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Junior Officer Billet Summary reveals these and many other jobs that do not appear to require the in-depth knowledge of flying that only an active aviator possesses. Concurrent with the restructure of the career pattern, the billet descriptions for all non-flying jobs requiring a 13IX (aviator) designator should be reevaluated. Junior aviators in particular—whether ashore or afloat—should be in flying billets.
The current shortage of aviators may cause this to happen simply because there are not enough aviators to fill all available cockpits. During recent years, however, the Navy has fluctuated between severe shortages of pilots
that in
and ridiculous excesses. It is probably safe to say 111 the future the situation will be reversed and the Navy again have the option of assigning aviators. When time comes, every effort should be made to keep avia in flying billets. . >s
The final step in a reevaluation of the naval avia role would be the most difficult. This involves altering Navy’s traditional thinking. The custom of consid&r aviation a collateral duty probably goes back to the bi ^ ^ naval aviation when line officers undertook aviati°ng collateral duty. Naval aviation has come a long way ^ then, and it is no longer realistic to assume that a
Why not improve combat SAR training now?
Successful combat search and rescue (SAR) begins with trained forces and a well-rehearsed scenario—none of which the U. S. Navy has, or appears to be seriously considering. We need a continuous, deployable capability—not a sometime thing on weekends and two- week active duty periods.
Fleet helicopter pilots believe that scant attention has been paid to training and capability for combat SAR, but plenty of attention has been paid to projecting power ashore, despite the knowledge that such activity makes combat SAR inevitable. The assets now available for combat SAR are helicopter and light helicopter antisubmarine squadrons (HSs)/(HSLs), helicopter combat support squadrons (HCs), and helicopter mine countermeasure squadrons (HMs)—all essentially untrained for combat SAR. Combat SAR does not only pick up downed aviators, it supports the Navy special warfare community—which now trains extensively with Naval Reserve helicopter assets— as well.
Initially, in Vietnam, the SH-3 Sea King in starboard delta flight pattern performed the combat SAR mission, but the loss rate was unacceptable. HC-7 handled combat SAR, and being the specialists in this mission, did reasonably well. Losses were still exceptionally high, averaging one aircraft lost per 1.4 rescues, and one crew member lost per 1.8 rescues. After the war, the combat SAR squadron was deemed no longer useful as a regular fleet asset, and was transferred to the reserves. In today’s come-as-you-are-
RH-53D SEA STAUJON/K. HARRISON
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wars, the call-up of a reserve nnt is combat SAR squadron or detac not likely. t ^r.9
The vintage H-3s of today s^ combat support squadron may' Dej- placed with reliable SH-60s. Bj^ sonnel and logistics problem
88
on g^r^an fly an F-14 or an F/A-18 proficiently and safely Ju ' a^'l*onal duty” basis.
learnni0r °fficers need to devote most of their time to flyi'n® .^Phisticated aircraft systems and complicated r°nsn S^,I**S’ rat^cr than turning out paperwork. Squad- contjn ed caPable and experienced senior pilots to provide a|] av'Ult^ an<^ ^ying leadership within a squadron. And a ma; °rs npe(i to have their aviation skills recognized as •j'ho/)°rt'0n of their contribution to the Navy.
Who are v!^ 'S extremely fortunate to have many officers kators outstancling aviators and excellent adminis- • he challenge, then, is not to create these people
but to identify them. Once they are identified, keep them in flying billets, recognize their aviation skills, and give them career patterns that will capitalize on their expensive and valuable talents. The entire Navy will benefit.
Commander Shipman flew A-4 and A-7 aircraft on active duty. Upon leaving active-duty service, he continued to fly A-4s with the Naval Air Reserve and eventually became commanding officer of VC-686, a reserve force squadron augmentation unit flying A-4E, F, and TA-4 models. As a civilian, Commander Shipman has worked as a writer/editor for Approach Magazine, as an accident investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board, and is currently employed as a pilot for People Express Airlines.
e*i«ts. It •
^ch^nt not feasible to deploy de- tractna s °n a regular basis for a pro-
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SclUadroneri0c* w>th the current reserve ald T^|, fanning of drilling reservists °f Reserv rammS and Administration ^evera|6S^ °^'cers and enlisted.
*“• rec°mmendations for a de-
ON
cent force within the range of a readily available fix are:
- Train and fly one officer in each squadron for the complete weapons and tactics instructor (WT1) course at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) at Yuma, Arizona.
- Use the model used by the Marine Corps with one WTI as the squadron expert (much like a naval air training and operations officer) training the squadron in tactics for combat SAR and special missions.
- Change the required operating capa- bility/projected operational environment for HS, HSL, HC, and HM squadrons to include combat SAR/special mission.
- Task MAWTS-1 and Strike University in Fallon to come up with an indepth program tailored for fleet use.
- Use the talent in HC-9 to initiate the program of combat SAR/special mission for the fleet.
Other alternatives would be:
- Establish regular combat SAR squadrons with detachments in CVs.
- Change the personnel mix in HC-9 in favor of more TAR and active Navy personnel so detachments can be more easily deployed.
- Rely more on the Marines for combat SAR support.
The rotary wing community has multi-mission capabilities—let’s use them all! The Navy wouldn’t dream of
sending pilots on a mission without appropriate training to hunt subs or drop bombs. After all, we rotary wing fliers are the ones who will respond to the first call for combat SAR, and the plea of “no training” will then fall on deaf ears.