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information applicable to a class of ships, but frequent do not account for equipment differences among ships^ Battle orders should not compete with or replace exist*® doctrines; they must account for differences among ifl<* vidual ships, a wide range of operations, and van0 threat levels. As equipment is altered or as new °Per?s tional requirements develop, the commanding officer battle orders must be easily changed. For example, should include instructions on how to fight at Set]e(g( quarters in a nuclear environment, while rearming- while receiving a helicopter. The captain’s battle ord® must also be up-to-date and short enough for all com systems team members to remain abreast of their requl ments in the face of a dynamic threat. ^
From the captain’s perspective, the initial round in^t engagement will probably be the most important. It111
All commanding officers should primarily be concerned with how best to fight their ships at various conditions of readiness in every warfare mission. This was my primary goal when I commanded the USS John Hancock (DD-981) in 1981-83. In addition to training and experience, numerous technical and tactical publications make this task easier. Ships may also have combat systems doctrines that describe warfare capabilities and nearly every piece of combat systems equipment in the ship. Still, these may not be enough.
I became aware of a serious shortcoming in our preparations for combat midway in my tour. We were on patrol in the Persian Gulf. There, the John Hancock was responsible for tracking and identifying all aircraft leaving Iran or Iraq and flying toward Saudi Arabia. I was called three times to the combat information center (CIC) by the tactical action officer (TAO) and informed that unknown aircraft, presumably hostile, were approaching the ship. Starting from condition III* in each instance, I ordered the TAO to arm and tune two Sea Sparrow missiles. In the first case, it took us about 120 seconds, and in the others 60 and 45 seconds. The differences were caused by the launcher and missiles not being in the same configurations. In the first case, the launcher was secured; in the second and third cases, the launcher was in remote but the missiles were not armed and tuned as they should have been. This unacceptable lack of consistency was probably present in other areas of combat systems.
To preclude a recurrence, we created instructions for the senior combat systems watchstanders for manning and operating our combat systems in all conceivable circumstances. We wanted to ensure that each TAO and all watchstanders knew my requirements and my expected systems employment in all conditions of readiness. Yet, we wanted to avoid spelling out lengthy instructions prior to each change of watch or readiness condition.
Almost immediately the solution became constrained by two requirements. The instructions had to cover the many possible combinations of readiness conditions, mission areas, and threat levels—collectively called “states”— yet be brief enough for all TAOs, junior officers, and senior enlisted men to know inside and out.
♦The various readiness conditions are based on a ship captain’s determination of amount of time needed to respond to a threat.
We called these instructions battle orders. Battle orders need the flexibility of standing night orders; they will heavily biased by the commanding officer and therefore will be as personal as his night orders; they will indeed be the captain’s orders for preparation of his combat systems-
What Should Be in Battle Orders? Understanding vv'ba| belongs in battle orders emerges from the evolution 0 surface warfare and an appreciation of the commanding officer’s perspective as he prepares to fight.
For at least 70 years, doctrines have been the primary source of direction on how to prepare for combat. D°c trines are written for warfare missions such as electronic warfare or antiair warfare. Also, some equipments-" Harpoon and LAMPS, for example—have their own doc' trine. Current surface force doctrines are many tim°s larger than their predecessors because the battle probk111 for surface ships has expanded from one to three dime0 sions and become vastly more complex. Unlike the aviatof and submariner, who have a single integrated combat sys tern, the surface warfare officer’s equipment changes s° rapidly that when he returns to sea duty after three yeafS ashore, he often finds different—albeit more capable"' combat systems in his ship. Surface warfare officers hav® not had the luxury of “wringing-out” systems to perf®^ doctrine by trial and error. Thus, they have encourag6 administrative commands to prepare operational doctrine Extant combat systems doctrines contain much ger»er
The concept of battle orders is thinking systematically about how to fight better. By explaining a procedure the author, below, found useful in writing battle orders, he hopes other surface warfare officers can benefit by Creasing the fighting effectiveness of their ships. While the examples are based on rou- hnes on board a Spruance-class destroyer, the concept and techniques are general enough to applied to any class of surface force ship.
list
the
2. List Warfare Capabilities. The second step is to the warfare capabilities of your ship. In addition to
be won for his ship to continue fighting; yet, it may erupt without warning or without the commanding officer in CIC to watch events unfold. To help ensure his TAOs are prepared to react properly against a surprise attack, the captain and the TAOs need battle orders that provide all watchstanders with instructions for setting up and employing their equipment.
Current naval warfare publications (NWPs), tactical notes (TacNotes), and tactical memos (TacMemos) do not attempt to integrate all warfare missions at differing conditions of shipboard readiness, nor can they be expected to account for variations among platforms—even those of the same class. Therefore, battle orders for shipboard use must coordinate combat systems in all conditions of readiness, be tailored to the ship’s current operations, and fit the style of its commanding officer. They should be written by the captain.
Every possible situation requires a particular degree of readiness on the part of men and their equipment to carry out a given warfare mission. For example, a state of preparedness at condition III in naval gunfire support would include orders governing the modes of search and fire control radars, the status of gun mounts, the type and amount of ammunition preloaded in the handling room, the manning in CIC, gunnery spaces, and navigational teams, and the disposition of command and control circuits.
The number of orders or size of the document is also an important factor in deciding what should be included in battle orders. There can be too much information and/or too many states of preparedness. Researchers at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory have postulated what all naval officers believe instinctively. Regardless of a decision maker’s understanding and acceptance of a standard operating procedure or orders, under certain circumstances, quick judgments based on intuition are preferred to predetermined responses. In other words, having to remember too many battle orders for too many preplanned conditions can cause the captain or TAO to reject some and perhaps all.
Hence, the number of states must be limited to those states needed in preparing for combat. To be concise, the orders must not repeat the descriptions of equipment already contained in other sources. Direct phrases should be used, such as, “Place the launchers in remote, fully loaded, with two missiles armed and tuned.” In three instances where battle orders have been written this way, 20-40 pages were adequate. The John Hancock's is 19 pages; USS Mount Baker's (AE-36) is 18; and USS Kidd's (DD-993) is 34.
For two additional reasons, the battle orders must be written for all combat systems operators and their supervisors, E-5 and senior, to understand. The combat systems team can be effective only if the members know how their efforts complement the ship’s mission. More importantly, they must also know which state of preparedness their equipment is supporting, because they are frequently responsible for maintenance as well as operations. Without understanding the captain’s battle orders, watchstanders may heedlessly take equipment out of service for maintenance or to reduce equipment fatigue. When the ship’s mission calls for a state of readiness different from what the watchstanders have established, such well-intended maintenance actions may weaken combat effectiveness.
Thus, battle orders must be flexible to address the ship s equipment, operations, and style of her commanding offi" cer. They must specify the necessary equipment status and weapon systems employment at numerous states of pt®" paredness yet be short enough for senior petty officers and officers to know thoroughly. Battle orders do not replace general doctrine; they bridge the gap between the general principles of naval warfare for a class of ship and the individual needs of a single platform with its certain systems and particular tasks.
Seven Steps to Battle Orders: The first three steps if writing battle orders describe the desired states of preparedness. The fourth specifies manning, communications, and responsibilities of watchstanders. Steps five and six list the desired status of equipment and initial systems configuration. The knowledge and experience of the captain, executive officer (XO), TAOs, department heads, and chief petty officers are invaluable in accomplishing these latter two steps. The final step is to resolve interface type conflicts that arise in steps four through six.
1. List Conditions of Readiness. The initial step is10 list the conditions of readiness to be used in fighting the ship. Possible choices for a destroyer are listed along the horizontal axis in Figure 1.
Conditions of readiness determine the ship’s capability to fight; for in each condition, different types and amounts of equipment are manned. Watch sections are affected by conditions of readiness but also depend upon training- ^ condition III, for example, there may be sufficient numbers of qualified sonarmen for four watch sections, bu there may only be enough operational specialists for two- A ship’s condition of readiness in a nuclear environm®[1][2] will require more personnel than even normal conditio11 manning. Special people will be needed on authenticati°n teams, to control power supplies, and to man monitoring teams for individual dosimeters as well as monitoring teams throughout the ship. Exposed personnel will need10 be rotated after their radiation limits are exceeded. If f°f no other reason than lack of manpower, operating in nuclear environment is going to cut fighting ability - primary ones, such as antiair warfare (AAW), antisurge warfare (ASUW), antiship missile defense (ASMD), 311 antisubmarine warfare (ASW), there are secondary cap[3] bilities that should be included such as underway reple0j ishments (UnReps), naval gunfire support (NGFS), ^ command, control, and communications (C3) support t
Figure 1 Conditions of Readiness
an embarked staff, sea detail, or flight operations. These should be listed along a second axis as shown in Figure 2. ^ith this step, the number of preparedness states the battle orders must include are beginning to be defined.
3- List the Threat Levels. The third step adds the threat kvel axis. Threat levels represent the likelihood of engagement or the need-to-use weapons. Three possibilities 316 white, yellow, and red, as shown in Figure 3. The Edition of the threat level axis has increased the number
preparedness states threefold. But, the use of these differing threat levels has special importance.
In port, for example, ships practice their AAW and ASW capabilities at condition III without a threat and therefore have no reason to prepare weapons or their Punchers. Practice in a benign environment can develop SUch strong habits that petty officers in remote equipment rooms, apart from direct supervision and without understanding the differences in threat levels, may start standing 3,1 condition III watches as though their ship was along- s'de a pier. This was probably one of the reasons for the delays in arming and tuning the two Seasparrow missiles ln the John Hancock in the Persian Gulf that I mentioned Earlier. Battle orders for actions at condition III in the ®nign environment of a fleet exercise should be different han those used while patrolling the war zone in the Per- s*an Gulf.
List Manning Requirements. The fourth step is to 3ddress the activities of each individual at his combat sys-
h'gure 2 ASW and AAW Missions at Conditions I and III
ema station. Each statement should contain the same four c0rriponents: title, responsibilities, reporting senior, and ,T)rnunications circuits. For example:
bridge Console Operator performs functions as required by the officer of the deck and mans the JL Phones and interphones.
Control Officer Console employs the ship’s 5754 guns and Mk-86 gunfire control system as directed by the ship’s weapons coordinator (SWC). He maintains communications with the SWC on interphones and TDTs on the 1JT circuit, k
failed. In this way, battle orders might stipulate a different degree of close-in weapon system and 5-inch/54 caliber gun mount readiness depending upon the status of the Sea Sparrow launcher and its effect on the AAW mission’ 6. Develop a Systems Employment Plan. In step six- the optimum initial configuration of each combat system is given by warfare mission. For example, the desired meth' ods of operation in an AAW situation for each search radar, the components of the gun and missile fire control
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_ the word processor on board the ship and can changed easily. As with changes in the night orders, bat>e orders must be read frequently to keep abreast of them'"' another reason for short and concise orders.
7. Establish Interfaces. The final step of the battle °r ders is to resolve combat situations not having a sinP solution. An incoming missile can be engaged, for exan1 pie, by the Sea Sparrow missile, the Mk-86 gun systeh*s’ or the close-in weapon system. Which one or combinat'0 should be used? Several situations like this will be encOu^ tered in steps five and six, therefore in this step, mulhP
in
ithef
example is choosing between soft and hard kills. Show
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Should the captain be absent from CIC during the first, and probably the most important, round of an engagement, his battle orders will ensure that all watchstanders have his orders for setting up and employing their equipment.
example, if attack is imminent, then the threat level is red, and, therefore, condition I must be set. This eliminates the need to describe preparations for any condition II or III states at threat level red. The equipment status for each combat system at all threat levels should be described this way. Referring again to my experience with the Sea Sparrow missiles, to preclude a recurrence, the new battle orders specified that at level red “the launcher should be in remote, fully loaded, with each missile armed and tuned”; at level yellow, “in remote, fully loaded, with each missile armed but not tuned”; and at level white, “partially loaded, and secured, with its missiles safed.”
In battle orders, the meaning of “armed” and “tuned” or how many seconds of reaction time are saved are not necessary. The operator, TAO, and captain should already know these facts. Further discussion takes up space, makes the orders harder to learn, and is superfluous.
The use of the battle override circuits accessible to the combat systems team should not be overlooked. A ship may have as few as five or as many as 30, but each is controlled by switches on the equipment in CIC and their use belongs in the battle orders. If they are not included, the operator is left to make his own decisions. Because he is normally also the technician for the equipment, the operator will have a tendency to suboptimize combat effectiveness. He will naturally resist “short circuiting” his equipment, thereby increasing the probability of damage to it, unless battle orders or a supervisor require him to do otherwise.
To include orders for battle override circuits, the same thought sequence for describing equipment status is used. Starting again with threat level red, the override circuits that should be energized should be listed by system (for example, Mk-86, NATO Sea Sparrow, Harpoon, or close- in weapon system). They should be energized for threat level red and off at threat level white. For decisions at intermediate threat levels, possibilities of unnecessary equipment damage must be compared with the need to maintain a warfare capability.
As his crew becomes comfortable with battle orders, a captain may wish to account for degraded combat systems performance resulting from maintenance or casualties. For example, the orders might be different for setting up ASW equipment if the fire control computer is not operating, if LAMPS is in cycle maintenance, or if the sonar transmitter’s output is six decibels below specifications. Such considerations add many more states and should not be attempted until a crew and captain are thoroughly familiar with the first three dimensions of states.
Nevertheless, system degradations are so common that any complete set of battle orders must eventually account for them. Only three or four stages are needed, such as fully operational, minor and major degradations, and system, the type of gun ammunition, and the missile salv0 policy should be specified. This process should be re' peated for every warfare mission as though all shipboard equipment were dedicated to it. Here again, the command' ing officer’s insight is essential. To accomplish this step* he must conceptualize what is likely to happen in combat- and how he expects his ship to perform each of her mis' sions. It is most efficient to do this with equipment and armament in their expected sequence of use. For AS^’ the order of equipment description would be sonars- LAMPS and sonobuoys, then antisubmarine rockets (AS' ROCs) or torpedoes. In AAW, the sequence might be search radars, fire control systems, then gun mounts and missile launchers.
The employment mode ordered for the systems depends on the ship’s expected operating environment. For exanj' pie, sonars are operated in different modes in the Atlant^ than in the Mediterranean. Only the currently prefers mode should be specified in the battle orders. If a shiplS deploying to the Tyrrhenian Sea and the captain wants t° use the bottom bounce mode of sonar in ASW search afl prosecution, yet the orders call for the convergence mode, then all the captain need do is merely change th® orders. Because the orders are short, they can be retail
capabilities should be prioritized to avoid waste. Ano commanding officer maneuver his ship to fire Sea Spar- tow missiles (hard kill) or remain on course to fire chaff (soft kill)? Useful insights into such questions can normally be found in TacMemos and TacNotes. If not, then lhe commanding officer should request assistance from the tactical development and evaluation branches of the type commander, fleet commander, or the Surface Warfare development Group staffs. Even if there is no patented answer, the questions must be resolved prior to hostilities and accounted for in the battle orders.
The Benefits of Battle Orders: Short, concise battle orders will make it easier for a commanding officer to change his ship’s readiness posture. TAOs can receive °tders without ambiguity or lengthy explanation. Both the Captain and his TAO will know the status of their combat systems with the assurance necessary to react efficiently during hostilities. In addition, the orders will be flexible enough to specify combat systems preparations and manning at different readiness conditions and threat levels, ‘hese capabilities are a considerable improvement over extant battle bills and combat systems doctrines. But there are numerous other advantages to preparing battle orders.
First, the need for battle orders is obvious; nearly every commanding officer is at least tacitly preparing them. This Procedure saves him time by providing an easily understood technique.
Second, steps five and six pull the commanding officer and his combat team further into their ship’s large libraries °C tactical notes, publications, and warfare documents as they look for the best way to prepare their systems for c°nibat. Even though these materials should be carefully read, there is seldom sufficient time to do so. Some people ar§ue this reason alone is sufficient to adapt the procedure. Third, a well-defined and widely understood set of bate orders can be helpful to the combat systems team as a neW commanding officer settles in. If there are orders in ®ffect when a new captain reports aboard, a crew can con- l'nue to operate as they did under the previous captain. attle orders give the combat systems team a better struc- Ure with less likelihood of major operational fluctuations.
Fourth, if a prospective commanding officer has his ncvv ship’s battle orders during pipeline training, he can ^Uestion them in class and discuss them with colleagues in Pipeline. Changes to the orders can be more carefully Cor>sidered and more promptly put into effect after assum- command. Thus, prospective officers will report a °ard their ships more fully prepared for their combat systems responsibilities.
Fifth, battle orders can be practiced easily in port or at ?ea- For example, the dynamics of increasing threat levels 'n A AW and ASMD from white to red can be observed, or PFt readiness conditions, such as condition I in A AW and SlJW and condition III in ASW, can be tested. Using attle orders this way will add realism to drills, reinforce n°wledge of the orders, and test their feasibility.
Sixth, battle orders are flexible enough to accommodate h^ges m operational scenarios. Revised concepts of a reat and mission can easily be massaged with the seven- eP procedure and incorporated into the battle orders.
Thus, a ship can be better prepared for new duties with battle orders all watchstanders understand. This will improve crew efficiency and fighting capability.
Seventh, in port or during overhaul, material changes to combat systems made by ordnance alterations or ship alterations can be integrated into the orders with the same facility as operational changes. Battle orders can be modified rapidly to reflect new warfare capabilities.
Eighth, the need for shipboard battle orders is always present. Technical change will continue rapidly, especially because of the increasingly capable threat. Therefore, our combat systems will be enhanced as they receive Outboard (an electronic signal sensing system), Tomahawk cruise missiles, close-in weapon systems, target acquisition systems, or new sonars. As this occurs, however, the similarity between ships of a class and the usefulness of their common doctrine will diminish. Battle orders will account for these differences and benefit all commanding officers in their pursuit of combat readiness.
How To Implement Battle Orders: In practice, all the decisions necessary to form battle orders are already being made. Someone or some group of people are deciding how to operate the ship’s combat systems. But this is the commanding officer’s primary responsibility. He best knows his combat equipment, and his perception of the threat should be the one that determines how his ship will fight.
The concept of thinking systematically about how to fight better using battle orders should begin at the department head level. There, the surface warfare officer can learn the process with the same practice and instruction from his captain that he gets in shiphandling and navigation. Later, a prospective commanding officer could write his battle orders following the seven-step procedures at the same time he writes his standing night orders.
The idea of battle orders is taking hold at the Surface Warfare Officers School in Newport, Rhode Island. Prospective commanding officers and executive officers receive a two-hour presentation discussing the technique. The prospective commanding officers are given several additional hours to begin preparing their own battle orders with the help of the school’s staff of post-command officers and its technical library. Of course, the exact wording of the battle orders is up to each prospective commander, since the orders will apply to his combat systems team and his ship.
For years, commanders have prepared affirmative action plans, standing night orders, and main space fire doctrines. What they need now are battle orders.
After graduating from the Naval Academy, Captain Arrison served in the USS Benjamin Stoddert (DDG-22), as officer in charge of PCFs-80/81, in the USS Sampson (DDG-10), in the USS Sellers (DDG-11), and as commander of the USS John Hancock (DD-981). His staff duty has included tours as aide and flag secretary to Commander, Middle East Force, on the staff of Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Two/De- stroyer Development Group, and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Commander Arrison received his master’s degree in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School and recently graduated from the Naval War College. He is now a special assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Program Planning.
IV
Within each condition of readiness group, the manning statements should be written by system starting with command and control. Obviously, some systems are useful in several missions but each system should be listed only once in each condition of readiness.
At the end of each readiness condition section should be added casualty control manning. These are the personnel specifically assigned to repair failed equipment, such as those assigned to man the electronics repair party. Statements should be by equipment or system and should include location, circuits, and responsibilities. At condition
I, for example:
Mk-86. The Mk-86 casualty team consists of two FTGs—one in Repair 1, the other in DPC. They maintain communications with CIC on the 21MC and Repair 8 on the X6JL.
The inherent constraints of the battle orders must be recognized. Insufficient detail is obviously bad; so is too much information. By keeping the following four assumptions in mind, a commanding officer can limit the scope of his battle orders:
►The ship is not under attack, but is preparing for it.
►There are no shortages of ammunition.
These, of course, can be changed to conform to different circumstances.
5. Describe Equipment Status. The proper status of combat systems equipment should be described from two frames of reference. Reaction time will be the most important variable. Starting with the highest threat level, the proper status of each equipment in every major combat system should be described. The states can be further limited by linking readiness conditions to threat levels. For
[1] (TNW*) I II III
Conditions of Readiness
'Theater Nuclear Warfare
►The crew is fully manned and without injuries.
►There are no equipment casualties.