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"Any person subject to this chapter who . . . with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny ...”
Article 94, Uniform Code of Military Justice
The closing months of 1972 were a time of trouble for the U. S. Navy. Four riotous, mutinous episodes had shaken the faith of the Congress and the public in the service’s traditionally taut discipline. On 12 October, a prolonged and bloody riot erupted on board the carrier Kitty Hawk (CVA-63). Bands of marauding blacks, charging racist practices, rampaged through the ship, senselessly lashing at whites with chains and wrenches. Forty-seven men, 40 of them white, were injured, three of them seriously.
Four days later, violence exploded on board the oiler Hassayampa (AO-145) as dissident blacks assaulted white crewmen. Within the space of two more days, a group of truculent men on board the carrier Saratoga (CVA-60) refused to disperse when ordered to do so. Only the quick action of the captain in sounding general quarters averted an ugly racial incident. As if all this were not enough, a fourth racial uproar took place on the night of 3-4 November on board the carrier Constellation (CVA-64).1 In a tumultuous all night sit-in, 60 black sailors refused to leave the mess deck and threatened to "tear up the ship.”2
Real danger lay in this threat. A major warship is a huge but delicate mechanism, highly vulnerable to sabotage from within, as had been dramatically demonstrated in the recent case of the carrier Ranger (CVA-61). Later we shall see how the Constellation's commanding officer met this situation by employing new standards of discipline, as he perceived them.
Although all four of these shocking episodes deserve lamination, this account, for several reasons, deals with only the Constellation affair. First, it received more coverage in the news media for the simple reason thatthe carrier was accessible to reporters and televisionnews. Of the four ships, she alone was on the West Coast. Additionally, a congressional investigating panel devoted more time to and heard more witnesses from the Constellation, again because she was readily available. Finally, the Constellation sit-in exemplified the ills that plagued the Navy in 1972, and it thus provides an arresting example of what had happened to the fleet and to the service.
Obviously, the Navy was not prepared for this rash of riots and demonstrations, but there was no lack of explanations on why they had broken out. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), declared that they were caused by operational pressures, minority tension, and a lack of "evenhanded leadership” by his officers. The Washington Post reported that a group of young black officers, counselors to the CNO on minority affairs, was convinced that the Navy was not keeping pace with the expectations of black sailors. During a meeting with Zumwalt on 10 November, one of them was quoted as saying: "Admiral, you have got to kick some tails [of senior officers].”3
Time magazine claimed that the "core of the problem” was "stubborn residual racism among Navy’s 'middle management.’” Newsweek identified "black grievances” as the primary cause. It even used Time's phrase, "the core of the problem,” in pinpointing "the Navy’s hidebound traditionalism.”4
The Navy’s official position was cleared through the Office of Information and published in such outlets as a February 1973 special edition of the Bureau of Personnel newsletter for retired personnel. This summary played down the Constellation sit-in as an "incident” which "did not involve any scuffles.” It assured its readers that "there was no disobedience of orders at sea,” a statement which didn’t square with evidence later made public as the result of congressional hearings.5
One must go beyond the news accounts of that time for an understanding of the long-range, deleterious effect on discipline unwittingly generated by the reforms of Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee from January 1969 to April 1972. Chafee, a former governor of Rhode Island, had earned a reputation in politics for his concern with improving the lot of the underprivileged.6 It is clear that Secretary Chafee took no specific action to lower naval standards, but he did administer the Navy at a time when standards sagged sharply. Pentagon observers of the Chafee years point to his encouragement of steps to change the Navy’s "old-fashioned” image and thus bring it in step with "mod” youth’s desire for individual expression.7
All such steps, critics charge, unintentionally served to create the service environment that led to riots and disorders in November 1972. In Chafee’s defense, it should be emphasized that these high-minded objectives were in accord with the Pentagon’s Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity programs. Moreover, he was also motivated by a praiseworthy desire, as he put it, to "ease the burdens on our men” and to build a Navy "that will provide a high degree of job satisfaction to all hands.”8 Modernizers and innovators often fail to see the pitfalls that lie ahead for those who try to do too much, too soon.
Chafee’s modifications of discipline came at a time when the United States was in the throes of various widespread trends which were changing existing cultural standards. Among them may be listed disillusionment with the war, the youth revolution, permissiveness in American life and morals, the black revolution ("Black is beautiful”), and pressures to improve the armed forces through numerous panels of junior officers, enlisted men, and, even in some cases, civilian representation on club committees. Among the more important of these groups were those devoted to assisting and advising their respective commanding officers in morale matters pertaining to human relations and minority affairs.
Racial difficulties arose when, in an effort to fill the ranks, enlistment standards were lowered.9 Inevitably, more minority recruits from a ghetto environment entered the service. A substantial number lacked an elementary knowledge of high school science and mathematics, and were thus prevented from qualifying for the Navy’s technical schools and promotion. These sailors, many of whom were black, soon found themselves assigned to jobs they considered menial. As their discontent mounted, they became prime targets for militants. It was this development which Chafee did not foresee when he introduced the reforms that sparked the violent shipboard disturbances some months after he had left office.10
Another change which Chafee was determined to make stemmed from his belief that the Navy would benefit if a greater number of younger officers could replace older admirals who voiced little enthusiasm for his modernization plans.11 When the opportunity came to promote a relatively young admiral to the post of Chief of Naval Operations, Chafee seized it and named 49-year-old Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
No sooner had Zumwalt assumed office on 1 July 1970 than he publicly noted that "personnel management and some personnel procedures must be altered to conform to changing social attitudes.” The new CNO lost no time in issuing a stream of directives reflecting Chafee’s policies. The so-called Z-grams were intended to meet the needs of naval personnel without relaxing the standards of good order and discipline. Unfortunately, some officers and men took advantage of the looser regulations, thus damaging the reputation of the Navy for smart military appearance.12 At the same time, a growing number of radicalized youths in the service began to erode discipline by bending, if not actually breaking, established customs and regulations. Worse still, crimes of sabotage and arson steadily increased in the fleet; most of them were presumably committed by anti-war elements.13
In April 1972, Secretary Chafee decided to run for the U. S. Senate from Rhode Island and submitted his resignation. He was succeeded by Under Secretary John W. Warner, a Washington lawyer, who would inherit a legacy of shipboard strife.
Meanwhile, congressional concern over disorders in the fleet had been coming to a slow boil when news of the Constellation sit-in reached Washington. Chairman F. Edward Hebert of the House Armed Services Committee reacted promptly, naming a three-man subcommittee to investigate the Navy’s "apparent breakdown in discipline.”14 The panel was chaired by Congressman Floyd V. Hicks of Washington. His colleagues were Alexander Pirnie of New York and W. C. Daniel of Virginia. All were veterans of World War II.
The report of the Hicks panel was less than complimentary. It found that permissiveness, unintentionally fostered in the service, had seriously weakened naval discipline. Further, it found "incredible” the fact that die Navy was "totally unprepared” to cope with ship- °ard riots and disorders. Finally, it strongly implied that senior officers and officials were less than perceptive *n not foreseeing the effects of certain reform measures efore they introduced them into the fleet.
On l July 1972, when the Constellation returned to an Diego from a nine-month combat cruise, she was a tIfed ship. There was little rest in prospect, for a tight ernpl°yment schedule called for her to refit promptly, c°rnplete refresher training, and sail again for the estern Pacific immediately after the Christmas leave Penod. In the course of her refit, the Navy spent some k mdlion to improve the ship’s fighting effectiveness, ut> as her skipper, Captain J D Ward, wryly remarked, only "a paltry sum [was expended] toward 'mprovement of habitability.”
By mid-October, the Constellation had completed r^pairs, received a draft of new men, and was cruising the California coast while conducting refresher training. This orderly routine was soon shattered.
hat sparked off the trouble? According to the testimony> the sit-in strikers had four basic complaints, I.\°ne °h which could be specifically proved before the H*ks panel:
w discrimination at mast
y av°ritism in work assignments
► ..n'a*rness *n quarterly evaluation marks and
tscharges from the Navy by general (less-than- °n°rable) discharge.
Subsequently, the congressional investigators un- °vered 'no substantial evidence” of racial discrimina- n as a cause of the trouble. Instead, they discovered th C SOrne young black sailors from the ghetto found an<jTlSe^VeS *n a Nav7 which was predominantly white t hence to be mistrusted. Thus, they were subject ak eing easily led, as in the Constellation case, where cje°ut 2o-25 agitators "carefully orchestrated” the entire r'a°nstration, as the Hicks panel pointed out. uring the last two weeks of October, Captain 1 N ^ecame uneasy over rising tension on board. On 0vember, black sailors waylaid a white mess cook in passageway and broke his jaw. At the same time, an 0rtunate combination of events brought matters to bl i his ship of five known troublemakers, all
• C > Ward had ordered that they be given admin- ffia 1VC discharScs’ wh‘ch in this instance were less pn honorable. Concurrently, he discovered that in late th^Cern^er he would have 250 more men on board than e ship could accommodate. To solve this problem he nC<? t0 §ive "early outs” to 250 "short-timers.” This di kC *S 2 common one whereby sailors are honorably arged a month or two before their enlistments expire. When the two reports leaked out, a rumor ran through the black segment of the ship that the captain was going to "kick out” 250 black sailors with administrative discharges. There were on board about 450 black sailors.
To clear up this "misunderstanding,” the harried captain scheduled an "open meeting” at 2100 on 3 November so all men with grievances could raise questions with the ship’s Human Relations Council (HRC) and receive straight answers. Thus, he reasoned, the uproar would be quelled quietly. With the wisdom of hindsight, some senior officers of the "old Navy” believe that the decision to set up an "open meeting” was a mistake. They assert that there is no room for a debating society in the administration of naval procedures. As we shall see, the militants took full advantage of the opportunity to turn the affair into a full-fledged tumult.
At noon that day, a group of some 50 blacks converged on a small mess area known as the "Sidewalk Cafe,” where they began a noisy sit-in, accompanied by occasional harassment of whites. Two warrant officers ordered them to break it up and return to their divisions, but they were ignored. The masters-at-arms kept a watchful eye on the scene, but they did not use any force to remove those conducting the sit-in, nor was it necessary to summon the 30 Marines of the "reaction force.” As Admiral Bernard A. Clarey, the Pacific Fleet
"Negotiations are new to my experience. I certainly would not have expected them when / first joined the service ... it was very clear to me that any . . . grievance stated by these men, was accepted [by the staff experts in human relations] as an absolute fact and that clearly they were mistreated, maligned, . . . individuals . . .”
Captain J D Ward, U. S. Navy
Commander-in-Chief, said, this was probably the point where the captain should have sounded general quarters, calling every man to his battle station, thus ending the sit-in, if not the basic discontent. We should remember that the captain of the Saratoga had avoided potential trouble by sounding GQ.
The chairman of the Human Relations Council had no sooner opened the 2100 meeting when shouting black sailors grabbed the microphone. For the next six hours, pandemonium reigned. The chairman, surprisingly, was the ship’s dental officer. To prepare him for the job, the captain had sent him to a week-long, Navy-conducted course, which included encounter group and sensitivity sessions. Obviously, the course did not qualify him to handle a crowd of howling protesters.15
Later, the dental officer (a commander) told the subcommittee that he and his fellow HRC members took profane and obscene abuse that night that he, for one, would "never take again.” Only the wish of the captain to avoid violence and "to resolve things” had impelled him to endure the indignities.16 One of the militants at the congressional hearings told a different version. According to him, the meeting had burst out of bounds because the HRC was unable to answef complaints.
By midnight, the crowd was threatening a "bloodbath.” According to the dental officer, one man shouted "the God damn captain couldn’t run his ship unless were down here doing it. So we are going to stop it and see how long he is a captain.” Others vowed to disrup1 the underway replenishment exercise scheduled in a da) or so. Still others telephoned the captain on the bridge telling him that unless he got down to the mess decks? they would "tear up the ship.”
To put a damper on what had become an unnd) mob, Captain Ward aroused the ship, turned on below-deck lights, and "flooded” the mess decks wid1 officers and senior petty officers. Security watches svefe set up on the hangar deck against possible sabotage This was no idle fear. Only six months before, carrier Ranger had sustained $800,000 damage and beefl put out of commission for months because of 12-inch bolts found in her main reduction geJf' Hundreds of other cases of sabotage and arson, eithej proved or suspected, were attributed by the Hicks pan to anti-war, anti-establishment groups such as the S - ("Sink our Ships”) movement.
To stabilize the situation, Captain Ward ordered d^ chief master-at-arms to clear the mess deck of 3 spectators and seal it off. The protesters did not budge but instead remained in noisy isolation in their mci'
of k ^ar^'s subsequent telling, "The primary interest e Navy at high level . . . was to get the entire °UP back aboard the ship although I had expressed ■ considerable misgivings. ... It soon became w^ar^nt t0 me that I would not help myself, nor eff * achieve anything, by insisting . . . [so] all °rts bad to be oriented toward the return of all these
yoUn
aer au
eck compartment. By this time, the captain had seen enough and turned his ship toward San Diego. He planned to off-load the troublemakers at the Naval Air Station on North Island for "appropriate action.” This meant a sequestration of the men at the air station until e Constellation finished her readiness exercises at sea, a ter which Captain Ward would determine what, if ‘*ny) offenses had been committed and what, if any, lsciplinary measures should be taken.
On his arrival at North Island, Captain Ward was greeted by a committee of senior officers, including the avAirPac staff officer charged with human relations, ney hurried to the captain’s cabin with the advice c at he should retain the men and "resolve” the alleged grievances on board. But Ward stuck to his guns and at 1130, 130 men, including 12 whites, were bused to arracks. The ship then returned to her operating area, though he could not know it, Ward’s troubles were only beginning, for the Navy chose to engage in engthy discussions over alleged grievances with the
dissidents.
The Constellation sit-in, because it involved more than °0 black enlisted men, promptly became a politically sen$itive issue in Washington. Probably for this reason, e critical problem was, in effect, taken out of Ward’s nds- ' But why was the Constellation allowed to return to sea? Perhaps the natural desire to wind up the operational readiness exercises overruled all other con- ^ erations. But in retrospect, it would appear that if • e Navy had ordered an official investigation on board o^rnediately, rather than placing such dependence on s^^reside negotiation, it would have been spared the sequent pain of bad publicity and even, perhaps, a °ngressional investigation.
After two days of talk and when it was clear that gotiations were not getting anywhere, Vice Admiral as vf1*15 '^aNer, Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific, ^ ard’s superior, recommended—and the CNO and ^ fleet commander-in-chief agreed—that Captain co^ reca^ed f°r "further counseling” so that he join in the negotiations. The next day, 7 °TVember, the Constellation was back at North Island.
terij & men- • • • This [hope] eventually faded, as we th negot‘ated with these gentlemen to the extent Th^y Were oc^cmfl back to the ship.”18 te upshot was that the human relations negotiating 01 ’ probably reflecting "guidance” from highe
thority, presented a beleaguered Captain Ward with a set of conditions. He reluctantly agreed that:
► A review of nonjudicial punishment be conducted to determine if he had discriminated against the blacks.
► A review of administrative discharges be conducted for the same purpose.
► All involved be received back on board without fear of disciplinary action.
Ward stipulated, however, that all men who were involved in prior offenses, or who might have committed assault during the night of 3-4 November, would not be immune from prosecution. Ostensibly, the dissidents agreed. The Washington Post correctly described the captain’s capitulation as "an act [believed] unprecedented in the Navy’s history of strict discipline against insubordination.” 19
The following morning, 9 November 1972, the dissidents were bused to the Constellation's wharf, but instead of moving up the accommodation ladder, they clustered in a disorganized crowd and began a second sit-in, or more accurately, a sit-down alongside the ship. Television crews were on hand to film the "black power” salute and to tape interviews in a street demonstration setting. The confusion was ended six hours later when some 120 men were put on buses and taken to the air station. About eight of the men rejoined the ship. Meanwhile, several civilian lawyers representing
52 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1976
the so-called Black Servicemen’s Caucus were accusing Captain Ward in the press with creating conditions on board to incite a riot.20
The Congressmen’s subsequent findings leave no doubt that, in their judgment, the Constellation affair capped off a series of blunders. First they scored Admiral Zumwalt for his error in placing "primary emphasis” on his social reforms "to resolve racial problems.” Because of the CNO’s emphatic methods in implementing "affirmative action” programs, "his subordinates may have perceived his attitude and his directives in a manner that has caused a lessening of discipline, creating a situation wherein racial problems have been overemphasized.”
Additionally, the Hicks panel uncovered evidence that misperceptions of command principles existed at all levels of authority. Bluntly, the panel charged that the Chief of Naval Operations, by addressing all naval personnel in a series of Z-grams which were general in nature, permitted individual interpretations of his directions. As long as these misperceptions continued to exist, declared the panel, the Navy will "have problems in maintaining good order and discipline.”
If the Navy committed blunders, it seems clear that the protesters did also. By showing no civility, by flouting naval procedures, by substituting emotion for thought, by flaunting their street-theater antics before the world, they "turned off” many potential allies and disillusioned other minority members in the service. In sum, they defeated their own goals.21
Back in Washington, Secretary Warner and the CNO moved quickly to put the Navy back on course.22 A directive went out to give early discharges to men of marginal efficiency who did not measure up. Enlistment standards were raised.
What of the 120 protesters who had refused to return to the Constellation? All were transferred to various shore stations in the San Diego area where they were brought to mast. For individuals who technically were guilty of mutiny (minor mutiny or not), the punishments were remarkably light when measured against former standards. We should note that the episode had political overtones which the White House and the Pentagon undoubtedly wished to soft-pedal. Probably for this reason, none of the "worst offenders” was given a bad conduct discharge. Twelve men received general discharges, which would grant them all veterans’ benefits but might make it difficult to obtain civil employment. Thirty-five were honorably discharged but not recommended for re-enlistment. The remaining 73 received punishments ranging from loss of pay and reduction in rate to warnings. All were assigned to sea duty.23
In 1974, Admiral Zumwalt, by then near retirement, viewed events differently and from the perspective of almost two years. In a press interview with the Fresno (California) Bee, he admitted that with regard to his human goals program, he would have been "more methodical and painstaking about being sure that all hands understood what was behind each change.” Further, he regretted that he had not paid "more attention” to the "details of briefings.”24 In short, the Navy had been too hasty in diluting its traditional doctrine and time-tested discipline.25
a Captain Ryan is a research associate at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University. A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy in 1936, he subsequently held three ship commands while serving in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean and served as chief engineer of an aircraft carrier after World War II. Holder of two M.A. degrees (Stanford, international relations; San Jose State University, history), he has published articles on naval history and diplomacy in the Proceedings and other journals. From 1969 to 1972 he served as Deputy Director of Naval History at the Navy Department. He is the coauthor (with Professor Thomas A- Bailey of Stanford) of the book The Lusitania Disaster, which was published in October 1975.
See Hea,
rings, pp. 912-914, for a list of 74 incidents of actual or apparent
sabi
Hec
arings, pp. 261-263; the dental officer’s own account is on pp. 171, 175. 17 s u .
ce Hearings, pp. 880-889, for Admiral Clarey’s testimony on the three- Nay tckphone conferences involving the CNO, CinCPacFleet, and Com- ^avAirPac. Hearings, pp. 402-412, gives Vice Admiral Walker’s (ComNav- ac) description of the three-way conversations wherein decisions were & ecd upon without consulting Captain Ward.
Retired Naval Personnel Newsletter, op. cit., p. 4.
e Keport, pp. 17670-71, on the lowering of enlistment standards and cr|ticism of the Navy’s recruiting program. See Hearings, p. 855, statement °f Admiral Bernard A. Clarey, USN, for a description of black discontent.
^ne of these Pentagon observers was a fleet commander in the Chafee Cra w^° thought the secretary anxiously sought views which coincided with his own convictions, and when another view differed from his, he searched the opinions of "very young, relatively inexperienced” flag officers. "Flag Board Stresses Youth,” Armed Pones Journal, 31 May 1969, p. 23, contains Chafee s "guidance” letter to the senior member of the flag officer selection ||oard. For a different view, see Rear Admiral J. D. H. Kane, USN (Ret.), ^eeP Selection—A Caution,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1974, PP- 100-101. For a harsh criticism of the "youth movement” in naval flag ranks, see Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, USN (Ret.), "Admirals on the ^Un> Armed Forces Journal International, October 1974, pp. 31-32.
^ec Y. A. Milre, "The Navy’s Unwelcome Visitors,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1974, pp. 101-102.
13 c otage to Pacific Fleet ships during 1972.
14'pt
Hicks panel heard 18 witnesses from the Constellation. Four were °fficers, H were black sailors, and three were white enlisted men. Of the 1 blacks, nine were dissidents, one was a minority affairs representative who was ambivalent in his opinions, and one was not sympathetic to the strikers. All testified voluntarily.
15 c
0r a description of this encounter group-sensitivity program, see Hearings, ^bl. For another view of naval seminars on race relations, see Commander ^ L. Schreadley, USN (Ret.), "The Lost Sheep: Our Navy in the World Mentions,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1974, pp. ~U2. During the inquiry, a Hicks staff member, H. H. Cantus, pointed ^ t0 ihe CNO that "using group encounter techniques and mixing ranks” Cs not strengthen "the position of rank.” Hearings, p. 1069.
Bor the chief master-at-arms’ description of the dental officer’s plight, see
18Hearings, p. 453. Ward’s views were quoted in Robert Meyers, "Constellation Avoids Racial Showdown, The Washington Post, 11 November 1972, p. A7: "I would like to have seen an effective review, to indicate the correct remedial action. Negotiations are new to my experience. I certainly would not have expected them when I first joined the service. Hearings, p. 461, Captain Ward testified that, "it was very clear to me that any . . . grievance stated by these men, was accepted [by the staff experts in human relations] as an absolute fact and that clearly they were mistreated, maligned, ... individuals and that corrective action must be made elsewhere,” Report, p. 17679, gives the subcommittee’s findings on this phase of the episode. For Admiral Clarey’s account of Ward’s agreement to the demands, see Hearings, p. 884 ff. Everett R. Holies, "130 Refuse to Join Ship; Most Reassigned by Navy,” The New York Times, 10 November 1972, pp. 1, 26, reports on Ward’s agreeing to the terms.
19"Sailors, in Bias Protest, Refuse to Board Ship” (from news dispatches), The Washington Post, 10 November 1972, p. A4.
20Hearings, pp. 128-129; Everett R. Holies, op. cit., p. 26; George C. Wilson, "Navy Postpones Blacks’ Trials,” The Washington Post, 9 November 1972, p. A3.
21 Congressman Daniel, who had been an enlisted man in World War II, expressed his indignation to the CNO on the bizarre costume of one dissenter who testified "dressed in high-top purple shoes, his Navy trousers, and a black silk shirt.” Hearings, p. 1080. Daniel also told the CNO that the Constellation men who testified "looked like a bunch of bums.” See Hearings, p. 1067.
22In George C. Wilson, "Leaders Hit Bias in Navy,” The Washington Post, 11 November 1972, pp. Al, A7, Warner is quoted: "We’re going to get tougher . . .” Retired Naval Personnel Newsletter, op. cit., p. 4.
23Retired Naval Personnel Newsletter, op. cit., p. 2. Hearings, p. 434 ff. The Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Clarey, told Chairman Hicks that there would be no more such incidents in this exchange: Mr. Hicks: "You don’t intend to build a mediation service for the Navy?” Admiral Clarey: "Absolutely not, sir. It is my intention that this is the last of any such thing of this nature.” See Hearings, p. 887.
24"Admiral Zumwalt Regrets Only Some Lack of Caution” (Associated Press dispatch), Palo Alto Times, 22 May 1974, p. 22.
25Over a year after the Constellation flare-up, there still remained an "atmosphere of lawlessness, intimidation and defiance of . . . authority” as cited by Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in a message to his commanding officers. See Sea Power, March 1974, p. 5.
*For a description of these disorders in the fleet, see Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U. S. Navy I of the Committet on Armed Services/House of Representatives I Ninety-Second Congress/Second Session (H.A.S.C. No. 93-13, printed October 1973), pp. 10-12; Report by the Specif Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U. S. Navy (H.A.S.C. No. 92-81 2 3 4’
2 January 1973), pp. 17667-68, 17674-79. These two documents, which were the main sources for this article, are hereafter cited as Hearings and Report respectively.
2Captain J D Ward’s testimony, Hearings, pp. 93, 95, on the intention of the dissidents "of damaging the ship . . . tearing up the ship and nor letting the airplanes fly . . . they were clearly hostile.”
3George C. Wilson, "Navy Mobilizing for Racial Reforms,” The Washington Post, 5 November 1972, pp. Al, A6.
4"Keelhauling the United States Navy,” Time, 27 November 1972, p. 20’ "The Navy’s New Racial Crisis,” Newsweek, 20 November 1972, pp. 32, 35-
5Retired Naval Personnel Newsletter (NAVPERS 15886), Vol. XVIII, N0' 7 (Special Edition), February 1973, p. 2.
6Virginia Conn, "Portrait of New Secretary of the Navy,” Navy, February 1969, pp. 23-25; Macon Reed, "SecNav uses 'People-Minded Ideas,”’ Times, 25 June 1969, pp. 5, 49.
7 Various flag officers who privately voiced this opinion to the writer served under Chafee. Among them is a four-star admiral. None wished to speak for attribution. However, a former CNO, Admiral George Anderson, ,n a 1972 address to hundreds of Naval Academy graduates, praised the Supef' intendent, Vice Admiral James F. Calvert, "for maintaining the standard5 6 7 8 here at the Naval Academy under very difficult times” and "under pressure of a Secretary of the Navy who wanted to be liberal. . A seni°f admiral has informed this writer that persistent efforts were made by White House to relax academic standards in order to favor. lesser-qualific^ candidates. See "Alumni Assembly Addresses,” Shipmate, December 19?^
p. 11.
8John Chafee, "Memorandum to Flag and General Officers,” 5 June 19^' Hearings, pp. 980-981.
--------------------------------------------------------------------- Landing Horses
When "Teddy” Roosevelt arrived in Cuba with his "Rough Riders” at the port of Siboney, the Navy was there to assist in the landing, and the first job was to get the horses ashore. These were hoisted over the side in slings, and when they hit the water it was expected that they would head for the beach and swim in, as horses usually do. However, they didn’t do it, but milled about alongside, some getting chopped by the propellers; it seemed almost as if they were waiting for something. All efforts to guide them and head them in the right direction were fruitless, until an old Army cavalry bugler sized up the situation and sounded "Boots and Saddles!” At once they turned and swam ashore—and in formation!
Contributed by Rear Admiral A. Farenholt (MC), U. S. Navy (Retired)
(originally published in 1949)
(The Naval Institute will pay $23.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)