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Preceding pages: Six minesweepers of the Netherlands Navy—twice as many as the entire U. S. Navy has in full commission—cross the English Channel in line abreast. These 169 ton inshore minesweepers are about 33 meters, or 109 feet, in length and can steam at 13 knots. The tasks of Allied Command Channel are carried out by the British,
Netherlands, and Belgian navies. The geographical extent of the command is small, and the fighting ships most useful in the command are also likely to be small, but the ships to be protected include some of the largest and most important merchant vessels in the world.
T
-L he Allied Command Channel (ACChan) is NATO’s one-off job, forged for its unique purpose in Western defence and well fitted to do it; statements that invite questions. Why was it—and is it—necessary? How did it start, how has it grown, and how does it stand today? Where is it going? To all of which this essay attempts to offer some reasonable—and reasoned—answers. After all, it might be argued, NATO’s defence falls naturally within two broad, well-defined, and easily understood geographical areas—the continent of Europe on which lies the land-frontier between East and West and the ocean connecting the two parts of the Western Alliance— so why this third; exiguous in extent and neither firm ground nor good broad ocean? Let us therefore set ourselves to finding what it is all about, starting with a few fundamentals.
Of all the waters of the world’s seas, the English Channel—"The Channel” to all seafarers—is probably the most famous in history, the most used and therefore the most important—and almost certainly the most fought over. Its very existence has made the English what they are and has ensured for these fortunate islanders a thousand years of freedom. It is the Channel that has made them quite different from their cousins in Germany and from their ethnically more distant relations in France and the Low Countries. The Channel has shaped their characters as much as their history. Today and for as far as anyone can peer ahead it will continue to play its sometimes dominant and always significant part; not only in the affairs of Britain but in those of the whole of Europe. The strands of history and geography are inextricably interwoven.
On more than one occasion this 20-mile ditch has
profoundly influenced the history of Europe—and hence of the world. "Give me command of the narrow seas for but six hours,” declared Bonaparte, "and I will destroy the English and take London.” Seamen might be skeptical about that "six hours,” even for an arm)' inured to living off the country, but at the time the boast held a chilling feasibility, despite the firm rebuttal from St. Vincent, then First Lord of the Admiralty: "I do not say they will not come; I only say they shall not come by sea.”
In those surface-bound days this did not give the enemy an alternative. In 1940 many discounted the continuing efficacy of the water-gap in the face of German air power. The success or failure of the pr°' posed German invasion of Britain, Operation Sealion, is, at the best, a matter for speculation, for it is one of 1 the great might-have-beens of modern history. The significant fact is that it was not even attempted.
However this might have turned out, there can he little doubt that the Channel presents a formidable obstacle to any large military venture across it, even if virtually unopposed, as was proved by the great storn1 of June 1944. The Channel was, is, and always will be open sea, and, as such, highly capricious. One of the ffist duties of the seaman is to make sure that landsmen afC never allowed to ignore these fundamental facts of nature.
It is at this point that another similarly basic factof ; must be introduced: the change in emphasis in the use (or would-be use) of the waterway since that day whe*1 Bonaparte stood on the cliff-top at Boulogne and- lifting his eyes from admiring his splendid Grande Armee, sourly contemplated the dirty grey-green watefS that barred the way to conquest. Today the Channel Is arguably of greater significance on account of wha1 travels along it, rather than on what might assaub ; across it. In short, the highway has displaced the moz1' even if it has by no means eliminated it from consider don.
Though, doubtless, the slide-rule warriors are eagef to do so, it is, of course, impossible to quantify such a abstraction. Nor would such figuring be profitable >n the present context, since the significance lies not s° much in the amount of the increase but in the fact thac not only seagirt, over-populated, and crowded Britai11 but also the whole of western Europe relies utterly °n imports—which for practical purposes means seaborue imports—for their very existence. No matter how mu^ oil is found under the North Sea, it is not likely to meet Europe’s needs; certainly it does not do so now. An^ there are many imported materials other than oil up°n which Europe’s people and industries depend.
Another post-World War II invention, the War, also helps to tip the scales of significance in favotff :
not
s°uth,
a choke-point. The density of shipping close to the
°f highway rather than moat. Interference with the use °f the sea on "lawful occasions” is today a much more likely contingency than overt assault.
Combined, these several factors present the first and m°st important conclusion with regard to the Channel: that not only is it a vital defence for Britain (a view that might seem a trifle narrow-minded to Britain’s continental allies) but it is also a vital medium of transport and communication, in peace, war, or at any °f the twilight stages in between. In traditional terms, therefore, it is not enough that its waters should be t^nied to the enemy,” they must also be fully available for use by ourselves and those that trade with us.
This significance of Channel-as-highway merits some analysis, for it is a new development.
fallow, Narrow, and Near”
S^n as a highway, the Channel is no more than an extension of the broad oceans of the world which have .een used down the centuries by those peoples and lr>dividuals with the wit, courage, tenacity, and ability t0 do so, to their great and lasting advantage. The °ceans are themselves highways, in that they afford a ^ay> but it is wise to recollect that, apart from this friction, they bear but a passing resemblance to their counterparts on shore. Like the road, rail, or canal, they °ffer the means of humping goods or people from ^here they are to where they are needed (and occasion- a y> in the case of people, where they actually want to §°). There the similarity comes to a sharp and final *t0P- There is no need here to list all the dissimilarities, Ut two are especially relevant to the Channel theme. Extent. The ocean is broad; the best (or, some would
Say> Worst) motorway/turnpike/autobahn/autostrada is
^'Uutely narrow, even when compared with the Chan- ne • "The strategist or ship owner is under no constraint to draw a great-circle on the chart as being the only °ute between the points of departure and landfall, -p f'eteas the truck trundling down the Pennsylvania Urupike would be well advised to steer within a few ,eet (and, occasionally, inches), the merchantman round- lng the southern tip of Africa has a thousand miles of P^n water between the shore and the Antarctic pack- ,CC' Naturally, her master will cut the corner as close as rc>dent navigation and traffic allow, but the Cape is
j lern tip of Africa reflects the present absence of anger from a naval source; it could be changed overnight.
*^he Channel presents a sharp contrast to the Cape uUte- The Dover Strait probably carries a greater vole °f freight and passenger traffic than any other
major waterway—and, compared to the oceans, with not much room to manoeuvre and none at all to evade (in the sense of avoiding an area known or thought to be dominated by hostile forces). Willy-nilly the shipping must converge on that twenty-mile gap.
Depth. The second relevant dissimilarity between highway and seaway lies in the inconvenient fact that not every ship can go everywhere; she needs water under her keel, and this today means a minimum charted depth approaching 35 metres for the VLCC and not much less for the bulk carrier. These between them play ever-increasing parts in bringing cargoes to northwest Europe. As a result, in the Channel the situation has been reached where there is precious little latitude in the matter of routing these very deep-draught vessels. Although this constriction has no direct military impact, for warships have fallen far behind in the sheer- size race, it does have a very important indirect effect, in that the shipping to be protected, and the most valuable ships at that, have to follow routes that can be predicted by an enemy just as easily as by a friend.
Thus to some extent a paradox is reached: having shown that the ocean is quite different from a road, we are now forced to admit that, in the special case of the Channel, every day Channel and road become more alike for, besides being shallow, the Channel is narrow and crammed with traffic. There is surely a firmly established case for saying: "Channel is special.”
It is at this point that the emphasis must once again return to the military sphere. The Channel is not only special but must also function separately from the much larger Atlantic and European military commands in order to fulfill its vital role of linking them. It is this linking which demands that operations in the narrow seas have special and separate treatment, for the narrow seas are neither oceanic nor strategically pan of the continent. It is true that the flanks of the European command lie in the sea, but the activities there are not the business of Channel, nor could they easily be combined with the linking task either by absorbing Channel within Europe or by extending Channel’s operational areas (under, presumably, another more grandiose title). It says much for the mental flexibility of the founding fathers of NATO that they eschewed this solution, so alluring to the tidy minds of administrators. Thus, in February 1952, less than a year after Allied Command Europe (ACE) and its headquarters (SHAPE) were set up under General Eisenhower, the North Atlantic Council established what was then known as the "Channel and Southern North Sea Command,” shortly to be abbreviated to "Channel.”
Linking is the chief reason for ACChan’s existence, but it receives two endorsements: tactical and politico- geographic. First, maritime warfare in and around the
narrow seas, by being so different from that on the broad ocean, calls for entirely different tactics and, more significantly, different attitudes of mind, especially by the command ashore. On the one hand, for practical purposes, the broad ocean can be considered as both bottomless and boundless, to the extent that a submarine can go as deep as her hull will let her and surface forces can move around as they please (though very much on their own, as reinforcement is almost always a
matter of hours or days rather than minutes if, indeed it can be achieved at all). In ACChan, however, the rff is "shallow, narrow, and near.” This is not to sugge5t that "a separate command for a different kind of fare” should be a universal maxim, but in the preset case it does lean in that direction.
The politico-geographic reason lies, first, in the factS that Britain (who supplies the NATO Commander i°' ACChan and who houses the headquarters) can ab° bring vast experience of these same narrow seas and stift considerable forces well equipped to operate there; at events, down to frigate size plus mine warfare craft Second, it stems from the country’s geographical p°51 tion. There lie the British Isles (so called), bestridi^ the way to northwest Europe so that no vessel can read1 its continental industrial heart without either passing1,1 sight of the White Cliffs or, in extremis, taking the lony way round northabout through the stormy sub-arc11) waters and uncomfortably close to the northern bases0
nati°n supreme command across the board cannot but e c°nstricting; it does not make practical sense in the
4 CCA
^ot at all bad, when one considers that it must have
b,
C„°f singleness of purpose—the intrusion of "con- reveals man’s, even staff-trained man’s, almost
,ersal inability to differentiate between the mission lch the British perversely call the aim) and the
*ATo
the Red Fleet. The waywardness of geography has an importance in human and international affairs that is seldom given the weight it deserves.
On the political side, there is much to be said for having a European commander for one of the three major commands. And, that command being essentially maritime, the choice of a British four-star admiral to lead it was—at the time—fairly obvious. It can still be seen as "Obviously fair,” but whereas in 1952 Britain Was by a long way the dominant European sea power, her lead had greatly dwindled.
hlost Europeans would agree that both SACLant and SACEur should be Americans. If they are realists, they also appreciate that this has nothing to do with eing fair t0 pr0vider of the lion’s share, but stems r°m self-interest. The nation that provides the top man *s chat much more likely to stand and fight rather than ev°te itself to conning the small print of the fourteen rticles for some excuse for looking the other way. the other hand, this can be taken too far. Even blowing for the fact that NATO’s military commanders take their orders from the Military Committee, on ^hich all NATO’s member nations (except France and j^land) have equal representation, and even though ere's broad representation from a number of member nati°ns at deputy and commander-in-chief levels, single-
b,
^itary field; not for lack of good will or straight ealing) but from the inevitable, often unconscious, arit> limits of experience, and plain lack of knowledge those subtle national quirks that alone can explain c apparently inexplicable.
hese, then, are the reasons for ACChan and a British ClI1Chan.
<an’s Mission and Bailiwick
to primary mission of the Channel Command is control and protect merchant shipping and contrib- e to the deterrence of all forms of aggression in the Cchan area.”* ^ 4lc work of several committees and innumerable afi °®cers. It is, of course, a pity that it did not stop ^hipping,” in which case the deplorable "pri- could have been obliterated. By the same token—
trol
uniVi
Facts and Figures (1971), page 203.
means of achieving it. The last part about "deterrence” illustrates this illogicality to perfection (if that is the word): admirable as a course of action, but not the Aim; added, no doubt, to placate some mulish blockhead with superior stamina.
All the same, not too bad, for the emphasis is where it should be—on shipping. Its protection, which will obviously demand its control, is the link-man’s business. Not for him to win wars, but to make sure they are not lost; not to provide the sinews, but to see that they arrive where they are needed.
The part of the world where all this goes on is, as usual and quite correctly, defined by lines drawn on charts. These are, however, no arbitrary demarcations on the style first made popular by Pope Alexander VI; at all events, their positioning suggests a great deal of logic and common sense; in such sharp contrast, be it said, to the ill-chosen and stubbornly maintained southern boundary which cages in SACLant at the Tropic of Cancer.
The CinChan’s writ runs from the waters out beyond the Scilly Isles once known as the Chops of the Channel (from the short choppy sea liable to be met on striking soundings when homeward bound) and now, by a curious change of meaning, once again a chop-line- in the NATO sense of change of operational control. Thence it runs up-Channel and out through the Dover Strait to include the narrow shallow waters of the southern North Sea. Its northern boundary runs roughly where these waters broaden and deepen, eventually merging with the Norwegian Sea and all under the command of SACLant. Eastwards it runs until these waters, whilst still narrow and shallow, change their character from an access-route to a present, or possible future, watery flank of NATO’s continental front-line; intangible, to be sure (unlike that on land), but just as important. Indeed, it could be said that, when the founding fathers of NATO defined CinChan’s job they also discovered, without great surprise, that the Channel area had in consequence defined itself.
The smallness, narrowness, and shallowness of the Channel must always be at the back of the mind of anyone operating there or conducting their affairs from the shore. From Lands End to the South Goodwin lightship off Dover is less than three hundred miles; the entire area is less than five hundred miles from end to end. All but a fairly narrow central strip in the western Channel lies well within the fifty-metre curve.
One further general question calls for an answer now: is the need for this maritime protection growing, static, or withering? The answer stems from one word- oil. Dominating every other factor in Europe’s current economy is the ever-increasing need for oil. It is true that some of this may come across the Mediterranean
*
182 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1976
(which, whilst it is also fraught with hazard, is outside the scope of this study); some may be piped or brought in tankers from beneath the North Sea; for some, again, a substitute may be found. Nevertheless, oil for Europe today means, by and large, oil from the Middle East brought round the Cape in large vulnerable vessels and all, perforce, converging on the Channel. Channel traffic—and doubly so, Channel tanker-traffic—is growing and showing every sign of going on doing so. With this growth goes the need for protection; a treble increase if the size and value of each vessel are considered, each one’s diminishing ability to evade (by going by another route) or to avoid (by a quick side-step when under attack), and the sum of the daily transit-tonnage. Only one factor is running in favour of the big new vessels (especially the container ships): they do have a good turn of speed. "Speed is armour!” cried Jackie Fisher, when a critic looked askance at the flimsy battlecruisers. Well, he was terribly wrong, so it would not be wise to pin too much on the slogan "speed is safety,” but it could help, even if only by cutting the time at the danger zone.
Oil is the most important cargo, but it is not all, not is the deep-water traffic the whole of the story. Long- haul dry cargo is on the increase, as demonstrated by the recent increase in the size of the bulk-cargo vessels- Northwest Europe (especially Britain) also depends very largely on a vast fleet of small short-haul coasters- These not only carry goods across the narrow seas, but also along its shores; a cheap, efficient, and surprisingly quick way of relieving road and rail of an enormous volume and weight of freight. The giant tanker is vital to northwest Europe, but so also is the tiny coaster- At all events, the ships are in the Channel. In war they must be protected. What and where is the threat?
Level of Conflict; Nature of Threat
One of the ways in which naval conflict differs fro01 its land-bound counterpart is its infinite choice of levd of engagement (using the last term in its very broadest sense of "activity relating to an overt or convert opp0' nent”). At sea today the Warsaw Pact nations may no1
shic
d
atld h3S WC^ as rccent developments such as hydrofoils
ke at war with NATO, but neither are they truly at peace. No amount of sophistry, SALT, detente-hopes, or Helsinki protestations can alter this unhappy fact. It is fashionable to explain that, when Khrushchev said "we W*H bury you!”, he did not, of course, mean "bury” but something else not entirely clear then or now. He said bury” ancj meant "bury.” The Pact and NATO are 'ocked in conflict and the place to look for its insidious Manifestations is not along the barbed wire of the Iron ^■urtain but on the broad ocean and in the narrow seas. And, since NATO shipping is thickest in the narrow Seas, there is the most likely point of erosion.
Erosion” is indeed the key. Looking at the problem r°m the Soviet point of view, provided the freedom of Use of the narrow seas (and, it should be added, the free exploitation of its resources) can be sufficiently worn awa>' over the years, the contribution to the overall Overthrow of NATO will be achieved. The Soviet efforts t0 close the Black, Baltic, and Barents seas to foreign ^arships are of long standing. Their effort to close the ea °f Okhotsk and the seas north of the Soviet Union 1101 0nly to the warships but also to the commercial ari(f scientific vessels of other countries have succeeded. acu success simply sets the stage for the next effort at ea closure. From all of which comes the simple deduc- w°n- NATO needs not only to be able to fight a naval ab but also to maintain a maritime peace.
be basic answer to the threat of Cold-War erosion to be ready to provide continuous surveillance (or as QCar to this ideal as is practicable) and swift presence. In sid ^ Wort^s’ CinChan needs to know what the other e ls up to, so as to have a countervailing military ^Ptesentative (which normally would mean a surface a[_sb*p) on the spot and soon enough to forestall the tvard chance of finding a fait accompli—a kind of ^arhime Berlin Wall. Naturally, this principle applies ^herc. The CinChan is lucky, in that his area is tQj^ "a5 major command areas go—but, by the same hea^' t^le density °f occupation, fixed and moving, is fQr f Thus, transit times can be measured in minutes . ahcraft and in hours for all but the slowest war-
ctafS’ and rhere is clearly scope for high-speed light att, as - -
hovercraft.
Wjj-i tbough overt attack by Pact forces is unlikely ide6 rbe war is cold, the threat from less readily a]| tl able enemies of NATO (or, for that matter, from ,p^i^nern*es of lawful activity) is steadily increasing. strunaturally leads to the protection of static off-shore oUtCt;res- Fortunately for CinChan, most oil rigs are v ‘ e bis area, but the similarly vulnerable gas rigs are s^h his concern. The need for defence against aside ?rties °b freebooters cannot therefore be brushed ' he anxiety arises not so much from the possible
size or significance of any such attack as from its unpredictability; anxiety compounded by the extreme vagueness of the legal status of these things that seem to be neither ship, island, nor continent. Whereas the centuries have led to a clear delineation of the rights and responsibilities of warships on the high seas vis a vis merchantmen of any nationality, in matters concerning these off-shore structures the captain of a warship can today do no more than offer "aid to the civil power.” And there is no need to remind any commander in any fighting service just what confusion and trouble this can lead to—trouble, especially, for him.
The Channel in War
In analysing the threats to shipping in overt war between NATO and the Pact (which, for the moment, is the only runner; later there may be others to think about, but not yet), it is wise to start on the basis that almost any kind of enemy-inspired disaster can befall the unlucky merchantman anywhere and at any time, from which it is the duty of the fighting forces to protect him. It is true that frogmen are not thick in mid-Atlantic, nor is submarine attack likely while on a patent slip, or marine railway. Nevertheless, the practical point is that most forms of attack are possible in most places; it is only their respective probabilities that shift around according to time, place, and circumstance.
Thus, in the Channel the front-runners can easily be identified: mines, light craft, and shore-based air or missiles are well up with the field; large surface ships might feel themselves unduly constricted, whilst highspeed nuclear-powered submarines might not relish the limits set on their vertical freedom of manoeuvre. However, the menace of the small conventionally powered submersible remains.
To these threats must be added two more: the hazards of wartime navigation without lights and off unlit coasts, and the ever-present risk of running into one of one’s friends. Radar, radio navigation aids, and communications have all vastly improved since World War II, when those operating in the narrow seas were wont to apportion the risks between rock and shoal, friend, and foe in the rough ratio of 40-40-20 per cent. Nevertheless, the thought of a 400,000-ton VLCC running without lights at almost 20 knots up-Channel with the tidal current under her (but precious little else), unable to stop, slow to turn and, in any case, severely restricted bysea room (or lack of it), is not conducive to peace of mind for the escort captain, particularly if in contact with a possible submarine. In short, not all the so-called threats come from the enemy: a point of considerable import when it comes to sea training.
184 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1976
all
does not seem to have become universally ackno edged. It is no exaggeration to see in, say, a sfl13*' squadron of Osa-class fast attack craft, a match for vessel afloat. And, as the Soviets have over 150 miss^c armed small combatants, this aspect is all too dci< Comparisons of numbers and strengths are #
m
operations. As long as the war was not yet hot would, of course, be able to make at least the out
tW
Ji'l er# j Id H
Enemy Bases and the Time Factor
A general and very important factor when considering the threat within Channel Command is the assessment of where this will come from. Right now this is simple: the limits of Pact territory are more clearly defined than those of any imperium since the Roman Emperor Hadrian built his wall across the north of England from the Solway to the Tyne. But what of the situation in overt war? Will, as gloomily predicted, the Red Army roll across Europe within the first week, taking over the sea bases as it goes? This is a contingency that must be allowed for. Its significance in the present context is that, as in the last conflict, when things happen in the narrow seas they will happen fast and with little, if any, warning.
The corresponding need for fast reaction need not unduly disturb the captain of a ship at sea or even the senior officer of a homogeneous force, as the modern computer-aided warship is geared for just such eventualities. However, it does pose a considerable problem to CinChan’s headquarters ashore, where inevitably the action is slower. It also puts a premium on those fighting vehicles—be they seaborne, airborne, foilborne, or hoverers—that can cut the time to target-area.
The Threat from the Mine
Although it would be unwise to assign any order to possible enemy actions, there is no doubt that, in any list, "mining” would be writ large and near the top. The shallowness and narrowness of the sea favour their use; they are excellent devices for indiscriminate closure of whole areas (especially when laid by aircraft); they can be laid in peacetime by, say, apparently innocent fishing craft; the Soviets are especially skillful in their design and use. Mines are most effective when laid in huge numbers so as to swamp the defences; if there is one special attribute of the Soviets it is their liking for huge numbers, backed by an unfortunate ability to produce them. Thus, NATO can be sure of one thing: if, in war, the Soviets decide on mining the narrow seas, there will be plenty of mines around. And sweeping is a slow business; hunting even slower.
The Threat from the Submarine
There was a time (say, until about five years ago very approximately) when it was possible to show that the greater part, if not all, of the Soviet Union’s submarine fleet would be tied down to defensive operations; which, after all, had been their original raison d’etre. There were no fewer than four widely spaced approaches to be defended. The proponents of this view had a strong case: the four sea-frontiers did pose a special problem in defence against attack from the sea, in that the vast distances between them virtually eliminated that flexibility of deployment that can be such a feature of sea power. Such may well have been the case; it is certainly not so any longer. The Soviet Union has plenty of submarines to spare for forward offensive deployment Are these—or some of them—suitable for the narrow' | seas?
Indeed they are! Take, for starters, the hundred boats j of the Whisky class; no lumbering leviathans bu1 displacing just over a thousand tons on the surface These early postwar craft are, of course, on their wa)' out, but it is reasonable to presume that their replace ments (probably, says Jane’s Fighting Ships, the slightly larger diesel-engined Tango class) will fill the gaps with something to spare.*
Are the narrow seas suitable for submarines? Thc short, slightly evasive, answer to this is that they i<c , hell for any kind of warfare. There is, of course, n° question of going "fast and deep” to make ones^ scarce after an attack, but, by the same token, therelS much scope for evasion among the numerous wreck5* shoals, and rips—given the requisite nerve on the p# of the submarine’s captain.
The Threat from the Surface
The threat posed by surface warships differs rfor(1 those of mines or submarines for it can come in a g[e>t variety of ways. All that a mine can actually do ist0 blow up; a submarine, qua submarine, can fire # weapon, for if she comes to the surface she is no loi#r a submarine. A surface warship can, however, play infinite number of roles, from, say, sinking withe11' warning to just being there and being seen to be th#' Surface warships come in two sizes: small and la# Their punch comes in one size only: large. This is ^ great change that the missile has brought to surf# fleets over the last decade, the full significance of w#
doubtedly gloomy for NATO, but there are also s01 factors working against the Soviets. First, and possf the most important, they have to reach the scen£ passage unmolested, though not without giving ing. Once it became hot they would not enjoy surf1 advantage, but might eventually be able to op1 from bases much nearer their targets, which cou
ffl1111 I
*Jane’s also comments that this Tango class "shows a continuing c°n)!t ment to diesel-propelled boats, which is of interest in view of the cow I tively slow fleet-submarine building programme.”
short-
th \
excellent Israeli Saar class is reported to be 3,000
k CS at economical speed and 1,000 at a spanking 30 ots), but they are still extremely fragile. The old to C Stad good: The shorter the passage time t e operating area the better, g , ,ey are better sea boats than they were, but their to '1°^ Worth sciH deteriorates in heavy weather. Their ^ CSt advcrsary ts Admiral Beaufort. Likewise, not ttiil IfUC^1 s^ould be made of the great range (150 class reP0rted ^or the SSN9 mounted in the Nanuchka- att .Corvettes, especially in the context of a surprise atta ' ^ SUC^ crowded wafcrs as the Channel, the terer must first identify his target—at least in general s- This, in turn, usually means that someone must
range little boats of World War II (the range of
h;
a look. Even on the broad ocean and in overt war, lertv . cataon of over-the-horizon targets adds a prob-
ifli
’ ln the Channel it is a must.
bCenCVertdlcdess, even w^en all the shortcomings have
their Carrfully paraded, it must be admitted that, in SovictnUrnerous and Powerfudy armed light craft, the trCrn ? ^ave the means of making the Channel ex- ten,,' y uncomfortable for the home side—given the
lUlsite k„„__ s
The
fltflteVrrC t*le‘r larger ships in a Channel context is C(
ely that
^ cuv-u JdlgU allied 111 d. V^lltlllllCl EUIUtAl ID
to CQv ' erent. Lacking shipborne aircraft with which likelv ^ t^em~at least for the next few years—it is not
valuable ships would be committed to the JQreSeasJ unless, as ever, bases on the continental BUt tj^Cre securely in Soviet or at least friendly hands. tv0uide Soviet problem would be one of priorities: 0rat ]e^le kig ships not be needed on the broad ocean tUiw lSt ln tlle Mediterranean? The ships are there and
st tiof Ur r
s?etn , De torgotten. However, on balance it would
t>at:
that the
achin r0tTI f^e Ught craft—possibly with big ship S' The Os as, the Nanuchkas, and their friends
could fill the bill admirably.
Basically, therefore, the maritime threats to the West’s use of the Channel fall under the same headings as anywhere else at sea. It is the importance likely to be given to the various attributes that is special to this area. Endurance, whilst it is always welcome, would take second place to all-out speed; sea-keeping would be of the kind able to cope with the short steep seas of these shallow waters; the big one-shot punch would be preferred to the ability to inflict a longer but lighter hammering; and, on the passive side of the same coin, some damage would be acceptable, thanks to being so near home.
But where would "home” be?
Home for the Red Fleet, in our present context, would be any part of Europe behind the Red Army’s front line. Its westward boundary would have considerable relevance to the choice of craft employed; hence (within pretty narrow limits) choice of weapons; hence, in turn, choice of tactics. Clearly along any littoral the varying fortunes of land and sea forces are closely interdependent.
The Threat from the Air
Although for the moment Soviet seaborne air power is inconsiderable, all aircraft that take part in the battle within the maritime environment must be considered as
ef
Benechan Box. The British have, however, come s° way since Channel was first set up, when it had * equal commanders-in-chief (the naval commander- chief being primus inter pares, his colleague being i ^ the C-in-C of Coastal Command, now embodied J Strike Command). Today the Commander-in-C^ Channel, enjoys complete operational control °f 1 aircraft as are assigned to him—via his subord**^ Commander, Allied Maritime Air Force, Channel system works; exercises show that, within the ' straitened material circumstances of the Seventies efficient—it produces the maximum end-pm1 which is aircraft in the air and manned with ^ trained for the job. It works, too, because of 5tr0^' personal ties. One of the few offsetting advantage £ small fighting services is that, completely in the ranks and to a great extent lower down as well. e(j£ one—and especially the flyers (in the word’s sense) destined for, or in, high places—knows eve*) else. (j(!
It works. Because of the system or in spire 0
The Forces Themselves
In discussing a large command as such it is nat1*^ ^ dwell largely on the higher echelons; though nevef’
maritime aircraft, no matter from where they take-off or to whom they report.
The Soviet Union’s naval air arm is second in size only to that of the United States; almost entirely shore- based, to be sure, but part of, and operated by, the Soviet Navy and therefore obviously trained to cooperate closely with ships. A substantial advance by the Red Army would open a completely fresh area of operation for the 1,200 naval aircraft, though there is some comfort to be drawn from the fact that current Soviet naval aircraft are mostly old and slow; hardly suitable for the inhospitable skies above the narrow seas.
That, of course, is not true for the 4,500 assorted MlGs, Yaks, and Sukhois of the Soviet tactical air force. Vintage for vintage, they are not yet quite equal to NATO’s airplanes, but the new ones are closing the gap. Over the water the great drawback (or, from our viewpoint, blessing) of all but the newest of these aircraft is their short operational range and endurance.
NATO’s Reply
So much—and, the reader may say, ample—for the threat against NATO’s secure enjoyment of the use of the narrow seas. It is, to say the least, formidable.
Soon after the Channel Command was created, the first two priorities were seen to be command and communications. At all events, this was what came to pass after the chaotic exercises of the early years. No chain of command can be the tidy dream of the planner; especially for an alliance of independent sovereign nations and in parsimonious peace time. Needless to say, it looks superb in NATO Facts and Figures, which loftily ignores national responsibilities. For instance, it is inconvenient that the Flag Officer at Plymouth is pulled three ways in his allegiance: to his national Commander-in-Chief, Naval Home Command; to his NATO Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic, in his own guise of Commander, Central Sub-Area; and to his NATO Commander-in-Chief, Channel (luckily the same person), in his second Allied guise of Commander, Plymouth Sub-Area.*
The trouble is that, in practice, to obtain anything approaching the Planner’s Dream would engulf double or more of the high-grade staff officers that are, perforce, already numerous. "One man, one master” may be a splendid precept, but it eats up the men. The alternative is to have good coordination, good communications, clear responsibilities according to activity and, above all, goodwill. Commands and staffs, as in
* However, when two or more staffs share one building they both gain the advantages of personal liaison. ACChan staffs seem to like it—and they should surely know.
other set-ups, are subject to the law of diminishing returns. It is a fair assessment that the present organize tion works well, helping to produce the best fighting answer up at the sharp end.
The Channel Command’s three sub-commands a# essentially geographical. These are: Plymouth, Bent' chan (at Den Helder) and Nore (at Rosyth). Rosyd* has taken over the Nore sub-area from Chatham I cause it already houses the EastLant team under Fhg j Officer Scotland (under his second NATO hat labeled "Commander Northern Sub-Area” under CinCEastLan*)-
It is true that this puts the Nore sub-area headqtU ters outside ACChan’s boundaries, but the distance 15 only a few hundred miles and is of no appreciate significance when weighed against the saving arisi*ig from using one building and one communication f*et work for two separate, but closely connected, ope<i tional commands.
Organizationally, then, all is delightfully simple with one exception, the control of maritime air.
Here is not the place to fight an engagement in [ c two-or-three-service battle, but merely to record d*j effect of having the separate air service on Chaflj* operations. As can be seen, the Commander, AH1 Maritime Air Force, Channel, commands the shofC based air in both the British sub-areas, thus demons^ ing that the Ghost of Indivisible Air Power is still large. The Netherlands’ Navy includes all mark* aircraft and this is reflected in the single uncomphc;lt'
tands.
a welcome visitor from Germany and sometimes
b°pes, to the extent of forgetting that these exist solely for getting the right fighting forces, properly trained and all that, to the right place by the right time—if not sooner. In peacetime, however, the forces of Channel Command are somewhat shadowy. They exist all right, but are not easy to identify. Officially they fall into one 0r other of four categories:
Standing Naval Force, Channel. StaNavForChan is small ln numbers and in the size of its individual ships, but it ollows StaNavForLant in providing a seagoing test-bed 0r its command. As so much of ACChan’s work will ave to do with mines, it is composed entirely of j^ne-warfare vessels: from Belgium, Britain, Nether- a so from Denmark; in Western Union-type coastal nunecraft or similar. It exists, exercises, and, at the drop ° cbe dan-buoy could switch to its wartime function.
can be seen; not at all a bad thing. It smooths the V>/ly for wartime integration, by helping to iron out °Se irritating little national wrinkles. In particular, it P°*nts in a highly practical way to the urgent need for ^dardization. It has, in short, significance and use far ey°nd its meagre size.
On-call forces. This compromise between "standing” g11 declared” is but a weak shadow of the former. it^ause the Channel Command has its standing force, °es not need to rely totally on this loose arrange- re£nt- Ships "on call” are subject to very much the same tj'lUlrements of geographical whereabouts and opera- 0na teadiness as those merely "declared.” In practice cj Cab forces might assemble more speedily than de- u C forces—and speed is essential to all ACChan tk ness-~but this is by no means assured. It is hoped St ^lere never w'h be political pressure to reduce 0f avF°rChan to merely being on-call. It is this speed bUtassemblythat is so important; throughout NATO, Cou,^aally so in the Channel, where military storms Co blow up as swiftly as their local meteorological nterparts, such as the line-squalls of Portland, Dorset, where, by a happy gift of nature, the holding ground—blue clay—is reputed to be the best in the world. It needs to be.
Declared to NATO. Each member-nation "declares” certain forces for immediate assignment to NATO command in time of war or an emergency officially announced as such—all, that is, except France (at present outside the military orbit in NATO though still a member) and Iceland (who has no military forces).
Undeclared forces. A literal reading of NATO’s ground- rules suggests that even in war some national forces will remain under national command. On the face of it, this is nonsense, if the "one for all and all for one” rallying cry of the Alliance is to mean anything. In a war or crisis the existence of two parallel command-structures on the same side and in the same area does not bear thinking about. However, in practical terms it is a fair guess that there will be no undeclared forces in a real war and that the official declarations amount, in fact, to each country’s estimate of her total usable fighting strength.
The Nature of the Forces
Strategically, NATO is on the defensive; its purpose is not to win a war but to avoid losing one. When the Principle of War labeled "Offensive Action” is being tossed around, the Channel Command is still committed to a mission that is a variant of the "safe and timely arrival of the convoy” of World War II. Within this framework, however, there must be offensive thinking and offensive action—finding the enemy and bringing him to action. The two requirements for this are reconnaissance and speed, the latter being built into the ship herself and consisting of an amalgam of power, design, and seakeeping—and, of course, there must be numbers. For the defence, which is CinChan’s part, endurance also plays a far greater part than for the attacker.
The debate therefore lies between large and small, simple and sophisticated. Current thinking favors the larger ships over more numerous smaller—or unconventional-craft. The reason for this is the emphasis that must be laid on operational versatility' and seakeeping—which latter can, on analysis, be seen as part of versatility in its widest sense. Just as he had to in the
The toughest adversary of small ships in the Channel is Admiral Beaufort. Here the offshore supply vessel East Shore of Rochester, England, finds it heaiy going in the North Sea. Such ships are used to support oil and gas rigs. The Channel command has few of the former to protect, hut a great many of the latter.
construed in any competitive sense, but rather a teV for Britain to ask herself whether she is still pulling
Napoleonic Wars, the defender must be able to keep the seas. He cannot always be at the point of action, but he must be known to be able to be there—or able to get there quickly. This is, after all, just another face of deterrence. Once there, he must be able to handle a wide spectrum of action, both in scale and means; this, again, calls for the larger vessel’s versatility. Thus the frigate should be able to say to the missile-boat: "Anything you can do I can do as well—or better. I can do a lot more. And, if it blows up to a gale, I can outrun you, too.”
A modern frigate can do a lot of jobs, and do them well. On many counts, the frigate is the ship for the Cold War, when presence is all. This is not to say that there is no role for the light craft, for the hydrofoil or the hovercraft, but that, in a defensive situation such as the Channel imposes and given extremely limited resources, the frigate offers the best value as an allrounder. In the Cold War the versatile frigate scores hands down.
This is by no means the same as saying that the frigate is essentially a Cold War weapon. There will be plenty of calls for the frigate if the contest warms up, but it is possible that the relative usefulness of frigate and light craft in the Narrow Seas will then tilt in favor of the smaller vessel.
Ships for the offensive role against enemy warships are scarce, largely because so much priority must be given to mine countermeasures and hence to providing the special warships for all its modern ramifications. This priority makes itself felt, naturally, in peacetime building programs and, once war has started, the two types cannot be switched between the two jobs. When we consider the huge forces both sides had to deploy against the mines of World War II, we may well wonder how we can muster the forces to cope with today’s vastly more complicated and elusive underwater devices. However, a small ray of hope: the pressure mine, while still unsweepable, is amenable to hunting; that is to say, to detection and either removal, countermining, or (possibly) rendering safe in situ. The business is slow, but that is better than stop.
The Channel Partners
Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium are the three working partners in ACChan. Britain, as the largest contributor, provides CinChan and houses the headquarters. However, the Netherlands’ share is both large and highly efficient, as befits a hardy race with centuries of seafaring tradition, both fighting and mercantile. From ACChan’s very start, liaison between the royal navies of Britain and Holland has been close and harmonious, aided by the fact—so shaming for the insular British— that almost all Netherlands (but not British) seafarers are bi-lingual. It is true that, through the fabric of the common fighting spirit, there runs a corresponding strand of stubbornness. The years of alliance since 19® have eroded this and, though British and Dutch still argue over which side won the Four Days’ Fight in June 1666, memories of that and many another stubbornly contested day have earned the mutual respect that is an essential part of any enduring partnership The practical fact is that NATO exercises have shown that Dutch and British ships and staff officers are completely interchangeable.
The Belgians are the third partner in this trio. Compared to the others, they are few (9.7 m against the Netherlands’ 13.3 m and United Kingdom’s 55.3 m) and primarily they are a land-power.
The Belgians’ naval specialty is mine warfare and thh therefore forms their present contribution. However, oi1 the stocks and due to join the Fleet within the nO[ couple of years are four missile-armed 1,500-ton frig ates: a doubly encouraging sign of increases in both ship-size and naval participation.
On the Sideline
And then there is France: still a NATO partner, N1 for the time being not a military participant. Is ACCh3n sans France "Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark”- Perhaps not quite, but it cannot be denied that ch^ without most of its southern shore and withol)t France’s powerful and growing fleet is far from coh1’ plete. "Without Laertes,” perhaps, the good frie*1 temporarily at odds? At all events, the sooner 0 Premar Un and Premar Deux* are once again 01 integrated as sub-areas of the Channel Command $ better for ACChan and therefore for NATO as an alliafl^'
As often happens, ties are a great deal closer betv.’Cr' the navies than between the politicos. French mariti^ forces frequently join the rest of NATO for exercises 0 such terms as "liaison,” "observer,” and the like J(£ interpreted with good sense and goodwill. ,
The French Fleet could add considerably to NAl^ strength, for it is being built up steadily and to a <0 and farsighted program. Indeed, projections for only few years ahead show France soon to be the lea<kIli naval power of NATO-in-Europe. This must not
weight. By the same token, other nations could ^ take a leaf out of the French book on a consistent Nv pohey. js
This, at all events, is the state of affairs as th*s written, but there are sad rumors that perhaps 1
* These arc the short titles of the Prefets Mari times de la Premia ^ Deuxieme Regions, at Cherbourg and Brest respectively. Until milkary withdrawal these were sub-areas of ACChan.
both
case may be.
^fj^fospect and a Few Conclusions
"Fhe long, narrow, shallow sea-approaches to industri- 12ed northwest Europe are geographical curiosities, ^°s'ng special problems for their defense. In at least °me of its aspects, this has been recognized over many enturies Today the problem is intensified.
nere is no denying that the prospect for at least the fipTlr ~ U«- fr\r f-Vi ^ \Y7ipCf for
th
French naval plan is not as securely timed as has until now been hoped. However this may turn out, what can be said with certainty is that the consistency shown nntil now has certainly paid off.
Communications
It is a truism that communications transform a collection of scattered ships and aircraft into a cohesive %hting force; likewise that communications must almost always compromise between speed and security, w‘th technical effort (another word for money spent on chem) playing its usual part but not an overriding one.
Applying these simple facts, not only to the Channel |!s a geographical area but also with a very firm regard °r Acchan’s chief business—the care of merchantmen— We evolve the two chief functions of communications there: routing ships so they will avoid both the passive ***lnc and the undiscovered submarine; and providing
em with protection against an enemy known or Surmised to be near—or, to be precise, carrying the Messages concerning these two, together with intelligence and information to enable those on the spot— mercantile and military—to survive or win as the
Fmv years is fraught with peril for the West, for k ^ePendence on seaborne—and therefore Channel- ^ntne—trade has increased so has Soviet ability to 0^SruPt it. Allied to this is the fact that a similar attack kj1 Soviet shipping could not bring about any compara- e mjury to a country that is self-sufficient in every- 'Ag but freedom.
eiJ0 what does the West do about it? NATO must j^SUre that the idea of attack in the narrow seas must ^made to seem to the Soviets to be not worthwhile, adv means> i°r such a persistent and well-informed tt ersarY, that it must, in fact, be not worthwhile. Su ’ ln practical terms, can NATO ensure this? Logic ggests the following:
' % recognizing the vital importance of ACChan SQr^Ugb building up its strength, both militarily (by 0neea^UStment °fi priorities) and politically—and here Pre ^'0ugbt should leap to the mind: to persuade the 2 °nce again to become full partners.
' By recognizing the interdependence between the sea war on the open ocean, the sea war in ACChan, and the land war on continental Europe.
3. By constant and realistic practice in the area through as wide a spread of potential forces as possible. This would have a double value: familiarity on the part of our seamen with a special kind of warfare and a seen-to-be-there deterrence to the Soviets.
4.By acquiring and keeping the ability and willingness to devise, try out, and encourage the use of unconventional methods of sea warfare. Since the narrow seas are oddities, very well, then so is the way open for the employment of odd craft, weapons, and tactics. The Channel is the place for the man who keeps one intellectual jump ahead of his adversary.
This study has, perforce, been broad, for it deals with a very broad subject. No doubt, some will complain that it raises a large number of questions, offers few answers and eschews beguiling statistics. This is as it should be, bearing in mind that it is a study, not a staff paper. Far from trying to serve up the "recommended course of action” (complete with Plan and an alphabet- full of appendices, which is the perfectly laudible business of the latter), it has set about what some would admit is the harder part: identifying the questions.
In so doing, it seeks to encourage thought on the fundamental military business of protecting the sea-link between NATO-in-Europe and NATO-on-and-across-the- ocean. In this process of question-asking, it may even have brought the reader to answer the biggest question of all, as far as ACChan is concerned: the one posed right at the start:
Why ACChan?
The author seeks consistency in his method by refraining from answering that one either, merely hoping that what has gone before, including the questions— perhaps especially the questions, will help the reader to decide the matter for himself.
One last end remains to be tucked in the ACLant- ACChan-ACE long-splice: how far east should ACChan extend? Should CinChan command to the Danish shore? After all, these waters are "narrow and shallow” just like the Channel and are very much "European Approaches.” On the other hand, the forces there are all Danish or German under Commander, German North Sea Sub-Area, who reports (as he should) on the SACEur net; likewise, what today is an "approach” might in war very swiftly become a "flank.” All this, too, will bear thinking about.