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The U. S. Marine Corps believed in the Harrier program from the earliest days of the PI 127, bottom. But the Marines needed to piggyback on Britain’s advances in V-STOL technology before they could justify the investment. The AV-8A, middle, and the AV-8B, top, eventually satisfied their need for a truly front-line aircraft.
November 1986
In July 1956, a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an American met in Paris to discuss the relative merits of a revolutionary aircraft design called Le Gyroptere: a single-engine, flat rising vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft. The aircraft would use a jet engine to power four centrifugal compressors designed to blow cold air out four rotatable pipes for both vertical and horizontal thrust. The pipes, equally spaced about the airframe and power unit’s center-of-gravity, would supply thrust to lift the aircraft off the ground vertically and then rotate rearward to provide forward momentum and flight; that is, vectored thrust.
The Frenchman, Michel Wibault, an aeronautical engineer whose company had built commercial aircraft between World Wars I and II, produced the design. The Englishman, Dr. (later Sir) Stanley Hooker, was the Technical Director of Bristol Aero-Engines, which pro-
The first P1127 prototype, XP831—powered by the Pegasus 1 engine—made the first vertical carrier landing on HMS Ark Royal in 1963. The Pegasus 5 engine gave the Kestrai more thrust than its predecessor. Right, the first Kestral, XS688, displays its Tripartite Evaluation Squadron markings.
BRITISH OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH duced the design’s 8,000 shaft horsepower Bristo ^ turbojet engine—the most powerful engine of >ts^ The American was U. S. Air Force Colonel Johnny^ coll, chairman of the Paris-based Mutual Weapons ^ opment Program (MWDP), a U. S. group establish2 • the war to examine and encourage European mihj ects which otherwise might die without fimding- ult's Driscoll had ordered the MWDP to evaluate ” j (0 design in March 1956. The group concluded, conajrCrafl then-prevailing U. S. Air Force thinking, that an .uS design that did not tie the plane to conventional--^ 0)] vulnerable—airfields indeed had merit. Colonel ^ had brought Wibault and Hooker together to ^isc^ents- design of Le Gyroptere and recommend impr°ve^ The meeting resulted in a new engine design .
___________ i.. i r\e*i rr,, - • . CalleU.
origin
"'as
5,000
As th:~ B0Un(ls shaft horsepower. interest *S Wor^ progressed, Dr. Hooker found he could the nrneitber his parent company, British Aeroplane, in dev'ei,,01’ nor tbe British bureau responsible for funding Pmental aircraft or engines, the Ministry of Sunnlv.
H,
°r of
using more economical guided missiles for air As a result of the White Paper, the Royal Air
ense.
ment
and both companies were shrewd enough to
tfinL ^ dp.PlCiAn itfnr tliQm Uw ncinrr 4 lnnnrn\;pn
deSlgn^° ruled out any competition from other British
P°sed
Moratorium.
, ................................. in March 1959,
ntUrer ^‘Bed to fund two prototype aircraft as a private •■ent fQ’ aoPing the design might fulfill a NATO require- iat a V/STOL capable aircraft to replace the aging
^U'ine19!?0, tbe Ministry of Supply and the RAF were ab°ut the PI 127—but that was about all they were
V6|
Piej
the ijf[S,an<^ assoc>ated shafting and gearboxes by taking the airfl rUSt ^'rect^ °ff the fan and directing the rest of pressoow through high-pressure combustion and com- r stages for horizontal thrust. Total engine output
j0vve - •"“* aircraft or engines, the Ministry of Supply.
Ceived er/ ^USt as Coding was about to run out, he re- °f Hawk etter from Sir Sydney Camm, Technical Director doing * ^‘rcraft- h read, “Dear Hooker: What are you It is3 °Ut vert*cal take-off engines?”2 Bi^to,remarkable tbat ^ir Sydney had invested time in the Defen ProP°sal. Duncan Sandys, then-U. K. Minister of WhichCC’ ^ Just delivered his infamous White Paper, fav0r hredicted no future need for manned fighters, in
def(
for ^ was directed to not even consider proposals progranct* fighter aircraft. Many aviation companies cut sanCes 0r redesigned aircraft to fit into the reconnais- the \yLUrvehIance, and communication roles allowed by Bristol ?C .^aPer- Nevertheless, Sir Sydney thought the vel°p esign provocative enough to detail two of his deV ent engineers (Ralph Hooper and John Fozard) to gine g designing an airframe to house the B.E. 52 en- Ple, anffS,e^ on Sir Sydney’s exhortation to “keep it sim- "or^bi et tbe pilot do the flying,” the men produced a %ent|vg, ^es'8n within months. Hawker Aircraft subsets aes'8nated the new project the PI 127. and enc°ncurrent development of the PI 127’s airframe aHi°ng lae’s a tribute to the coordination and cooperation ^n(iyS’ developing partners. However, the Duncan h' decision to forego future fighter aircraft developtechno]llat ^ec'si°n work for them. By using "unproven stUcljes ’ as a vehicle to promote V/STOL “design %ein Bristol and Hawker were able to continue devel- 'mposprt *5 a fighter aircraft despite the govemment- °Perat ,earIy 1957, the engineers of both companies co- lhe Q . . and coordinated their efforts at such a rate that Craft’s^lna* studies had to be abandoned. Hawker Air** design featured four rotating ducts, instead of I^Tq) ^(lna' tw°, and could achieve vertical take-off Pound, Lrom an improved engine that delivered 9,000 Tl s Mrust.3 It lae Pi 1 0-7
U' B. iu\ / Pr°gram gradually increased in scope as the a ” I9P, now commanded by Colonel Willis Chap- ^1-4 t0 Pa^ a ^5% share of the costs of develop- *°1 jnae first engine, named the Pegasus 1, ran at Bris- Hau,i. ^ePtember 1959. Meanwhile,
doing. In the United States however, John Stack at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had become interested and authorized the construction and wind tunnel testing of a one-sixth scale model, which subsequently verified the aircraft’s ability to perform VTO. In addition, Hawker’s chief experimental test pilot Hugh Merewether “flew” a NASA simulator that was programmed to fly like the PI 127 and another experimental VTO aircraft, the Bell X-14, in an effort to coordinate and share U. S.-U. K. V/STOL experience.
In June 1960, the attention being lavished by the United States on Hawker’s PI 127 and the Pegasus engine finally prompted the Ministry of Supply to act. It decided to reimburse Hawker for the two PI 127 prototypes the company had produced as a private venture and for the PI 127’s development costs. The MWDP, however, was still covering the development costs of the Pegasus engine. Finally, on 21 October 1960, after engine shakedown tests and, surprisingly, with the aircraft tethered to the ground for safety precautions, Hawker’s A. W. “Bill” Bedford lifted the wheels of the first PI 127 prototype, XP831, off the ground in its first powered hover—notably, with his leg set in a plaster cast. Bedford’s leg had been broken in a car accident in Switzerland the month before, but he had been able to convince the flight trials review board that he was fit to fly.5
The first PI 127 tethered flights had been quickly followed by several more, until untethered hovers were allowed in November 1960. The flight data gained was sufficient to induce the Ministry of Supply to fund four more development aircraft and also to provide some funding to Bristol Aero-Engines for further engine development. Fur-
the
and sold its three Kestrals to the United States. Once^ ^ United States, the Kestrals were subjected to furt e ^aVy ies by NASA at Langley Air Force Base, and 1 c pa- and the Marine Corps at the Naval Air Test Center ^ tuxent River, Maryland. The three British Kestra ^ turned over to the RAF for further evaluation at Bos
Down and Famborough, England, and formed the
that effort that interest in the RAF PI 127 develop1
men1
;atiy
iT
19,000-pounds thrust Pegasus 6 engine in late
the Marine Corps without further argument to u‘V'ajrcfal ing a program to procure an “off-the-shelf system. jtltf
As soon as the news of this advance was announc p. Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Leon
thermore, in March 1961, NATO published Basic Military Requirement 3, which stated a need for a jet V/STOL close-support strike aircraft. Hawker Aircraft’s foresight had been confirmed, even though the PI 127 was far from becoming a fixture of the British defense program.
Despite the RAF’s lack of interest in the PI 127, Hawker Aircraft (which by this time had become the Hawker Blackburn Division of Hawker Siddeley Aviation and would eventually evolve into the Kingston Brough Division of British Aerospace, and then simply British Aerospace Ltd.) had continued to test and fund the PI 127 at a much reduced level, but a level that had gradually improved the design. The aircraft’s main fault was that it simply did not have enough thrust to lift a suitable weapons load and itself off the ground with enough fuel to perform a military mission. A major breakthrough came when Hooker’s team at Bristol was able to improve the Pegasus 1 to the extent that 15,500 pounds thrust was achieved. This new engine was designated the Pegasus 5 and enabled the PI 127 to carry both weapons and extra fuel. (By this time, Bristol Aero-Engines had become Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd. and was, in turn, absorbed in 1966 by a greatly expanded Rolls-Royce Ltd.) The Pegasus 5 also attracted another American’s interest in the practicalities of V/STOL flight.
Larry Levy, a wealthy U. S. aircraft accessories merchant, had been persuaded by the Kennedy Administration to join the MWDP in Paris and had immediately showed an interest in the PI 127. Subsequently, Levy persuaded the German, British, and U. S. governments that it was politically a good idea for these NATO nations to be seen collaborating on the development of a V/STOL aircraft. He succeeded in getting the three nations to fund jointly a Tripartite Evaluation Squadron (TES) that was initially scheduled to evaluate 18 Kestral aircraft, the updated version of the PI 127. The British Labour government reduced that number, claiming it could not afford the funding required. A nine-aircraft squadron, made up of pilots and ground personnel of the RAF, U. S. Air Force, U. S. Navy, U. S. Army, and German Luftwaffe, was eventually agreed upon. The squadron was tasked with assessing both the practicalities and difficulties associated with jet V/STOL operation. Although the aircraft were not equipped to perform any operational mission other than to drop an occasional practice bomb, and were underpowered, the squadron had to wring out the operational aspects of flying the Kestral, with an emphasis on off- airfield operations.
The TES evaluation of the Kestral—powered by the 15,500 pound rated Pegasus 5 and featuring a new swept- wing design as well as many other technical improvements—lasted from April to November 1965. During this period, the squadron flew 938 sorties, for more than 600 hours in-flight. Takeoffs were made from surfaces ranging from concrete and tarmac to grass and polyester sheeting. The capability of the aircraft to operate without a fixed airfield was proven when they had to operate for three weeks in the field. It was also fully qualified by the lack of any serious accidents during the entire evaluation program. Two incidents did mar the program, however. In the
first, a U. S. pilot tried to take off conventionally parking brake on, destroying the aircraft. In the s incident, the Luftwaffe pilot, Colonel Gerhard Bat a World War II ace with 301 kills to his credit, t*C|iin£|ed tally chopped power while in a hover at 20 feet an ^ hard. Although the aircraft flew again, Colonel Bar, ^ was heard to claim “302 Allied aircraft destroyed- cause of his skill.6
At the completion of the evaluation, the nine ^ aircraft were to be divided among the sponsor nn Germany, however, refrained from picking up this
basis
- , . ^valu^
tor their next operational requirement since tne c ,c
of the TES was completed just as the ill-fated sU^pi 12?*
PI 154 project, a grossly stretched version of the
was being cancelled. . p0r a
Between 1960 and 1965, the RAF’s predeliction ^
supersonic aircraft wasted time, energy, and inone^e,
could have been sunk into developing the PlU jin
wise, the U. S. Air Force and Navy were not intcr<es^^e
a fighter that could not operate in the supersonic r & j a
As it was, only the U. S. Marine Corps demons
continuous interest in the PI 127 program.
Since the early 1950s, the Marine Corps air a £orps
believed that the future of its contribution to jn£jeed>
revolved about the concept of close air support- ^jng
during the 1950s, the Marines spent eight years ^
on a program that would guarantee close air supP0^ ^
ing an amphibious assault. This program, known ^
Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS), *nV0,pt
complex problem of landing the men, equip1111' ^ ’aftef'
components necessary to construct an airfield in * 6 -njtial
math of an amphibious assault, shortly after the ^
beachhead had been established. The study had f°u ^1
such an operation would not be necessary—if sW. ,p0Wer
of V/STOL aircraft were available with enough l|rC
to perform the close air support mission. irtof
Although they did not have a Marine flying aS aPfjjie$
the TES during the evaluation of the Kestral, the .jCj-
had watched the evaluation closely. They actively Pj^d
pated in the follow-on evaluation work that was per ^0jj)
on the Kestral at Patuxent River, and it was large
maintained. The Kestral and PI 127 were both gre‘ V'stjfy derpowered, however, and the Marines could n0T>> an operational requirement from this evaluatory w an improvement in lift could be guaranteed to pr0 ^ (he weapons load capability they needed. The at*vent,/g |ef*
' bi»*<
eadv ’’“nistry °f Supply.) The U. S. Government had received British permission for each of the two
Vi**
°rties j -
1,1 get l'le new RAF aircraft. The Marine Corps wanted f%p UrtC(l as soon as possible. Two weeks later, the T'hia'n Washington, reporting to General
j^rf0rrtler°space Companies air show at Farnborough to i rrieraa°Perational evaluation of the newly designated ,<J67 by Pi 127 had been christened the Harrier in (L tae Ministry of Technology, which had formerly alreadv ' 'r” " " ~ J
PiIots a
Vt lvpn0rnPany>ng Brigadier General Johnson (Colonel s0rt;„ . Cr and Lieutenant Colonel Bud Baker) to fly ten
The glowing report delivered by Colonels Miller and Baker led to a full Navy preliminary evaluation, conducted in England by a Navy/Marine Corps team in January 1969. This evaluation was also positive and enabled the Marine Corps to obtain the necessary funding for an initial buy of 12 aircraft in June 1969. Total planned procurement called for 114 aircraft to fill four operational squadrons, plus trainers and attrition assets.8
One of the stringent procurement limitations placed upon the Marine buy was a requirement that a substantial production content of this system would take place within the United States. Colonels Miller and Baker visited all major U. S. aircraft manufacturers to ascertain possible industry interest. Douglas Aircraft of California showed immediate interest, but was constrained by its recent merger with McDonnell Aircraft of St. Louis from forming any lasting agreements without approval from the parent organization. Subsequently, the interest shown by Douglas was stronger than expected and led to a 15-year license agreement between McDonnell Douglas and with Hawker Siddeley Aviation in 1969. At much the same time, Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd. signed a similar agreement with Pratt and Whitney in the United States to work jointly on the engine’s development. Not to be left out, in October 1969, the U. S. and British governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding by which they agreed to develop jointly the Harrier and its improvements.
What made the U. S. Marine Corps so interested in the
cut defense expenditure- ^^0 :ed: “there is not enough e j IT : (n,r US to J
that time, in an effort to ish Government announced: “there is not ei ground on the Advance Harrier program for us the program with the US.”10 fU
Undaunted, McDonnell Douglas pressed ^°r^aVal Alf its work and, in late 1975, demonstrated to the the P® Systems Command (NavAir) that it could doubl load and flight radius of the AV-8A by airframe m ^e\. tion alone. Thus, there would be no need to fun
luded 3
_ _ _ _ speci
new wing design, improved engine intakes, an° 0f the
lift 1 mnrm/pmpnf rlainoac offor'Viorl trt flip 1113flGl"^ rifO
In the AV-8B, McDonnell Douglas gave the Marine Corps an improved Harrier, with double the payload of the AV-8A. Meanwhile, the Royal Air Force pursued an operational innovation that gave their Sea Harrier a much better takeoff performance than the cartoon, far right, suggests.
Harrier? Its interest can be traced to the fighting experience gained in World War II, Korea, and later, in part, to Vietnam. The Marines, a highly mobile, but relatively lightly armed, group, had proved the advantages of close air support in many battles during those conflicts. One of the lessons learned was that a small, unplanned battle was most often won within the first 30 minutes of action. For the Marines and their lack of ready heavy armor, that meant having air support close enough to quickly turn the tide of the fighting. The Marine Corps saw in the Harrier a means to deliver bombs and rocket/gun support that could be developed to meet their demands. Here was an aircraft that could hide on the ground close to the forward edge of the battle area, fully armed and self-supported, until called into action. As one veteran put it, close air support was “short sorties and lots of them.”9 V/STOL could provide such support.
The U. S. Marine Corps was a few years behind the RAF in recognizing this basic operation condition. Although the RAF was the first service to fully realize the potential, it had its funding and development problems as well. It was not until April 1969 that it founded No 1 (F) Squadron at Wittering as the start of its first Harrier GR (ground/reconnaissance) Mark (Mk) 1 Group. This command proved the feasibility and capability of the Harriers through a series of evaluations and weapon training programs that took them from Cyprus in June to Norway in December 1971. Throughout this period, the Harriers and their pilots and maintenance crews were subjected to harsh conditions, living in tents and working in hideaways, as they spent many months proving that the aircraft was simple, reliable, and flexible enough to provide the support demanded. Once properly equipped, the Harriers did not need much to operate. This was proved on the first Harrier out-of-airfield operation, when the only connection the squadron had with the airfield for a week was the second- in-command’s phone call to the air traffic control center each morning to check on the weather and divert fields. Sir Sydney Camm’s order to his design engineers—“keep it simple and let the pilots do the flying”—had indeed paid dividends.
The simplicity of the Harrier is best explained by the way RAF and Marine Corps pilots were initially trained to fly the aircraft. Since there were no two-seat Harriers at that time, pilots first worked to get the feel of the plane by doing a half-hour of high speed taxiing around the airfield. “Experienced” pilots, with 50 hours of V/STOL flying, would carefully monitor the progress from the control tower. The first flight was always a conventional takeoff and landing. A vertical transition to conventional flight was the goal of following syllabus flights.
During the early 1970s, with the Harrier GR Mk 1 and AV-8A in full production, it was only logical for the Mc- rTstudy
Donnell Douglas and Hawker Siddeley teams ^ a methods of enhancing performance to make the a ^ better prospect for sales to a third country. 0°° ver- efforts were directed toward a supersonic V/5 nCi sion powered by a larger Pegasus engine that ha a 24,500-pound thrust rating during bench testsbecause Siddeley. This program was eventually cancelle seJ of the period’s massive inflationary trends. (The P J j97I development program would have cost $1 billi°n jn- dollars and would probably have doubled by the ^re- service status was achieved.) The gloomy econon^^ casts pursuaded the Hawker and McDonnell teams that any planned improvements to the curaratjon3l rier fleet must provide an order of magnitude op improvement at a low-development cost. . ^jflg As any aircraft manufacturer can attest, therelS[0 a harder than trying to sell qualitative improveme government that has just procured a new aircra gjve about to enter service. The U. S. Marine Corps^foVe- McDonnell Douglas a formal requirement for an ' »p pat' ment to the Harrier in 1973, but also demanded ^0 ticipation in order to make the necessary aPPrt,Lr sef' seem more economical to both governments. Nel vice could agree on the operational requirem^^. M ever, and the issue was stalemated until March grit'
rd*ith
opment program to improve the Pegasus 6 t^rU'st]UlJv The changes proposed by McDonnell Douglas mcqv
npw u/ino rlf»cirrn imnrm/prl ^nrrin/p intillcPS. .ft
lift improvement devices attached to the underswj' pr° aircraft to contain jet upwash during hover and, vide more lift. This improved system was to . known as the Harrier II and was subsequently gre3 the AV-8B by the United States and the GR Mk 5 Britain. $or
Besides these material improvements, both 1 g inge Air Force and the U. S. Marine Corps had develop^ ^O- nious and distinctive operational innovations sinroCedafe The Marines fully developed and fine-tuned the P
That was a short flight!
courtesy o
Vly t|TVJ
Hs ^reafter. The ski jump ramp built at Farnborough iri(l morChased hy NavAir and installed at Patuxent River Ss * t*lan 100 launches at exit airspeeds from 50 to 73 C)(Cee(je^re Oown. The evaluation proved that the YAV-8B Vii jq aH U. S. Marine Corps requirements, and, in ^'Hion McDonnell Douglas was awarded a $35- Hj]onc|)ntract for four full-scale development aircraft ^ ‘ead production items At this time, however, the
production items. At this time, however, the
Thisln forward flight as an air-combat maneuver. CaPabiTt>Ce<^Ure °P^m*ze<f the Harrier’s vectored-thrust thruSt v ^ ^ Positioning the engine nozzle to provide feelerefCtors l^at greatly enhance the aircraft’s ability to exercisese'haCCe*erate’ anc^ translate in flight. Air combat Pr°vedth between the Harrier and other aircraft have Efficient6 ^rocec*ure t° the point where its pilots are quite 'Vorkino ac^'ev*ng a kill against any opponent when The (jWll^'n v'sua' range.
simple t.nit.e<f Kingdom’s operational innovation was so at it raised the question why it was not thought of
Y °F BRmSH AEROSPACE)
Meme ^ Was the brainchild of Royal Navy Engineer thesis n • '“0rnmander Doug Taylor, who developed, as a °ry 0p «*ct at Southampton University in 1973, the the- Ptrform. *n® a ski jump ramp to increase aircraft takeoff r5rnp eace- The upward momentum provided by the than ne j ed the Harrier to be launched with less speed Zander °n a ^at surface or w'th a larger load. Com- v,hiC|1. aylor’s theory was useful to the Royal Navy, *Tarrier ■ ^Ust made its case for a maritime version of the tjR 3 ala 1971. This version was built around the RAF na‘Ssanc ^est8nated the Sea Harrier FRS (fighter/recon- SiddeieCe/strike). Although quickly advocated by Hawker Hen th ’ l^e concePt was not fully tested until 1976, The r ^lrst sk' jump ramp was built at Famborough. honneii"}' Pr°t°type YAV-8B was flown in 1978 at Mc- - Douglas in St. Louis and at Patuxent River trials
A , . rwuMVUUii it WHO. ru imo Hint/, livy
aPon ^ .^ministration made a full go-ahead contingent Hnt 'ru1S^1 agreement to enter into the joint develop- ,s delayed the start of development until June Hipq aen the Ministry of Defence announced that it vJn°uncUrChaSC AV-8B-typc aircraft for the RAF.11 The %0rCerTlent was followed by the signing of yet another °r joiantlum of Understanding, authorizing $800 million kfips (L ^uH‘Scale development of the Harrier II under HnUf at ultimately were much more favorable to U. S. The pUrers than to those in the United Kingdom. lve-year delay from initial demonstration of the capability of the Harrier II to receipt of production orders allowed many more changes to be embodied in the aircraft. A few of the significant improvements included:
- Raising the cockpit 10.5 inches to allow better visibility
- Moving the outriggers inboard and the reaction control valves outboard for better control on the ground and in hover
- Increasing allowable fuel weight by 50% to compensate for a larger wing radius and composite structure
- Increasing weapons load by 15% because of combined airframe and lift improvements
The U. S. Marine Corps has replaced 65% of the AV- 8As and AV-8Cs now in service in Marine Attack Training Squadron (VMAT)-203, and Marine Attack Squadrons (VMAs)-231 and -542. The aircraft being replaced will be transferred to Marine Reserve squadrons. The remaining production orders will be used to replace the Marine Corps’ aging A-4 Skyhawk fleet. Five squadrons are to be recommissioned in this manner.
The RAF’s buy of 60 aircraft will be used to man more Harrier squadrons than those already outfitted with the GR Mk 3. The Harrier GR Mk 3 is presently going through a mid-life update program to enhance current weapon load and avionics configurations.
On 23 January 1986, the Ministry of Defence outlined a new collaborative agreement for developing an advanced, supersonic short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) fighter for the 21st century. A joint U. S./U. K. Memorandum of Understanding was signed by officials from NASA, the U. S. Department of Defense, and the U. K. Ministry of Defence. The document outlines a joint program of research into four single-engine advanced STOVL concepts. These concepts are to be evaluated during a five-year development study. The successful concept will be embodied in a developmental aircraft that is expected to fly by 1992-93. An advanced STOVL fighter/attack aircraft is not expected to enter service until the year 2000. Guidelines call for equal effort on both sides of the Atlantic, producing two sets of data on the four STOVL concepts. The working group that drew up the joint technology program included members of the U. S. Navy and Air Force and the Royal Navy and Air Force.12
Although there have been numerous instances during the Harrier’s development when a single government or company provided the impetus that kept the Harrier aircraft development alive, the development of the Pegasus engine has been a continuous joint effort since 1972. More than $160 million has been spent to improve the Pegasus engine from the Harrier GR Mk 1 Pegasus 6 standard, with its 400-hour life, to the Pegasus 11-21 standard with a 1,000-hour life and improved thrust.
Notwithstanding the broad differences of opinion among services on the development of the Harrier aircraft, the U. S. Marine Corps, as its biggest proponent, has made a priority effort of ensuring coordination among the services since 1969, when the initial Harrier Development Agreement was signed. Since that time, the Harrier program has proven its operational value in almost all incidences, most notably during the 1982 Falklands Conflict. A total 38 Sea Harriers and GR Mk 3s flew more than
>n&l November
1986
59
And<
completed flight training in 1975 and was assigned to in Barbers Point, Hawaii. He was subsequently accepted
0-:
.01
at the
Navy Test Pilot School, from which he graduated in 1980 an' ^ Com' worked as a project officer at the Naval Air Test Center. In ^ group
2,000 sorties at 95% aircraft availability and accounted for 32 aircraft destroyed with nine losses of their own—an operation waged 4,000 miles from the nearest friendly base. The ease of operating the Harrier at sea was shown by the successful embarkation of RAF GR Mk 3s with no at-sea experience and the qualification of each RAF pilot after only one successful ski jump takeoff.13
The lessons of the Falklands have not been lost on the rest of the world. Although both Spain and India had purchased AV-8A/GR Mk 3 aircraft in the 1970s, both countries have since ordered more AV-8B/GR Mk 5 aircraft, and each has either built another aircraft carrier (Spain), or bought one (India purchased the Hermes from the United Kingdom in May 1986) to enhance their seagoing operational aircraft capabilities.
Despite its unconventional development path, the Harrier has survived its many critics and it is flying high—and low, and vertically, and ....
publish
4Bill Sweetman, Harrier: Janes Aircraft Spectacular (London: Jane Company Ltd., 1984), p. 9.
5Gunston, Aviation Fact File, p. 20. . •te(j) 19^’
6Alfred Price, Harrier at War (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allen Litfi
P- 31- „ • ,, crephen ^
7Francis K. Mason, Harrier (Second Edition) (Cambridge: Patriot ited, 1983), p. 109.
8Ibid.
9Price, Harrier at War, p. 53. l0Gunston, Aviation Fact File, p. 50.
"Mason, Harrier, p. 151.
12Flight International, 22 February 1986, p. 11. .. ^
,3Rodney A. Burden, et al., Falklands, the Air War (London: Bn >
Research Group, 1986), pp. 189-223.
A 1974 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, Commander g comdeted flieht training in 1975 and was assigned to Patrol 9 ,i $•
wv/ir\.v_vj uo a piyjvvi at ixavai rui itai ^ ^
mander Anderson was assigned to the staff of Cruiser Destroy ^ ^ Twelve as Electronic Warfare Officer, completing two crU1a(tend tl>{ Mediterranean and Indian Ocean before being appointed to aUtical Royal Naval Staff College in 1985. He was selected as an jngas Engineering Duty Officer in February 1985, and is presentpMA'2^* the Manager of the London Office of the Harrier Project ( ^va) Air and F402 Engine Technical Representative in London for the Systems Command.
Sky Hook: Tactical Air for Smaller Ships
By Dr. John Fozard, Heinz Frick, and Denis J. Mottram
larly in the vertical motion axis. Landing and ta^e°rrjed
til IliUtL, n n/.tiinll. > A’. ffl n. ■ 1 * t / 1 f A llv /'
of
therefore, while not actually difficult, tend to be
The evolution of the aircraft carrier has been driven by advances in defense technology. Aircraft and weapons have grown in performance and hence in weight and complexity; this has been matched by an increase in size and cost of the carrier. But only the United States, France, and—soon—the Soviet Union can carry the burden of the conventional carrier in its full flowering.
The advent of the Harrier family of jet vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) attack fighters has had a different effect. The Harrier’s short takeoff performance has made catapults redundant and vertical landing has similarly eliminated the arresting gear. Thus, the launch and recovery needs of the carrier’s aircraft no longer have to dictate the size of the flight deck, and hence the ship.
The Harrier, in principle, is capable of operating from decks as small as a frigate helicopter deck. It is feasible to configure a ship little larger than a frigate to be capable of supporting two Harriers. It is then possible to provide a degree of air cover for formations of ships much smaller than those warranting cover by a full-blooded aircraft carrier, whether 90,000 or 20,000 tons. British Shipbuilders made studies of vessels of less than 6,000 tons displacement capable of operating a mix of six fixed-wing vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) jet aircraft and helicopters. This would be a handy force for brushfire conflicts and would leave the precious CVAs, LHAs, LPHs, and CVSs free for their primary missions.
Operating jet VTOL combat aircraft from small vessels offers considerable tactical advantages. However, it will
be effective only if any additional operating li*1® „
incurred as a result of moving away from the wls(iip spaces of the attack carrier deck are acceptable- ve0; envisaged could be as small as 4,000 tons, and he 0f lively. Indeed, in sea state six, the vertical m°ve® et_ an aft helicopter deck in such vessels could be 33 j,at 0 The problem is: How do we operate jet VTOL co ^ craft safely from small decks in extreme con^‘t'Pnucopter' Remember, a Harrier does not behave like a he^£ the Certainly, it can arrive and depart vertically, hut ^ resemblance ends. A helicopter is optimized for nacCu- and can do so for many minutes on end with gre jglit racy. It has a low density, low “wing loading \ ^ t0 divided by jet nozzle area), and is highly susceph turbulence. The stored energy in the rotor system^-1 a good standard of vertical-axis maneuverability- ^ rier, by contrast, has a high density, a very high (,a> loading,” and is thus relatively unaffected by guS ^jcU- Iess maneuverability in hover than a helicopter, P ^
out with commitment, the pilot embarking on a c°,)(]jljst' action from which it is difficult to diverge. Thus, ^ ment of hover height and position to accommodate ^ a movement is not normally feasible. Though the us^cts, raised or gridded platform can minimize ground e ^ the cross-coupling between aircraft attitude and tn ^ for vector can still cause problems: lower a wing to a a]l roll of the ship and you move sideways. That may
'Bill Gunston, Harrier (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allen Limited, 1981), p. 8.
[2]Bill Gunston, Aviation Fact File: Harrier (London: Salamander Books Limited, 1984), p. 5.
[3]“Summary of Pegasus Development 1959-1982,” Rolls Royce Limited, 1982.