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The New Central Front”
T.E. Descheneau, pp. 38-46, September 1977 Proceedings)
■ _
William Daniel O’Neil III, a staff spe- c'alist in the Office of the Director of ReMarch and Engineering—There is noth- lnS inherently implausible about the ^enario Mr. Descheneau proposes. ,ne major key, of course, is the Soviet ^rlift capability. It appears that the °viets are serious about building up a eet of 11-76 “Candid” transports, he 11-76 set a record carrying 40 Ihetric tons 5,000 km (about 3,100
Statute miles or 2,700 nautical miles), and most open-source references seem to accept this as representative of the jlrcraft’s maximum capabilities. (The °ckheed C-141A StarLifter, operating at Wartime load factors of 2.25G, can ^arry about 37 metric tons about ’°00 nautical miles; it is slightly Waller than the 11-76.) Mr. De- *cheneau speaks of a tanker version, Ut I can find no reference to it in °Pen sources, and the aircraft is, in hty personal view, not ideally suited Such a role. Moreover, available P °tos do not reveal a refueling probe the transport version. Nevertheless, y*n8 with reduced but still substan- Pal payloads (25 to 30 tons), the 11-76 °nld still be capable of reaching
Alaska, the western half of Canada, the northern Canadian islands, and Greenland, with sufficient reserves to get its cargo back home if the operation is aborted.
The Soviets do indeed maintain a large force of elite airborne troops, and do talk quite a bit about “desant” (special air and sea landing operations; also refers to the troops employed in these operations) operations. Undoubtedly, those who have built their careers on “airborne, airborne, all the way!” would be determined to see this force committed in important airborne operations in another war. (During World War II, airborne units were used primarily simply as elite ground troops.)
I remain unconvinced that the Soviets would view targets in the American and Canadian arctic as the most important objectives for this force. The United States does, as Mr. Descheneau observes, maintain some interceptor forces in the north, and Canadian interceptors could probably be staged forward in a matter of a few hours—less than the time it would take the Il-76s to reach their objectives. If complete surprise were not achieved, even a handful of interceptors could wreak havoc with the undefended transports.
And if initial success were achieved, what then? Tactical aircraft could be ferried in to the newly-seized bases but only at considerable difficulty and danger. Reinforcement and resupply would present nightmarish problems. There is little doubt that the United States and Canada, with their longer- ranged tactical air forces and relatively short distances to the arctic, would be able to cut off and overwhelm any Soviet airheads in a matter of weeks, if not days—if they had the forces available to do so.
None of this, however, is a good reason for ignoring the threat. Mr. Descheneau has presented a good case.
The Future of U. S. Amphibious Forces: A View from the Hill
William S. Lind, Legislative Assistant for Military Affairs, Senator Gary Hart’s staff—The importance of congressional attitudes toward the future of amphibious forces derives not only from Congress’s authority to set budgets and manpower levels, but also from the special relationship which has heretofore existed between the Congress and the U. S. Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has traditionally found the Congress a strong champion, and indeed the Corps owes its continued existence to congressional action in the late 1940s.
Congressional concerns aroused by Marine Corps manpower problems appear to have receded. Instances of abuse of recruits, coupled with alarming disciplinary problems, caused both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees to express serious concern in 1976 about Marine Corps recruiting and recruit training policies. The Senate Manpower Subcommittee recommended cuts in end strength to emphasize its belief that manpower quality should not be sacrificed to meet a force-level goal of 196,000. These concerns appear to have diminished as the present Commandant has improved recruit quality, halted training abuses, and made clear his belief that force levels should decline rather than compel induction of substandard manpower.
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Unfortunately, favorable congressional reaction to improvements in Marine Corps manpower policies appears to have blinded Marine Corps leadership to the growing concern among elements in Congress about deficiencies in amphibious force structure. One major congressional concern, however, relates to the Navy rather than the Marine Corps—the shortage of amphibious shipping. Navy insistence that improvements in amphibious shipping capability be
subordinated to the desire for a s0' called "balanced” fleet have not satis* fled some Members of Congress, who note that the nation is paying the high annual manpower costs for three Marine Amphibious Forces (MAFs), yet can move only one and one-third- Congressional concern with this contradiction could affect both the Navy shipbuilding budget and authorizations for Marine Corps force levels until amphibious lift is brought level with the size of the Marine Corps.
Another major force structure concern was expressed in the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the fiscal year 1978 defense authorization bill, which stated, “The Committee has noted the continued retention in the Army and the Marine Corps of a level of nonmechanical infantry forces which seems excessive m view of the alteration in mission priorities which has taken place since the termination of the conflict m Southeast Asia and the decreasing utility of nonmechanized infantry on the modern battlefield.” Worldwide proliferation of armored and mechanized forces—to the point where even Kuwait has more tanks than the Marine Corps—opens to question the cost effectiveness of a foot infantry amphibious force. If the Marines must fight a well-equipped Third World mechanized force, not to speak of forces from the Warsaw Pact, their chances of success would not appear high. Congress’s increasing concern w*th manpower costs may raise the Question of whether the expense of Maintaining a force of 190,000 men configured as foot infantry is justifiable, given other defense investment needs and options.
Marine Corps assertions that Marine a‘r units exist only to support the ground forces appear to some Members of Congress to contradict the evident priority accorded to the air wing both in budgeting and in the assignment of better quality personnel. The Senate Armed Services Committee report noted:
. . . the continuing disparity in the quality of Marine ground force and tactical air force personnel. This disparity is evident in significantly higher rates of indiscipline in Marine ground forces, and the greater difficulty those forces have encountered in recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified personnel.
It is the committee’s view that the Marine Corps is first and foremost a ground combat force and that the role of Marine aviation is to facilitate the operations of Marine ground forces. In the absence of a viable and appropriately equipped ground component, there is little justification for the separate status of Marine aviation. However, Marine ground forces have been consistently unable to meet authorized end strengths, and are demonstrably undercapitalized for combat in mid to high-intensity environments.
The Marine Corps should seek the optimum balance between the personnel and the resources devoted to the ground components and the aviation forces.
Congress may increasingly question che need for Marine fighter squadrons, h has noted, for example, the absence °f any explanation for Marine Corps ejection of the Haynes Board recommendation to trade three fighter squadrons for more ground firepower. Questions are beginning to be asked about the “air-ground team” concept in view of the increasing capability of hostile front-line air defenses, and the conclusion by some European air forces that these defenses make close air support an ineffective allocation of air assets. Potentially, these questions suggest serious congressional doubts about the perpetuation of Marine Corps air wings.
Thus far, congressional questions about Marine Corps force structure do not appear to have spread to amphibious force mission definition. However, it is not hard to foresee that apparent inconsistencies in Marine Corps missions will be noted as Congress expands its examination of the basic concepts underlying defense budget requests. For example, the relationship between the probability of a sudden attack in Europe and the time required to move a MAF to either Central Europe or the NATO flanks may lead to doubts about a NATO mission for the Marines. The same problem of slow response time could raise similar doubts about a Third World intervention mission, as could recognition of the political costs to the United States of involvement in a possibly protracted intervention conflict. The focus of the Marine Corps’ mission on seizing a beach—relying on follow-on Army forces to prosecute the subsequent land campaign—may cause further congressional questioning, given the lack of shipping and the very long response time of major Army forces.
These concerns go well beyond the issues of manpower quality and disciplinary problems, as important as those are. They illustrate the Congress’s increasing involvement in military concepts as opposed to manage
ment issues. Unless the Marine Corps is able to resolve its seeming contradictions in a coherent fashion and present its resolutions in an understandable and credible way to the Congress, the 30-year era of good feelings between the Congress and the Marine Corps may come to an end.
“WANTED:
Czar for Amphibious Forces”
(See R. A. Smaldone, pp. 94-95, July
Proceedings)
Captain Raymond A. Komorowski, U. S. Navy (Retired) and Lieutenant Robert D. Owen, U. S. Navy—If we read him correctly, Colonel Smaldone demeans the relationship among officers and communities when he suggests that the healthy, productive, competitive striving among communities has as its object, “to firmly ensure for themselves [officers] secure futures in the Navy.” Indeed, if that is the true purpose of communities, it would seem that he would advocate their abolition instead of urging the creation of yet another!
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If it is a question of garnering “a fair share of the best and the brightest” surface warfare officers to serve in amphibious forces, as Colonel Smaldone puts it, some facts may quiet his concern. Training for every officer aspiring to be a surface warfare officer begins with the Surface Warfare Officer’s School (Basic), the curriculum of which includes amphibious warfare. In order to qualify as a surface warfare officer (1110), and wear the distinguishing device, every officer must com-
plete the personnel qualification standard which includes sections on amphibious warfare theory, mission, amphibious task force/group organization, operations including Marine, surface, air, etc. No matter which ship type an officer first serves in, he enjoys a common basic professional training that includes the complexities and challenges of amphibious warfare.
Beyond that, all department heads in surface warfare ships are graduates of the surface warfare department head course. All graduates are first assigned as department heads on board surface combatants. Subsequently about three quarters can be expected to be split- toured to a department head billet in an amphibious or mobile logistic ship, a desirable practice constrained only by the available number of department head billets in those type ships.
In short, it is clearly the Navy’s objective to train and detail surface warfare officers on the basis of performance and not in accordance with the elitist systems that may have dominated in the past.
Finally, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) reports to the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to all naval amphibious matters. The Commandant of the Marine Corps’ interest in this matter hardly needs review; moreover, he and the CNO sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff | 1:1250 Ships, over 1500 models to select. Also • ’ the new 1:2400 models. We have NAVIS, ' ? NEPTUN, HANSA, VIKING, MERCATOR, ?
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We cannot know how those two gentlemen might react to the strident title of "czar,” but we expect they can nonetheless be relied upon to look over amphibious warfare with the vigor and fastidious care such a major capability deserves.
“Is Military Unionization An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
(See J. E. Kane, G. C. Reynolds, A. R. Thorgerson, and J. Gordon, pp. 36-44, November 1976, and pp. 24-28, December 1976; E. J. Ohlert, p. 75, and C. E. Burns, pp. 82-83, March 1977; R. S. Mathews, R. W. Noland, and S. H. Edwards, pp. 76-79, April 1977; W. S. Hoffman, p. 92, June 1977; R. J. Bayer, p. 68, August 1977; P. A. Young, pp. 86-87, September 1977 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Dan Brown, U.S. Marine Corps—The longer tours—four to six years in the same area rather than two or three—we’re all facing may change the naval service more than anything we’ve experienced. They could be the start of a trend with a bigger impact than the erosions of our benefits or even unionization.
If it comes, the trend will be toward “stability.” And "stability” could be disastrous, because we’re not "stable” people.
Let’s face it: we’re nomads.
True, there’s lots of talk about reducing "turbulence,” and the need to settle down. Many of us spout the advantages of buying homes and keeping the kids in a particular school. We even talk about the “need” to become part of some community.
But what do we mean? What’s bad about “turbulence?” Are we buying houses to settle down or to make money? What do we mean about schools? Is our talk the talk of nomads trying to make peace with the situation?
I don’t know the answers. I’m no psychologist. But, if the men of the naval service are nomads, the psychology of nomads is important. It may be time to find out what motivates nomads.
Some disagree, but I believe we have reason to be proud of ourselves. We’ve responded well in repeated crises. A few of us faced the crisis in Korea. Many moved rapidly and created national credibility during the Lebanon and Cuban crises. Most of us did the job—moving from unit to unit and place to place as required—' throughout the war in Vietnam. Some responded to 1975’s three crises in Southeast Asia. And many other examples of our prowess could be cited.
Think over your own career. As yon moved, did you find familiar professionals and familiar procedures? Did you bring to commands ideas that had worked in other commands? Did yon pick up new experience and carry *c when you moved? Has your experience helped commands work together?
Professionals will say “yes” to all those questions. But what if we were non-nomadic? Would commands develop incompatible procedures? They might. While visiting my duty station last year, the Commandant of the Mexican Marine Corps said his marines don’t move, and there are big differences between the marines of eastern and western Mexico. Those of us who worked with Vietnamese forces—South Vietnamese servicemen usually served within a few “klicks” of home—noted similar things. Could that happen to our Navy and Marine Corps?
Think about your involvement in crises. Did your nomadic leaning— and the fact you had moved frequently—make it easier to move fast when you had to? Did familiar faces and procedures simplify the preparation for crisis in a command which filled rapidly? Did the same things—familiar faces and procedures— simplify working with “strange” ships or units?
Many times in the past 20 years, Atlantic and Pacific fleet units— ships, squadrons, and Marine battalions—have unexpectedly found themselves to be partners. They’ve done well each time. Will we do as well if our opportunities to move decrease?
If opportunities to move decrease, will the character of our professional cadres—the officers, chief petty offi-
Cers, and staff noncommissioned officers—change? Could the fastcoving professionals of today give Way to a slow-moving group whose Cernbers will do little inter-command sharing of ideas and experiences? Could they be the group to lose a war?
These questions are tough, but they need ask ing. And, if the crises c°ntinue, their answers could be crucial t0 national survival. We must ask such Questions, and they must reach our na- tlQn s leaders. They’re part of our sworn °hligation to “uphold and defend . . . against all enemies. ...”
These questions won’t be received gratefully. Those who “raise armies and navies” are struggling with rising Costs, and the price of keeping us nomadic is huge. These questions are n°r easily answered by cost effective's studies, and—though such arguments don’t fit formal studies either—national planners may argue rhat reducing “turbulence” will take stfains off service families and improve °Ur links with society.
But strains on families and links ^*th society don’t win or prevent ^ars. Fighting men do.
We can depend on our national Planners to buy us new weapons. But, 'f they don’t pay attention to our psychological makeup too, they’ll buy defeat.
They’ll have to remember we’re n°mads.
Should Military Unionization Permitted?”
c. J. Parnell, pp. 18-24, July 1977; G.
T van de Griendt, p. 70, October 1977 ^r°ceedings)
lieutenant W. J. E. van Rijn, Royal Netherlands Navy, Navigating Officer, NNLMS Tromp (F-801)—In an effort tQ prove his point against unionizing
U.S. armed forces, Commander arnell has gone so far as to seriously °ffend the Dutch armed forces by Crediting them with a reputation for sWenliness and unreliability. It is not ^lear on which observations he bases ls opinion, but I think very few of ^ose who have had the opportunity to ^ork with the Netherlands armed °rces will agree with him.
After making remarks similar to Commander Parnell’s, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, U.S. Air Force, was invited to the Netherlands for a visit to the Royal Netherlands Navy, Army, and Air Force. His prejudice, as well as Commander Parnell’s, must have been based on a very tendentious TVdocumentary which has also circulated in the United States giving a totally distorted picture of the Dutch armed forces. When on board my ship General Brown admitted his first opinion to be erroneous.
Indeed, saluting has been abolished (as in many other countries), but no lax practices are allowed; long hair is permitted, but unkempt appearance is not tolerated and uniforms may not be sloppy; reduction in rank is no longer a viable disciplinary tool since it does not help to motivate a man to do better next time; compensation for extra duty has been a normal matter in civilian life for years and has now finally been effected for the military man as well.
The right to unionize in military life has been accepted for a long time in the Netherlands. Perhaps unions in the United States have different goals than those in Europe, but of course unionizing may in no way adversely affect the combat readiness and reliability of the armed forces. Some restrictions must be, and are in effect, imposed.
Most unions are primarily concerned with the working conditions and legal status of their members, though some are more militant, like the union of conscripts. Recently, there have been some disputes between the union of conscripts and the secretary of defense which may have given way to the opinion that unions are undermining discipline and so the armed forces as a whole. This, however, is an inadmissible generalization, as many unions, directly or indirectly, work in the interest of the armed forces.
The Royal Netherlands Navy in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas, the Royal Netherlands Army in the Northern Army Group, and the Royal Netherlands Air Force in the Second Allied Tactical Air Force are performing their duties in a keen, professional, and efficient way, together with their allies. Those who have worked closely with the Dutch armed forces can confirm this.
So, with his fourth argument against unionizing the U.S. armed forces, Commander Parnell not only weakens his position, but also insults a proud organization which performs a vital role in NATO.
Si
the
th;
lat it exists in the United States. In rermany most of the male officers ^ave not even gotten used to their new
^ale armed forces medical personnel Vet.
The Sexually-Integrated Warship ...”
®ee D- R. Burnett, pp. 90-91, April 1977; S. J- McCrory and N.J. Kotite, p. 83, July *577; E. M. Kaufman, pp. 63-64, August 1977 Proceedings)
^se Maria Wellershoff—If the day-to- ^jay life in coed naval ships should in- eed prove to be as complicated as ^rs- Kaufman sees it, I suggest that che U.S, Navy give women the oppor- lunity of serving on board ship by Seating "male,” “female,” and “coed” Vessels. It could then be optional for Sailors (and their husbands/wives) to ^erve on the kind of ship they want. 'v'th the number of ships of each type available in the United States this shouU not be too much of an organi- 2ati°nal problem. It simply does not *eern right to deprive all those fine ^ale sailors, some of whom have Served in the merchant marine for Vears without a problem, of the career °Pportunities their male colleagues en- ,Qy- If the only complications are exPected between the sexes, you should . ‘east consider the alternative of hav- women serve in single-sex ships. The competition between “male” atlcI ‘female” ships might actually Prove to be very positive, although I sj-fongly suspect that after a few years
Mostly "coed” ships with only officers atl<I sailors with fouled-up marriages Serving in single-sex ships. After all, People do not come in two kinds to av°id contact with each other but to arn to live together harmoniously.
Respite the fact that I do not Suite see why the discussion should eVen be necessary, I am glad to see
h;
The Disadvantaged Navy Woman”
W.D. Hoover, pp. 118-121, July 1977 Pr°ceedings)
^Qptain Robert C Peniston, U.S. Navy 3et‘red), last commanding officer, USS ew Jersey (BB-62)—The impulse to submit this comment to the Proceedings was not brought on by the fact that I, an unrestricted line officer, was relieved in May 1976 as Director Naval Educational Development by the first female “unrestricted” line rear admiral, who incidentally is a charming Southern lady. As a matter of fact, I set aside the first draft some months ago. But recent articles—appearing in the Proceedings and elsewhere — suggesting assignment of women to combatant ships and squadrons made
me dust it off and have another go.
I am sure most seagoing officers never thought until recently that such a thing could happen. However, with the admittance of women to the U.S. Naval Academy, the assignment of women to combat billets at sea is perhaps inevitable. Some justifiable use will have to be found for this expensive education, the purpose of which I still like to believe is to prepare junior officers for assignment to combat billets. There are other disquieting signs. The number of women in the all-volunteer force is increasing and billets must be found for them, especially if the male recruiting goals are not met. So it is not surprising that the Secretary of the Navy has stated that he would like to “man” a destroyer with all females. No doubt a way will be found to accomplish this. But for what purpose? I think that most will concede that on an individual-case basis, almost anything can be done. And this destroyer might just operate; however, I would not want to steam in company with the ship. I have heard several individuals voice the opinion that this should be permitted to happen just to demonstrate that the female crew will figuratively fall on its face. I object. A destroyer is not a toy to be used to accommodate the whims of a few, and the American taxpayer should not be required to bear this unnecessary burden to prove something knowledgeable naval officers know cannot be sustained on an expanded scale.
Whether it be an all-male, allfemale, or mixed crew, life at sea on board a combatant vessel is very demanding. A commanding officer has enough problems with just young men in confined quarters who are without the immediate presence of and the distraction of women. Furthermore, I cannot envision a woman standing watch in a hot, noisy, and sometimes grimy engineering space for sustained periods at sea. Nor can I envision them providing “Norwegian steam” in deck evolutions on a similar basis.
There are proposals being set forth which would permit women to serve temporarily on board warships but not in combat. Apparently the proponents of this concept have forgotten that any warship out of the shipyard must be considered available for combat should the call be sounded. Even more basic, to train women and then replace them with men prior to deployment to a forward area is neither sound nor cost-effective.
Whether assignment of women to combat billets comes to pass or not, storm signals are flying. I would hope that before any trial period is initiated, and most certainly before the law prohibiting assignment of women to these billets is changed, a representative number of commanding officers
of our combatant vessels and squadrons be asked to testify. That should settle the matter if their testimony is given any credence. But whatever the outcome, just the prospect of a change in the law makes me glad that my four combatant command tours are behind me. Even so, I feel for those captains who follow in my wake.
“The Nimitz-Class Carrier”
(See T. F. Connolly, pp. 83-85, July 1977 Proceedings)
Captain E. M. Stiver, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Connolly presents a convincing case for large aircraft carriers. His description of the many advantages of these impressive ships ought to be sufficient to silence the cost-and-vulnerability criticism of the "anti-large carrier lobby.” He cites the large carriers’ superiority as “principal symbol[s] of American interest and determination,” their greater capacity for aircraft, jet fuel, weapons, spare parts, etc., their saving in space and gain in safety, as well as improved aircraft performance attainable from use of catapults and arresting gear rather than VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) aircraft. He points out that ship construction costs don’t rise in straight line proportion to size and that for a few hundred million bucks more we get a disproportionately greater capability for aircraft operations. In short, his thesis is "bigger is better, and it’s worth the price.”
He then goes on to point out the disadvantages of the so-called vertical/short takeoff and landing [V/STOL] carrier (CW) with V/STOL aircraft as an alternative to the Nimitz- class with conventional aircraft. He makes it clear that the main limitations of the CW concept are the penalties in aircraft speed, range, endurance, and useful load that must be paid to achieve VTOL and STOL capability without catapults or arresting gear. Other disadvantages include VTOL engine exhaust on the deck, difficulty in maintaining proper attitude during liftoff or landing, and others. These are all pretty strong arguments for not substituting something new and untried for existing and known capabilities. And, Admiral Connolly’s points are all valid—as far as they go.
Unfortunately, there are a lot of unanswered questions on this what- kjnd-of-carrier-is-best problem that the admiral didn’t address. Some of us who are not a part of the anti-large carrier lobby (or any other lobby for that matter) would like to see more information on some of the other issues before the country is irrevocably committed to a program which reduces the Navy’s portion of defense appropriations by over $2 billion for each ship acquired. There can be no question as to the superior effectiveness of the Nimitz-chcss carrier; but what about cost effectiveness, especially in the light of the changing nature of the Soviet threat? Is a $2 billion ship the only way to counter this threat? Are there really no workable alternatives?
Admiral Connolly states that “the notion that there are ‘high’ threat and ‘low’ threat combat areas to which we can tailor naval forces, and thereby save money, is naive.” If this is so, the
World War II CVE (escort carrier) should never have been made part of the Fleet. We should have waited for the £rr«x-class carriers. Of course, we’d have had to wait longer; we’d have lost a lot more ships while wait' ing; and ship construction costs would have been higher. But the bigger ships would have suffered none of the disadvantages of the jeeps’ small size and enjoyed all of the advantages of larger size!
The admiral also states that "the proposed replacements for large carriers will be almost as expensive.” if this is so, it would seem to me that the wrong types of replacements are being proposed. Are the design requirements for the proposed replacements based on the same operational requirements that led to the Nimitt design? Are the replacements expected to carry on board all types of aircraft for all possible missions at all times as do the big CVs? If so, it’s not surprising that the replacements are almost as expensive.
Jh
Unfortunately, the main disadvan-
i
■)
i
Superiority
can’t
Performed by naval aircraft, maybe diey don’t need it. The Navy seems to ave a sound and sensible V/STOL development program that should lead t0 some very useful new aircraft types: aircraft that can perform many essen- t'aI naval aviation missions from many
shi
*P platforms other than the big CVs.
feel
very strongly that as long as there
tage of the big carrier (aside from cost) 'Vas not mentioned: that is, the tremendous numbers of people required °n board to maintain and operate the sbip and her aircraft—nearly 6,000! *■s difficult for me to understand how |be traditionally people-conscious U-S. Navy could get so committed to *uch a people-eating weapon system. '° wonder the Navy faces increasing Problems of drugs, race riots, low reenlistments, and disciplinary deterioration. The dehumanizing effect having 6,000 souls stuffed into one null wouldn’t seem to be the best en- Vlfonment for good order and disciPline, even under the most en- 'ghtened leadership.
Moving to VTOL/STOL aircraft, I w°uld agree that the trade-off between STOL capabilities in the ship versus JTOl/stol capabilities in the aircraft °esn’t seem to favor VTOL aircraft— at the present time. But then, the trade-off between the first Navy jets ar*d the propellor aircraft of the day ’dn’t look too favorable for the jets at die beginning. Nevertheless, we went ahead with their development and to- ay> the U.S. Navy, after a series of ess-than-best, has the finest air jet aircraft in the world.
. expect today’s VTOL/STOL
aircraft to equal or approach the per- °rmance of conventionally designed a*tcraft and, for a lot of the missions ^ hope the Navy and Congress get this Urgently needed program off to a fast start without worrying about whether °r not the U.S. Air Force is undertakes similar programs. (Incidentally, ^ e 1 August 1977 Aviation Week and Pace Technology reported that U.S. Air 0rce officials in Europe have asked (hat propulsion technology efforts be Parted for a V/STOL fighter to replace the F-15 and F-16.)
I suspect that there are thousands of etired personnel, like myself, who ls a requirement for U.S. armed forces there is a requirement for the capability of taking combat aircraft to sea in large numbers over widely dispersed ocean areas. At the same time, many of us have an uneasy feeling that the big carriers, as presently conceived and configured, are not necessarily the best (or only) means for meeting this requirement in spite of their impressive operating capabilities. Furthermore, continued big carrier acquisition seems to drain the ship construction pot dry, leaving no funds for development of alternatives. With this kind of programming, we’ll never know whether a better combat ship than the Nimitz will ever be available for naval aviators to embrace.
The admiral’s conclusion that the “United States requires a much larger Navy” is one that no member of the active or retired naval community would dispute. But it is precisely because of the present and growing numerical inadequacy of our Navy that the big expensive carrier program looks so questionable. We’re playing “catch-up ball” now and building big carriers would seem to be the slowest and most expensive way of catching up. Even the old Errex-class ships updated with modern sensors and weaponry could close the gap faster if we haven’t forgotten how to build them. We have the big ships in the Fleet now for the “harm’s way” jobs. Why waste them on the many other naval aviation tasks that could be performed just as well by smaller, less capable, and less expensive ships?
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In a recent Library of Congress report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, a research analyst reportedly made the following statement: “Problems will prevail as long as U.S. decision makers bank on bigger budgets to cure defense ills, without reference to better strategy.” I wouldn’t know about the “strategy” implications, but if this analyst had substituted “better operating and support procedures and plans” for "better strategy” I would understand and concur. There must be a better way of taking combat aircraft to sea!
of
“The Soviet Aircraft Carrier”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 138-141, October 1976;
W. S. Lind, p. 78, February 1977 Proceedings)
“U. S. Observations of the Kiev’’
(See ]. W. Kehoe, H.A. Meier, L. J.
Kennedy, and D.C. East, pp. 105-111, July
1977 Proceedings)
“The Kiev: A German View”
(See U. Schulz-Torge, pp. 111-115, July 1977
Proceedings.)
John D. Sullivan and Hamlin A. Caldwell Jr. —When the Kiev began to assume the recognizable form of an aircraft carrier, some U.S. naval analysts assigned her a power projection role as a strike or amphibious warfare ship. After long conjecture, many now agree that she is an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ship targeted primarily against the U.S. nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. This chain of ethnocentric analysis based on U.S. Navy usage of air capable ships would be quite correct if Soviet naval philosophy paralleled our own. Demonstrably it does not and never has. Admiral of the Fleet of the U.S.S.R. S.G. Gorshkov has stated, “It is impossible to build a navy blindly copying some manning and organization, even though this model be the navy of the most powerful state.” Gorshkov has gone on to further suggest that while navies will have much in common due to the uniqueness of the ocean environment, as well as principles of shipbuilding and other sciences, mirror imaging is not necessarily the name of the game. Bearing this in mind, we stand a reasonable chance of more objectivity determining the nature of the Kiev. The primary question then is what is the Kiev to the Soviet Navy, not what does she represent to the U. S. Navy.
While we speculate about what the Kiev was designed for, Admiral Gorshkov is busy exerting a great deal of time and effort telling the Soviet Navy and the United States what the ship was designed to do. He has said, "Surface ships remain the main and frequently only weapon supporting the deployment of the main attack forces of the Navy, the submarines.” The Kiev, not being a submarine, is not part of the main attack force of the Soviet Navy. (It should be noted that the submarine strike forces to which the Soviet admirals refer over and over again are not the cruise missile and attack submarines, which are assets for tactical naval warfare, but the strategic ballistic missile submarine forces which are part of the national nuclear triad.)
The obsession Admiral Gorshkov may have for protecting his submarine forces may be irrational in the U.S. view, but the requirement for such protection is a reality to him. Although he has a submarine-oriented navy, he has said:
... a modern navy whose nu5" sion is to conduct operations against a strong enemy cannot only be an undersea navy. The underestimation of the need to support submarine operations with aircraft and surface ships cost the German High Command dearly in the last two wars. . . . The First and Second World Wars showed the mistakeness of the opinion that the submarine, in vie* of its ability to remain concealed after departing its base, could assure its own invulnerability.
Since the introduction of the submarine at the turn of the century. Western navies have used it m- dependently or in direct support o surface forces. The Soviets have reversed the formula and use surface forces for direct support of submarine operations. Mr. Bradford Dismukes the Center for Naval Analyses recognized and first publicly articulated this concept in a 1974 monograph entitled, Roles and Missions of Soviet GW' eral Purpose Forces in Wartime: Pf0' SSBN Operations? Subsequent indicators and events tend to reinforce his cogent premise.
In July 1976, the Kiev left her Nikolayev building yard on the Black Sea and joined the Northern Fleet in September. Many U.S. observer5 viewed this as an extended training and shakedown cruise and predicted that the Kiev would soon return t0 take her place as the showpiece of the anticarrier warfare-oriented Mediterranean Squadron. More than a yeaf later, this has not occurred.
Let us examine the perceived Soviet pro-submarine warfare doctrine whose most recent and direct manifestation 15 the Kiev. Soviet naval leaders have repeatedly stated that the SSBN is thelf primary weapon and strategic attack >5 their primary mission. A natural corollary is that security of tin5 strategic attack force is an integral part of the primary naval mission. It lS difficult to assure complete security ot “Yankee”-class SSBNs which mu5t make lengthy open-ocean transits e*' posed to sophisticated ocean surveil' lance, quiet SSNs, and increasingly ef' fective patrol aircraft to reach their pa' tr°l stations. Assuring the security of che newer “Delta”-class SSBN is a tfuch simpler problem. Armed with the 4,800-plus-mile SS-N-8 missile, Delta” boats can strike targets in the United States from patrol areas and P°rts in Soviet home waters. The Predicated basic wartime mission of the Kiev and a large portion of Soviet naval air, surface, and attack sub- t^rine forces is the protection of the SsBN forces by denial of their patrol areas and transit routes to opposing ‘'SVC' forces.
Since World War II the Soviets ave fashioned an elaborate coastal ASW system. Its elements include rtlaj°r surface forces, smaller patrol ^essels, such as the “Petya” and ^irka” classes, ASW aircraft represented by the medium-range 11-38 k%s,” shorter range Be-12 “Mail” arnphibians, helicopters, and fixed sUrveiHance arrays. Some of the ra- tlQnale for this extensive effort is the ^aditional and emotionally important efense of the motherland and sea ‘nes of communication protection, although the latter has never loomed arge in Russian naval practice. The m°st logical reason for Soviet coastal is denial of the inshore areas atound naval bases to intruding hostile Ss^s to ensure the security of Soviet Subrnarine transit and training opera- tlons. The Kiev represents a major step tQ extend submarine havens farther 0Ashore and gives the Soviet submarine force more elbow room.
The Kiev conducts her pro-SSBN Mission through her capabilities as an ‘'AW, asw, and command and control Platform. Equipped with “Forger” VTOL aircraft, long-range SA-N-3S, and cl°se-in SA-N-4 missiles, the Kiev can Place a protective antiair umbrella of ^eful dimensions in support of her SSBNs and preclude effective patrol air- Cfaft operations. In company with mher ASW forces and with her own hormone” helicopters and hull- mounted sonars and weaponry, the lev can exert pressure on intruding SsNs over a moderate area.
Perhaps the Kiev's most important c°t>tribution to pro-submarine warfare *111 be as a command and control ship. Admiral Gorshkov has recognized:
An important positive quality of surface ships is their ability to maintain uninterrupted two-way communication with shore command posts. This considerably facilitates control and ensures the timely transmission to ships all the necessary information and orders, which is extremely important in a prewar (deployment) situation when the factor assumes particular importance.
Through the Kiev, national naval authorities can more easily exercise their typically tight, centralized control over a gaggle of mixed air, surface, and subsurface forces in offshore operations. Locally, she can coordinate area sanitization, delous- ing, and escort in support of SSBN operations.
The argument for the Kiev's prosubmarine role is buttressed by the process of eliminating missions that she is not capable of performing. Outside of its home waters a Soviet task force built around one or more Kievs currently has an extremely marginal capability of projecting power ashore and in controlling or denying the sea against more than moderate opposition because of inherent limitations of her VTOL and SAM battery.
An anti-SSBN mission is also not a viable mission. The Soviets might like to target the Kiev against U.S. Navy SSBNs, but lacking a major technical breakthrough, this will remain a wistful goal rather than a realistic mission. Even if the Kiev and her surface escorts had the technical ability to detect, fix, and destroy SSBNs in their vast potential patrol areas, the Soviet Navy would first have to demonstrate a greater capacity to control the surface and air above ocean areas distant from its homeland than it presently possesses. While many view with dismay the erosion of the U.S. Navy’s capability to exercise sea control, few question U.S. capability to deny the sea to hostile surface forces in ocean reaches from where Trident and C-3 Polaris SSBNs can launch their missiles against the U.S.S.R.
Operating areas for the Kiev are well defined. There is no requirement for her in Soviet coastal waters where the pro-submarine mission can be performed by less-costly assets. Outer limits of her operating areas are drawn by her inability to survive for tactically useful periods of time within range of carrier or land-based tactical airpower. As a result the Kiev's usefulness will be in fringe areas of the Barents and Norwegian Seas and the Northern Pacific where Soviet SSBNs transit or patrol. She can survive and effectively support SSBN operations in these bleak waters vital to the U.S.S.R.
The pro-submarine theory for the Kiev has more serious implications than the more popular “The Russians are Coming in Tall Ships” power projection and pure ASW surmises. The Soviets seem to realize that seapower, like politics, is an art of the possible. The Kiev is a cautious move to control limited fringe areas of ocean to support SSBN strategic offensive operations. Therein lies the Kiev's danger, which should imply a clear requirement for us to reexamine some of our own weaponry and tactics.
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“NROTC: Quo Vadis?”
(See E. N. Bouffard, pp. 33-42, July 1977; S. N. Levey and A. M. Wildberger, p. 68, October 1977 Proceedings)
Commander Marion Johnson, U. S. Naval Reserve—Three cheers for Captain Bouffard’s article. His observations are timely and accurate.
I believe that the NROTC program is just what the name says: Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps. Most NROTC candidates have no intentions of making Navy careers, but join for the academic scholarships, for the opportunities to be placed in positions of significant responsibility at early ages, and for travel opportunities before settling into true careers. With that in mind, I am not surprised that a low percentage of NROTC graduates go to nuclear or to flight.
If the Navy truly wants “engineers and scientists” to be the heart of its cadre of junior officers, it should upgrade the Naval Academy programs and graduate young officers with the same levels of expertise, in major fields, as are required of graduates with technical degrees from NROTC universities. It is unclear to me, however, that to do so would improve the quality of future junior officers. Present Navy assignments of junior officers do not appear to reflect the need for such a change.
For example, during an officer’s first two years of naval service:
► does a structural engineer ever solve one structural analysis?
► does a chemist ever solve one chemical equation?
► does a metallurgist ever select one alloy for a particular application?
► does a mechanical engineer ever design one mechanism?
► does an electronics engineer ever build one electronic circuit?
► does an ensign ever solve any problem using calculus?
Conversely, how many times per day, in the first two years of naval service, does the young naval officer:
► set goals and objectives?
► organize personnel for a task?
► counsel his people with persona problems?
► perform or supervise clerK3 chores?
I have no statistics but I would expeCt the answer to the first set of question to be “rarely,” and the answer to second set of questions to be ‘ ffe' quently.”
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It appears to me that the Nav) wants airplane drivers and ship drived who can supervise and manage tecl>n> cians in the operation and mainte' nance of sophisticated system package within two years of entry into [^e service. At the same time, it appeafi that the Navy is directing its off>ce( training away from programs vvhi^ would enable young officers to do tbe tasks assigned. The chemical industry1 in which I am a private-practice c0[1 sultant, has long since learned tha‘ good engineers design plants wh^ can be operated and managed by tl°r' technical personnel; it is my opin'011 that the Navy should mimic this 'n dustry, using highly qualified e(1^ gineers and scientists in design
dur
y might be.
Wain Richard E. Peterson, U. S. avy—As the professor of naval sci- cnce (pms) at the Illinois Institute of echnology (IIT) for the past three ^afs, I have had an intense interest in ^ NROTC policy changes discussed y Captain Bouffard in his excellent art>cle. The issue he raises of the ad-
sh:
'Pmen in the junior class could be
construction, while using managers, tacficians, and technicians in the operating forces.
The Naval Academy has long Proved a good source of technicians; Sc‘ence and engineering graduates of ^ROtc universities can be quickly 'rained to be technicians as required.
ut where will the managers and tac- tlc'ians come from? Neither the Naval ^demy nor the NROTC universities, Under present concepts, will provide human relations training necessary °r the junior officer to perform this Very large part of his assigned duty, 'egardless of what the specific assigned
'dsability of requiring 80% of the Navy scholarship midshipmen to Ir'ai°r in engineering, math, chemis- j'y. or physics has been debated at ength by the professors of naval sci- nce at our annual PNS conferences and 0ri other occasions. Possibly my view- ^°‘nt is influenced by the fact that 0yer 80% of the midshipmen in my Un‘c are already in the preferred ^a)°rs, and that, as a scholarship midshipman, I majored in en- 8'neering.
Afy belief is that while the 80% 8°al is going to be very difficult to rtach in practice, its achievement will 1101 harm either the quality of NROTC S'aduates or the Navy.
One reason that the 80% goal will e difficult to achieve is that the pres- trit group of NROTC colleges and uniVersities contains schools where only a Srr>all percentage of the students are goring in engineering and the hard Sc*ences. For these schools to simultaneously meet the 80% requirement arid the Department of Defense standard requiring a minimum of 17 mid- very difficult.
One option in this situation would be to drop such schools from NROTC participation. And, the Navy, with defense and congressional urging, is planning to cut down the total number of NROTC units. However, many considerations should go into these decisions, such as maintaining a distribution of schools geographically and a mix of state versus private schools, and holding onto the better known and more prestigious schools and those with the better records of production of career officers.
Another option, since the 80% number really applies to the total NROTC year group and not to each individual unit, would be for the more technically oriented NROTC colleges to produce more than 80% of their graduates in the preferred majors so that the predominantly liberal arts colleges could produce lower percentages. But, in my opinion, that would also cause problems. Even at IIT, not all of the Navy option scholarship students are in technical majors. Furthermore, as Captain Bouffard pointed out, not all students who start in engineering or hard science graduate in these fields. Since the professor of naval science must approve any change of academic major by a midshipman, this option could result either in students' being pressured to remain in a technical field to which they really aren’t suited, or in the loss to the Navy of some fine potential officers.
As a member of this year’s central selection board for the 1977 NROTC Scholarship Program, I can state that we attempted to select candidates with SAT or ACT scores and high school grades which indicated success in engineering, physical science, or mathematics majors. The files for the finalists also contained statements by the candidates as to their intended majors and career aspirations, and it did not hurt a candidate’s chances for him to state his intention to major in a technical field. Since a large proportion of the candidates were aware of the Navy’s preferred majors, it will be interesting to see how many of the scholarship winners actually register in and remain in one of the preferred majors.
There is a major theme in Captain Bouffard’s article which troubles me and with which 1 cannot agree. Perhaps it is the inadequacy of my “engineering mind” that doesn't permit me to accept at face value the extravagant claims for the superiority of a liberal education quoted at length by Captain Bouffard in his article. But, if a liberal education is all that valuable, why is the job market for liberal arts graduates as bad as it is?
“Launch aircraft!
Land the landing force!”
(See R. G. Smith, cover, May 1977 Naval
Review issue, Proceedings)
Lieutenant George Galdorisi, U. S. Navy—I was somewhat taken aback by Mr. R.G. Smith’s rendition of a futuristic (1987) naval exercise. The ships and fixed-wing aircraft appeared to be adequately advanced, but the helicopter in the foreground bears a striking resemblance to the doughty Mk I LAMPS SH-2F. The LAMPS Mk III featuring a totally new airframe is currently scheduled for fleet delivery in the early to mid-1980s. Hopefully, Mr. Smith’s 1987 rendition featuring the Mk I LAMPS is an innocent oversight and not a prophecy. [See this month’s Notebook Department for new LAMPS III developments—Editor.]
“Technology and Bargaining in Anglo-American Naval Relations: 1938-1946”
(See J. R. Leutze, pp. 50-61, June 1977;
W. S. Anderson, pp. 70-71, August 1977 Proceedings)
Patrick Beesly—I was much interested in Dr. Leutze’s article because the British Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral John Godfrey, to whom he refers, was married to a first cousin of mine. I served in the Intelligence Division throughout World War II and visited with the admiral regularly thereafter until his death in 1971. I think that his services to Britain and, as Dr. Leutze also shows, to the United States have not received the recognition they deserve.
I appreciate that Dr. Leutze’s theme
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was the exchange of technical information, but I am sorry that he was not able to deal with the parallel question of intelligence matters. This was a field where, in those days at any rate, Britain had much to offer and did in fact provide it, even if this was done with an ulterior motive. 1 imagine that records of what took place are now hard to come by, but I suspect that Godfrey was much less inhibited on the intelligence side where up to a point things were within his own hands than on the material side where he obviously always had to refer to higher authority.
I do touch on one aspect of this question in my book, Very Special Intelligence, namely the part played by Commander Rodger Winn, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, whose deputy I was, in the establishment of ‘Op 20, Atlantic Section, Operational Intelligence, COMINCH.’ This later became F.21, part of the Tenth Fleet. The U.S. Naval Mission in London had been given full access to the British Naval Intelligence Division and to its Operational Intelligence Centre as far back as mid-1940. It still seems strange to me that it was not until May 1942, six months after the German declaration of war on the United States and then only as a result of Winn’s determined advocacy, that the U.S. Navy finally agreed to set up an operational intelligence center on the British model. Op 20, under the inspired leadership of my old friend Captain Kenneth Knowles, U.S. Navy, then made a vital contribution to the U.S. antisubmarine war, but many ships and lives might have been saved if Knowles’ department had been created earlier.
The doubts about security which Dr. Leutze also mentions also bedevilled U.S.-Canadian relations, and although we in London worked in the most intimate harmony with Knowles in Washington and with his opposite number, McDiarmid, in Ottawa, relations between the two North American organizations remained unnecessarily sour. I am sure this was no fault of Knowles or McDiarmid, but was imposed on them from higher up.
“Vietnam: Winnable War?”
(See W. P. Hughes, pp. 60-65, July 1977; H-
Brainard, pp. 65-66, October 1977
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William &• Small, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In rny opinion Captain Hughes’ artide should be especially noted for its validity and significance. Captai*1 Hughes points out that the “subordi' nation [of military leadership] to civil' ian leadership” and the consequent disregard of the counsel of the military leadership by the civilian leadership *n the prosecution of the war in Vietnam changed a winnable war into a losing war. This is a lesson for the civilian leadership of our government to learn for the future. I suggest one way t0 emphasize this lesson is to impress on the minds of the members of the aP' propriate committees of the Congre5S this example and lesson of the war >n Vietnam, as presented by Captain Hughes.
“ ‘Mayday’ for the Mayaguez”
(SeeJ.A. Messegee, R.A. Peterson, W.J. Wood, J.B. Hendricks, andJ.M. Rodgers, pp. 93-111, November 1976 Proceedings)
Frank R. Hamlett, Jr.—I found Commander J. Michael Rodgers’ at' count of the part played by the Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) of partied** interest because it brought into focus ■> problem which I had begun to thiol' existed only in my own mind. I allude to his use of the “close-in defend team” to counter the threat to his ship posed by small craft. Captain Rodgt'rS solution to this problem was ingeniou5 and practical, renewing my faith ,p the ability of today’s U. S. Navy z° survive.
During the year or two since I be' came a regular reader of Proceedings, have read with interest the descnP' tions of new ships, and only once can I remember any reference to weap' ons installed specifically to couO' ter small craft threats. This was lfl the February 1976 professional not* describing HMS Sheffield (D-80). She has two Oerlikon 20-mm., rapi
^igressional Record, 30 June 1977. As naval strategists, veterans of unde- ared “conflicts” and “cold war” p^Ses’ they spoke from first-hand exfence in carrying out naval missions the defense of this country’s policy q objectives. Their theme (as was . aPtain Ryan’s) was that the strategic (. Pottance of the canal, as proved e and again in times of tension and r’ *s indispensable to the U.S. Navy 11 carrying out its objective —
c .
'ring guns for this purpose—which e author notes also “have a certain eterrent effect against low-flying air- ^raft and helicopters.” Reading the escriptfons of modern naval ships — ''ith the exception of the Sheffield— as left me wondering if they would e at the mercy of a bold and deter- n"ned man in a 16-foot plastic boat arrned with a “war-surplus bazooka.”
Canal Diplomacy and U. S. Interests”
(*c p- Ryan, pp. 43-53, January 1977; J.P. “'0<Tner, pp. 70-71, August 1977 feedings)
tytain Frank K. B. Whealer, U.S. avy (Retired)—Captain Ryan’s con- teTtion that the United States main- ta*n de facto control over the operation che Panama Canal in any future p6aty was paralleled by a letter to the resident from four former CNOs. In une 1977, in a letter which surpris- lnS!y received little attention in the ped*a, these four admirals advised resident Carter that it was their con- S|dered individual and combined ^dgment that the United States °uld retain “full sovereign control” pVtr the Panama Canal and the Canal °ne- It is of interest that these four 8entlemen join with another former Admiral D. L. McDonald, °se views were quoted in the Ryan article.
The four flag officers are: Admiral ^bert B. Carney (CNO, 1953-1955); Ttniral Arleigh A. Burke (CNO, ^5-l96i). Admiral George W. An- Aerson- Jr. (cno, 1961-1963); and , H^ral Thomas H. Moorer (CNO,
«7-1970; Chairman of the Joint ,hlefs of Staff, 1970-1974). Their lnt letter was later published in the
maintaining freedom of the seas), even more so now than in the past.
Regrettably, the four CNOs wrote too late to convince President Carter to change his policy to achieve a treaty calling for transfer of the canal and zone to Panama by the year of 2000. However, the letter understandably sets forth the dangers in the treaty which certain naval officers may fail to see. For example:
► The canal enables the United States to transfer swiftly its naval forces and merchant ships from ocean to ocean. This strategic advantage is increasingly important because of the reduced size of the U. S. fleet.
► The Navy’s large carriers (too large for the canal) can be positioned in time of tensions-related, short-range, limited situations. (A big advantage of the nuclear-powered carrier is her tremendous cruising range.) Meanwhile, hundreds of non-nuclear-powered combatant ships and support ships can be funneled through the canal to join up with the carriers. In the years ahead, as carriers become smaller or the canal is enlarged, this problem will become minimal.
y U. S. sovereignty (e.g., operational control) over the canal enables the United States to use the canal or to deny its use to others. This authority proved especially helpful in World War II and during our Vietnam involvement.
y Under the control of a potential adversary, the canal would become an immediate crucial problem, “with enormous potential consequences for evil.”
► At a time when Soviet naval forces are seriously challenging the U. S. Navy for the control of the sea, this maritime threat is compounded by the possibility that under the Panamanian rule the canal could be neutralized or lost.
y Loss of the canal would contribute to the encirclement of the United States by hostile naval forces and threaten our survivability.
The Germans were trying to do in South and Central America the same things the Soviets are trying today. By stirring up the people in these countries, they hoped to gain control. The first major outward sign of this in
World War II that I recall, while operating in the area, was when the Germans and Italians started an airbase in Natal, Brazil, using St. Paul Roche as a cache for submarine supplies, and infiltrating the Caribbean with submarines trying to get at the canal, landing supplies and men to accomplish this mission.
Those who are so naive as to think that by turning over the canal and zone to Panama we will ensure that radicals and terrorists will not harm the canal today should restudy their Latin American history, especially the post-World War II history of this globe. It seems axiomatic that when a power vacuum is left, revolution starts. We don’t have to look very far south to see how the downtrodden are easily taken over by another tyrant. Certainly Panama has prospered more by our presence than if it had no canal or had it tried to finance it by itself. I feel no shame—I’m proud of what we have done there. I shudder, however, to think of the Soviets being in charge and what that would do to the security of the Western Hemisphere.
The canal as used by U.S.-flag ships is also a stabilizing factor in maintaining transcontinental shipping costs. If this route is subjected to unreasonable transit charges, in the manner of the OPEC countries in lifting the price of oil, it would further increase costs to the U.S. and world populations. It would be as big a bonanza for the government in power in Panama to do this as it was for the oil-producing countries—another opportunity for international blackmail. We also have the example of what happened to the Suez Canal.
Our government always seems to think that money is unlimited. Could one ever convince the American public it should pay for another canal, particularly to let someone else run it, even if it were wider and more modern?
Finally, we are in the Canal Zone now. We are able to defend it. If we were not in it and the local government became unstable and someone else took over with the Soviet blessing, it would be an act of war instead of defending our property and rights. “A bird in the hand . . . !”