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replacement program is in NATO’s planning stages. Escort requirements analyses were conducted by the U. S. Navy which examined merchant shipping needs worldwide. These studies also identified the numbers and types of surface escorts required to protect shipping. The Navy’s conclusion is that even with all the FFG-7s currently in the U. S. shipbuilding program, plus the Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates, there will still be a critical escort shortage. That shortage, incidentally, assumes that about 200 allied frigates would be available.
Despite the many good arguments advanced for the elimination of convoys, there would seem to be as many—and much stronger—arguments in favor of convoys.
The FFG-7 was designed in the early 1970s with her somewhat narrowly defined set of mission requirements aimed at convoy protection. That design, greatly constrained by cost goals and not necessarily optimum for that mission, nevertheless provides a modest level of antisubmarine and antiair protection to escorted shipping. A combination of possible threats—namely, submarine-launched torpedoes and cruise missiles, and air- launched cruise missiles—are likely since worldwide sealift can no longer, as in the past, be guaranteed transits in “low threat” environments.
If the merchant ships form into something resembling a convoy formation, the FFG-7s make a useful antisubmarine warfare contribution. The FFG-7 in the outer screen will employ the SQR-19 towed array sonar and LAMPS-III helicopter, and will be stationed to minimize the submarine’s chances of hitting one of the protected convoy ships with long-range weapons. The towed array screens must be sufficiently distant from the convoy so that the towed array’s performance is not degraded by convoy noise, and detection is made early enough to complete target prosecution with LAMPS-III.
The FFG-7 can provide a second level of defense as an inner- zone ASW “pouncer,” responding to a flaming datum (a torpedoed merchantman). The same pouncer ships can also provide air defense inside the convoy. However, inner-zone antisubmarine defense may be somewhat less effective than the outer screen because of the FFG-7’s short active sonar range and the difficulty of obtaining valid sonobuoy detections in the midst of a convoy. Air defense against crossing targets is also a problem. Even if the capability of the Mk-92 fire control system were to be enhanced with a phased array radar, as is now being proposed, it is doubtful that the Standard-MR (SM-1) missile would have the coverage envelope necessary to protect more than the few merchant ships adjacent to an FFG-7 in the convoy.
It is not the purpose of this article to recommend specific technical modifications to optimize the FFG-7’s combat system for sealift protection. Any such recommendations must be based on careful analyses of the tradeoffs and an in-depth appreciation of the ship’s primary mission. In the meantime, the Navy should intensify its training with the FFG-7 in the convoy protection role. The current concept of frigate operations for the outer and inner screens of expanded or concentrated convoys is complex larger and more realistic exercises are needed to gain proficiency. These exercises should be given high priority, and conducted on the same scale as exercises involving carrier battle groups.
The stakes involved in effective sealift protection are high- They concern not just Navy missions, but the achievement of national military objectives. The lack of preparedness for effective sealift protection in World Wars I and II must not be repeated. Future conflicts may not give us an opportunity to make up for the lack of peacetime emphasis on sealift protection.
'Reuven Leopold, “Technology and Future Warship Design,” Proceedings, March 1978, pp. 36-47, and Captain H. C. Mustin, USN, “The Surface Navy: All Stop or All Ahead Flank,” Proceedings, March 1978, pp. 56-61.
Planning of General Purpose Forces: The Navy, Congressional Budget Office. 1976.
3Carl White, “A Capacity for Conflict,” Sea Power, April 1983, pp. 62-67. 4Joseph G. DiLullo, ‘‘A Force for Southwest Asia,” National Defense, July/Au- gust 1983, pp. 40-44.
5Soviet Military Power (2nd ed.), U. S. Government Printing Office, 1983. 6Terry Hughes and John Costello, Battle of the Atlantic (New York: The Dial Press, 1977).
7John Winton and Michael Joseph, Lest We Forget Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade, 1890-1990 (London, 1983).
Commander Adler, a 1953 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, earned a master’s degree in 1962 from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His naval service included several tours on board surface combatants and in research and development billets. From 1968 to 1973, he participated in mission tradeoff studies, under OpNaV direction, which led to the design of the patrol frigate (later called the FFG-7). Since 1973, he has been the founding president of a systems engineering analysis firm in Washington, D.C.
Article Bonus Contest Winner
Round Holes Aplenty
We all owe Lieutenant Commander Bruce Linder one for getting the dialogue going with “The FFG-7 is becoming the square peg in the Navy’s round holes of operational planning.” Maybe. But a square peg will fit into a round hole—if the round hole is big enough. And the U.S. Navy has plenty of big round holes in its operational planning that only the FFG-7 class of frigates can, and should, fill.
Supertanker Escort: Some of our most
By Paul Anderson
important strategic lifelines are the routes that supertankers travel carrying crude petroleum from the Middle East/Persian Gulf area to our East Coast ports. These supertankers would become prime targets for Soviet submarines and aircraft once war broke out (or before), and are potential targets for terrorist attacks or quick, surgical “warning shot” strikes. These ships need all the protection they can get, and the FFG-7 is the one type of ship that can give it to them. These frigates can escort a supertanker, or a group of supertankers in a convoy, from the Persian Gulf, through the Strait of Hormuz, around Africa, and to U. S. East Coast or Gulf Coast ports—even to Europe or Japan—and back again. Obviously, this is one of the few types of missions for these frigates that can be performed regularly in peacetime; all that needs to be done is to find a captain of a supertanker who would like to have some company on his next Middle East run, and you
have an instant “convoy” with which to practice tactics.
Underway Replenishment Group Escort: When units of our fleet are far away from home protecting our vital national interests, they must be kept supplied with fuel, ammunition, and other materials; this is the mission of the underway replenishment groups. The FFG-7s are capable of protecting these groups from both air and subsurface attack in low- to medium-threat environments. Besides defending against attacks by aircraft (such as “Backfires”), their missiles would be used to shoot down any submarine-launched cruise missiles aimed at the group, while the embarked helicopters prosecuted the attacking submarine. Also, with the top speed of many replenishment ships being approximately 20 knots, these frigates have the speed necessary to escort such a group.
Hunter-Killer Group Escort: One of the main methods used during the latter part of World War II for combating submarines was the employment of the hunter-killer group, consisting of a small aircraft carrier and several escorts. Several of these units patrolled the North Atlantic, and were credited with sinking many submarines.
This same concept is still appropriate today. The modem hunter-killer group would consist of three FFG-7s and one Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer in company with an Arapaho-configured merchantman, which would also serve as the unit’s replenishment ship. Using the helicopters based on board the Arapaho ship and escorts, in addition to on-board weapons and sensors, this hunter-killer group would seek out and destroy submarines. Any missiles fired by the submarines would be countered by the combatants’ point defense systems.
Coastal Convoy Escort: Some of our most important—and most vulnerable— trade routes are the coastal shipping routes just off our shores. During the early part of World War II, the Germans exploited this vulnerability, and sank more than 300 U. S. and Allied ships operating along these coastal routes. Today, this weakness still exists, and the Soviets know it. These routes will become some of the first hunting grounds for Soviet submarines once war breaks out; something must be done to protect the ships traveling these routes. The FFG-7s are good ships to use for this mission. They will not keep the submarines away from these lanes, but they will be in a position to shoot down missiles fired from these submarines against the convoy, and they will be able to attack the submarines. The FFG-7s are also capable of countering attacks by “Backfires” or any other aircraft that might be sent against a convoy from Cuba or other nearby Soviet surrogates. Also, their 76mm. gun would make short work of many fast attack craft that might try to intercept the convoy. The FFG-7s are ideally suited for this type of work.
Coast Defense: During World War II, our coastal areas were relatively safe from enemy attack; this is not the case today. Submarines stationed 100 miles off our coast, or bombers sent from Cuba could inflict massive damage, even with conventional munitions. The FFG-7s could be used to defend our shores from these attacks in a manner similar to their use as coastal convoy escorts. The FFG-7s would patrol the waters off our more valuable port cities and harbors, guarding these locations. Any missile fired from a submarine could be intercepted, and any submarine caught in coastal waters would soon be sunk; similarly, hostile aircraft could be brought down before much damage was inflicted. Also, these ships would be able to alert a harbor or city to a threat, providing them enough time to take defensive measures. Because our coastal cities are some of the most important cities we have, and the most vulnerable, something must be done to protect them; other than setting up complex and extensive missile and aircraft defenses at each location, using FFG-7s in a coastal defense role is one of the most feasible ways of doing it.
While the duties mentioned here can be
Fin stabilizers could eliminate much of the rock and roll experienced by Oliver Hazard Perry-c/ass frigates operating in high sea states, making them even more effective escorts.
performed quite well, as the ships are currently configured, some of the FFG-7s could be modified to make them even more capable:
► Convert all ships to accommodate the LAMPS-III helicopter
► Install fin stabilizers in every ship of the class to allow for air operations in heavier seas than is now possible
► Install the tactical towed array sonar in each ship to give the FFG-7 better submarine detection and classification capabilities than her current on-board systems can provide
► Upgrade the AN/SLQ-32(V)2 electronic warfare system to the (V)3 version to give the ship additional electronic warfare strength, including a jamming capability which she does not now have
► Install at least two more Phalanx close- in weapon systems in each ship to help counter a large-scale missile attack.
It could be argued that because these ships are small, relatively slow, underarmed, and technologically behind the times, they are not fit for almost any duty (except as an anchor for a real ship). But these terms also describe the 50 destroyers that we sent to Britain in 1940 as part of the “lend-lease” deal. Those destroyers became known as the “50 ships that saved the world” because they arrived in Britain just in time to keep that nation from being starved to death by the German U-boat offensive. The FFG-7s are arriving just in time today. In the next war, they may very well be the 50 ships that help to save our world.
Mr. Anderson earned a B.S. in computer math and computer physics from Saginaw Valley State College, Michigan, an M.S.E.E. at Cleveland State University, and is earning a professional degree in operations research at George Washington University. Currently, he is a computer engineer at the Naval Electronic Systems Command in Washington, D.C.