the ASWC staff could easily solve these problems, but they are rather complex. High battle group speed is an effective ASW defense, but SCTA works most effectively at about one-third to one-fourth of this speed. The sprint-drift method— sprint to get ahead, then slow, drift, search, and then repeat—has been used to try and reconcile the difference. The results have not been promising. One proposed remedy is the SCTA leap frog: one sprints while the other
^°de m!?S' Munch and recov " ' wit!
0c*e maC ,.iaunchand rec Carrier v GS ^compatible w tarn- dlrcraft. and it i*
fines is0eW Sencration of Soviet subn Many [jVC^- clu'et and very lethal, the Drn • ^servers are counting o aircraft^.°Se^ ^^-22 Osprey tilt-rotor Placeni,. ° <?0Unter this threat. As a re a po0rfor ‘he S-3, it appears to b Politics nf°'Ce- Granted, the vagaries < ccpt ]e *en force the military to ac- kt’s facan'°Ptimal solutions, but Priate ai«r!!tS'Though it is an appre Ait pQr rarr|e for Marine Corps and lo° sloe/ SUPPort roles, it is too big, ttle multi’ 3nd ,0° short-legged to fulf f')rmed , miss'on carrier role now per- build th,.' l'lc S-3. It will cost more aircraft , reHuisite numbers of SV-22 abeadv n an to build more S-3s—an ^t‘°n, th s;611 performer. In at readi|y ? SM-22 as proposed is not *8 Cync„raPtable to the carrier. There Multiple n afr°ut its impact on the dei can->i- '- , an<l its respot and fold-up
^nker *vJCra^’ ar,d it is unsuitab
N fromn6’ '* is at least teny beet introduction.
A new multimission aircraft could be designed to replace the S-3, but it would take years to complete. Look how long it took for the YF-17 to join the fleet as the F/A-18. An aggressive nuclear-propelled attack submarine (SSN) construction program could be undertaken, but this would be cost- prohibitive considering current budget restrictions and take years to complete.
The S-3 is the logical platform to provide the CVBG ASW protection needed into the 1990s, but more are needed. Reopening the S-3 line now is critical to maintaining the availability and capability we enjoy today. Readiness rates of deploying S-3 squadrons are among the highest in fleet air wings. However, without replacement aircraft, Viking squadrons soon will be unable to fulfill their primary ASW mission, much less their secondary roles.
It is time to admit that the Soviet submarine force is rapidly outstripping our ASW capabilities. Our own SSN fleet is overextended, even with new
More S-3B Vikings—not SV-22s or new aircraft—are needed for the 1990s and beyond.
submarine construction. Our ability to protect the carrier battle group is tenuous at best, and the future is not bright. Let’s quit equivocating, and either fish or cut bait.
Lieutenant Nevitt is an instructor pilot for the S-3 fleet replacement squadron, Air Antisubmarine Squadron 41, at NAS North Island, California.
r ------------------ —-____ By Lieuten ke >nner er'z°ne Achilles’ Heel lfacked !hBcar a'rcraft are routinely ^rrier ba,°,Usands of miles from U. S. ‘8htcrsa tle groups (CVBGs), whose [!f 'hiles v"ePare for intercept hundreds _ ey°nd the Bears’ missile Velopes. The fighters’ missile | iant Commander Wallace J. Conway, rails are loaded for Bear, and air crews have been briefed on the rules of engagement (ROEs) in effect. If the appropriate hostile intent or event is initiated by the bogey, the threat will be eliminated. Every Soviet intrusion into CVBG intercept range is overtly countered, without regard for the lack of a | U. S. Navy perceived hostile intent. No Soviet aircraft is permitted to pass unescorted within its strike range. Intercept and escort are practiced on the sea surface much as they are in the air. Surface surveillance missions are flown and surface scouts are positioned to prevent Soviet surface ships from |
B' October 1987 |
| 137 |
drifts. This would decrease the swath covered by SCTA ahead of the battle group, but a unit would be searching at all times. Increasing the number of SCTAs assigned to each battle group would increase towed array coverage, but could cause shortages in the availabiity of convoy escorts during wartime mobilization.
Surface Combatants: Normally stationed within ultrahigh-frequency range of the main body, these ships provide—as they have since before World War II—close-in, last-ditch defense. If the track record of the SCTA is bad, the record of these ships is worse. More and more of these inner-screen ships are equipped with very-high-power, low-frequency sonars (SQS-26/53). (The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates’ medium-frequency, medium-power SQS-56 is a new-construction exception.) These sonars introduce two big tactical problems: They provide locating information at very long ranges to submarines that might not otherwise locate the battle group (given good electronic emmissions control), and they are plagued by high false-contact rates—the operator gets a contact that he calls a submarine when in fact it is not.
The first problem has been verified by our own SSNs ^ exercise after exercise. The solution to this, of course, not to go active on these big sonars until the submarine located the battle group. However, making this determi tion is, given current prediction systems, very chan ;• False contacts most likely are a function of operator w perience and the inherent design of modem signal ProC^j|| ing. Given that a “classify with a weapon” mentality probably exist early in the Norwegian Sea battle (wnn . the British in the Falklands Conflict), weapon use a consequent availability could pose a big problem- tainly, the U. S. Navy is not basing current weapon P curement on current false-contact rates. [S
A glimmer of hope for inner-screen surface eoniba is the variable depth sonar (VDS) on the Knox (FF-1 ^ class frigates. This high-frequency, low-power sonafCer]y tinues to perform well on board those ships that Pr°P|0^ maintain and regularly use it (not always the case). Its power does not give away the battle group position a tended ranges, and because its signal processing lS .g. extremely sophisticated, the false-contact rate is sl° ^ cantly lower than its high-powered cousins. However,
Proceedings
closing to weapon range without a suitable friendly platform in position to neutralize the threat, should the situation dictate.
If Soviet air and surface combatants are denied an opportunity for unopposed assault on the CVBG, why do we tolerate unescorted or—even more dangerous—undetected intrusions by potentially hostile submarines into the inner zone of the CVBG defense?
Increasing the difficulty with which submarines enter the CVBG inner zone should be a high U. S. Navy priority. The effectiveness of the IOSS network and P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft in the outer zone is acknowledged, as is the role of the tactical towed array sonar system (TACTASS) and S-3 Viking ASW aircraft in the middle zone. However, these systems were not designed to ensure that 100% of those submarines attempting to penetrate the inner zone are detected. The inner zone must be managed to guarantee detection and localization of every subsurface contact.
The inner zone, with the aircraft carrier as its center, is mobile. The movement of the carrier and hence the inner zone can be adjusted to complicate submarine targeting. Options include the use of deception, environmental exploitation in transit-route planning, high speeds of advance, and the use of safe havens, as in the fjord concept.
The operational trade-offs involved in focusing attention on the inner zone during planning will determine the final course of action. ASW considerations 138
AH too frequently, ancillary duties prevent SH-3 Sea Kings from performing their most important mission—painting the battle group’s inner zone with their dipping sonars.
and a given CVBG mission often will be mutually exclusive. This conflict reinforces the need for aggressive pursuit of inner-zone submarine intruders.
The inner-zone ASW mission is carried out by the carrier-indigenous helicopter equipped with variable depth sonar. The SH-3H Sea King is scheduled to be replaced by the SH-60F within the next five years. The two helos’ sonar and sonobuoy processing
sider
systems are similar enough to co them together in discussions of w zone prosecution.
Three issues confound helic°p|^ne employment in the inner zone: p guard posture, acoustic emission trol (EmCon), and airborne .weap0^, carrying policies. Variables in the merous tactical scenarios mandate bility in policy development, but ^ inconsistent approaches to scenar CVBG commanders and carrier c^gC. manding officers often preclude e tive inner-zone aircraft empl°ym ct of Plane Guard Posture: The ben a rapid-response rescue vehicle been validated by the lives that _ been saved. The issue is: Whic P.^ form should respond and from w position of readiness should that sponse begin? Most search an”, titbit1 (SAR) evolutions are .conducted fgS. one nautical mile of the carrier- ^gS cue destroyer stationed astern P s
essentially the same response ti ^gjt. the helicopter in a close-in SA _rjef SAR evolutions farther from the ^e.
best exploit the helo’s speed adv ^ The rescue destroyer can proV' ^ m*5' immediate response to carrier g\
haps while the carrier helo can c the outer bounds of the ASW in fof zone. There is no better prepara the demands placed upon helic°P ^s. crews during a night, open-°ceag cue than to task the crew to opc^ tactically at night in a 40-foot s hover. . v'ia"
Acoustic EmCon: Establishing ble acoustic EmCon doctrine is
/ oct»ber
clas«f °n^ 'n l^c U. S. inventory, so when the Knox and d'S ®°ne’ t*ie MDS will g° with it. The Aegis cruisers Sqs gtr°yers are (and will be) receiving variants of the
The venerable SH-3 Sea King with the the st ^'gh-frequcncy, low-power sonar is undoubtedly l°w f [ sh°w—both in numbers of detections and in
tectio3 Se contact rates. Hard data explaining the high de- eyjj °1316 an<^ *°w false-contact rate does not exist, but ness Pff’ mainly from the Ship-Helicopter ASW Readi- Verifip <?ct'veness Measurement (SHAREM) program, 'ndicatS ^ rateS- Testimony from the SSN community the th £S ^at helo with a dipping sonar is one of
enouPi,eatS they dread most. The mere presence of one is
The LA ^Ut ^ *n 3 defensive mindset, ber 0f ^^PS Mk-I is limited in endurance and the num- l'»Pro,)“"lb"0)'S it can relay to the shipboard processor, in ft "ments are in the offing, but have not been tested
^eet operations.
ProVe!LAMPS Mk-III is another story. Its overall im- derSto0jn~over the Mk-I has to be experienced to be un- ^ • 0 °ne used to operating the Mk-I as a localization tool, the Mk-III is so effective—both in ASW and ASUW—that, ironically, it has become a problem. The ASW commander must now fight for an asset that was by design his from the drawing board. It is a wise battle group commander who can keep his threat priorities firmly in mind when adjudicating asset squabbles. Using the Mk-III as a surface surveillance/over-the-horizon bird may be cost-effective when sub contacts are few and far between, but too much emphasis on ASUW might preclude an effective shift to ASW when the need arises.
General Problems: Acoustic prediction systems have long been a critical problem for the ASW commander in positioning his assets. The available systems are inaccurate. Improvements have been made and more are programmed, but until in situ ambient noise is used to solve the sonar equation on a real-time basis, the ASW commander will not have accurate range predictions. Even with such a system, there remains the additional problem of taking environmental readings almost simultaneously over a large area to get the environmental picture for the entire battle group area. Environmental intelligence is mandatory for ASW effectiveness; our ASW commanders
tial t0 ,
fiient is ^Ure ^at carrier helo employ-
threat n-Vf,ne^ w*lh both the perceived •y., and pvnr ■ ■
Ihebjg °Peratlng intentions.
her helo’^ °^ect‘on t0 using the car- ^rcePtioS ^ l*Ve dipping sonar is the tUency i.n taat l'le sonar’s discrete fre- carrier yCaijons the submarine to the l^ntal c h" certa*n acoustic/environ- 'fideed a, ons a submarine may (rates the£ -eCt sonar after it pene-
'nclude lnner zone- These conditions (SVP)e Sound velocity profile ^nic jav°nar home depth in relation to s°Urce« er hcpth, and ambient noise The band levels‘s hie ca'^eSt source °f ambient noise Carricr c '~r herself. Depending on techniqUen '§Uration, assumed analysis hie Syp s’ ar|h the characteristics of hie carrje ^ COUnterhetection range of Nation l0 .r( based on the signal propane c0Un.SS7is m°st often greater than t n§ sona? tetection range of the dip- ■tiCon r, ln ahhition, if the acoustic intent SfUrC 'S not consistent with ffnCoj, °* lhe electromagnetic
Posture, the exploitation of the
subsurface environment by the helicopter is sacrificed to the submarine, with no commensurate advantage gained by the carrier. If the electromagnetic EmCon posture provides long-range locating information to be exploited by the submarine, the detection by the submarine of the discrete acoustic emission of the helicopter’s sonar serves not as a beacon, but rather as an obstacle to the undetected approach to an attack solution. The composite EmCon plan must reflect a well- thought-out attempt to achieve undetected movement and operational deception, while not ignoring the submarine lurking within attack criteria in the inner zone and being treated as a nonthreat as long as it is undetected.
Airborne Weapon Policy: The Soviet Union’s supremacy in numbers of submarines is well known. Yet the Soviets are given no better opportunity to execute a lethal strike than by the tolerance shown Soviet submarines in their routine, unopposed proximity to U. S. Navy CVBGs. We cannot assume that a preemptive strike by the Soviet Union (or any other nation) will not include submarine attacks. Yet we have not committed to countering that threat by keeping the weapon delivery platform on top of the submarine with the appropriate ASW weapon and ready to attack if the ROEs are satisfied. This invites attack on U. S. carriers because the risk to the hostile launch platform is minimized.
The susceptibility of the carrier to submarine attack in the inner zone is the Achilles’ heel of our carrier battle group in its power projection role. We have the means to deter or destroy this threat, but it rests with blades folded on the hangar deck, or drones endlessly in the starboard delta pattern—unarmed with all sensors secured—under the pretense of an increased SAR readiness, and unprepared for an enemy submarine in the inner zone.
Commander Conway is Commander Helicopter ASW Wing 1, at NAS Jacksonville, Florida.
___ By Lieutenant Commander Arthur W. Gallo, U.
% y.
lcr°tnanaging LAMPS Mk-I 1’U get . k
. Many Ato my points:
‘ laffs are , a X-ray (ASW commander) i^'Cr°rnanS*5end'nI’ t0° much time t 'r LAiun'11!’ die daily scheduling of Mfa vMPS Mk-l helos.
ray should set an absolute
minimum battle group LAMPS Mk-I alert plan commensurate with the threat, and allow his ship’s commanding officers (COs) to employ their LAMPS accordingly.
Alfa X-ray cannot write a meaningful battle group LAMPS flight schedule that would work in wartime, nor one
S. Navy _____________________
that would (or could) consider all the peacetime maintenance scheduling, crew proficiency, and rest requirements managed by the LAMPS officers-in- charge (OINCs).
► Most of the battle group LAMPS rotating alert plans or flight schedules that are written by Alfa X-ray’s staff
^di
'n8st October 1987
139
do not have that information.
Another problem is a lack of software that would help determine when to use active sonar. As noted, current low-frequency, high-powered sonars normally give away more information than they collect. The ASW commander must have an algorithm that will enable him to decide when to be active on which sonar.
Communications availability is a third handicap for the ASW commander. Given the secure battle group communications requirements, the ASW and ASUW commanders normally share a C&R net, often to the detriment of both and always to one or the other.
Possibly the most important problem is the lack of a high-priority, highly structured program that would produce accurate measurements of coordinated sensor and platform effectiveness. The SHAREM program is not manned and funded to the extent that it can give good, hard data on which to base acquisition programs. Consequently, we have a number of platforms and sensors that do well in some area ASW but not at all well in battle group ASW, and there are no firm analytical data to explain this performance discrepancy.
Options
Given the fiscal limitations imposed by the Gram®
Rudman-Hollings Act and the current facts of econo®
,ved by nor is What is
life, it is not likely that the situation will be impro throwing large amounts of money at the problems an ASW breakthrough likely in the near term. ^ needed are some good choices among a few new syste and on-the-margin improvements to current systems-
Improvements must be made in exercise reconsl and data analysis to better evaluate sensor effective This will be enhanced by the new generation of navtg-
ation
satellites, prompted by over-the-horizon targeting requ'f ments. Given accurate navigation systems, exercise a]
nalyj
sis can proceed if more Center for Naval AnalyseS ^ Operations Evaluation Group personnel are shifted to type of work.
Using quantitative data, it might be possible
to
deter'
mine why the AQS-13 dipping sonar is so good at tion and classification. Is it because the AQS-13 ts p mally used close-in where the submarine usually en j firing his green flare? Would the detection rate be as D if the dipping sonar were stationed in a normal scree
are done without any idea of what it is that the flight/alert plan should accomplish, or what it does accomplish— other than publishing a “schedule” for all to see.
No matter how much planning or
To launch or not to launch LAMPS Mk-I? That is the question for the ship’s commanding officer—not the battle group ASW commander, who has bigger fish to fry.
scheduling anyone does, the only people who can guarantee an “on top” LAMPS Mk-I are the ship’s CO and the LAMPS detachment OINC. The concept is really that simple.
Probably the most abused and misunderstood warfare coordinator is the LAMPS/helicopter element coordinator (LEC/HEC). (We’re not even sure what to call him anymore.) This is an assignment normally handled by Alfa X-ray. What is the LEC/HEC supposed to do? What is his job assignment? The standard (easy) answer is “flight scheduling.” With this line of thinking came the micromanagement that bred the term “quick reaction” vehicle. When the words “quick reaction” were selected to describe LAMPS, they hit the mark. However, most of our quick reactions are not in response to submarine contacts, but to nonfunctional, micromanaged scheduling from “above.”
Direction to launch LAMPS from warfare commanders may be necessary, but this should be the exception. Let the ship’s CO fight his ship. LAMPS Mk-I is a ship weapon system and not an air asset of the embarked air wing—the “key” we seem to have forgotten. In wartime, most of the LAMPS launches will and should be directed by the ship’s CO. Alfa X-ray, using his operational hat, need only set the battle group minimum LAMPS Mk-I alert requirements equal to the anticipated threat. As the LEC/HEC, he should be coordinating only administrative functions, like supply.
Examples of battle group micro
management include requirements submit daily OpGen Hotels (hehcop flight requests), OpGen Foxtrots/ OpTasks (battle group helicopter plans), and OpSums (operational'.s maries). These three messages o' ® (S, say the same thing in different f° i.e., anticipated flight schedule an maintenance requirements. Add t
i mes"
thousands of other battle group sages, compounded with delays t'1 ceipt, and the OpGen Hotel nee s ^
be
i to
transmitted at least two days in ad^(
then.
for the OINC to ensure that his plans are even considered. (Even there are no guarantees.) . Jt
Will we do this in wartime-’ *\ ?
won’t work. Why do it in Pea(ret‘ a Why force a ship’s CO to publ'S flight schedule in different n,essa:lcoit1' or at all? What are we trying to a
plish? If the answer is to prov
the
combined helicopter flight plan, f3y goal is ridiculous. If it is so A aar' knows what the LAMPS helicoP 0f doing, why do commanding of ships get paid? If the answer is 0r pedite the scheduling of mainten necessary logistic flights, the d® OpSum or the radio/teletype ne ^ cover both of these nicely. Let s it, Alfa X-ray and his staff ^aV^0fty many other important things to e about. If you buy this, why no P top
daily OpGen Hotels/Foxtrots on .0l) of the list for the paperwork re ^ program? These messages have occasional use. ujp's
The bottom line is when the
140
Proceedings
/ Octol
iW
19«1
Obvion- , we ^a(J answers to those questions, it might be tie p,-US 1 ,ac^ing another squadron of SH-3s to the bat- Pronorf ^ 'ncrease ASW effectiveness well out of
'on to the numbers (and cost) involved. iSsueSlrTU*ar case might be made for the VDS, though that have d' m°re ^'hfieult. Submarine safety considerations has ConVen employment and tactical utility. Safety ercjs„ nsistently precluded proper employment during ex- fectivS ant* l^us a §0°d long-term evaluation of VDS ef- (j, g en~SS- foreign navies swear by VDS, as do senior 'ng th °,.lcers wht° have used it in Norway’s fjords. Add- VDs ? '§htweight, automated, and miniaturized SQS-35 'nexne° S°me °h Ihe early FFG-7s could be a relatively He orr,nSIVe way t0 increase ASW effectiveness in the bat- AgrouP >nner screen.
gram 1IT1Proveil exercise reconstruction and analysis practical01* ^ a'S0 use(l to examine tactics. By varying the it might^h °^Certa'n platforms—the SCTA, for instance— relative] 6 Poss'hle to determine why arrays have been analvsi ^ Unsuccessful in battle group operations. Tactical er>tirelyS nh'8ht PromPt a shift of these units to area ASW ^ ’ ae battle group could depend more on speed and maneuver for defense.
The benefits of near-term improvements in range prediction and tactical systems should be substantial. In particular, the algorithm for making better decisions in ac- tive/passive operations could greatly complicate the submarine’s job. In ASW, it is much better to evade than to fight.
Executing the maritime strategy demands that we do a better job at battle group ASW. If we know what works and why, and what does not work, we can make intelligent, fiscally responsible choices regarding battle group composition and unit tactical employment.
Captain Frigge has been Senior ASW instructor, Tactical Training Group Atlantic since August 1986. Previous assignments include: Assistant Operations and Plans (ASW), Carrier Group 8 Staff; Commanding Officer of the Truett (FF-1095); ASW Tactical Evaluation and Development/ Ship-Helicopter ASW Readiness Effectiveness Measurement Program, Surface Warfare Development Group; and Chief Staff Officer and ASW Warfare Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1965, has an M.S. degree in Oceanography, and is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College.
CO
unches sub, shiPs
Co
hunches *if »?INC t0 launch> he LAMpshe C° gets a sniff of a
^MPS goes, if u is
another
C'\fqpo "tact and it is too far away, What al °es not 8°—I don’t care •he fii„L ae *s in or what it says on ter how s. dule. An alert—no mat- LA,Vipb jjnagent—does not guarantee C-AMPs k * area coverage if the contact •rL a^ert *s to° far from the hant, bUt • *s nothing new or bril*° I-AMpQ1 |ffems (hat when it comes to °verln v, . nianagement, we tend ^ight sCb° , ^!’Sl LAMPS alert and built upQe a*'ng policies cannot be akrt and V" 6 Same critcria as carrier ?re only scheduling policies. We w spreada °ne'Per-ship asset and may *f a det;‘)Ver a large geographic area. u'ed aj ment is placed in a sched- Pears bev °r f|'ght and a contact ap- area coye°ncl 'ts range—but within the ^achrn,/3®6 caPat>ilities of another Cn the *) ln a scheduled standdown, ^hateVeAert Pl.an> OpGen Foxtrot, or ^set whe aS ^a'*ec* to provide a ready 'hat whatn 11 Was most needed. Isn’t toPr°vid WC rcal‘y necd to accomplish: 'v'th a ,„S an on t0P,” ready asset The 0rPedo?
S2r.»?“ X-ray must ^01,1,1 he building his alert plan
!?,stead
' alert (or the
‘Do I have a LAMPS airborne) 24 hours a day?”
^hat kind C*UeSt'ons sf10Uld be:
h,
J* the buiit -Screen
0|Jrs au coverage do I have 24 L ay. “Win this coverage anticipated threat?” Perhaps
in
assignments should be
Part, around the area coverage
capabilities of the embarked LAMPS. (This has to be done if the LAMPS are to be mutually supportive.) Generally, we don’t do this. The alert plans must be designed to answer the right questions. I believe that we design our alert plans without even knowing the questions. Disagree? How was your LAMPS used in your last fleet exercise?
Alfa X-ray, please provide your minimum battle group alert requirements and get on with it. Trust the ship’s CO to do the rest. Any CO or OINC worth his salt will plan his maintenance and use his weapon systems accordingly.
He does not need a published battle group flight schedule to tell him when to launch. We need a plan that tells us how fast to launch and what area to cover. There is really no operational need for a LAMPS “CAG” (air group commander)—in the form of a LEC/ HEC—other than to provide a single point of contact on the carrier for expediting supply/repair. Too many LEC/ HECs have crossed into operations; this trend should be reversed.
Probably the greatest single change in LAMPS management has been the introduction and growth of the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept. This concept is so broad and can vary so much from battle group to battle group that countless variations of CWC guidance have been tried. One of these experiments deals with an LEC/HEC who was given the responsibility of LAMPS alerts and scheduling. 1 am sure that COs have been burned in the past owing to, perhaps, bad OINC
planning or poor parts support, etc.
This is an unfortunate occurrence that we pay for today in the form of tighter control, i.e., micromanagement of LAMPS Mk-I scheduling.
Let’s rethink the job description of the LEC/HEC. Alfa X-ray has to believe we are smarter then we were years ago: Our parts support and reliability are the best ever. 1 recommend he base his LAMPS control criteria on a laissez-faire attitude. Trust the OINC to work closely with the ship’s CO to give him a ready aircraft and crew. Trust the squadron’s CO to keep the OINC honest. And trust the ship’s CO to launch LAMPS (or to hold LAMPS on deck) when necessary. The ASWC can always step in later. In short, let’s go back to the way we used to do things, with one exception: Let’s do it smarter.
Author’s Note: LAMPS Mk-III is not a part of this discussion because / have limited experience with the system.
Also, its longer endurance and more- capable data link allow it to transgress the boundaries of all warfare areas over larger geographic locations. Everybody wants to use this guy.
Owing to the laws of supply and demand, its scheduling may have to be more controlled than that of LAMPS Mk-I. This is a question for the Mk-III community.
Commander Gallo is the operations officer for Light Antisubmarine Squadron 33 at NAS North Island, California.
141
‘8sI October 1987