This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
According to an old Korean proverb, a man accused of stealing chickens held up the foot of a duck and thereby cleared himself of stealing chickens—but not of stealing. To Koreans, the duck’s foot has come to symbolize deliberate deception—which is what United Nations Command representatives have had to deal with since Admirals C. Turner Joy and Ar- leigh Burke began negotiations with the North Koreans at Kaesong in July 1951. Now, more than 25 years later, the negotiations drone on, and U.S. teams continue to endure new showings of ducks’ feet.
“5 GIs Hurt, 1 Lost in Korean DMZ Explosion,” ‘‘Reds at Panmunjom Stomp, Injure Major,” “N. Koreans Kill 2 U.S. Officers.” These 1974, 1975, and 1976 headlines resulted from the occurrence of events in “the land of morning calm”—Korea.
Korea is a country which the average American has limited knowledge of, save perhaps the Korean War and the USS Pueblo incident. Yet, in this faraway oriental peninsula, daily meetings are conducted between representatives of the Free World and the Communist world. These and other, more formalized meetings derive their origin from negotiations which led to the establishment of the Korean Armistice Agreement. To date, this is among the longest armistices ever maintained by mankind. However, as the opening headlines suggest, it has been an armistice maintained at the cost of lives.
In light of the events that took place during 1974-1976 in Korea and the subsequent deaths and injuries sustained by American and Korean personnel, let us review the situation in Korea with regard to the armistice agreement and the agencies provided to maintain that agreement.
Before proceeding to the current situation in Korea, it is pertinent to review briefly that land’s path to the present. For thousands of years, Korea had been a united country of a rugged and determined people. Nonetheless, it has long suffered interference, if not outright domination, by one of its more powerful neighbors—-first China, then Japan. At the close of World War II, it was divided and has remained so ever since.
The division came about when Japan surrendered in September 1945. The United States and the U.S.S.R. made arrangements to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces occupying Korea, south and north of the 38th parallel, respectively. Perhaps a more detailed arrangement might have been negotiated, but in fact the 38th parallel just about halved the peninsula. Thus, it seemed the expedient thing to use for effecting the surrender.
Prior to then, it had been established at high-level conferences held in Cairo and Potsdam that Korea would be made “free and independent.” However, the U.S.S.R., which had hitherto subscribed to the agreement, moved in and rang down its soon-to-be- famous “iron curtain” along the 38th parallel. Thus, the Cold War had its beginning in the Orient.
With the closing of northern Korea, its people were denied access to the outside world. To this day, only “the chosen few” read other nations’ newspapers, hear other countries’ opinions, or travel outside North Korea’s boundaries. Coincident with this isolation was the elimination of the nation’s history, for northern Korea—now called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—recognizes only that which has occurred since 1948. That was when the Supreme People’s Assembly was established, the constitution was drawn up, and the present leader, Premier Kim Il-sung, came into power as dictator of a newly
formed Communist state. Prior to 1948, Russia controlled North Korea.
Gone was any mention of the Silla and Yi dynasties which brought dignity, culture, and freedom to the land of morning calm. National heroes such as Admiral Yi Sun-sin who had defeated the Japanese in the 1590s with the innovation of the world’s first ironclad ships became nonexistent. Only what Kim Il-sung said and did was and is important.
Between 1945 and 1950, the two Koreas drifted farther apart. Southern Korea had taken up a democratic form of government and became the Republic of Korea. Though the United Nations attempted to resolve the Korean situation during these years, its efforts were thwarted by U.S.S.R. vetoes. Free elections to bring the two Koreas together were denied by the north, and the south showed no sympathy toward Communism.
Border skirmishes broke out along the 38th parallel, and war clouds began to gather on the horizon of Korea’s future. Though each of the Koreas called for reunification, neither would accept the other’s plans. In 1949, Kim Il-sung went to Moscow and there received encouragement to put his reunification program into action.1 On Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, events were set in motion with a four-prong attack directed at the Republic of Korea. The world came to know this program as the Korean War.
After the attack had been under way for many hours, the world press was informed by Kim Il-sung that he was repelling a sneak attack. “This sneak attack was perpetrated and put into action by the bandit traitor, Syngman Rhee,” then the President of the Republic of Korea. This statement was a reversal of fact, or as the Korean would say, “The world was shown the foot of a duck.” This stems from an old Korean proverb concerning deceit which states, “You are like a man who steals chickens and when accused, holds up the foot of a duck.”
During the next three years, 1950-1953, the battle sallied up and down the peninsula. Eventually, its participants included 16 countries under the U.N. flag and two under the “Red banner”— Communist China and North Korea. Throughout the course of the war, the United Nations actively sought a cease-fire. Only when the war reached an unfavorable position for the Communist forces did they finally agree to come to the table.
Without realizing it at the time, the United Nations was about to take up a new challenge, that of dealing with the very trying Communist conference table technique. These talks began in the ancient
Please turn to page 33 for footnotes.
Korean capital of Kaesong on 10 July 1951. At that time, Kaesong was in the hands of the Communist forces.
When Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, U.S. Navy, chief of the U.N. negotiators, came to the table with three other American officers and one South Korean officer, the Communist tactics began. The vehicles which brought them to the site of negotiation were marked with white flags, as previously agreed upon. Chinese and North Korean newsmen were at hand to photograph this as evidence that the United Nations was coming to surrender.
Once inside the building, Admiral Joy was seated in a chair which placed him a foot lower than the North Korean representative, Nam II, whose short stature had been improved because of his high seat. The North Korean flag in the conference room was huge and towered over the U.N. pennant. All this provided the Communists with pictorial evidence for their propaganda machine. “Such devices,” Joy commented later, “. . . may seem childish when each is considered in isolation. It should be borne in mind, however, that a great multitude of these maneuvers can add up to a propaganda total of effective magnitude.”2
The peace talks went on and on and on. The site of the negotiations was changed from Kaesong to the village of Panmunjom. Every device the Communist representatives could conceive of was thrust at the U.N. negotiators. Some meetings dragged on for hours, while one lasted 15 seconds. Finally, after two years and 17 days of talks, a truce was signed on 27 July 1953. This ended one of the longest armistice negotiations in history. Three years, one month, and two days had passed since that Sunday in June 1950.
The Korean Armistice Agreement is primarily a military document. It is unusual in that it is binding upon only the military forces of North Korea, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and the 16 U.N. member nations which furnished combat forces. The Republic of Korea, which participated in the talks as an observer, is not a signatory of the armistice. A recommendation within the agreement proposed the convention of a political conference to discuss the unification of Korea. Nine months after the truce went into effect (12 hours later than the signing), a conference was held in Geneva. However, it was fruitless and with no acceptable solution being resolved, Korea has remained divided ever since.
The major provisions of the armistice agreement:
^ . . . suspended open hostilities.
► . . . withdrew all military forces and equipment from a 4,000-meter-wide buffer zone separating the two sides.
^ . arranged release and repatriation of prisoners
of war and displaced persons.
^ . . . established the Military Armistice Commission and other agencies to negotiate any violations and to insure adherence to the truce terms.
^ . . . established the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
The provisions are rather self-explanatory; however, a few comments are in order as to their unique features. The buffer zone or demilitarized zone was formed by each side withdrawing its troops 2,000 meters north and south from the line of ground contact between opposing forces. This Military Demarcation Line extends 151 miles across the Korean peninsula, commencing in the west at the Han River Estuary and terminating in the east at the Yellow Sea. It is identified by 1,292 markers placed at varying intervals. Each marker is within sight of the markers on either side of it. They are numbered and marked with the words “Military Demarcation Line” which appear in English and Korean facing south and in Korean and Chinese facing north. In addition to tracing the course of the demarcation line, they are used to identify specific locations within the demilitarized zone.
The zone is regularly patrolled by civil police from each side. Each side is allowed 1,000 civil police in the entire demilitarized zone at any one time, and additional working parties are also permitted within its boundaries to perform maintenance tasks. Among these latter was the maintenance of demarcation line markers. However, the United Nations Command terminated marker maintenance in 1973 when the North Korean civil police fired on a South Korean working party, killing one officer and wounding two others.
The provision establishing the agencies to implement and supervise the armistice created the Military Armistice Commission as the principal agency. It is composed of ten senior officers, five appointed by the U.N. Command and five by the Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteers. The senior member of the U.N. Command side is a U.S. officer of two-star rank. This position used to be rotated among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps approximately every six months. There is no longer a fixed rotation for the two-star officers. Other members of the U.N. Command side include two general officers from the Republic of Korea and a brigadier general from the United Kingdom. The fifth seat is filled on a rotational basis by a colonel from one of the other U.N. countries.
The Communist seats are filled by four North Korean senior officers and one representative from the
Chinese People’s Volunteers. Their senior member is a two-star North Korean officer. The rotation of these officers is less frequent than that of the U.N. side. Their new senior member, Major General Han Ju-kyong relieved Major General Kim Pung-sop in December 1975. General Kim had been with the Military Armistice Commission for almost 15 years and served two of them as senior member of the Communist delegation.
All official business and meetings of the armistice commission are conducted in the joint security area. This is a neutral portion of the demilitarized zone, approximately 800 meters in diameter, and halved by the demarcation line. The Military Armistice Commission building, as well as several others, was built on the demarcation line so that half the building is technically in North Korea and the other half in South Korea. The conference table actually straddles the line. The buildings situated on the demarcation line have collectively come to be known as conference row. Each side has constructed its own buildings within the joint security area, and though it is not in writing, each side does not enter the other’s buildings without permission. Only the Military Armistice Commission building is entered by both sides.
Provisions for a security force in the area were provided by the armistice agreement and subsequent agreements. Each side is allowed to maintain 30 armed enlisted men and five armed officers within the joint security area. Their arms, as are those of the civil police, are limited to non-automatic pistols and rifles.
Until September 1976, guards from both sides were allowed to move freely within the joint security
area on both sides of the military demarcation line, but since then, as with the rest of the demilitarized zone, guards remain on their respective sides. This change was brought about as a result of the confrontation in August 1976, during which two U.S. Army officers, Captain Arthur G. Bonifas and Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett, were killed by North Korean guards. The officers were supervising a U.N. work party in the joint security area when the attack took place. The killings turned the world’s eyes to the situation in Korea and the volatile nature of the North Koreans.
Over the years, the North Koreans have continued their antics in the joint security area as they did at Kaesong. For example, the South Koreans built a modern building, referred to as Freedom House, opposite conference row. The North Koreans had no such building, but showed a great deal of curiosity in the building’s dimensions. Shortly thereafter, they erected a new building, the Korean People’s Army joint duty officer building. As it turned out, it just happened to be one meter taller than Freedom House.
Each side has a replica of its flag on the conference table in the Military Armistice Commission building. When one places the U.N. flag next to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea flag he will see that the North Korean flag is a few centimeters taller. Even the uniforms of the Korean People’s Army security force serve to project North Korea’s propaganda effort. Though they may appear baggy to the newcomer, he will be told, “Not so.” It is simply that North Korea is rich in textiles and, therefore, can tailor fuller uniforms for its military.
The Military Armistice Commission meets when either side calls for a meeting. One side proposes a date, and the other has the option of accepting it or counterproposing another. When the date is agreed to, the meeting is convened at 1100. There is no agenda set for these meetings, and there is no chairman. Whoever initiated the call for a meeting speaks first. The conferences are conducted using the English, Korean, and Chinese languages. When the U.N. Command representative speaks first, translations follow in Korean and then Chinese. The other side responds in Korean, then English, and finally Chinese. This trilingual line of communication trebles the time for any statement.
The next level of the Military Armistice Commission is that of the office of secretary. Each side appoints an officer of the rank of colonel to this position. The secretaries are responsible for administrative functions, record keeping, interpreter-translator services, and other duties as the commission directs. Secretary meetings are conducted at the request of either side and follow the same format as that of a Military Armistice Commission meeting. The Chinese language has been excluded from these meetings because the Chinese do not have representatives at these meetings.
Providing direct support to the U.N. Command’s senior member and secretary is the Armistice Affairs Division, shown in Figure 1. The U.N. Command secretary also has the additional title of Chief, Armistice Affairs Division. This division is a major joint staff which is composed of officers and enlisted personnel from the four U.S. services. In addition to the military personnel, civilian interpreters are employed to assist with the Korean and Chinese translations. These personnel work within the language branch of the division and indeed provide a great deal of continuity to the staff, for some have been with the division for ten or more years.
As one of its duties, the Armistice Affairs Division staff prepares statements for Military Armistice Commission and secretary meetings. Without an agenda to work with, the staff, attempting to cover all contingencies, prepares statements in advance through the process of anticipating what the North Koreans are likely to say or introduce. They have maintained records and correspondence pertaining to the commission since its inception. These records of previous meetings, blended with the knowledge of current events, provide the basis for the statements and counterstatements.
The U.N. Advisory Group that is shown in Figure 1 represents the countries that had combat forces in Korea during the war. They meet periodically with the secretary and the senior member of the U.N. team to exchange views and information concerning
armistice matters. One advisor from each country attends Military Armistice Commission meetings. And, as stated earlier, one of these advisors sits on the commission itself. Many of these officers also function as their country’s defense attache to the Republic of Korea. The countries which still maintain an active part in this group are Australia, Canada, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The presence of these officers in the conference room during meetings serves to emphasize the combined U.N. effort in working for a lasting peace despite the trying behavior of the Communist side.
Another agency established by the armistice was that of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. This is an independent, fact-finding body outside the authority of, but reporting to, the Military Armistice Commission. The commission consists of four senior officers, each referred to as member, and their staffs from the countries of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Its original mission was to conduct inspections and observations at ten ports of entry designated in the armistice agreement—five in the north and five in the south. The inspections were to verify adherence by both sides to the provisions designed to maintain the military status quo which existed when the cease-fire became effective. However, at the 70th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, held 31 May 1956, the U.N. Command announced provisional suspension of any further inspections.
The cause for termination of this effort was attributable to North Korean tactics. When Swiss and Swedish officers boarded an airplane to go to Wonsan
on the east coast, they ended up in Haeju on the west coast. Trains mysteriously broke down. Hour upon hour, delays were imposed on Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission officers awaiting transportation. And so on. Meanwhile, the commission’s Czech and Polish personnel had complete freedom within the Republic of Korea. Since the inspection system took on this one-way aspect, the U.N. Command effected the provisional suspension until the North Korean side would honor the provision setting forth the supervisory commission’s mission.
Today, the commission meets every week to discuss armistice matters and to review military status reports submitted to them from each side. Although the supervisory activities have been severely curtailed, and though the commission members have no charter in the demilitarized zone, the presence of these neutral representatives is of significant importance. Their contacts with the Communist and U.N. personnel provide a stabilizing influence on the activities of both sides. They also help to shape world opinion and thus constitute an agency-in-being which is always ready and available to assist in any action aimed at lessening tension.
A dramatic example of how the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has played a viable role in the lessening of tension occurred in the joint security area. That area, despite its formal environment of peacekeeping and neutrality, has been the scene of violent outbursts between the security force guards of the two sides. On one occasion in October 1968, several Korean People’s Army guards struck down an American soldier (U.S. and South Korean army personnel make up the U.N. Command security force) and were stomping on him. A Swiss officer who came upon this scene went to the fallen soldier’s aid and shielded the man’s body with his own. The North Koreans backed off, and eventually the peace was restored.
As was pointed out earlier, the Armistice Affairs Division, a major joint staff, is composed of officers from four of the U.S. services. Two positions occupied by representatives of the naval service are the joint duty officer and Chief, Joint Observer Team. (The term “joint,” as used in these titles, refers to U.N. Command/North Korean composition.)
The Military Armistice Commission secretaries maintain continuous contact through their advance secretariats, known as the joint duty officers. The U.N. Command’s joint duty officer has been a Navy lieutenant commander’s billet since I960. Interestingly, his office is in North Korea. This is due to the fact that the demarcation line halves the building in which he works. The joint duty officer maintains
around-the-clock communications with his Korean People’s Army counterpart. To assist him in this endeavor, he has a joint staff of Army, Navy, and Air Force enlisted personnel as well as civilian interpreters. The joint duty officers meet daily at noon, except Sundays, to exchange reports and correspondence. In addition, they pass messages concerning Military Armistice Commission business over “hot lines” strung between their buildings.
Aside from his dealings with the North Koreans the joint duty officer also conducts a good deal of business with the staffs of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.3 In fact, at times the joint duty officer’s office takes on the appearance of a mini-U.N. meeting featuring an assemblage of officers from the four countries of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as well as U.S. and South Korean personnel. All this contributes to his major function, that of maintaining an open line of communications with the other side. For indeed, this is
the only office which enables daily communications between the North Koreans and the U.N. Command.
The joint duty officer lives at Camp Kitty Hawk, just outside the demilitarized zone. The camp is also the home of the U.N. joint security force. This command, which is made up of U.S. and Republic of Korea Army personnel, comes under the operational control of the Chief, Armistice Affairs Division. Selection to the joint security area security force is very stringent, and it is voluntary duty. Both officers and men must meet demanding physical and mental requirements before they are considered. It is not enough to have a “big hombre” on duty in the joint security area. Indeed, a great deal of maturity and self-control is essential to the personality of a U.N. Command guard.
Consider yourself in attendance at a Military Ar- can’t, the consequences will make headlines.
The final type of agency created by the armistice agreement to assist the Military Armistice Commission is the joint observer team. Under the terms of the agreement, five such teams are provided to assist the commission in supervising those provisions which pertain to the demilitarized zone and the Han River Estuary. Four teams are assigned to designated sectors within the zone, while the fifth is responsible for the estuary. Each team is comprised of four to six field-grade (major and above) officers, half of whom are appointed by each side. For the past several years, a U.S. Marine Corps major has been appointed chief of the joint observer teams.
mistice Commission meeting. You have positioned yourself at an assigned station. All seems quiet, and the meeting appears to be progressing. Then, a couple of Korean People’s Army guards walk up to you. They are smiling and conversing when suddenly one of them spits on your trousers and laughs. Do you haul off and hit him? Sure, and that will guarantee a riot. This sort of thing does not happen all the time, but often enough. Nevertheless, it is clear that it takes a mature individual to cope with it. If he
The primary function of the U.N. component of these joint teams is to meet with their Communist counterparts and to conduct investigations of alleged armistice violations. Both the Military Armistice
Commission and the senior member of either side are authorized to dispatch a joint observer team.
The “joint” aspect of the teams ceased to exist in 1967 because the Korean People’s Army has not responded to any requests on the part of the U.N. Command to dispatch a North Korean observer team since that time. The most recent U.N. Command requests for joint observer team meetings occurred in 1974, 1975, and 1976. The latest grew out of the tree-chopping deaths; the two earlier ones came after discovery in the demilitarized zone of a tunnel which extended from the northern side across into the southern sector.
A demilitarized zone civil police squad from the U.N. Command was conducting a routine patrol near Korang-po in the west-central part of the zone on the morning of 15 November 1974. As the nine-man squad, led by Sergeant Ku Chong-sop, was passing a point, it came across a strange scene. Steam was rising from supposedly solid ground. When the squad members began to dig, they received automatic weapons fire from a North Korean outpost in the vicinity.
After a brief exchange of fire in which no casualties were sustained, the squad resumed its digging and uncovered a tunnel 122 centimeters (about 4 feet) in height and 90 centimeters (3 feet) in width. It also became apparent why the patrol members received fire from the North Koreans. They found warm rice in bowls, indicating tunnelers had been there just as the squad approached. In addition to the food, items collected from the scene included dynamite, claymore mines, some of which had the slogan “Destroy the American Imperialistic Aggressors” inscribed on them, a North Korean watch, and cigarettes.
The U.N. Command dispatched a joint observer team to the scene while simultaneously requesting the Korean People’s Army to join in and investigate the matter. The North Koreans’ reply was predictable. They refused to send their team because, “this incident is nothing but a fabrication of untruths on the part of the U.S. Imperialistic Aggressors." 4
The tunnel had penetrated 1,200 meters (about four fifths of a mile) south of the military demarcation line. The extensive cementwork in the tunnel, its lighting system, a two-foot-wide railway by which carts were used to haul dirt, and a system of side tunnels and roundtables provided ample evidence that this was an effort of sizable undertaking.
A unilateral investigation by the U.N. Command continued without incident. However, the calm ended on 20 November when there was an earsplitting explosion. There were nine officers and enlisted personnel in the tunnel at that time. The explosion, which was apparently set off by a booby trap, took two lives: Commander Robert M. Ballinger of the U.S. Navy and Republic of Korea Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Kim Hok Choi. It wounded the remainder of the party, including Major Anthony D. Nastri, one of the coauthors of this article. When confronted with this incident at a Military Armistice Commission meeting the North Koreans claimed that it was “a United States Imperialistic Aggressors and South Korean puppet clique plot to fool the world.”
If one tunnel had been built with such effort, wasn’t it possible that there were more? This was the question the U.N. Command and the Republic of Korea undertook to answer. Through the coordinated efforts of the military, civilian personnel, and scientists, a second tunnel was discovered fifty meters below the surface on 20 March 1975. This one was east of the first tunnel and north of the town of Chorwon. Through scientific analysis of bore samples taken from special drilling equipment and supporting pictorial evidence provided by special “bore hole” cameras, the existence of what became known as Sobang-san tunnel was confirmed without man setting foot in it. This evidence was presented by the U.N. Command on 27 May 1975 at the 362nd Military Armistice Commission meeting. The Korean People’s Army refuted knowledge of any tunnels and once again called the whole matter a fabrication.
Approximately one month after its initial detection, the Sobang-san tunnel was entered by means of a countertunnel dug by the U.N. Command. This second North Korean tunnel had penetrated 1,100 meters (1,203 yards) south of the demarcation line and showed a great deal more sophistication than the first. The second tunnel amounted to a complex mining operation which required the same planning, equipment, and labor force that would be called for in a normal mining operation that is 150 feet below the surface and involves digging through bedrock. Whereas the first one showed potential as a means of infiltration for small groups of personnel, the second one was large enough to rush a large number of armed troops and equipment through without much delay.
Another interesting fact arose from the discovery of these tunnels and from the subsequent investigations. It was learned that construction began on these tunnels in 1972. This was confirmed by two North Korean defectors who were involved in the tunnel project. On 5 July 1972, a dialogue began between the civilian representatives of the North and South Korean Governments. It was a dialogue which the United Nations hoped would bring the two Koreas closer together—if not united, at least in harmony. However, there had been no mention made of a subway system between Pyongyang and Seoul at these meetings.
Though the Korean People’s Army denied existence of these tunnels throughout the Military Armistice Commission meetings involving discussion about them, several months later at a press conference in Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung stated that the North Koreans did construct tunnels. He was quoted as saying, “They were not tunnels to provide infiltration to the south, but rather tunnels to allow the escape to the North of the oppressed South Koreans who must suffer the brutalities of the fascist Park Chung-hui puppet clique.” 5 And so, “the foot of the duck” was held up again. The North Koreans have charged the U.N. Command with this in every dealing the two sides have had throughout the 23- year history of the armistice. Yet, it is rather obvious just who displays “the foot of a duck.”
The armistice agreement has recently entered a new era. This was brought about at the 30th session of the United Nations. As has been the case for the past several years, an agenda item addressing the Korean situation was voted upon in December 1975 by the General Assembly. Normally, there are two resolutions which are voted upon by this body. One, the Eastern resolution, is usually the product of the countries sponsoring the Democratic People s Republic of Korea. The other, the Western resolution, originates from supporters of the Republic of Korea. Heretofore, the resolution which was approved by the General Assembly was the Western resolution. In 1975, both were approved.
A feature common to both resolutions is that they call for termination or dissolution of the U.N. Command. The Eastern resolution has always called for the dissolution of the U.N. Command, withdrawal of all foreign troops in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations, and replacement of the armistice by a peace agreement concluded by the Koreans themselves.
On 27 June 1975, the United States called this bluff by agreeing to terminate the U.N. Command by 1 January 1976, provided that the parties directly concerned reached agreement on alternatives mutually acceptable to them for maintaining the armistice agreement. This was set forth in a letter to the President of the Security Council. To date, the Korean People’s Army representatives to the armistice commission have done nothing to effect an alternative agreement. They resolutely cling to their duck’s foot and have indicated the only way is their way.
And so it has been their way for 24 years. To quote Major General J.O. Butcher, U.S. Marine Corps, “The communist way of negotiating has changed very little. It is aggressive, dogmatic; capitalizes on capitulations, and recognizes compromises as weakness.” 6
Many fine words have been set to paper for us to draw strength from when met with this challenge. Others have tried to rationalize the ever-asked, “Why?” The ones that say it simply and with impact are those contained in a U.N. pamphlet: “The United Nations Command will continue to honor its spirit with sincere negotiation and military dignity. To do less would be perfidious to those who died to preserve a free society.”
H Commander Martin was commissioned upon graduation from the New York State Maritime College in 1958. His shipboard assignments have included duty on board the USS Monticello (LSD-35), the USS Charles F. Adams (DDG-2), the USS Northampton (CC-1), and on the staff of Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Four. Ashore he was an instructor at the Fleet Antiair Warfare Training Center, Dam Neck and surface operations officer at the Fleet Electronic Warfare Support Group, joint duty officer of the Armistice Affairs Division of the U.N. Command in Korea, and electronic warfare training division officer for the Fleet Combat Direction Systems Training Center, Dam Neck. He is now executive officer of the USS Milwaukee (AOR-2).
Wf JHHBI Major Nastri was commissioned upon graduation from f Villanova University in 1961. His assignments have in-
JjBL. eluded duty with Fleet Marine Force units on both
coasts and in Vietnam. He has also served joint staff tours with CinCUSNavEur in London and with the U.N. Command, Military Armistice Commission in Seoul, Korea. In the latter billet he was chief of the Joint Observer Team. He is now serving as fire support coordinator of the 17th Marine Amphibious Unit at Camp Pendleton, California. The unit is involved with operational evaluation of the USS Tarawa (LHA-1).
’Strobe Talbott, translator and editor, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 367-368.
2Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (Ret.), How Communists Negotiate (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), p.5.
3Though the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission meets regularly as a body, each side by necessity has its own staff. The Swiss and Swedish delegations are supported administratively by the U.N. Command and live in the southern portion of the demilitarized zone, while the Czechs and Poles live in the northern half and have their needs handled by the North Koreans.
4The phrase “U.S. Imperialistic Aggressors” is one the North Koreans use frequently when addressing American officers of the U.N. Command. Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, they use the initials "USIA.”
5Park Chung-hui, the incumbent President of the Republic of Korea, was elected to office in 1963-
flMajor General J.O. Butcher, USMC, “The Challenge,” The Marine Corps Gazette, December 1966, p.26.