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Peter Tare and the PHM
By Commander Brent L. Gravatt, U. S. Navy
“Ancient” mariners will have had little difficulty recognizing the subject of this article from its title. However, for us “boots” now on watch, “Peter Tare” comes from the phonetic alphabet used during World War II, and refers to the famous "PT” (patrol torpedo) boats of that era. Both the PT boat and her innovative descendant, the patrol combatant hydrofoil (missile)—or PHM—spring from the same concept: a small, expendable, heavily armed craft capable of destroying much larger and/or more heavily armed ships. Today’s PHM-launched, surface-to-surface missile (SSM) is analogous to the PT-launched torpedo.
However, the price we have paid in the PHM for high-speed stability and for an open-water capability (high silhouette, deep draft, fragility, and complexity of control) is too great if it means that the Pegasus-c\ass PHMs are to be the only fast patrol craft in the U. S. Navy’s inventory. In choosing the hydrofoil instead of the planing hull of the PT, we have given
up more utility than we have gained.
The PT was a fast, low-silhouette, short-range, shallow-draft boat with a redundant propulsion plant (three gasoline engines). While the Electric Boat Company (ELCO) and Higgins Industries versions of the PT varied in some specifics, they were equipped virtually the same. For purposes of comparing characteristics of U. S. World War II PT-boats and modern-day PHMs, only the ELCO 80-footer in her 1945 configuration will be addressed.
The PT’s main armament, torpedoes, were fire-and-forget antiship weapons dependent primarily on passive (eyeball) inputs, although some torpedo attacks were launched principally on radar data. Radar was first installed in late 1942, but it was not until 1943 that the PTs had a reliable radar set. The initial antiship weapons (Mk-8 torpedoes; 10,000 yards at 27 knots) had a longer range than the PT direction system could exploit. The boats had no “torpedo computer” as such but rather a visual “torpedo director” whose “solution” gave a best guess as to where to point the boat to launch the torpedoes; launch “doctrine” was 1,000 to 2,000 yards. A more suitable match between fire control system and weapon occurred in early 1943 with adaptation of the Mk-13 aircraft torpedo (5,500 yards at 33 knots; less at 45 knots).
A late development, the five-inch spin-stabilized antiship and bombardment rockets (5,000 + yards), introduced in 1945, came too late in the war to be used against shipping. However, Commander, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Seventh
The PT boat’s torpedoes cannot match the range of the PHM’s Harpoon missiles, but one could argue that her hull design and air defense capabilities are better. While the hydrofoil patrol combatant is a valuable fleet asset, there still may be a need for more “Peter Tare”-style boats.
Fleet, Captain Selman S. Bowling, considered them to be “the greatest potential PT weapon of the war’ ’ and prophetically urged the development of a “motor rocket boat.”
The single 40-mm. and single 37-mm. guns were principally antisurface craft weapons of short-to-medium range (5,400 yards and 8,800 yards, respectively). The single 20-mm. and two twin 50-caliber machine guns served as close- in weapon systems for antiair and antisurface use. A smoke generator and smoke pots served as concealment and deception devices for the PTs. Depth charges were carried, but the PT had no means of detecting a submerged submarine. But when set for shallow depth and dropped in the PT’s wake, the depth charges had a very discouraging effect on pursuing destroyers. Offensively, the depth charges were used to break the backs of neutralized, but still afloat, troop and supply barges and similar small craft.
The PHM, in comparison, is faster than the PT, has greater range (700 versus 300 nautical miles at 40 knots), has a much higher silhouette, and a much greater draft (23.2 feet) even when hull- borne, since the normal operating mode is with the foils extended. When foil- borne, the draft is only 8.8 feet, about three feet greater than the PT’s. Essentially, the PHM has only one main engine, a gas turbine. If that becomes inoperative, the ship must remain hullborne and carry on with a top speed of 12 knots provided by twin diesel engines.
The PHM is a hydrofoil, and the PT is a planing boat. This basic distinction provides the PHM with significant advantages. The planing hull, at speed, tends to slam into the waves from one crest to the next. This does not make for a very stable weapons platform in choppy water, nor is it conducive to keeping the boat in one piece at high speeds in rough waters. Also, a revved-up PT in a seaway was not kind to her human operators. Generally, PTs could operate effectively in waves up to four feet. The foilbome PHM, on the other hand, is very stable in waves up to 13 feet.
While oversimplified, this stability makes the PHM more of a deep and/or open water combatant than a shallow and/or protected water craft as was the PT. The PT was used primarily near coastlines and in protected inter-island waters, but the PHM has less capability for such operations. Even with her foils retracted (draft 6.2 feet), she must shift to foilbome operations to get any kind of speed up, and in the process the draft goes to 23.2 feet. While the foilbome draft is only about eight feet, it is difficult to envision the PHM patrolling in shallow water on her foils, trying to remain undetected with her high silhouette and a plume of water trailing behind her. Foilbome PHM operations in shallow waters are more likely to be of the “get-in and get-out” or “pass through quickly” variety, rather than sustained patrol operations as the PTs performed. Fast patrol craft operations are much more likely to occur in protected waters such as those found in choke points, archipelagos, and along littorals than they are in areas of more open water. The planing fast patrol boat is admirably suited for protected water operations—much more than the PHM—regardless of water depth.
The hydrofoil craft is more fragile than the planing boat. The two after foils on the PHM support 68% of the foilbome ship’s weight; the forward foil supports the rest. If one or more of the stmts connecting the hull to the foils takes a hit, the
PHM is going to go “sploosh” in a hurry, and the ship is limited to a 12-knot maximum speed. PT boats in World War II were able to take comparable hits to the hull and maintain speed (providing, of course, the main engines were not hit) simply because their speed kept the holes out of the water.
Certainly, the Fire control and detection systems on the PHM are superior to what existed on board “Peter Tare,” which was mainly the eyeball. However, the armament mix on the PHM, when compared with that of the PT’s with her redundancy, is not as good in relative terms. Essentially, the PHM has a main armament of a fire-and-forget, antiship weapon (eight Harpoon SSMs with a five- to 60-mile range), and a secondary armament of one dual-purpose (air and surface) 76-mm. gun with a maximum horizontal range of 18,000 yards.
The Harpoon missile, like the PT’s Mk-13 torpedo, has a longer range than the detection system can reliably handle. Surface skippers are not too different from attack submarine commanders: given a limited number of missiles/torpe- does to throw at the enemy, they don’t want to waste any—they want to know what the target is and take a look! For the PHM skipper, if there is doubt as to what his sensors are showing him, he’s probably going to close the target until he is satisfied with the identification.
The PHM, therefore, should have a shorter-range SSM, but not to the exclusion of the over-the-horizon Harpoon. Save half the Harpoon battery for those occasions when you can employ the long-range kill and for major targets; substitute the other half with short-range, lightweight, fire-and-forget missiles such as the Exocet MM-38, Otomat, Gabriel Mk-3, or Penguin Mk-2. These smaller warhead missiles would be particularly useful against targets not warranting the expenditure of the larger and more expensive Harpoon. The Penguin would be a particularly attractive option with its light weight, small size, horizon range, and passive infrared homing system; d would nicely complement the Harpoon s long-range and active radar.
As PHM skipper, I would be a little concerned that my only air defense is one gun. The PT had a reasonably effective point-defense system in its 20-mm. and 50-caliber machine guns. On some boats, a four-barreled, power-driven, one-man mount called a “Thunderbolt” (sort of a precursor to today’s Phalanx close-in weapon system) was mounted in place of the 40-mm. gun. The PHM should have a lightweight, fast-reaction, rapid-firing, air defense system. A PHM captain should consider bolting 50-caliber and 20-mm. gun pedestals wherever possible because when the war is on and those automatic, power-driven weapon systems are battle-damaged or waiting for power from that generator the crew is to bring back on line, it sure would be nice to be able to shoot something!
I am not advocating doing away with the PHM. Instead, 1 believe the Navy should have a mix of fast patrol craft— some to operate in shallow protected waters, and others to operate in deep open water—would be the ideal solution. If the Navy is limited to buying one type or the other, then the choice should be the one that provides the greater utility in waters where patrol craft are more likely to be used. The planing boat has this greater utility in the more probable areas of operations—the protected waters of choke points, islands, and coastlines.
During World War II, the United States built more than 500 planing PTs and trained about 15,000 people to operate and maintain them. What did these daring young men in their magnificent planing machines do? How did they do it? What can we leam about fast patrol boat warfare from PT wartime operations?
The won/lost record for PT boats in combat is a good one; only 26 boats were sunk in enemy action. Yet they successfully interdicted coastal and inter-island shipping, sinking combatants as large as 2,300-ton destroyers. In short, they were a good buy for the money. However, as good as the platforms were, their potential as “ship-killers” in protected waters was never fully exploited. Commanders were unfamiliar with or underestimated the PTs’ ability to contribute to fleet actions in such waters and, hence, did not take full advantage of the PTs’ antiship capability. Nowhere was this more evident than at the Battle of Surigao Strait in late October 1944.
As a result of a poor deployment plan, the absence of an on-scene control element removed from the immediate combat, and an underlying, yet pervasive, lack of fleet integration, the PTs at Surigao were not used as effectively as they could have been.
For the PTs, the battle was one of lost opportunities. Built and designed for torpedo attacks on warships in protected waters like Surigao Strait, the PT attacks were fragmented and ineffective. Tasked to report and to attack, the PTs were mal- deployed for the first and mal-employed for the second. As a consequence, they performed the task of reporting just barely and the task of attacking abysmally. Of the 39 boats on patrol in the Strait, 15 launched 35 torpedoes with only one confirmed hit. Had the PTs been previously integrated into fleet operations, it is likely that the PTs’ deployment and employment at Surigao would have been substantially different.
PT boat commanders avoided singleboat patrols wherever possible; the smallest patrol section consisted of two to four boats. PT boats generally operated from dusk to dawn, not only because the enemy employed the night to conceal their movements, but also because the air threat to PTs was less. In addition, the darkness assisted PTs in closing their targets undetected. In open water, PT boats could defend themselves against the single- or two-plane raid, including the kamikaze, but a multiplane raid would eventually overpower the defensive capability of a two-to-four boat patrol section.
PTs were deployed at or near the leading edge of the battle area. Their original concept of operations as defenders of advance bases, coupled with their short range, dictated such deployment; where the boat went, so went her support. A mixture of afloat and ashore facilities supported PT operations. Afloat units served as the very advanced base until a secure area ashore was established and the “functional component” blocks were moved in.
How do the World War II experiences of PT boats relate to their high-technology descendants, the PHMs? First, if war came tomorrow, the Navy would find itself without a PHM doctrine—just as it was without a PT doctrine at the beginning of World War II. Although progress on the formulation of a PHM doctrine has been slow, a rudimentary “plan for use” was finally promulgated last September. Given a good doctrine that fully exploits the attack capability of the PHM and promotes the full integration of the PHM into the fleet, we will have gone a long way toward avoiding a repetition of the errors made in PT boat employment in World War II.
Given the PHM’s particular capabilities and limitations, what is she good for? Like the PT, advance base and beachhead defense is certainly one mission; amphibious ship screening in the amphibious objective area is another. If the subsurface and air threats are low, the screening of ships in transit through or near choke points, archipelagos, or along coasts is a valid task for the PHM, although the planing fast patrol boat would be the preferred platform in these waters. After all, why expose an expensive and valuable destroyer or frigate to an enemy missile boat when an expendable patrol boat will do just fine? Of course, the PHM’s reason for existence is to conduct offensive operations against surface ships, and therefore fits nicely with a surface action group within the limitations of her operational radius. Hence, there is a need for the inclusion of the PHM into fleet operations on a routine basis. Other possible uses include the destruction of offshore oil rigs and service as a “gunboat” to indicate U. S. concern and resolve in particular situations. In addition, the PHM has a mission not only to train PHM crews in how to handle their craft but also to train fleet units and staffs in how to employ and defend against the fast, missile-equipped patrol boat.
Tactically, PHMs (like PTs) will probably operate best in darkness or reduced visibility because, even in this day of sophisticated detection systems, they provide an edge to the attacker. PHMs will probably operate in groups no smaller than two or three, and will most likely be under the direction of an onscene control element to coordinate their movements. The control element could be one of the PHMs not directly engaged in combat, an aircraft, or a nearby helicopter-equipped frigate or destroyer.
PHMs, because of their restricted range, likely will be forward deployed. Their operating areas will probably be close to some advanced base, whether it is a full-blown operating base or simply a support ship stuck away in some cove. In this regard, the PHMs mobile logistic support group is a necessary—but not sufficient—first step. Flexibility in the employment of the PHMs will be greatly increased with the addition of a dedicated support ship—the once-proposed patrol combatant support ship. Both the PTs and the patrol gunboats in the Mediterranean in the 1970s demonstrated the utility of such a ship. Besides her in-theater support function, which would obviate the need for a shore-based facility in some situations, the support ship could add to the mobility of the PHM by acting as a “mother ship” for long transits—as was the case with PT boats.
Fast patrol combatants have useful missions which they can perform as well as, if not better than, more expensive and more valuable ships; they are an econ- omy-of-force measure. Our Navy does not need many of them in peacetime, but it needs enough of them to train with so that the fleet will know how to use them—and how to defend against them.
Commander Gravatt, a 1967 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, holds an M.A. in political science from Duke University and is a recent graduate of the College of Naval Warfare in Newport, Rhode Island. Currently, he is assigned to the international security division in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
By Captain Henry H. Beam, U. S. Naval Reserve
Many articles have been written about how to write fitness reports. But one aspect of the fitness report process rarely gets the attention it deserves; namely, the responsibilities of the officer being reported upon* Unless the officer being reported upon does his part to inform his reporting senior (usually the commanding officer) of his achievements, the likelihood of his receiving a high-quality fitness report is greatly reduced. A high- quality fitness report is one in which the written comments in block 88 of the Nav- Pers 1611/1 fitness report fully substantiate the objective marks and rankings given in blocks 29 through 72. Since fitness reports are the primary source of information used by selection boards, an officer’s input can have a direct bearing upon his or her chances for promotion.
Whether serving on active duty or drilling as a reservist, you can take three actions that will help you get a higher- quality fitness report:
Provide input. Know when your commanding officer has to write your fitness report and provide him with a carefully prepared written summary of your accomplishments well ahead of time. Do this whether he asks for it or not. Commanding officers of small ships or small units may know all their officers well. But even the best of human memories occasionally needs to be refreshed, so it is wise to leave nothing to chance. Provide your commanding officer with a carefully prepared written summary of your accomplishments as you see them. If he feels you overstate your accomplishments, it is his prerogative to make changes as he sees fit, or to ignore what you say altogether. However, it is more likely that a commanding officer, already fully taxed by his heavy work load, will welcome a well-prepared input document that makes the fitness report preparation task a bit easier.
Most commanding officers recognize this, and many will provide you with a form to help you organize your response. Figure 1 is a sample of a form which has been used to obtain input data from active duty officers. Figure 2 is a sample of a form which has been used for naval reserve officers in a drilling status. Similar forms can be developed to meet the needs of a particular command. Prepare your
♦See T. A. Sylvester, “Selection Board Dynamics,” September 1983 Proceedings, pp. 123-125, and G. Haering, “Fitness Report Finesse,” January 1980 Proceedings, pp. 34-38.
input carefully, giving it to your commanding officer in timely fashion. Have your input typed if at all possible. That shows that you take pride in your work, and a neatly typed document is always easier to read than one that is handwritten. It is also much more likely to make a good first impression, and that can only be to your advantage.
Plan early. Let your commanding officer know what you want to accomplish at the start of each reporting period. A management-by-objectives approach may work well whereby you and your com
Figure 1 Sample Fitness Report Input Form for Active Duty Officers______________
To: Commanding Officer
From: (Full name, rank, designator, and Social Security Number)
Subject: Report on the Fitness of Officers
Enclosures: (1) Appraisal Work Sheet
(2) Copies of Correspondence Reflecting Favorably on My Performance
1. To assist the drafter in the preparation of my fitness report, the following information is submitted:
A. Period of report. (Ensure periods of leave and transit enroute to duty station are included in block 28.)
B. Primary, collateral duty assignments (Titles only), and number of months assigned.
C. Future duty preference. (Indicate retirement/separation plans if the below is not applicable.)
(1) Sea.
(2) Shore.
(3) Foreign Shore.
D. Selection zone information.
(1) Date of rank.
(2) I will/will not be in the selection zone or zone of consideration for the next selection board or one in process.
(3) Number of times in the selection zone.
E. Job description: (Functional statement describing your billet, primary and collateral assignments and responsibilities. Also include the number of personnel under your command, amount of your annual budget, numbers of students/recruits graduated per year, value of physical facilities, etc.)
F. Notable accomplishments: (Do not be modest. Enumerate matter which will assist in drafting your report. List individual tasks of excellence performed, constructive accomplishments, inspection grades of significance, and ideas proposed and implemented for improved management.) List in order of importance to mission and overall contribution to Navy.
G. Height and weight.
H. Sections 1 through 22, section 28, and sections 44, 45, or 46 of the Appraisal Work Sheet have been completed. (If applicable) I have attached copies of correspondence reflecting favorably on my performance as Enclosure 2.
2. I am available to discuss further anything contained in this memo.
manding officer jointly determine what performance objectives you wish to obtain during the forthcoming marking period. The important point is to set some goals and then be able to show measurable progress toward attaining them by the end of the marking period. For example, the surface warfare officer program, initiated in the early 1970s and similar to the submarine qualification program, greatly facilitates the setting of meaningful objectives for junior officers in each of the functional shipboard areas. Before, junior officers on board surface ships had lit-
Figure 2 Fitness Report Input Form for Drilling Reservists—Completed To: Commanding Officer,MR. F\BFC B&C. Itr Ue.t ISIS
From: Namo lP*4***m~ ie .
Date 5/'Q/03
Subject: Fitness Report Data laSN kief Designator—LLL£---------------
1. Here is the requested data about my Naval Reserve accomplishments, civilian occupation, and civic/personal achievements. I haven't hesitated to lay it on thick—I want to provide you with as much pertinent data as possible to help you write a fair
and well-documented fitness report on me. _ . „
I OcLt 82__________________________________________ Tn 30 Sep S3_____________
A. Period of report: From
B. ACDUTRA: Location t-‘+- Crk- Days-i^------------- Pay------- *
FrnmT tn*r 83 jQJB_rrusBZ
C. Reserve unit billet (e.g., Operations Officer, Instructor)
D. Reserve unit accomplishments (e.g., special lectures, field trips arranged): LXtyuilyV ftC.DUrT2.ft uAztL CstfJ- lW-7wi ik />Wc-A.
Civilian occupation (description,'people supen/ised, budget responsibilities):
a-A-Se*. a-/ *ZJ. —!=*k—lS&2c-
to , ooo - ttic2"ir oIm***^
G. Licenses held, special qualifications:--------------- T---------------
c-/ a-pZg-r-
-- 'to - /-S' -aac-A. • IZim
4^-
F. Community activities (include offices held, nature of activity, years of active participation) : T’mc./ft (
. U• :5. TIcut-mJL —
idations or'awards
I. Commen
H. Educational attainments (include civilian schooling [e.g., MBA degree] and Navy correspondence courses completed): ^
of OC.C. /3fr^7~A —tDptsf-qZZOwl Ctsn a re • Q j
Rank.
(attach copies of letters if available)
J. Other (e.g., recruiting activities, seapower presentation team talks given, blue & gold officer, articles,, beneficial sngr^estinnsV &u>q -
2. I am prepared to discuss further anything contained in this memo.
tie leverage to use to be rotated from one billet to another. Too many commanding officers found it expedient to keep a talented junior officer in one billet his whole time on board ship—to the detriment of that officer’s overall professional development. Consequently, a newly commissioned officer with an engineering degree might spend his first two years in the engineering spaces, including qualifying as engineering officer of the watch, but never be given the chance to qualify as officer of the deck while under way. The surface warfare officer qualification program greatly enhanced the setting of meaningful professional development objectives for junior officers assigned to surface ships.
Document potential. Although there are other uses for fitness reports (i.e., screening for command), their primary use is in selecting the officers best qualified for promotion. Since high marks in the objective portion of the fitness report are the norm, the comments section becomes important as the “tie-breaker” when choosing between two officers whose records contain virtually identical marks. As the officer reported upon, you should give your reporting senior as much evidence as you can that pertains to why you should be promoted.
The reporting senior should then use that evidence to write comments which document your promotion potential. He should also avoid the excessive use of
Lcpe
Non-pay.
unsubstantiated superlatives such as “most outstanding, superb, or exemplary.” They are inadequate substitutes for specific examples that clearly document why a certain officer should be promoted. A comment such as “Lieutenant Commander Blitz is a superb officer who should be given accelerated promotion as rapidly as possible” lacks credibility. There are no facts or examples to substantiate the recommendation. How much more effective it would be to write: “This superb officer helped his (ship/unit) attain an outstanding grade on the administrative inspection in August, and he was instrumental in increasing the retention rate by 35% so that it is now the highest in the squadron. Further, Lieutenant Commander Blitz demonstrated beyond a doubt by his performance as executive officer that he has the leadership and administrative skills to assume command at the grade of commander. Consequently, I most strongly recommend him for accelerated promotion to commander.” In either case, the block 88 comments that Lieutenant Commander Blitz actually receives will very likely depend on the input data that he supplies to his commanding officer.
In sum, the officer who provides input, plans ahead, and documents potential will have done his part to ensure that his fitness report will present his accomplishments in the best possible light.
I have prepared nearly hundreds of fitness reports as the commanding officer of three naval units. Further, while on Ac- DuTra with a Naval Reserve readiness command staff, I have twice assisted the readiness commander in the preparation of fitness reports on 250 reserve unit commanding officers. The lessons 1 learned are applicable to both active and inactive duty officer fitness reports, since both systems are now virtually the same, including use of the same form:
The better the input, the better the fitness report. Those officers who provide the best input usually get the best fitness reports, especially in the comments section. An officer who provides little or no input gives the impression that he does not care (even if the input is requested on short notice, as it all too often is) and often gets short shrift in the quality of the remarks made in the comments section. Further there are many very large commands in the Navy where the commanding officer may have 100 or more officers under him, some of whom may work at different locations. In such cases, the only way a commanding officer may know some of his subordinates, particularly junior officers, is by what they provide in the way of input data.
Recognize, too, that in such commands your fitness report will most likely be drafted by a department head or program officer, reviewed by the executive officer or chief staff officer, and finally presented to the commanding officer for review and signature. The clearer your input, the less likely these intermediaries in the fitness report writing process will distort or misinterpret what you said. In large, widely dispersed commands, it is also wise to periodically keep the person who will draft your fitness report informed of what you are doing. While assisting the readiness command staff with writing fitness reports on reserve unit commanding officers, I asked a program manager why he gave a particular commanding officer such low marks. His reply: "I never hear from the guy. In two years, he has never called me or written to me. Why should 1 go out of my way to see that he gets a good fitness report?” Explain all terms. Abbreviations are acceptable, but all abbreviations should be spelled out the first time they are used, not only on the input form but on the fitness report as well. Selection board members with different career backgrounds may not be familiar with an abbreviation that is commonplace in your command. You can’t receive credit if the person reading about you does not understand what you did and why it was important. Unfamiliar job titles should also be explained. For reserve officers, it is particularly important that their civilian jobs be explained in readily understandable terms, since they are expected to carry status and responsibility comparable to that of their military rank. With the great increase in service sector and technology- related jobs in recent years, job titles or billet titles often give no clue to the real responsibilities associated with them.
Here is a case in point. A reserve officer’s civilian job happened to be that of a space analyst with a major university. Unless they were provided with a job description, few people would know what a space analyst does. In fact, the job entailed responsibility for utilization of all university property, including operation of a computerized storage and retrieval system for all plans and blueprints. Two full-time secretaries were required to assist the space analyst, and the salary grade and job description confirmed that the position of space analyst was, in fact, an upper middle management job in a large organization— analogous to one that a captain or commander might hold in the Navy.
Active duty officers serving in certain shore duty or staff billets may also need to explicitly describe their jobs so those individuals not familiar with them can understand their degrees of responsibility. A good way to write a clear description of your job or billet is to imagine that you have to write an advertisement for it in the Wall Street Journal. The end result should be a job description that can be used as part of your fitness report input data, and, if you are an inactive reserve officer, incorporated into your Annual Qualification Questionnaire (AQQ).
Volunteer for special assignments. There are numerous opportunities to set yourself apart by volunteering to serve on a special committee, assist with recruiting, or give talks as part of the Chief of Naval Operations Seapower Presentation Team. Such extra activities can carry weight far out of proportion to their actual importance when your record is reviewed. Since all officers are expected to do well in their primary billet assignment, differentiation in performance between two officers may be hard to make on that basis alone. This is where the officer with additional achievements is likely to get preference when selections are made. And remember, your commanding officer can use such assignments to justify a recommendation that you should be promoted: since you showed initiative or leadership in your present assignment, you can be expected to show similar initiative or leadership if promoted. Be sure to include such assignments on your fitness report input, as your commanding officer may not know of them otherwise.
Be sure to respond to any request for input data for your fitness report. Each time I write fitness reports, I am surprised by the number of officers who simply do not take the time to respond to input data requests for their own fitness reports, or who provide only the most rudimentary information. It will always be the responsibility of the commanding officer to write the fitness reports on the officers under his command. But how well he writes those fitness reports depends directly on the quality of the input provided by his officers. If you don’t take time to help yourself, there is no guarantee that someone higher up the line will. And one of the best ways to help yourself is to provide your commanding officer with a well-prepared fitness report input document each time he has to write a fitness report on you.
Captain Beam is an associate professor of management at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo.
Flags of Inconvenience
By Captain Robert E. Kallman, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), and Lieutenant Eugene D. Wheeler, U. S. Air Force (Retired)
The numbers of merchant ships registered under flags of convenience have grown from about 2% to more than 30% of the world’s merchant marine shipping tonnage. Lilliputian Liberia continues to boast the world’s biggest merchant ship registry with more than 2,700 ships and 150 million deadweight tons (dwt) of capacity. The country accounts for more than 75% of all the ships registered in convenience countries and 85% of all tanker tonnage flying those flags. Panama’s merchant marine has continued to grow and now represents about 2,400 ships (38 million dwt), merchant marine, making it the world’s sixth-largest merchant fleet. Other countries offering convenience registeries include Cyprus, Singapore, Bermuda, and the Bahamas. Oil tankers continue to be the main users of flags of convenience, and the concentration of tankers is most apparent in ships flying the flag of Liberia. The total tonnage registered to that nation is three times greater than that of its nearest competitor, Japan.
The United States is the largest user of convenience flags, with Greece, Hong Kong, and Japan being other major users. U. S. shipping interests own an estimated one-third of the tonnage registered under flags of convenience, with Greece and Hong Kong owning about 20% apiece and Japan another 10%; the balance is divided among 12 other countries. As foreign-registered tankers are barred from operating in the the U. S. domestic shipping market, U. S. interests who own
Liberian- and Panamanian-registered
ships also own or operate U. S.-flag tankers that are to enter American ports.
U. S. shipping interests use flags of convenience because of the cost differential and savings to them. By using ships of this type of registry, owners can reach cost parity with competing foreign interests. U. S. tanker construction costs have historically been considerably higher than foreign costs. Greater labor costs have accounted for most of this differential in the past. Recently, as wages have m-
creased worldwide, greater shipbuilding and maintenance savings have been realized by the productivity advantages of the highly automated shipyards operated in Japan and elsewhere, compared with facilities in the United States. Minimal labor is needed in these modem automated shipyards.
Operating costs for U. S.-registered ships are more than double that of convenience-registered vessels, and the wages paid to crews are even higher. For example, the costs for a 32-man U. S. crew are more than $2.2 million a year, as compared with an Italian crew of the same size with a payroll of $.8 million. A report by a U. S. congressional committee showed that under current Merchant Marine Act conditions, it costs the U. S. Government more than $37,000 per crew member to make up the difference between a U. S. seaman’s wages and the average wage paid to seamen of other nations.
Because of unnecessarily high U. S. maritime operational cost differentials, most of the crude oil imported into the United States is carried in foreign-owned or -flagged tankers. More than half is delivered by convenience-registered ships of Liberia, Panama, and Singapore. The cost of moving oil from the Persian Gulf to this country is about twice as much in a U. S.-owned ship than in a foreign-flag tanker or flag of convenience tanker.
U. S. shipping interests who register their ships under flags of convenience enjoy greater freedom in picking crews, can shop among foreign shipyards to get the best construction price, and can select the most convenient and economical repair facilities. U. S. maritime laws require that U. S.-flag ships be built in this country, be manned by U. S. seaman, and either be repaired in U. S. shipyards or else pay a 50% duty on the cost of repairs made in foreign yards.
Although no national emergency has required the requisitioning of ships since World War II, most U. S.-owned vessels registered in Liberia and Panama represent potential assets to U. S. security. They are considered part of the U. S. maritime fleet in a national emergency and come under control of this country. The Military Sealift Command reports that 332 Liberian and Panamanian tankers, totaling 42 million dwt, are under U. S. control. Ships flying flags of convenience were a part of this nation’s sealift requirements during both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, providing supplies to our forces overseas.
Some officials express concern about the adequacy of safety and environmental standards on ships in the convenience registries. It is inevitable, given the tremendous amount of tonnage being hauled over the seas of the world, that some accidents will happen—no matter what is done to prevent them. The popular conception that substandard “rust buckets” owned by companies flying flags of convenience cause most of the accidents is not borne out by fact. However, improperly trained and unlicensed crews are a critical problem on foreign-registered ships. Substandard crews can make a tanker a higher accident risk than structural deficiencies or faulty equipment, and records show that human operating errors account for at least 75% of all tanker accidents. Unfortunately, accident rates of the convenience fleets over an extended period of time have been consistently worse than those of the world merchant fleet in general, and the world tanker fleet in particular. This is probably the result of a higher proportion of poorly trained and licensed crews, and inadequate maintenance standards within ships flying flags of convenience.
Since no international maritime policing policy exists for the enforcement of
safety standards, and the enforcement efforts of nations that authorize ships to fly their flags are almost nonexistent, unilateral action is needed by countries that allow convenience ships to use their port facilities. A good example of this is the U. S. Coast Guard’s foreign tank vessel examination program. Since 1977, foreign-flag tankers have been examined to ensure that they possess the necessary certificates and registrations. Brought about by a series of tanker accidents which caused extensive oil spills and loss of life in 1976, marine inspectors now board almost all foreign-flag tankers calling at U. S. ports. They examine them at least once a year to ensure they meet all general safety control provisions. The inspection program has been successful in raising the overall safety level of tankers and in bringing about needed repairs to specific ships. The boarding program has brought about the scrapping of some 25 vessels that had been inspected and found seriously deficient. In addition, a number of ships which once called at U. S. ports now stay away from our waters because deficiencies were uncovered on board which the owners were unwilling to correct.
The U. S. National Academy of Sci-
It is much cheaper to ship by flags of convenience than U. S. flag vessels— but it’s not without risk to the cargo and the country’s defense. Improperly trained and unlicensed crews on foreign-registered ships are a real problem. An abandoned Panamanian merchant vessel, above, takes on water prior to her sinking in 1980.
ences reports that tanker accidents account for less than 4% of the estimated six million tons of oil that pollute the oceans of the world each year. This figure includes all sources of oil spillage from both tanker and nontanker origin. In spite of the fact that tanker accidents cause relatively small amounts of pollution, they are dramatic, highly visible, and stimulate demands for more regulations. Many of them take place in coastal areas with dense traffic and shallow waters, and can be very destructive initially. In these coastal zones, wildlife is more prevalant than in open sea areas as most marine life is spawned, raised, and caught in the coastal zones. Tanker pollution comes primarily from discharges arising from routine operations, and during loading procedures at terminals.
Automation has greatly reduced the number of men required to crew a tanker. During World War II, 45 seamen were needed for a typical T-2 tanker of 16,000 dwt. Today, a 250,000 dwt very large crude carrier (VLCC) tanker can be handled by 30 men, or a ratio of barrels of oil per seaman about 20 times greater than on a T-2. More than 50% of tanker tonnage is now in the supertanker class, and new tankers are expected to increase that ratio, providing only a limited number of new crew jobs regardless of registry.
With the growth of port inspections on a multinational level, it is safe to assume that inadequately manned and operated vessels will become persona non grata in the harbors of the world. It will become necessary for the operators of substandard ships to either scrap them or to put them into acceptable condition. The United States should continue its port inspections of foreign-registered ships. The U. S. public should be better informed of the need for our merchant marine to stay on a competitive footing with ships flying flags of convenience.
Since 1789, the U. S. shipping industry has received subsidies from the federal government. Until 1980, shipbuilders received direct subsidies from federal coffers to lower the cost of U. S.-built ships to levels competitive with foreign shipyards. Subsidies have run as high as the federal limit of 50% of a ship’s total cost.
Maritime laws require that 50% of government cargo and 100% of military cargo be carried by U. S.-flag ships, which, according to a Brookings Institute study, has added at least $5 billion to the government’s shipping costs. The National Journal reported that from 1950 to
1981, the proportion of import and export shipping carried by U. S.-flag ships decreased from about 43% to less than 4%. To put it another way, the numbers of U. S. merchant vessels dropped from a high of 1,170 ships at the end of World War II to 577 ships at the beginning of
1982. Although this has been offset somewhat with the introduction of new and larger vessels, the decline of U. S. merchant ships is a serious trend that continues to beg for a solution.
Captain Kallman retired from the Naval Reserve after 35 years of service. For the past ten years, he has been county supervisor in Santa Barbara, California.
Lieutenant Wheeler was a pilot during World War II, followed by a career in urban planning. He has also written several screen plays.
Ten Years of Volunteers
By Roger D. Little and Major Robert L. Wolf,
In an effort to put to rest the controversy that has surrounded our nation’s enlisted procurement policy over the last ten years, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger declared the following during a speech at the U. S. Naval Academy on 3 November 1983: “We know that an All-Volunteer Force can succeed, and we know what it takes to make it succeed. We need only the will, the perseverance—and the commitment to quality. Therefore, from today it will not be the policy of the Department of Defense to speak about our military as the AllVolunteer Armed Force. From today, that can go without saying. Our men and women in uniform, including the midshipmen here today, are simply the armed forces, and the finest armed forces this country has ever known.” His speech, part of a two-and-a-half day conference titled the “All Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect,” reflected the current optimism over accessions that was espoused as well by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics [MRA&L|) Lawrence J. Korb in his luncheon address. While the administration’s position was abundantly clear and in general agreement with the majority of speakers at the conference, a straw poll of the 300 attendees showed that large numbers ex-
U. S. Marine Corps
pected some form of conscription to return during the next ten years.
Cosponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) and the U. S. Naval Academy, the conference was divided into four half-day sessions together with addresses by Martin Anderson of the Hoover Institution and Charles Moskos of Northwestern University, as well as Mr. Weinberger and Dr. Korb. The four panels addressed: (1) the Gates Commission and the experience of the last ten years, (2) the impact of technology, weapon systems, and force size on future demand, (3) the effects of the economy and the budget on manpower supply in the 1980s, and (4) alternate procurement policies. Starting with the widely accepted position that favorable demographic and economic factors which worked to increase accessions over the last decade will take on a different complexion in the future, the conference identified three additional aspects of the current manpower atmosphere which will have important effects on near-term policies. First, there is widespread recognition that DoD has learned a great deal about how to compete for the available manpower supply, and that the services have made giant strides in their ability to successfully manage their active forces. While this factor bodes well for the future of the active force, our ability to adequately man the reserves is a second concern of the next decade. The third major concern is force quality and training requirements given the technological advances of new weapon systems now on the horizon.
We will summarize some highlights of the conference. Interested readers will be able to explore these issues in more depth when the conference proceedings are published by Pergamon International later this year.
Looking back over the last decade, notwithstanding President Richard Nixon’s insistence that conscription should have been ended, it is now clear that support for the all-volunteer force concept rested on three fundamental truths. First, the so-called “baby boom” generation would reach maturity during the 1970s. Second, one of the most visible manifestations of the Vietnam War’s unpopularity was draft evasion and draft resistance. Third, scholarly writings which had identified the so-called “conscription tax” as an unfair burden on the draftee were receiving a sympathetic hearing. Thus, a large number of young people would be available to man a volunteer force at a time when antimilitary sentiment was strong and was exacerbated by perceived inequalities of the draft, which were re-
ceiving academic verification as well as public condemnation.
Without a draft, the Gates Commission theorized, force size might be smaller, but effectiveness might increase if competent people could be recruited and retained. Over the decade, recruiting strategies improved, were complemented by effective advertising, and generally brought in adequate numbers of people, many of whom were high school graduates. As a result, first-term attrition declined and the career enlisted force, which the commission had largely ignored, grew and became more stable. Unfortunately, according to recent research, stability has not characterized the technical specialties where needs are perceived to be the greatest. Although some doubt the services’ requirements for larger proportions in high skill areas, bonus compensation schemes designed to retain personnel in specific specialties have been implemented. Many view these compensation policies as disruptive to morale and a shortsighted patchwork that adds an unpredictable element to manpower costs. While the debate over force requirements and compensation continues, so does the debate over force composition, which has changed markedly over the ten years, and fueled its own concerns. The Gates Commission had predicted that 82% of the force would be white male. By 1983, however, minorities were 33% of the enlisted force and 9% of the total was female. Debate has frequently flared over whether such anomalies should be viewed, in the extreme, as constituting a potential for racial genocide or merely evidence of equal opportunity and social mobility.
Explicit consideration of how force structure requirements are changing as a result of technological advances was explored (perhaps more directly than previously) in the conference’s session on technology and force size. Holding that the electronic revolution of today is as significant as steam was to sail, former Undersecretary of the Navy Robert M. Murray demonstrated the impact of new technology by showing projections of a 1990 fleet that has 40% greater capacity than the 1978 fleet, but is manned with the same size crews. Fulfillment of this projection, together with the trend toward fewer ships with more diverse capabilities to meet scenarios in which the peacetime and wartime commitments of the Navy are more closely integrated, will place greater emphasis on technological superiority, and strain a training system that must “build" technicians rather than hire them.
The U. S. Air Force, which has been
The nuclear submarine community’s requirement for technically skilled personnel has long been recognized— here, a crewman of the USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705) checks out one of the submarine’s torpedo tubes. How does the Navy, however, meet the demand for skilled people in 1990, when the fleet may have 40% more capability than it did in 1978?
rather successful in retaining technical personnel, can meet future challenges to a volunteer force through state-of-the-art weapon systems development, General John W. Roberts, U. S. Air Force (Retired), argued. Perhaps to a greater extent than the other services, however, much of this responsibility will rest heavily on reserve forces which are felt to be cost- effective in large part because of important training carryover from the civilian jobs of reserve technicians and pilots. Thus, in the Air Force view, a continuation or expansion of reserve manning policies constitutes an important caveat to the Air Force’s ability to meet the challenge or new weapon systems.
Addressing the U. S. Army’s problems, General W. E. Depuy, U. S. Army (Retired), showed vividly how technology-induced changes in manning requirements were causing a contraction in the Army’s combat branches and a corresponding expansion in combat support areas. Arguing that technology would continue to drive these changes, he demonstrated a model in which system performance was degraded by inadequate human performance, even though the equipment met its own expected level of performance. Higher quality personnel, he posited, provided the best leverage for increasing systems performance.
However, session moderator Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired), did not hold much hope for better quality. In his summary remarks, he compared assurances that next year’s personnel will be better than last year’s to the promise that the “check is in the mail.” Responding to projections of smaller crew sizes, Admiral Kidd noted that specially trained maintenance support teams often had to be flown in to make repairs on these ships while they were in port. Not entirely in jest, he suggested the Navy had better make sure it had military control of land masses before undertaking a naval engagement! In any case, our ability to train personnel in sufficient numbers to adequately complement our growing technical capabilities is part of the uncharted course of the next decade. The role that the reserves play in providing technical capabilities in the emerging scenario may well grow because of the Air Force experience, and the perception in Congress that an expansion of the reserve role is cost-effective.
As an example of congressional support of a growing reserve force, John R. Brinkerhoff and David W. Grissmer cited the 13% expansion in Naval Reserve strength between 1978 and 1982. The Naval Reserve, however, is still small in relation to the active Navy and other services. Although Naval Reserve manning is primarily demand-driven, our knowledge of reserve manning requirements across all services is inadequate. Research on motivations for reserve participation is now suggesting that such participation primarily satisfies leisure and avocational needs, while income plays a decidedly secondary role. As the Gates Commission itself recognized, and current experience continues to verify, better understanding of reserve force manning is necessary in order to strengthen this weak link in our total force strategy.
Although reserve force manpower management appears inadequate, active force management has improved markedly. While many agree with Professor Moskos, and decry a military which relies on economic factors rather than patriotism and unit cohesiveness, these qual- ity-of-life factors are difficult to quantify, much less change through policy. Thus, active force management has come to rely heavily on compensation levels which in turn recognize that civilian sector job opportunities are important determinants of enlistments and reenlistments.
On the accession side, the Army has had success with incentives for recruiters who bring in high-quality soldiers. On the retention side, selective reenlistment bonuses tend to lengthen the average term of commitment in critical skills, and improve the return on training investments while reducing accession requirements. Large career forces extend federal pension plan liabilities, however, and provide fodder for Congress to consider ways of expanding the reserves. With a Congress which is tom between concerns over Soviet expansionism and the effect of defense spending on the federal deficit, it is unlikely that major changes will occur until after the election. Cuts in manpower spending may then be attractive because they are quick. But the Navy, which had the smallest cuts of all the services in fiscal year 1984, probably remains in a relatively good position. Regardless of how the services fare relatively, an attempt to cut manpower costs by a return to conscription is no prescription, most analysts argue. With projected savings of less than 1% of the defense budget, many politicians expect there would be an overwhelmingly negative public response to a proposed reinstitution of a draft which would more than offset the expected saving.
Even those who argue most persuasively for the return of some form of conscription infrequently couch their alternative proposals in terms of cost savings. They argue that a volunteer force will always tend to be too small and too inflexible to meet our commitments. Lacking adequate reserves, we cannot mobilize quickly enough to protect our national security. Moreover, while the Gates Commission had predicated a volunteer force on the existence of a standby draft system, at present we have only a provision for registration without much in the way of an implementation strategy. Recognizing that returning to a pre-Vietnam War-type draft is not feasible for many reasons, national service alternatives are popular with some. Such proposals seem attractive because they appear to answer the equity question which is summed up by, “Who serves when not everyone serves.”
As a third alternative to the volunteer/ draft debate, the national service rubric covers a number of specific proposals. One proposal would require some limited service—a basic training course for example—as a prerequisite to high school graduation. Another would restrict federal educational benefits to those fulfilling some reserve, active military, or civilian service. Yet another scheme would restrict full social security benefits to those completing four quarters of military or civilian service, as well as 40 quarters of regular paid employment.
There are those, however, who argue that the best alternative of all is to make the volunteer concept work; General M. R. Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, is one. Because he is credited with making the volunteer system work for the Army, conceded to be the most difficult recruiting problem, his views have considerable credence. These views call for a volunteer force in which quality is enhanced by the restoration of G.I. Bill benefits; he believes the benefit of an increased education level for our nation outweighs the high cost of establishing such a program.
So, after a decade, what is the status of the volunteer armed forces? First, it is generally agreed that the system has worked in a peacetime environment. There is now a much better understanding of factors necessary to keep it working during the next decade. Because the system is untested in wartime, there is a need for some form of contingency draft legislation on the books in order to quickly supplement our forces with conscripts. The perceived inability to rapidly add conscripts is exacerbated by reserve forces whose strengths and wartime capabilities are in question. Yet, some argue an expansion of the reserves is a cost-effective way to provide the cadre of trained manpower necessary to supplement an active force that is too small to meet our commitments. Even if the size problem could be solved, the questions of quality and trainability remain. During the next decade, greater emphasis will be placed on matching people to equipment, but it is the performance of the system that counts. System performance is no stronger than its weakest link: in this case, inadequately trained personnel—or so many believe.
Assistant Secretary Korb addressed some of the ways these problems can be overcome. Enlistment incentives to college-bound youth, recruitment of older enlistees, and attracting more prior-service personnel, he argued, should supplement the targeting of interested youth through expanded and more intensive market research surveys. These approaches and tools can be effective, Dr. Korb contended in his summary, only if the pay system is fair and competitive with that of the private sector.
Complementing these views, and in answer to his own rhetorical question about what had been learned during the first decade. Secretary Weinberger put the draft/volunteer controversy in a somewhat different perspective. He told the assembled midshipmen and the conferees, “First, we have learned that the All-Volunteer Force can be not just a success, but a huge success. This is good news for the young people of America, both for those who seek opportunities in the armed forces and for those who seek a different future. And it is good news for a nation that puts the highest value on individual choice and freedom.”
Dr. Little is professor and chairman of the Economics Department at the U. S. Naval Academy. His teaching areas include manpower economics and the economics of technological change. His current research deals with the economic value of military service and the socioeconomic characteristics of servicemen, veterans, and non veterans.
Major Wolf is an instructor and executive assistant for the U. S. and International Studies Division at the U. S. Naval Academy. His recent teaching and research have focused on defense economics and terrorism issues.
Justifying the Alaska Patrol
By Lieutenant J. A. McKenzie, U. S. Coast Guard
On 1 March 1977, the U. S. Coast Guard became the nation’s primary maritime enforcement agency for the newly implemented Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (now the Mag- nuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act [MFCMA]). With this legislation, the Coast Guard was tasked with enforcing federal regulations intended for the conservation of all fishery resources, and directed primarily at the hundreds of foreign ships that had for centuries fished virtually unregulated off U. S. coasts. The success of the act and the overall national effort in accomplishing meaningful fishery conservation was, and still remains, dependent on the effectiveness of the Coast Guard’s seagoing enforcement program.
Along with the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the Coast Guard received the nebulous responsibility of enforcing the provisions of this MFCMA Act (50 CFR 311 [a]). In response to this new task, the Coast Guard set its course in typical “can do” fashion to enforce untested regulatory procedures in the newly declared 200-mile fishery conservation zone. In the seven years since implementation, the Coast Guard’s enforcement role has remained unchanged and undefined. However, resulting from the increased knowledge and developed talents of the people involved with fisheries law enforcement, the Coast Guard has established its enforcement role and has become recognized as a critical component of the national fishery management process. An examination of MFCMA enforcement by members of the Coast Guard on foreign fishing fleets operating in the waters adjacent to Alaska is the focus of this discussion.
Coast Guard boardings of foreign fishing fleets have changed from the years of enforcement before the MFCMA was enacted. Boardings that were primarily devoted to cursory inspections of logs and catches, accompanied by customary exchanges of gifts and refreshments, have developed into complex, time-consuming audits involving thorough inspections of all logs and catches. But the expertise and efficiency developed since implementation of the act have not been acquired without considerable effort. In the past seven years, Coast Guard boarding teams have improved the quality of their performance through exhausting hours and days in auditing logbooks, counting frozen fish blocks, and tunneling through the -20°F freezer spaces of a foreign fishing ship. A boarding of a foreign ship in which no violations are found will normally require six to eight hours for an experienced boarding team.
The challenges facing Coast Guard cutters and their boarding teams during Alaska Patrol (AlPat) have also changed from the period of fisheries law enforcement prior to the MFCMA. Although the hostile environment of the Northern Pacific and Bering Sea has not changed, efforts by the foreign fleets to avoid or deceive Coast Guard units have introduced an additional factor for consideration in the design of effective fisheries law enforcement. Coast Guard boarding teams now face the increased sophistication of foreign fleets as the era of high technology enters the competitive world of international commercial fishing. The advent of high technology has enabled the fleets to abandon labor intensive fishing operations for modem equipment and methods designed and intended exclusively for the pursuit of profit.
In addition to modernized processing and navigation equipment, many foreign fishing vessels have started to rely on communications equipment with the ability to continuously scan as many as 128 frequencies, radio teletype units capable of secure transmission for messages to parent companies in the Orient or Europe (and intercepting Coast Guard nonsecure
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act dramatically changed Coast Guard boardings of foreign fishing vessels—especially on the Alaska Patrol. An inspection of a vessel which involves counting blocks of frozen fish and uncovers no violations requires six to eight hours by an experienced boarding team.
messages), and complex shipboard computer systems capable of calculating and printing complete counts by species and weight of all catch on board. These examples are only a small portion of the advanced technology that is becoming as common among the fishing fleets of the 1980s as radars and fathometers were for the fleets of the 1960s.
Unlike the organized training opportunities available to personnel involved with the clandestine operations of drug interdiction. Coast Guard fisheries law enforcement has developed without dedicated, comprehensive training courses or texts for junior and senior officers and petty officers who comprise the boarding teams. Without clear enforcement direction or objectives provided in the original legislation, or a consistent source for comprehensive training, the high quality of performance that has developed in fisheries law enforcement has primarily been the product of self-development by the boarding teams and support elements. Support for the AlPat cutters in the form of year-round coordination of surveillance and tactics, and analysis of foreign fishing activity have been a learning process for the Seventeenth Coast Guard District’s air stations and district intelligence and law enforcement staff. Among the benefits of this combined enforcement effort of boardings and analysis is the popular recognition of the Coast Guard as a critical component in the management process of the nation’s valuable fishery resources.
In the seven years since implementation of the MFCMA, 85% of the foreign fishing vessels within the entire U. S. Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) have operated within 200 miles of Alaska’s coasts. In an effort to fulfill the Coast Guard’s commitment to fishery law enforcement, given the demand (normally more than 200 foreign ships per month) and the amount of area involved (950,000 square nautical miles), the Seventeenth District has probably become the most demanding of all districts for Coast Guard resources dedicated to fisheries law enforcement. In addition to patrol efforts for enforcement of fishery regulations within the FCZ, Coast Guard units have continued to provide enforcement coverage of domestic fishing, various international agreements for fishing beyond the FCZ, pollution, marine safety, contraband, and customs.
Duri ng the seven years of federal enforcement of fishery regulations in the FCZ adjacent to Alaska, the Coast Guard has made more than 2,700 enforcement boardings on foreign fishing vessels. These boardings have resulted in 43 seizures and 372 other infractions of the foreign fishing regulations. Monetary fines recovered from these violations exceed $12 million with additional penalty sanctions on the permits of individual foreign fishing vessels of 120 months. The result of these additional sanctions translates into a loss of ten years of ship capacity to produce income from FCZ fisheries for the parent companies of seized vessels.
In comparison. Coast Guard effort for fisheries law enforcement in the Seventeenth District since 1 March 1977 amounts to more than 5,000 cutter days and 12,800 total aircraft hours with combined trackline coverage of more than 2.5 million miles. Based on these totals, enforcement costs for fisheries law enforcement operations (not including personnel salaries) in the Seventeenth District for the first six years of the MFCMA are approximately $62.5 million.*
A comparison of AlPat enforcement costs and the fines recovered from penalties assessed on the foreign fleets quickly attracts the attention of “budget- watchers”—both in and out of the Coast Guard. Although the difference between operating costs ($62.5 million) and fines recovered ($12 million) would equal the typical budget of a small-town school district, or the amount spent by the Department of Defense on combat boots in 1982, the AlPat program is frequently criticized when evaluated solely on the basis of an objective cost-benefit analysis. The fault of this evaluation technique occurs when the attempt is made to equate direct operational costs with the less quantifiable benefits of enforcing national fishery resource policy.
The notion of obtaining a particular “benefit” for each cost implies the need to recover penalties equal to enforcement costs. This would mean issuing tines worth $15,000 for each cutter patrol day, or combining all enforcement costs for a three-week period and making a seizure worth at least $315,000. The average settlement amount for a foreign fishing vessel seizure in Alaska during the first six years of the MFCMA was approximately $279,000. The interpretation raises doubts as to whether the actual benefit of enforcement is really the penalty awarded relative to the amount of effort expended rather than the overall conservation benefit to the nation’s fishery resources. However, as lacking as the MFCMA may be for Coast Guard enforcement direction and goals, the original intent of the legislation was clearly to focus enforcement efforts toward achieving conservation
♦Amount limited to fuel, maintenance, and depreciation costs using 1982 operating costs. Costs of acquisition, personnel, etc., were intentionally omitted.
goals for fishery resources, rather than to increase or limit operations based on fines recovered from assessed penalties.
This example illustrates the short- range usefulness of cost-benefit analysis as a technique for evaluating enforcement effectiveness. The inappropriateness of relying on such analysis as a means of designing practical enforcement policy is further demonstrated in areas outside of fisheries conservation. A recent U. S. Government Accounting Office study on the federal drug interdiction effort shows that government spending between 1977 and 1982 has more than tripled (from $83 million to $277.9 million). However, the study concludes, “drug availability, the primary target of interdiction, has not been seriously affected.” The conclusion of this study is that if the goal of the enforcement effort (restrict drug availability) has not been affected, a cost-benefit analysis of the federal interdiction effort would raise doubts as to whether federal enforcement has been a deterrent or an actual benefit to drug trafficking.
Similarities from this example on drug interdiction and fisheries law enforcement are readily apparent. A policy of fisheries law enforcement aimed toward a balance of costs and benefits fails to acknowledge the actual deterrent that exists through efforts at quality enforcement. This important point is further illustrated through an analysis of foreign fishing vessel days off of Alaska, AlPat cutter days, foreign ship boardings, and the ratio of violations resulting from boardings during 1977-82. An examination of two periods, 1977-78 and 1979-82, shows important differences resulting from two distinctly different enforcement strategies. This analysis reveals the following observations:
► Because of the early emphasis on completing large numbers of boardings, no relationship exists between the number of cutter days and the number of boardings in 1977-78 and the period 1979-82.
► Since 1979, the number of foreign fishing vessel boardings have steadily increased without a direct relationship to the number of actual foreign ship days or AlPat days.
► Accompanying the steady increase in boardings is the steady increase in the percentage of boardings that have resulted in violations.
The observations indicate that after 1978, a transition occurred in fisheries enforcement from an early emphasis on boarding numbers per cutter day to a primary concern for the quality of boarding effort. This change in emphasis throughout the AlPat program resulted in steady increases in the numbers and quality of boardings, and the corresponding likelihood of detecting violations.
It is inappropriate to apply cost-benefit analysis in an evaluation of Coast Guard fisheries law enforcement operations in Alaska. The fault of this evaluation technique has been illustrated by its inability to take into account benefits derived from effective enforcement efforts that are not readily quantifiable for accurate assessment. A conclusion for increased or decreased enforcement based on a cost-benefit analysis would therefore fail to accurately emphasize the quality of boarding and detection efforts that are the primary goals in a national policy for enforcement of practical regulations.
Since implementation of the MFCMA, many suggestions have been introduced as ways to reduce the amount of time and money spent for cutters to, as critics accuse, “putter around the Bering Sea on fish patrol.” Such ideas have resulted in actual legislation that will soon change the scene of international fishing and require 100% coverage by NMFS observers on all foreign fishing ships. Other ideas have suggested the use of satellites for information gathering, the stationing of U. S. “fish counters” in the home ports of foreign ships, or the directing of foreign fishing ships to a designated location within the FCZ for complete offloading and inspection.
Although these ideas and other proposals possess some merit, many fail to consider the practical, jurisdictional, and intense political barriers inextricably associated with a national conservation effort which are dependent on federal, state, and international cooperation. Management of the valuable fishery resources adjacent to Alaska has traditionally been characterized by the realities of an international “fish and chips” policy. Over the years, this policy has attempted to balance the benefits and burdens of enforcement against the overall good of fishery conservation. As a result, the complexities involved with fisheries conservation as a tool of international politics has rarely ever allowed for an accurate evaluation of Coast Guard enforcement based on tangible costs versus obvious benefits.
An improved understanding of the international considerations in fisheries regulation has accompanied the systematic raising of qualitative standards by which the effectiveness of the AlPat program is judged in the Seventeenth District. The improved quality of boarding efforts, combined with several important changes to foreign fishing vessel regulations for increased control of foreign fleets, has enhanced the actual benefits of federal enforcement under the MFCMA. Continued support from the Coast Guard, National Marine Fisheries Service/Na- tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and concerned fisheries producers and conservation groups for proposed regulation changes that tighten control on reporting and logging procedures of foreign fishing ships will increase operational efficiency.
The increased use of current regulatory procedures in the State of Alaska is being incorporated into the federal management effort where the state’s efforts have previously proven successful. Use of existing regulatory structures in addition to increased use of NMFS training facilities, requests for Department of Defense facilities (as authorized in MFMCA, Sec. 311), and participation in the training of NMFS observers and the newly developed fisheries portion of the Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement School training program, will further aid the quality of boardings and the overall enforcement effort.
U. S. Coast Guard boardings on foreign fishing ships at sea during their actual fishing operations continue to be the only practical, effective, and accurate way of assuring compliance with the regulations. The true product of an enforcement program with an apparent inefficient ratio of costs to benefits is not the monetary deficit, but the steady rise of detected violations and the improved quality of boardings. The real benefit of the AlPat program, therefore, is the Coast Guard’s contribution to the overall management effort for the conservation of valuable U. S. fishery resources.
Lieutenant McKenzie, a 1978 graduate of the U. S. Coast Guard Academy, holds a master’s degree in public administration from the University of Alaska, Juneau. He served as a deck watch officer in the USCGC Valiant (WMEC-621), and is the assistant branch chief of the Seventeenth Coast Guard District’s office of intelligence and law enforcement in Juneau.
Steadier As She Goes
By A. C. Fairlie-Clarke and Commander J. Stafford, Royal Navy (Retired)
The provision of fin stabilizers in a warship extends her seakeeping qualities far beyond that of simply reducing the roll motion. Provided that the commanding officer has some freedom to select his course, he can reduce pitching, slamming, and deck wetness at high speeds by taking the sea on the beam. The excessive roll motion that would normally result from such a maneuver will automatically be reduced to manageable proportions by the stabilizers. This technique, which virtually extends the ship’s calm weather performance into moderate and even severe sea states, might be used for only a few minutes for helicopter operations, or for an hour or so for a vital underway replenishment.
For ships of less than about 20,000 tons displacement deployed in the open ocean, one of the prime benefits of stabilization is improved helicopter operations. As a helicopter makes its final descent to touchdown, its wheels are in the true horizontal plane and the angle of the flight deck to the horizontal is critical. If the flight deck is tilted at the instant of touchdown, the reaction through the landing gear is not in line with the vertical lift force from the rotor. This creates a stress moment in the rotor linkage which, for large deck angles, will exceed the maximum permitted value. This deck reaction moment also can cause distortion of the swept disc of the rotors at the instant of landing which, particularly with nonrigid rotors, can produce interference between blade tips and ship’s structure. It should be noted that these two phenomena will occur in a free landing or in one involving a haul-down technique.
In addition to the angle of the flight deck at touchdown, the relative velocity is also critical if damage to the landing gear by impact forces is to be avoided. The risk of damage from too high of a relative vertical velocity is obvious, but it is significant that the vertical motion of the aft flight deck of a destroyer or frigate is a result of pitching moment much more than true heave. A judicious alteration of course for a minute or two can often optimize the pitch and roll motion of a stabilized ship so that both are within limits simultaneously, and facilitate a launch or landing that would otherwise involve considerable risk for both the aircraft and its crew.
In ships where a landing is being made without the aid of a cable-winch recovery system, there is also a limitation on the lateral forces that can be allowed on the landing gear when the aircraft is standing on deck untethered, as it must be just before takeoff and immediately after landing. These forces originate from the lateral acceleration of the flight deck to which roll motion is the main contributor.
In summary, the modern helicopter can fly in virtually any weather conditions, but its operational availability in the maritime role is dictated by the effect of weather on its parent ship. The provision of ship roll stabilizers greatly enhances helicopter availability.
The ability to control the radar crosssection of a ship is a prime factor in countermeasures to missile attack. The reflected image of the ship is critically dependent on the angular relationship of the reflecting surfaces, and this will be affected by roll angle. Not only will the measures taken to reduce radar cross-section be largely negated if rolling is allowed, but the ship will also exhibit a characteristic periodicity in her reflected image. Roll angle must be controlled to tight limits in order to avoid these effects. Powerful fin stabilizers can do this and can also induce rolling of the ship in such a way that the reflected image will mimic that of other ship types.
The modem replenishment ship, with her large displacement, sheltered replenishment decks, automatically tensioned
1. Bridge Control Unit 2. Auxiliary Sensor Unit 3. Central Control Unit 4. Central Processor Unit 5. Local Control Unit 6. Angle Transmitter Units
7. Power Units and Hydraulics
8. Fin Units 9. Fins high lines, sliding blocks, and fork trucks is capable of providing replenishment in high sea states, certainly up to state four and often up to state six. Except in the case of the aircraft carrier, underway replenishment limitations occur at lower sea states because of the motion, confined spaces, and wet deck conditions in the receiving ships. In addition to actually receiving the loads on deck, destroyers and frigates have problems with breaking down the pallet loads for storing, and with the much more difficult task of preparing and striking down replacement missiles.
In the case of the projected vertical launch system, the receiving ship will have the task of handling incoming individual loads of between 2,000 and 3,000 pounds, while on deck some 250 pounds of transport equipment will need to be stripped from each and cleared away. The canisters, some 20 feet in length and 25 inches square, will then have to be upended by a crane and lowered into closely fitting cells of the same length. During this operation, the lateral forces acting on the missile caused by ship roll may reach 1,000 pounds. On a stabilized ship, these factors could be reduced to the order of 200 pounds, thus becoming manageable and enabling the time alongside for missile replenishment to be greatly reduced. In the case of a forward mounted missile system, ship stabilizers may convert what could be a lengthy and hazardous task, even in moderate seas, into a practical proposition.
Even if one is not actually seasick, the debilitating effects of continuous exposure to ship motion are well known to mariners. The sheer physical effort required to counteract the motion, whether on or off duty, soon reduces to some extent the alertness and reaction speed of ship’s personnel. Under combat conditions, when alertness of the highest order is required, the situation is aggravated by even longer hours of duty and the disturbance of time off watch by action alarms. The fighting efficiency of a ship is considerably reduced, even by short periods of bad weather.
“A Review of Shipboard Living and Working Conditions from Ship Environmental Design Viewpoint,” by Lieutenant Commander H. Tahara of the Maritime Staff Office, Japanese Defence Agency, considers the influence of ship motion on the health, safety, morale, performance, efficiency, and retention of personnel and urges that all practical measures should be taken to reduce ship motion because of their serious detrimental effect. The U. S. Navy has also been active in studying the effects of rolling on ship and crew performance. NavSec report 6136-74-280 of October 1974, entitled “Development of a Technical Practice for Roll Stabilization System Selection,” states that some operations become very difficult to perform at only 5° roll amplitudes and that personnel effectiveness is degraded at roll amplitudes greater than 6°. It is impossible to quantify the value of roll stabilizers in maintaining the efficiency and morale of ship crews during prolonged periods of bad weather. But the British experience in the South Atlantic during 1982 was overwhelmingly favorable toward the benefits of fin-stabilized warships.
For engineering reasons, it is not always possible to provide an independently stabilized platform for larger radar aerials or sonar transducers. The ability to keep a target within the beam width of these arrays in heavy weather is greatly enhanced by roll stabilizers. In addition, the performance and accuracy of systems that are independently stabilized will be enhanced if the motions for which they have to compensate are reduced.
The maritime conflict between Great Britain and Argentina in 1982 saw the formation of a naval task force and its deployment under combat conditions not experienced by the Royal Navy since World War II. Of the 27 combat ships that took part in the conflict, as opposed to auxiliaries and merchant ships taken up from trade, 24 were fitted with active fin stabilizer systems. These ships averaged 85 continuous days at sea under combat conditions; HMS Invincible set the record with 155 days. During this period, which most of the ships spent entirely in the open ocean, sea states six and above with winds in excess of force eight were commonplace. It is not possible to provide a quantitative assessment of the contribution that roll stabilizers made to the success of the operations, but the opinion of many who took part was that it is difficult to see how they could have managed without them. Indeed, there were tasks performed at sea that one must suspect would have been at least hazardous if not impossible in an unstabilized ship. These included the changing of an Olympus main engine gas generator (28,000 shaft horsepower) in the Invincible (19,000 tons), and an engine and rotor change for a Lynx helicopter carried out in a “Type- 42” destroyer (4,000 tons).
The early adoption of the tachometric gunfire control systems and surface-to-air missiles by the U. S. Navy and its retention of an aircraft carrier force meant that the requirement for fin stabilization to improve gun and helicopter performance was less than that for European navies-
Also, the few roll stabilizers that were fitted in U. S. Navy ships during the 1960s exhibited poor reliability, maintainability, and performance, with the result that the broader advantages of stabilizers were not apparent.
During the 1970s, however, there was a revival of interest in roll stabilization within the U. S. Navy. “Destroyer Seakeeping: U. S. and U.S.S.R.,” by Captain James W. Kehoe, Jr., U. S. Navy, published in the December 1973 Proceedings, brought to light the general advantages in seakeeping that were enjoyed by the stabilized ships of the Soviet and European navies over the unstabilized ships of the U. S. Navy. Whatever operational reasons may have prompted the Soviets and Europeans to fit stabilizers originally, it was the improved seakeeping which impressed many senior U. S. naval officers.
Captain Kehoe’s work stimulated considerable discussion and study on the benefits of stabilization for warships. The case is admirably summed up and justified in the paper, “Upgrading Mission Capability and Performance and Effectiveness of Naval Ships by the use of Active Fin Stabilizers,” presented to the 14th Annual Technical Symposium of the American Society of Engineers in 1977 by Dr. Juliani Gatzoulis and Robert G. Keane.
The introduction of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate into the U. S. fleet, with her larger SH-60B helicopter, precipitated the decision to reintroduce roll stabilizers into the U. S. Navy. The trial results of the first ship so fitted, the USS Gallery (FFG-26) have been excellent and expected to justify that decision.
The FFG-7-class fin stabilizer system comprises the principal components shown in Figure 1. Roll angle data are obtained from the ship’s main weapons gyro or alternatively from an auxiliary sensor, which is a solid state angular accelerometer. The central processor unit uses the data to continuously compute the required fin angle for optimum roll reduction. This angle is transmitted to the local control units, which then regulate the hydraulic power units so that the fins follow the demanded angle continuously. Executive control is exercised from the bridge control unit and central control unit, while the central processor unit monitors and reports system status via these other units.
The stabilizer system is capable of 75% to 80% roll reductions over a wide range of irregular sea states. Figure 2 shows a computer prediction of stabilized and unstabilized roll behavior. The repair and maintenance requirements for a roll stabilizer system are very similar to those of the steering system, and all necessary skills are already available. Total annual man-hours for all on-board maintenance and repair activities are not expected to exceed 200 hours.
In light of the poor reliability record of fin stabilizers in the U. S. Navy, considerable emphasis was given to this area in the procurement specifications for the FFG-7 class fin stabilizers. A reliability and maintainability program was implemented with the objective of achieving the following:
► Mean time before failure of the system: 1,000 hours
► Mean time before failure of parts not repairable on board: 6,000 hours
► Mean time to repair: one hour
► Maximum time to repair for 90% of repair actions: less than three hours. Design analysis and prototype testing indicate that these objectives can be achieved; this is borne out by experience with fin stabilizers fitted to Royal Navy warships.
Dr. Fairlie-Clarke is a design and development manager for Brown Brothers and Company, Ltd.
Commander Stafford is a naval systems manager at Vickers Marine Engineering Division.
The Fanatic Factor
By Richard Stewart
In the fall of 1984, following air support strikes in a retaliatory mission against the military forces of a country in the Middle East, a U. S. Navy aircraft carrier put into the harbor of an Eastern Mediterranean island state, accompanied by two escort ships. The anchorage was shared with a dozen vessels of various types, cargoes, and registries. Liberty boats carried the crews to and from the harbor’s major city; it was friendly, prices were low, and the hotels offered drinks and discos.
On the second night of a scheduled three-day visit, and after the last liberty launch had returned the crews to their ships, another ship approached the island’s coast at a point ten nautical miles northeast of the port city. Her peeling red paint and unwashed sides made her name unreadable. She carried a crew of five and a landing party of six, including one woman. The ship’s cargo was an unusual one, not intended to be seen by the is-
To stop a fanatic bent on making his attack calls for intense uncritical devotion to duty—all the time.
land’s customs officials.
In the aft hold of this 60-foot trawler were two small aluminum boats equipped with outboard motors. Just forward of the boats, carefully covered with old rugs, rested 400 pounds of explosives divided into lots. On the aft deck were two crudely welded steel brackets, each designed to fit over the bow of the small boats and hold four 120-mm. mortar shells armed with contact fuses. The mortar shells, their fuses, and six five- gallon cans of gasoline completed the manifest.
In the light fog, the shore was felt more than seen. As the ship lost headway, the anchor was eased into 30 feet of water; the captain knew where he wanted to be. The beach was only 500 yards to starboard, and three miles ahead was the quiet Mediterranean harbor.
The crew set to work in faded jeans and shirts that bore no naval insignia. Carefully, the boats were handed up to the deck and put over the sides. Three crew members boarded each boat; one in the bow to navigate and watch, another to steer and run the motor, and the third at midships as a guard. The guard commanded each boat and carried a small submachine gun in the event of discovery, or hesitation by any crew member.
Now the explosives were passed over the side to the boats. The “bow high” load compensated for the weight of the mortar shells that were handed unfused to the crews, who placed them in their brackets. Finally, the fuses in cotton- lined wooden boxes were passed over to each boat guard; they were ready. Prayers were said, and the men kissed each other. Faint sounds of farewell drifted across the water as the boats rowed toward the shore. Once shallow water was reached, one crew member from each boat slipped over the side and stood in waist-high water and gently screwed the fuses into the nose of each mortar shell. Now the fully armed boats turned seaward. When the shoreline faded, the engines were started. Their throttles turned to “slow ahead” as they turned starboard 90° to parallel the shoreline.
The bow crewmen kept careful watch ahead for anything adrift that could possibly set off the mortar shells. Soon the green haze that marked the lights of the port area were seen, and, ashore to starboard, the lights atop a large hotel were now visible. Once parallel to the hotel, the helmsmen changed course 45° to port; this was their last bearing. Ahead one mile was their target. The final connections between the explosives, the shells, and the gas containers were made by the boat guard. The aircraft carrier and her escorts (port and starboard) rode at anchor 4,000 yards from the beach. On board the carrier the first dogwatch was half over; watchstanders passed the time with coffee and small talk. The lights on the flight deck outlined the carrier’s massive shape against the distant port and accentuated the shapes of a dozen or so planes and helicopters positioned on deck.
Throughout the ship herself, the crew was awake and watchful, prepared to fight a fire, get up steam, receive messages, or sound an alarm. On board, all was secure, but in the water there was no protection: No armed patrol boat circling the waters around the carrier, no rapid- fire weapon that could be brought to bear against an intruder. No booms and nets protected the ship against an unconventional attack. Suddenly, the low whine of motors could be heard approaching 600 yards off the carrier’s port side. On the bridge, the officer of the deck and a lookout saw the dim bow waves of the two boats as they turned slowly toward the carrier. One boat closed the turning radius to follow the other, then their engines screamed as they accelerated to close the distance.
Officers shouted orders, sailors ran for locked weapons, and alarms rang in disbelief. Pistols were fired in vain protest, and a flare lit the night in a red bath of light. The explosions rocked the harbor, killed hundreds of men, severely damaged an aircraft carrier, and started a war.
Is that historic call to arms— “Remember the Maine!”—destined to become “Remember the Independence or the John F. Kennedy”? In this era of terrorism on both land and sea, is it not feasible that several of our warships— massed in some foreign harbor during an international crisis—could be sabotaged and even sunk without firing so much as a shot from one of their saluting guns? Today, no harbor is a safe one for U. S. naval combatants. If we are to prevent terrorist attacks against our deployed fleet, a great deal of attention must be given now to the potential danger.
As events in the past year have shown, intelligence systems cannot be fully relied upon for on-the-spot decisions regarding security. Available information may not be current or complete. In some cases, intelligence gathering does not reach down to the plans of small splinter groups of terrorists who act independently from a larger organization. In other cases, groups may be supported and controlled by a larger unit that will later disavow its actions as a political expedient. One must also remember that terrorism is an official policy in certain countries.
Some suggestions to assure safer harbors are: major U. S. warships should add one or two small, high-performance patrol craft armed with machine guns and crewed by experienced seamen. Such boats could establish and patrol a defensive exclusion area around their respective ships and assist in general harbor security. Large ships that lack armor belts could use booms or other methods to protect sensitive areas from surface attack while anchored offshore. Areas surrounding the hull should be watched and checked for swimmers. Suspected swimmers could be brought to the surface with small explosive charges especially made for that purpose; such charges would not damage the hull. Although underwater sonar gear could be damaged, the immediate threat of limpet mines being attached to a warship’s hull justifies such a risk.
Last, the cooperation and support of host ports and local authorities are basic considerations for effective harbor security. Increased efforts to obtain the assistance and cooperation of local naval and police units would enhance the general harbor security program overseas, and help to make certain that we will not have another Maine to remember.
Mr. Stewart is an author and real estate investor who lives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His professional note, “El Salvador's Navy," was published in the August 1983 issue of Proceedings, pp. 109-110-
T
L?
Brazil Designs a Warship _By Commander R. B. do Rego Macedo, Brazilian Navy
In October 1977, the Brazilian Navy decided to replace its Fletcher-class destroyers, which have been in service for nearly 40 years, with a new class of 1,600-ton corvettes—the first warships to be built according to Brazilian design specifications. The Brazilian Navy’s General Staff (Estado Maior da Armada) realized, however, that it would be advisable to obtain technical assistance from experienced foreign design consultants in order to reduce the risk of error in certain areas. The following year, a contract was signed with the West German company MTG Marinetechnik, under which MTG would send engineers to Brazil for several months to advise the corvette’s design team.
In 1979, the main requirements for this new ship class (CVO-1) were identified:
► Maximum speed of 25+ knots with full load displacement in sea state three
► Cruising speed of 15-17 knots
► Range of 4,000 miles at cruising speed
► Endurance of ten days to match a specified speed
► Protection against nuclear-biological-chemical warfare
► Seakeeping characteristics such that helicopter operations and replenishment at sea are feasible in sea states up to five
► Weapon systems comprising four surface-to-surface missiles, medium-caliber guns, antisubmarine torpedoes, hull sonar, and the required control subsystems
► Full support for an on-board helicopter, including hangar and refueling at sea
Time spent on the conceptual phase of the corvette design lasted until December 1980; this phase was far longer than previously expected. Of the many reasons which caused the delay, the most important was the extensive analysis carried out on several configurations of the propulsion and weapon systems. In the beginning of 1981, the navy selected the combined diesel or gas propulsion plant, based on the use of controllable-pitch propellers. At the same time, the General Staff selected a weapon system comprising two 57-mm. guns, four surface-to-surface missiles, and two triple-mount torpedo tubes. Later, to effect a commonality with the Niteroi-dass frigates, the 57-mm. guns were replaced by one 4.5-inch Vickers gun and two automatic Bofors 40-mm. guns.
During the development of the corvette’s hull design,
General
Full load displacement: 1,964 tons Length overall: 95.8 meters Beam: 11.4 meters Draft: 3.6 meters Speed (maximum): 25+ knots
Armament
Four surface-to-surface missiles One 4.5-inch Vickers automatic gun Two 40-mm. Bofors automatic guns Six antisubmarine torpedo tubes
Electronics
One Plessey AWS-4 surveillance radar One Selenia RTN-10X tracking radar
One optronic Saab EOS-400 tracker system One Krupp-Atlas ASO 4-2 sonar Two optical sights
Electronic countermeasure and electronic support measure systems
Propulsion Machinery
One General Electric LM-2500 gas turbine
Two MTU 16V956 diesel engines
Two five-blade controllable-pitch propellers
Electrical Power
Four MTU/Siemens diesel generator sets, 500 kilovolts each
Complement
14 officers, 33 petty officers, 79 crewmen
extensive tank tests were conducted at the Marinetechniska Institute in Sweden. The hull design was tested for resistance up to 29 knots, self-propulsion, seakeeping, and maneuverability.
As the corvette project developed, the Brazilian Navy decided to subcontract design services in certain areas.
The reasons for this were a need for high levels of specialization and convenience of manufacturing equipment. The subcontracted areas were:
►Integration of the propulsion plant
►Design of the propeller blades
►Design of the “degaussing” coils
►Specification of the propulsion control system
►Specification of the air conditioning and the ventilation systems
But the General Staff’s overriding policy was to undertake design services in-house, since this procedure would give Brazilian naval engineers control over the project’s design data and philosophy.
Naturally, the lack of experimental data—and the nonexistence in Brazil of suitable experimental facilities— forced the Brazilian Navy to get foreign assistance in specific fields. For instance, the design of the propeller blades was undertaken in close cooperation with the Marinetechniska Institute. In this design study, three different shapes of the blades were examined. After theoretical comparisons were made in terms of predicted efficiency, cavitation, and induced hull vibration, two propellers were tested in the cavitation tunnel.
Another example of overseas testing was the simulation
of the dynamic behavior of the ship and her propulsion system during extreme maneuvers that took place in Scotland. The results of this study were incorporated in the specification of the propulsion control system prepared by the navy.
Generally, the design was produced by a team of about 80 engineers and draftsmen at the Directorate of Naval Engineering in Rio de Janeiro.
During the contracting phase of the project, the design of all subsystems was checked once more, and a comprehensive work of arrangement integration for the whole ship was done, including the construction of two engine- room models. Following that, about 200 drawings and ship specifications were prepared. This work was completed in last August, and the plans were delivered to the Naval Shipyard of Rio de Janeiro.
Concurrently, the acquisition of items with long delivery times was initiated. Equipment selected for the ship was based on a careful analysis of available options, which included the degree to which the manufacture of equipment could be undertaken by Brazilian industry.
Initially, four ships will be built, with construction of the new corvettes continuing at least until 1988. The first two hulls will be built by the Naval Shipyard of Rio de Janeiro, and the remaining two by a private Brazilian shipyard which has not yet been selected.
Commander do Rego Macedo is attached to the Directorate of Naval Engineering in the Brazilian Ministry of the Navy.
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