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Like most bureaucracies, the Navy is more or less chronically preoccupied with overhauling its internal administrative structure; and its people have learned to accept the resultant reorganizations with relative equanimity—or at least indifference. However, the 1974 decision to consolidate the Cruiser-Destroyer Forces, the Amphibious Forces, the Service Forces and the remnants of the Mine Force into two Naval Surface Forces was an exception. Many able Navy men felt a serious error had been made and that the traditional command structure should have been retained; and some of these concerns still linger on. Thus, it seems appropriate to review the considerations which led to the Surface Force consolidation and to discuss the challenges which lie ahead.
The Background. Superficially, the Surface Force reorganization was initiated to achieve reductions in the number of staff people assigned to various fleet headquarters. In 1972, at the initiative of the Navy Department, a high-level study group analyzed a spectrum of organizational changes as possibilities for accommodating a 25% reduction in fleet staffs; and the Surface Force amalgamation was seriously considered at that
ALL PHOTOS U. S. NAVY UNLESS OTHERWISE CREDITED
time. However, in light of the strong objections of the fleet commanders-in-chief, the decision was made to effect the required billet cuts through a combination of deep horizontal reductions and the abolition of a number of lower-level operational commands such as service squadrons and destroyer Divisions.
Nonetheless, only a year later, in November 1973, reduction of overhead had again become a front-burner question—but this time at the instance of the Secretary of Defense rather than the Navy’s own leadership. Along with the other services, the Navy was required to provide OSD with plans for effecting a 10%, 20%, or 30% reduction in headquarters personnel at all levels from OpNav down to and including the type commanders (TyComs).
To meet this short-fused requirement, the CNO convened two small groups of senior officers. Vice Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, who was then Director of Navy Program Planning, chaired the group concerned with departmental level reductions and reorganization; and I was ordered to Washington on temporary additional duty from my assignment as ComPhibPac to be senior member of the group which was charged with providing recommendations concerning the fleets. Rear Admirals James C. Donaldson, Jr. and Walter L. Small, Jr. were the other flag participants in my group.
After surveying the consequences of the 1972 reduction, we rapidly reached agreement on the infeasibility of further major horizontal cuts and turned our attention to the possibility of vertical reductions through reorganization. It became clear that a 30% reduction involved unacceptable command and control problems while a 20% cut required so sweeping a reorganization that the range of choice essentially vanished at this level. Accordingly, most of our efforts were directed at assessing the relative merits of the alternatives available on which to base a 10% reduction. The field was eventually narrowed to two prime candidates. One involved radical surgery on the Second Fleet and disestablish' ment of the Third Fleet (with its ASW functions being absorbed by CinCPacFlt); the other was consolidation of the seven existing Surface TyComs) into an Atlantic and a Pacific Naval Surface Force. (NavSurfLant and NavSurfPac).
Following extended discussions of the pros and cons with Admiral James L. Holloway III, who was then Vice Chief of Naval Operations, it was decided that a TyCom merger should be effected in the event of a 1°^ cut. Such a consolidation would be accompanied b) reducing or eliminating the Second and Third Fleet staffs if a 20% reduction were ordered.
The Decision and Implementation. As matters turned out, the cut actually imposed on the Navy was considerably less than 10%; and it could have been accommodated by relatively modest horizontal reductions- Nonetheless, in the spring of 1974, the CNO directed the activation of the two Naval Surface Forces by * January 1975, with the merger to be complete by 3° June. Vice Admiral Robert E. Adamson, Jr. was subsequently designated to be the first ComNavSurfLant, an I was assigned this responsibility in the Pacific.
Clearly, the CNO had arrived at the decision to make this significant change in fleet structure for more baSlC reasons than reduction of overhead. Reorganizatm11 could not alleviate the resource constraints which svefe so central to the problems of the surface elements of Navy; and there were several disadvantages: turm°* and disruption at a time when all hands needed 10 concentrate on readiness improvement in the wake 0 the Vietnamese War; the abolition of a comma11 structure which had proven viable under the pressure
°f three wars; and the leadership/management prob- lerns implicit in the sheer size of the new "super- ^yComs.” The only real advantage in the merger was potential it offered for assisting in the restoration of proper emphasis on surface warfare and reversing the feline in the prestige and esprit of the "black shoe” c°mmunity which had become so apparent in recent years. But this was important enough to tip the scales decisively in favor of amalgamation.
The CNO’s concern over the status of the surface Segrnent of the Navy was justified in every respect. The naval air arm emerged from World War II as the dominant element of the U. S. Navy; and its powerful advocates have been extraordinarily effective in mainlining that position ever since. Also, with the advent °f nuclear propulsion, the Submarine Force became far ^ore prominent an element of naval power than had ^Ver been the case before; and resource allocation was at ^ast commensurate. The surface components of the Navy brought up the rear with respect to funding, fanning, and professional training programs; also they adly lacked cohesiveness. Corrective measures were Nearly required. If the TyCom amalgamation could Serve as a catalyst for developing and implementing the rttjuired far-reaching programs, it would be well worth cbe cost and effort.
In any case, once the marching orders had been
£lven, the issue was not "whether” but "how best.” Th •
nere was the usual pressure from Washington to
ensure that NavSurfPac and NavSurfLant emerged as
°rganizational mirror images. Vice Admiral Adamson
and I coordinated our planning intimately to achieve
Slrnilarity where possible. However, the Atlantic oper-
atlng environment differs in some regards from the
acific; and over the years, the respective fleet organiza-
tlQnal structures have been adapted to meet these needs.
Accordingly, NavSurfLant and NavSurfPac started from different base points; and it would have been poor judgment to exacerbate organizational turmoil by making unneeded changes solely in quest of uniformity. CinCPacFlt supported this viewpoint strongly, and it finally prevailed. Thus, the structures differ in detail, although not in concept.
From the outset of planning for the formation of the surface commands, it was apparent that one of the more acute needs would be to strengthen the intermediate chain of command between the ships and the TyCom. In so large a force, there could be no other means for effective supervision of adherence to those standards of leadership, discipline, maintenance, and training which are prerequisites to combat readiness.
Nobody dissented in theory from this viewpoint; and the CNO permitted us to deviate from the 1972 directive which had prohibited more than one echelon between ships and the type commander. However, more was required; and it was difficult to get recognition of how badly the subordinate command structure had been eroded by previous reductions and reorganizations. In the Pacific the situation was worst in the Service Force where one group commander had over 30 units reporting directly to him. But the Cruiser- Destroyer Force command structure was not in good shape either. Originally, ir appeared that we did not have to be too concerned over the Amphibious Force. But an ill-advised directive (formulated in isolation of reorganization planning) disestablished the only West Coast-based amphibious group in the Pacific at the same time as the Surface Force amalgamation was ordered.
NavSurfPac Headquarters billets were the primary resource available for correction of these Pacific deficiencies. We managed to create two service squadrons,
was
deveh
salvage the amphibious group staff, and augment the maintenance capabilities of group commanders by providing compensation from this source. These measures made the subordinate commanders’ situation tenable in my judgment, but it was far from optimal. Serious span of control problems still existed; and due to rigid rank limitations, the NavSurfPac structure did not have sufficient senior billets to offer as compensation for the establishment of additional intermediate command echelons. I understand that the formation of NavSurfLant involved some similar problems.
Professional Standards and Training: Reorganization planning and the important, although mundane, business of preparing standard procedures and instructions applicable to all Surface Force units could not, of course, be permitted to interfere with the regular press of TyCom operations; and very few key personnel were underemployed in this period. However, reorganization per se was going to have only an indirect and long-range influence on a vital objective of the consolidation— development of a sense of cohesion and common professionalism among the officers of the surface community. It was essential that we make a visible start toward achieving this goal if we were to convince the community that worthwile results were going to stem from the consolidation. This need could not be satisfied by public relations gestures or other superficial measures; for the decision to disestablish the traditional TyCom organization had not been greeted with any enthusiasm at all by the career officers and enlisted men of the various forces.
There was no foot-dragging or other manifestation of indiscipline, but skepticism as to the wisdom of the decision was widespread. For the most part, officers had spent the bulk of their seagoing careers in the same type commands as a result of officer detailing practices, and they had become attached to them. They werC proud of their forces’ individual histories and traditions and feared that these would lose their luster through the consolidation. Also, there was a distinct concern m the Amphibious and Service Force wardrooms that their ships might be treated as "second-class citizens within the new force because of the traditional Nav)' perception of destroyers as the elite surface service. Only the Mine Force people seemed to react favorably to the change—possibly on the pragmatic basis that they ha nothing more to lose.
The approach selected to meet this challenge was the development of formal detailed criteria of professional competence and qualification applicable to all surfac£ officers in all Navy ships. This matter had been dlS' cussed at length at each Surface Type Commander Conference since 1972. However, these meetings ha been relatively unproductive of tangible results—proba- bly as a result of their size. Initially, some fears wer£ expressed that the requirements of each surface tyf^ were too specialized to permit effective cross-training and use of officers. On the basis of my own duty lfj Mine and Service Force ships as well as destroyer an amphibious types, I felt confident that this argument was fallacious. There are differences, but they are dwarfed by the similarities.
In any event, by the time the merger was fa*f^ underway, Vice Admiral Frank H. Price, Jr., the11 DCNO (Surface), Vice Admiral Adamson, and I 'vefe sufficiently in accord on this matter so that it possible to move out vigorously on the development0 qualification standards and criteria. The goal provide definitive requirements for professional opment throughout a surface officer’s career as well aS
*P command lshed. A kev i
t0 provide firm guidelines for surface officer formal Gaining programs.
Fortunately, this effort did not have to start from a 2er° base. After years of churning, the Navy had finally atnved at the conclusion that some formal entry-level Gaining for surface officers was needed; and action was taken at the beginning of 1974 to meet this long- neglected requirement. It was easy to realign and exPand this curriculum to conform to the Surface Officer rofessional Qualifications Standard (PQS), which was eveloped under forced draft in the latter part of 1974. tle Bureau of Naval Personnel (BuPers) agreed to er*deavor to send all surface ensigns to this course prior to their first sea tour and promulgated the new PQS as a Mandatory qualification requirement for assignment of 1110 surface warfare designator.
"Phe established and useful department-head training c°urse at the destroyer school was expanded so that Successful completion of this training could be made a Pterequisite to assignment as a department head in all Surface ships; and the Destroyer School was properly ^‘designated as the Surface Warfare Officer School. uPers then agreed to split-tour officers serving in their epartment head tour between destroyers and either arriphibious or auxiliary ships, in order to broaden Pr°fessional competence and cross-fertilize surface exPertise among the various types.
development of detailed command qualification and Professional examination standards was a considerably ^ore difficult task than originally anticipated because of SOrne strongly held differences among the principals as certain requirements. Eventually these matters were resolved, and formal prerequisites for the attainment of by surface warfare officers were pub- j sue was ducked by failing to prescribe standards concerning the qualifications of officers from
other communities to command surface ships.
By and large, these programs were well received in the Fleet and generated a somewhat more positive attitude toward the Surface Force concept. The quality of the 1110 PQS and the Command Qualification Examinations must, however, be refined on a continuing basis. It is far from certain that a fully adequate balance between professional rigor and the attainability of qualifications was achieved by this initial effort. It would have been ideal to adhere to a strict "requirements” approach on standards, but this was not practicable in some areas. For example, it would have been clearly desirable for all entry-level officers to have to qualify as engineering officer of the watch (EOOW) in addition to officer of the deck (OOD) and CIC watch officer (CICWO) during their first sea tours. However, under current wardroom manning policies, the majority of young officers could not be given a turn at engineering duty during that period. To have disregarded this fact in the development of qualification requirements would have impaired the credibility of the overall program and led to laxity of implementation. Thus, as a compromise, a lesser degree of engineering expertise was developed for qualification of junior 1110 officers; and there is some question as to whether these standards are sufficiently demanding.
In any case, such expediencies should be phased out, if and when adequate junior officer training billets can be provided to surface ships. Fortunately, the present Chief of Naval Personnel is a strong advocate of professionalism in line training; and it is to be hoped that progress will be made soon in this area. Indispensable as formal schools are, they do not serve as a substitute for qualification through seagoing experience.
Appraisal: Nearly two years have passed since the
ymem
a half
Surface Force flags were first broken; and there is no question but that they are functioning entities. Some reductions in staff overhead were achieved, although their magnitude was considerably more modest than initially envisaged by the personnel planners in Washington. Clearly, though, the biggest single plus has been the progress that has been, and continues to be, made toward implementation of professional qualification standards. To date, I have heard no unfavorable comments on this program other than that certain of the standards should be made more rigorous.
Nonetheless, doubts concerning the merger persist on several counts:
► First, there is skepticism as to whether such large commands could be expanded efficiently to manage the surges in force levels which would occur in the event of war. Frankly, it seems quite possible that, under such pressures, it might be advantageous to reestablish temporarily one or more of the former TyComs. However, I do not conceive this to be a major issue. Certainly, the spawning of new headquarters was the very smallest of the problems associated with the Navy’s buildup in the three wars of my time. The tough problem was getting rid of them afterwards.
► Parochialism and rivalry between officers of the different ship types within the Surface Forces are reportedly still noticeable. But, it would be surprising if a real dent had been made in such deep-rooted attitudes over so brief a period of time. They should subside as the impact of cross-detailing becomes progressively greater over the next two years. To facilitate this process, it would be desirable to correct the present predominance of destroyermen in key billets on the Surface Force staffs through routine detailing actions. There are good officers from other components of the Surface Forces available to fill some of these slots; and the present perception that the TyComs’ priorities are focused on cruisers and destroyers would be diminished.
► Also, a potential problem is posed by indications of some lessening in the intimacy of the ties which bound the Fleet Marine Forces and the former Amphibious Forces together. The nature of amphibious planning- logistics, and operations makes it vital that the closest possible relations be maintained with the Marines on a continuing basis at the TyCom as well as at subordinate command levels. The Surface Force consolidation cannot be permitted to impact adversely on the capability of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
► Finally, there is continuing concern that the Surface Force command structure is too remote from the operating units to support and supervise them optimally- This relates directly to our premonitory worries during the reorganization phase as to the adequacy of t*1e subordinate chain of command both with respect to span of control and staff capabilities. The cruiser- destroyer group commanders are in a particular!) difficult position at the times when two of them mu5t rotate on forward deployments. Between predeploy" ment preparations, transit time, and post-deplo leave periods, this process can consume two and to three months in the wide reaches of the Pacific During such periods only one group commander is available to supervise all the cruisers and destroyer squadron5 on the East or West Coast. That makes for a full da) under the best of circumstances; and the situation can become completely untenable if the Second or Thif Fleet Commander requires this same group command^ to plan or run a major exercise concurrently.
One helpful step might be to reestablish the cruiser-destroyer groups eliminated in 1971. I cannot see why it should not be possible to find flag biHet
the
°Wever, it is still too early to judge how successful
!200
p.s.i. engineering improvement program, and even
Compensation for such a purpose within Washington where 50%, or more, of the Navy’s rear admirals are Pre°ccupied with duties which are not nearly so ger- rtlane to the combat effectiveness of the fleets. Also, it |^ay now be time to cut back the TyCom staff more °ldly than was deemed prudent during the reorganiza- phase, in order to bolster the capabilities of subor- ‘nate commanders further. In retrospect, I may have ^■tde a mistake in not forcing more moves of this type ^hile the NavSurfPac organization was still in a state of nux.
p Notwithstanding such problem areas, the Surface °rces are shaking down acceptably in my opinion.
P :y will be in bringing about the renaissance of sur- ^Ce warfare professionalism sought by Admiral Elmo U[nwalt. A start has certainly been made, but no more an that. Tough challenges lie ahead, and momentum rtlUst be maintained.
k y^e Future: Improved maintenance of surface ships is ^eing accorded great emphasis in a steady flow of 'tectives and exhortation from all levels. Such recog- n,tion of this pressing need is gratifying since mainte- p'tnce is the foundation on which readiness must be However, thus far, resource allocation has not matched the urgency attached to these programs in ^tds and on paper. The only exception has been the
f ‘s top priority effort has been hampered by shortages °/ technicians and funding in some cases. High profes- Sl°nal standards and concentrated command attention are indispensable elements of improved maintenance, a'N they must be pursued relentlessly. However, they not suffice to do the job in the face of continuing °ttages of skilled manpower and funding.
Indefinitely deferred maintenance and makeshift repairs clearly lead to degradations of operational reliability and court safety hazards. Of equal importance are the profoundly adverse effects that such practices generate over the long run on the maintenance attitudes and work habits of both officers and men. All the efforts to increase professionalism in the Surface Forces will amount to very little unless we provide our people the resources to practice what we preach (as has been done for many years in the Submarine Force).
New construction and modernization programs must place requisite emphasis on the maintainability and reliability of equipments and subsystems in order to reduce the proportion of future budgets which must be devoted to ship maintenance. However, the upkeep requirements of our existing forces are both largely fixed and a basic determinant of the fleets’ combat readiness. It is time to put our money where our mouth has been in the maintenance business, even if such "sacred cow” programs as the installation of sewage collection systems in our ships have to be deferred.
The Level of Surface Force Integration: In the early days of planning for the activation of NavSurfPac, two of our group commanders developed a concept for extending the consolidation down through their command echelon by forming operational naval surface groups to replace cruiser-destroyer and amphibious groups. These groups would be theoretically comprised of an amphibious and three destroyer squadrons as well as cruisers; and it appeared that only modest staff augmentation would be required to provide the commanders with the required expertise in the expanded mission area.
At the time, I rejected this idea because it would have caused unacceptable turmoil to have reorganized
at the group level while the TyCom merger was in process. However, that phase is over; and I believe that the operational surface group proposal merits serious reconsideration on several counts. First, it would broaden the Navy’s shrunken base of flag-level expertise in amphibious warfare. It would also tend to bring the group structure into alignment with operational requirements, since the antisubmarine, antiair, and gunfire support capabilities of cruisers and destroyers are indispensable elements of successful amphibious assaults. And finally, it would facilitate development of the capabilities of the larger amphibious ships for participation with cruisers and destroyers in sea-control type operations in lieu of aircraft carriers. Air surveillance and attack capabilities are essential to accomplishment of this mission. However, commitment of a large carrier represents overkill under most circumstances; and the helicopter operating and support capabilities of such ships as the LPH, the LHA, or even the LPD are superior to those of any other type ship. Also, the LPH and LHA could be modified at a relatively modest price to handle the vertical takeoff/landing aircraft now under development for sea-control missions.
Command Matters: No single factor in the complex readiness equation is more important than the quality and experience of the commanders who are directly entrusted with the leadership and combat proficiency of our ships and sailors. The standard must be excellence; and the command qualification standards to which I alluded earlier must be rigorously implemented within the surface community to achieve this goal with greater regularity than has been the case in the past.
The "command opportunity” quotas so dear to the hearts of Navy personnel planners cannot be permitted to stand in the way of this pressing need. Admittedly, the Navy needs surface officers to serve repetitive tours in such fields as research and development, systems analysis, financial management, or personnel admmlS' tration; and successful performance in these demanding billets certainly merits recognition in the promotion process. However, the skills acquired in such positions are not necessarily those which make for excellence m command afloat. The only valid criterion for assign" ment to such duty must be a solid and extensive recor of outstanding seagoing performance. If this shorn lead to eventual establishment of "wet and dry” career patterns, so be it. Surely that would be a lesser evil than mediocrity in command at sea.
The Navy must also take the essential step of making the surface command qualification applicable to officerS of all communities who aspire to command Surface Force units. Specifically, a halt must be called to the practice of assigning selected naval aviator captains to command most of our larger amphibious and auxifiarf vessels without regard to their prior experience in, °c knowledge of, ships. This policy has been justified both in the name of "command opportunity” and to provio^ prior shipboard command experience to officers slate as captains of aircraft carriers. My views on the com mand opportunity shibboleth need no further expos* tion. And the adverse impact on the readiness of the surface ships which are burdened with a succession 0 such "in training” commanding officers is unaccepta ble. Moreover, the premise that an officer with little °r no prior seagoing experience can learn enough in ;1 single (and usually abreviated) ship’s company tour t° manage effectively so huge and complex an entity as a11 aircraft carrier is patently faulty.
I have no desire to see the command of surface ship5 made the exclusive preserve of 1110 officers; but thelt’ can be no compromise with the principle that the
Captain of a ship must be at least the professional peer any officer within his command. To bring this about lri the aviation community will almost certainly re- Huire changes in its assignment patterns so that promises aviation officers will have the opportunity to serve and qualify on surface ships earlier in their careers. The ’eprovements to be gained in the readiness of both the sttrface ships and the carriers they may subsequently c°mrnand would be clearly worth this price.
Direction of Readiness and Training: Now that there is 0rdy one surface type commander in each major Fleet, 11 ls time to rethink the pervasive, though nebulous role t^at the Second and Third Fleets have come to play in basic TyCom responsibility for the readiness of 0rces. Originally, the rationale for this admixture of responsibilities was the perceived need for an overall Co*imand structure to plan and administer advanced fining involving units of different type commands. ubsequently the Second and Third Fleet roles were expanded to include nominal operational control of m°st units training in home waters (except for Subma- r*ne and Amphibious Forces).
This system of split responsibility has never worked ^oothly. Training cannot be divided into discrete asff, intermediate, and advanced” segments except on . staff scheduler’s pad. And the readiness which training ‘^signed to promote is inextricably intertwined with e logistic and administrative needs of ships on both a r°nological and a functional basis.
1 doubt that there was ever much substance behind . e argument for numbered fleet cognizance over lnter-type training since, as a practical matter, one or pother group or squadron commander of the several yComs planned and conducted these evolutions under numbered fleet designator. And whatever requirement
formerly existed for this arrangement has been greatly diminished by the TyCom consolidation. My experiences in the Amphibious Force indicated clearly the benefits of unitary TyCom responsibility for all aspects of readiness; and I feel that this principle should be applied in the Surface Forces.
It may be argued that such a realignment would jeopardize the continued existence of the Second and Third Fleet command structures since much ado has been made in the Pentagon about the importance of having a large proportion of forces "deployed” to the operational control of these commanders. However, the rationale for any command structure must be based on its contribution to combat effectiveness; and cosmetic factors should not be seriously considered. Accordingly, the case for continuation of the Second and Third Fleets should be founded on their contingency planning and oceanic antisubmarine missions.
Vice Admiral Salzer served in the Navy from February 1941 until his retirement from active duty in September 1975. His assignments included command of the USS Summit (AMC-106), USS YMS-347, USS LST-624, USS Abbot (DD-629), USS Bryce Canyon (AD-36), Destroyer Divisions 232 and 192, Amphibious Squadron 4, River Assault Flotilla l/River Support Squadron 7, Cruiser- Destroyer Flotilla 3, U. S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet, and finally, Surface Force Pacific Fleet. While ashore, he had intelligence, logistic, and systems analysis assignments in the Pentagon. He holds a B.A. degree from Yale University and an M.B.A. from George Washington University. Since retirement, he has been a consultant with the Logistic Management Institute and Ketron, Inc., in Washington, D.C.