Debate on strategic nuclear weapons seems to have become a permanent fixture in American political life. A year ago, the B-l bomber program assumed international significance when its value to the nation’s security was openly and hotly debated prior to the project’s cancellation. Since then, the new land-based missile system, dubbed MX in Pentagonese, has assumed a similar stature and quite possibly faces a similar fate. Other programs with lower profiles have not been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, but many have fallen by the wayside. The Trident submarine is the sole survivor among the nation’s major strategic upgrade programs.
By way of contrast, the most recent estimates indicate that by the early- to mid-1980s the Soviets intend to deploy some 820 intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) and possibly an additional 380 modern single-headed, land-based missiles.1 To supplement this huge force, the Soviets appear to be moving in the direction of some 950-1,000 modern sea-launched ballistic missiles deployed aboard submarines. As a final gesture, upwards of 400 new “Backfire” intercontinental bombers appear to be in the offing, and that means that for the first time in history the Soviet long-range air force will outnumber its U. S. counterpart.2
Unlike the developing Soviet capability, the American force of tomorrow will bear a considerable resemblance to the force of today. It will still consist of the basic triad of land-based missiles, long-range intercontinental bombers, and submarine-launched weapons. But there will be some differences. By the early- to mid-1980s, it has been estimated, 75-90% of the 1,054 existing land-based missiles will not be able to survive an attack from large and increasingly accurate Soviet land-based missiles. The B-52 bomber, the last of which was delivered in October 1962, will be just that much older. Built to fly for ten years or 5,000 hours, the average B-52 has now logged more than 8,000 hours. Even so, Washington planners still intend to include it in the active inventory into the 1990s. How effective such an ancient weapon can be in the face of ever-improving Soviet air defenses (which may include dedicated submarine-launched ballistic missiles with depressed trajectories) must remain a matter for conjecture.3
Therefore, it would seem prudent to guarantee that at least one leg of the triad is both secure and modernized, lest the entire strategic picture become hopelessly imbalanced. On these grounds alone, a strong case can be made for the Trident. But that is only the beginning. The existing fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), today consisting of 41 ships, faces block obsolescence beginning in the mid-1980s at the latest. This situation is the product of policies which resulted in large numbers of SSBNs being commissioned in the years 1959-1967 (particularly 1964), and then virtually no additional ships coming along until fiscal year 1974, when the first Trident was authorized.
Obsolescence is also a product of engineering and cost factors. Some analysts have estimated that the first ten ballistic-missile submarines, the five George Washingtons (SSBN-598 class) and the five Ethan Allens (SSBN-608 class), each armed with 16 Polaris A-3 missiles, will be useful for fleet service for only 20 years because of engineering considerations. The 3 1 more modern units of the Lafayette (SSBN-616) class, each armed with 16 Poseidon C-3 missiles, should possess service lives of 25 years. Should this dour assessment prove correct, then the problem will begin to make itself felt as early as 1979- Otherwise, the problem will not begin to manifest itself until 1984 (see Table 1). Frankly, however, given the appalling state of much of the rest of the strategic nuclear triad, it is doubtful that anyone will seriously consider phasing out the ten Polaris-armed SSBNs, no matter what their engineering status is.4
As for the Poseidon-armed ships, though their service potential may be safely assumed to be 25 years, questions do begin to enter beyond that. There is little possibility of retrofitting modern noise- reducing techniques into the old ships, and there is a lack of room for growth, thus precluding future improvements in the ship and missile systems. Their survivability (to be dealt with presently), in the face of ever-improving Soviet antisubmarine capabilities, would also have to be called into question. And this does not touch the problem of cost.5
The Department of Defense (DoD) has estimated that to extend the useful service careers of the 31 Poseidon-armed SSBNs from 20 to 25 years would cost $580 million in fiscal year 1978 dollars. To prolong the period from 20 to 30 years would cost $2.03 billion in the same currency. Conclusion: by the end of the next decade, or by 1992 at the latest, the entire current fleet of 41 ships and 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles must be replaced.6
DoD and the Department of the Navy have determined that the replacement for the aging fleet should be the Trident-armed Ohio (SSBN-726) class. In every respect, this ship represents an advance upon her predecessors. However, in at least one respect, namely her great size (18,700 submerged tons contrasted to the 8,250 tons of the Lafayette class), she has been challenged as “gold-plated” and condemned as not cost-effective. This accusation, though enjoying wide acceptability, is not accurate, as an examination of the ship will show.
First, one of the most important factors involved in determining the size of the submarine was the number of missiles to be deployed per ship. Today, the state of the art has determined that number to be 24. Beyond that, the ship becomes too long and maneuvering becomes a problem. But if one attempts to reduce the beam of the ship, and thus accommodate 24 missiles in a smaller hull, then the length-to- beam ratio enters a state of imbalance, and the ship will experience flotation problems.7
Second, the new reactor, which produces more quiet speed for each level of noise (the faster the ship, the more the noise) and more speed overall, is large. And that size was one of the key factors in the determination of the size of the ship. On the other hand, the state of the art indicates that in the future the reactor size may be reduced, and for a given amount of power, the reactor and hull may be smaller. But under these circumstances, one is still confronted by the specter of a 16-missile ship (the flotation problem does not alter), and, therefore, it is necessary to purchase 15 smaller submarines to carry as many missiles as ten larger ones. In its turn, this leads to a sharp rise in crew costs (a very big factor in the life-cycle costs of the ship), since crews tend to be around the same size regardless of the size of the submarine.8
Third, the large hull can accommodate a larger and more sensitive sonar array; it has room for growth and improved technology (a smaller hull would have almost no such room); and, very importantly, the large hull allows sophisticated quieting techniques to be employed. For example, the large hull can accommodate two sets of machinery, one matched to the light load of low-speed operations, and one for the heavy load of high-speed maneuvers.9
Fourth, those who advocate smaller hulls with a mind to proliferating targets in the face of improved enemy defenses fail to take into account modern antisubmarine warfare concepts. The basic way SSBNs are hunted involves sweeping the ocean launch space at a fixed number of square miles (normally a few) per hour. If one submarine is present, then one will be found; if five are present, then five will be found. It is a question of space, not numbers.10
Fifth, the greatest advantage the Ohio class brings to the fleet is its ability to handle first the Trident I (C-4) missile and later the highly sophisticated Trident II (D-5). Lafayette-class ships can also manage the Trident I, but under no circumstances can they accommodate the Trident II. These two weapons are essential for the nation’s defense in the future, principally because of the range factor.
Today’s Polaris A-3 and Poseidon C-3 missiles have the identical range of 2,500 nautical miles (2,880 statute miles). With Moscow assumed to be the locus of the target structure, that is adequate to provide more than three million square nautical miles of sea space to hide in (excluding water beneath the polar ice caps and within the 200-fathom line). As a result, expert testimony has repeatedly confirmed the belief that the current fleet of SSBNs has a very high survivability potential in the face of an enemy attack. In fact, 90% for those at sea is the usually accepted figure.11
Unfortunately, tomorrow is another matter, for a wide variety of reasons. One of these lies in the situation created by the deterioration of the other two- thirds of the strategic triad. With the bombers questionable and the land-based missiles on the verge of becoming little more than a target structure, a great deal of effort is apt to be devoted to the destruction of the SSBNs. A second difficulty arises from the fact that when the SSBNs are deployed, it is away from the soil of the United States proper. They, unlike either remaining arm of the triad, may be attacked without damaging the metropole. Under these conditions, they could invite an attack upon themselves. Then there is the problem of a “creeping” or “attritional” assault. High on the list of plausible situations resulting in nuclear confrontation would be one during a war involving the European NATO nations. Such a war might involve days, weeks, or even months, with the SSBNs conceivably under attack for a prolonged period prior to the actual confrontation. In such a circumstance, their survival prospects are unpredictable.
The principal threat to the existing fleet stems from the potential dwindling of the available sea launch space, which itself is a product of the awesome growth of Soviet capabilities. It was noted above that the existing missile systems provided over three million miles of sea space for deployment. That figure is a bit misleading. First, certain areas such as the Black, Baltic, Barents, and possibly Norwegian Seas, including the entirety of the area north of the Denmark Strait, would have to be ruled out (or at least considered risky) because of the extreme hazards posed by ever-growing, ever-improving Soviet antisubmarine forces.
The Mediterranean is in much the same category, particularly the highly desirable eastern portion where some of the best launch points are located. It may be unfortunate, but this body of water, encompassing more than 950,000 square miles, is not only terribly narrow at Gibraltar, but it is also broken up into basins and choke points throughout its length and breadth. The most notable of these are created by the boot of Italy and by Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, and Cyprus. Soviet proximity to the region, and possible use of the Turkish Straits, plainly leaves the region open to intense Soviet naval activity— attack submarines, surface combatants, and aircraft.
Fortunately, the launching areas which are available are still rather considerable in size. Almost all of the 204 prime urban target areas with populations above 100,000 can be struck by launching missiles from the North Atlantic, Western Pacific, and Arabian Sea areas. However, it is possible for a substantial reduction in this available sea space to occur. To understand this potential menace more fully, it is necessary to examine one exotic tactic for attacking and destroying submerged SSBNs. This is the concept of conducting barrage attacks against the points at sea where the SSBNs may be lurking. A few years ago, former SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiator and arms expert Paul H. Nitze warned that a serious situation would exist if the Soviets came to possess a force sufficiently large to barrage some 100 key aim-points, each 300 square miles in area. More recently,. DoD experts, in carefully sanitized testimony, stated that it was feasible to create a large enough strategic capability to blanket an area the size of the Mediterranean Sea (over 950,000 square miles), or a square of sea space up to 750 miles on a side, with submarine-crushing quantities of overpressure.12 Unfortunately, neither of these goals should be beyond Soviet expectations, given the projected size of the Soviet strategic force in the 1980s, which far exceeds the 1,200 modern intercontinental ballistic missiles, 950-1,000 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 400 "Backfire” bombers mentioned earlier.
First, there is the problem of the land-mobile SS-16, a true ICBM which has thus far been tested with one reentry vehicle. At the current deployment rate, up to 1,000 of these weapons may enter the stockpile or inventory by 1985.13 Complicating the issue further is the SS-20, an SS-16 with two instead of three stages. It is widely believed that this system could be rapidly outfitted with the third stage necessary to convert it into an ICBM, that the SS-20 launcher can handle the SS-16, and that a very large purchase may be expected—as many as 1,000.14 One must also wonder what is becoming of all the older weapons currently being phased out of service. Though today the number is less, at one point there were more than 1,000 SS-11s, 210 SS-7/8s (up to four reloads for some of these were purchased), 288 huge SS-9s, and 60 SS-Bs. Since the Soviets are known to discard nothing, one must wonder if these missiles were truly dismantled or if they were stockpiled for soft-pad launch in time of crisis.15
Perhaps the greatest confusion exists in relation to the “Yankee”-class submarine. This class dates from around 1967, which means the oldest units in this very large class (34 ships, each with 16 missiles) are more modern than the youngest of the American Lafayette-class SSBNs. The proposed strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT-II) would indicate a ceiling of some 950-1,000 for the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile force. Since the Soviets are already very near this figure, they will have three options: cease building strategic submarines, phase out some of the old ones, or negotiate a treaty that while stating one ceiling actually allows another to exist.
Of those three options, the first is implausible because the Soviets are only now beginning to construct the long-awaited 24-missile “Typhoon” class. Unless they intend to undergo the extraordinary cost of constructing only one or two of these (and all research and development costs are sunk, irrespective of the number constructed), they will soon have to adopt one of the other solutions or a combination thereof.16
A combination looms as their most plausible option, because the Soviets are known to be developing a new and improved missile (SS-NX-17) for the “Yankee”-class and must intend to deploy it. In addition, there have been repeated rumors emanating from SALT that the ceilings agreed to will not become active until after the three-year protocol has expired, and that when this occurs, the Soviets will demand an extension of the protocol under threat of abrogating the treaty.17
Two other rumors are also disquieting. The first posits that the Soviets really do intend to reduce the number of “Yankee”-class hulls now carrying ballistic missiles. Instead, according to the rumor, they would be rearmed with SS-N-12 or SS-N-13 cruise missiles for use against other submarines. Second, it has been rumored that some of the old diesel-powered boats have been outfitted with the modern long- range SS-N-8 missile. If this latter is proven to be true, then it would represent a blatant violation of SALT I and would bring the entire process into question. If the former is true, then a major question involving the verification of the conversion will emerge.18
Moving to the manned bomber program does not improve the picture. In terms of barraging sea space, bombers are particularly lethal because of the immense payloads they are capable of lifting over short ranges, and because they are reusable. Even a medium-range bomber, such as the Tu-16 “Badger” with the relatively modest payload of 20,000 pounds, could theoretically lift well over a 15-megaton gravity bomb for some portion of its 2,000-mile combat radius.19 The exact size this force will assume in the future is not certain. It has been estimated, however, that the Soviets will deploy not only some 400 new intercontinental “Backfire” bombers (which will not be covered in SALT II) but are well along the road to deploying an even longer- ranged version. And this does not touch upon the hundreds of older medium- and long-range bombers that are currently contained in the Soviet strategic and tactical air inventories.20
In examining the unprecedented size of the projected Soviet strategic force of the 1980s and the relatively modest demands placed upon it by other strategic necessities (such as destroying missile silos), it would appear that it will acquire the capability to employ exotic techniques against the SSBN forces of the United States. As a result, previously held concepts of high survivability against antisubmarine warfare and sea space barrage techniques must be considered outmoded. While no one is able to predict precisely how effective some of these methods might be if put into practice, it would seem prudent to assume that the earlier held figure of 67% of the total SSBN fleet (.75 crisis-available x .9 survivable) available for launching missiles should be lowered to the 50% range.
In view of the state of the remainder of the triad, this is not supportable. Wisdom would appear to dictate that a much longer-ranged missile should be deployed to increase the vital sea space available to the SSBN of the 1980s. Trident I (C-4), with its estimated 4,000-mile range, would increase the sea space available for maneuver from around 3 million square miles to more than 14 million. The even longer ranged Trident II (D-5)—perhaps 7,500 statute miles—would increase that sea space to some 55 million. In addition, the vast range of these weapons would make the boats less susceptible to conventional antisubmarine assault by allowing them to operate in areas undergoing seasonal storms and other natural disturbances.21
The next consideration involves the size of the Trident force to be purchased. This, in turn revolves around the mission the fleet of the 1980s is expected to execute, which admittedly is difficult to evaluate.
As a result of what are known as "civil defense measures,” the Soviets have been or in a few years will be able to substantially reduce the amount of devastation that the small and inherently inaccurate submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads are able to inflict. This is/will be accomplished brough a series of preparations involving industrial hardening combined with population evacuation and sheltering. More specifically, Soviet civil defense programs (today or tomorrow) function by increasing the area the populace is dispersed in from a small fraction of 1% of the nation’s territory to as much as 27%— or, in the case of industry, by increasing certain machinery’s ability to withstand overpressure (from 10 pounds per square inch to as much as 300) by packing it in soil and mounting it properly.22
The result today is that Polaris, Poseidon, or Trident I missiles might realistically be expected to assault only that portion of Soviet society which by its nature will remain unhardened. But in terms of industrial damage (population loss is difficult to calculate), the amount is still impressive. The absolute minimum the SSBN fleet should be able to inflict would be equal to some 35% of all Soviet industry, and the entirety of the 310 or so urban centers with populations in excess of 50,000. Any Soviet planner who is not deeply concerned with the prospective loss of all of the nation’s largest urban centers in the matter of half an hour—bearing in mind that World War II damage to the Soviet Union was spread over four years—may be difficult to deter at all.23
To achieve the disruptive goal of general damage with no cushion for error or the covering of targets in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 15 Ohio-class boats would suffice to deliver 400-megaton equivalents on the Soviet Union, using the formula of .9 at sea x .9 survivable x .8 missile reliability x a constant 100 kiloton burst for each of a missile’s eight warheads. On the other hand, if a margin for error is included (and 200 additional megaton equivalents allowed for the PRC), then some 20 Trident-class submarines (see table 2) would be necessary, given the variables involved in a nuclear attack. These include the percentage of the ships at sea (75-90%), their survivability (90% for Trident), the reliability of the missile (between 65-90%), and the stability of the burst (80-120 kilotons).
That means if the Trident system performed adequately, there would be sufficient force to cover not only the basic target structure in the Soviet Union, but that in the People’s Republic of China as well. If the performance of the system were in the mid-range, then there would be sufficient coverage for the prime targets in the Soviet Union and some in China. Lastly, if the system performed poorly, though there would not be sufficient force to cover even the whole of the Soviet Union, at least the bulk of the key targets, the 204 urban centers with populations over 100,000, could be struck. Perhaps most importantly, this force level could be achieved by the cutoff date of 1992 by continuing the current rate of procurement through 1987.
There is another way to achieve this goal: rearm the 3 1 ships of the Lafayette class with Trident I (C-4) missiles and bear the additional expense of extending their service lives to 30 years. (Current force planning proposes to convert ten Poseidon units to the Trident configuration between 1980-1984.) Of course, at the end of that additional five-year extension, the same block obsolescence would have to be faced, the old hulls could not possibly be as secure as the modern silent Trident class, and under no circumstances could the old Lafayette class be armed with the highly promising Trident II (D-5) missile.24
If the Trident II (D-5) missile program (which currently has its initial operating capability projected for the late 1980s) is accelerated, then SSBN capability can be vastly increased. At this writing, the only valid estimate of what would be necessary to overcome Soviet civil defense programs rests on the testimony of arms expert Paul Nitze. He has estimated that 1,500-2,000 hard-target-capable weapons and 3,000 megatons are required to overcome any plausible Soviet civil defense program. In this sense, Trident II is capable of making a very substantial contribution.25
Again assuming that in the future no one arm of the triad will be able to execute the whole strategic mission, then some 30 Ohio-class SSBNs (about the largest number that realistically could be constructed by 1992) could provide a very considerable portion of the whole. In this instance they could be armed with a mixed magazine consisting of 12 missiles each equipped with seven 150-kiloton reentry vehicles and 12 additional missiles each armed with a single five-megaton reentry vehicle. (Note: This estimate might prove to be pessimistic because the final configuration of the missile is yet to be decided upon. It is possible that the Trident II may be equipped with up to 14 150-kiloton reentry vehicles or an eight- megaton single warhead.) It is also to be hoped that by the late 1980s terminal guidance will finally be ready for deployment, and that it will reduce accuracy errors to the .05 nautical mile area.26 Under these conditions, the fleet of 30 boats would be able to strike at most combinations of targets with very high single shot kill probabilities, and at the same time deliver a very substantial quantity of megaton- age. To procure a force of this description would require some acceleration in the existing rate of construction. But there would be no basic problems, because originally it was intended to construct Trident at the rate of three a year. If this rate were to be adopted in 1981 and carried through to 1987, then by the cutoff year of 1992, the entire force of 30 would have entered the fleet. This would be a formidable force, one that would give any aggressor pause for reflection.27
In summary, it would appear that the United States is going to have to make some hard choices. The strategic bombers are rapidly turning into antiques, while the land-based missile portion of the triad is in danger of becoming a target structure. This fate cannot be allowed to befall the entire triad, so it would appear wise to upgrade the sea-based missile force.
In this sense, Trident is the most cost-effective answer. The big boats may be armed with 50% more weapons than the current SSBNs, will be more quiet, carry extremely sophisticated sensors, and overall will be more survivable. Above all, upgrade programs for the existing 31 Lafayette-class SSBNs with the Trident I (C-4) missile should be abjured. At the most, they postpone the day of judgment by a few years, cannot guarantee the same high level of survivability against breakthroughs that the Ohio-class SSBN can, and, worst, might well doom the highly promising Trident II program.
Even with this promising weapon, a force of 30 Trident-class boats could not execute the entire mission alone. But today no one arm of the triad is expected to. With Trident II and up to 30 units in commission, a very real portion of the mission could be carried out. Synergism with the surviving portions of the other two arms of the triad would be necessary to conclude the job.
Finally, there are those who complain that the cost of Trident is too great. They are particularly upset when large numbers (20 or 30) are mentioned, because the unit cost might run in the $1.5 billion range. But these same critics seem to forget that only 14 years ago the United States, without spending itself into bankruptcy, was able to spend 8.3% of the then gross national product on defense. Today, the figure is in the 5.4% range. It is difficult to believe that nothing more is possible, that no further expense can possibly be borne, that all strategic arms programs must be cancelled or slashed—or that the richest nation on the face of the earth can no longer afford to survive.28
1. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “SALT Stance Allows New Missile,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 April 1978, p. 19.
2. Edgar Ulsamer, “The Equal Sign in the SALT II Equation,” Air Force Magazine, January 1978, p. 28.
3. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, January 1978, pp. 60-65; Robinson, “Soviets Boost 1CBM Accuracy,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 April 1978, p. 14.
4. "SAC Tests Consolidation of Maintenance,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 May 1976, pp. 152-153; Norman Polmar and D. A. Paolucci, “Sea-Based ‘Strategic’ Weapons for the 1980s and Beyond,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1978, p. 100.
5. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Authorizations, 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977, p. 3693.
6. Ibid., p. 3428.
7. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Research and Development, 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977, p. 6659.
8. Ibid., p. 6658; Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Research and Development, 94th Congress, 2nd session, 1976, p. 6535.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 6599-6600.
11. Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman, Strategic Force Issues for the Mid-Seventies (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 72; Sea-Based ‘Strategic’ Weapons,” p. 100.
12. Paul H. Nitze, “The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1974-1975, p. 148; Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Research and Development, 94th Congress, 2nd session, 1976, p. 5950.
13. Peter Hughes, “Arms Control and Strategic Stability,” Air Force Magazine, April 1978, p. 62; Bernard Weinraub, “Pentagon Aides Say Moscow Has Mobile Missiles Able to Reach U.S.," New York Times, 3 November 1977, p. 3.
14. Ulsamer, “The Equal Sign,” p. 29-
15. George J. Keegan, Jr., "New Assessment Put on Soviet Treaty,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28 March 1977, p. 46.
16. "Subs Raise SALT Observance Question,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 April 1978, p. 17.
17. Robinson, “Soviet Submarine Violates Pact,” Aviation Week 6 Space Technology, 27 February 1978, p. 14.
18. Polmar, "The Soviet SLBM Force,” Air Force Magazine, March 1978, p. 46; “Subs Raise SALT Observance,” p. 17.
19. Ted Greenwood, George W. Rathjens, and Jack Ruina, "Nuclear Power and Weapons Proliferation,” Adelphi Papers No. 130 (Winter 1976), p. 5.
20. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Authorizations, 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977, p. 73.
21.”Sea-Based ‘Strategic’ Weapons,” p. 101; Quanbeck and Bleechman, Strategic Force Issues, p. 72.
22. Senate Hearing Before the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Defense Industrial Base: Industrial Preparedness and Nuclear War Survival. 94th Congress, 2nd session, 1976, pp. 93, 204.
23. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Authorizations. 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977, p. 872.
24. Committee on Armed Services, Authorizations, 95th Congress, 1st session, p. 141.
25. Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1976-1977, p. 209.
26. Robinson, “MX Deployment Urged for Parity,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 5 December 1977, p. 14; Robinson, “SALT Stance,” p. 16.
27. “Sea-Based ‘Strategic’ Weapons,” p. 103.
28. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Authorizations. 94th Congress, 2nd session, 1976, p. 457.