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"hundred horsepower mouth,” were greeted enthust;lS
tically by all but Secretary of War Simon Carnet01’’
who thought the plan ridiculous. Gideon Welles, -e£
retary of the Navy, pressed Eads to expand his ^ .
to a naval board convened for the purpose. The bo^
approved Eads’ recommendations and forwarded th-1"
to Naval Constructor Samuel Pook for detailed stu ,
Meanwhile, Secretary Cameron did an about-hc£’
embraced the idea of gunboats on the western wat£^
and convinced the cabinet that the Army, not 1
Navy, had jurisdiction on inland rivers. Cameron
structed General George B. McClellan in Cincinnan
consult with Eads and such naval officers as the N3'
T!>£
Confederate plan was to establish a beachhead at1 and then to thrust northwestward to secure St. L - just the danger Eads had hoped to forestall with gunboat plan.
"Be not surprised if you are called here suddenly by telegram,” began the letter James B. Eads of St. Louis received on 17 April 1861, four days after the fall of Fort Sumter. The letter was from Eads’ friend, Edward Bates, Attorney General of the United States. "If called,” the letter continued, "come instantly. In a certain contingency it will be necessary to have the aid of the most thorough knowledge of our Western rivers and the use of steam on them, and in that event I have advised that you should be consulted.”
No one was more aware of that "certain contingency” than James Buchanan Eads. A self-taught engineer, he had spent his life on the greatest of the "Western rivers,” the Mississippi, applying his technical genius to the salvage of cargoes from sunken steamboats. Now, at 40, well-to-do and semi-retired, Eads saw clearly the significance to the Union of control of the Mississippi and its feeder rivers, the Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland.
A few days later, Eads was summoned to Washington. At a special meeting of the cabinet on 29 April, he argued vigorously for a fleet of shallow-draft armored gunboats to "effectually control passage of vessels bound up or down the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.” Eads’ words, delivered with an habitual abrupt emphasis that earned him the sobriquet of the man with the
Department might order to the Mississippi Valley Navy sent Commander John D. Rodgers. Cam1 then turned the matter over to harried Brigidier eral Montgomery C. Meigs, the 45-year old Army e{t?. neer recently appointed Quartermaster General. fully, Meigs instructed Rodgers to ask Pook to c° up with specifications for the gunboats. j(
On 6 July, Meigs had Pook’s design in hand- _ called for a vessel of approximately 500 tons; h to be 175 feet long, with a 51.5-foot beam, and a 6- draft. It had three keels and a flat bottom. The snP structure was an oblong casement with sloping 51 ^ and a flat roof. The casement was ported for three g . at the bow, four on each side, and tw-o aft, an tons of iron plating were to be used on each h°at^[S protect the engines and boilers. Meigs placed requ( for proposals in the newspapers in Ohio and the uPq Mississippi regions on 18 July, with bid opening5 be held on 5 August.
Eads moved fast to prepare his proposal. The e ^ was spurred by the news that Confederate forces been dispatched north-ward to New Madrid, Miss0 ^ to be joined by other Southern troops for a conCeft drive on the sleepy levee town of Cairo, Illinois, the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi R 'verS^3ltO
hi'
Eads was the lowest responsible bidder. He signed
k°ats forf(
Utr; da
w°fk completed in the preceding period. The Treas-
by the appointed date would make Eads liable eiture of $250 per day for each vessel. Total
■tact price was $627,200, or $89,600 per boat. Every ys Eads was to submit an estimate of the amount
(q C°ntraCt *n Washington, D.C. on 7 August to build r the U. S. government seven gunboats to be deliv- th ' t0 *“a*ro c°tnpleted, engines on board, ready for eeir Ornament by 10 October—just 65 days from the , Cution of the contract. Failure to complete the seven
to
c°nti '0 da-
oft
^Was to pay 75% of the estimate; the 25% withheld t0 guarantee contract performance. There was a •i E etnental agreement that was to become important:
• • no deviation from the specifications shall be rein r y superintendents which will delay in complet- S this contract in the specified time.”
Coe program had all the characteristics of a problem intent’ subject to political pressures, time constraints, Cu jeryice rivalr) arising from a Navy design, pro' , by the Army, and administered by local naval (jjjg tttendents of shipbuilding, and not least, the eulties of the new technology of ironclads, and n<aaunte^’ Eads was in St. Louis by 10 August aready to set to work. He had become, in essence, lcl)t°type of today’s program/systems manager. He CarC t*le marine ways at the Union Ironworks in tr°ndelet at the edge of St. Louis to build four of andSCVCn gunboats: the St. Louis. Pittsburgh, Louisville, Qfj/be Carondelet. He tied up the telegraph wires out toj].t' Louis for hours at a time persuading owners of t0ln§ mills, machine shops, sawmills, and foundries re°pen. The rebellion had played havoc with the demand for any but the goods of war and many companies without government contracts had shut down. Ultimately, Eads lined up a network of suppliers located in Kentucky, Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri. Iron plating was ordered from the Gaylord Company of Ohio in mid-August. Engine and boiler subcontracts went to three companies. Meanwhile, he made arrangements to use the Marine Railway and Shipyard at Mound City, near Cairo, for the construction of the Cincinnati, Mound City, and Cairo. He advertised for workmen, offering $2 for a 10-hour day plus an extraordinary 25 cents per hour overtime rate. He ordered a seven-day work week at the shipyards. Eads encouraged his subcontractors to operate night shifts and offered to shipyard and subcontractor workmen generous bonuses if they stayed on the job until the work was completed. By 25 August, most of the structural work on his four gunboats was complete. On 27 August, Eads submitted his first estimate, for $58,315.40. On 30 August he posted to Meigs the bonds required and noted that he had 600 men and 12 sawmills at work on the seven hulls. He requested early payment on the first estimate.
The war news was not lost on Eads. The Confederates had moved north from New Madrid to fortify Columbus on the Mississippi, 25 miles south of Cairo and Eads’ shipyard. The Southerners had also dispatched a force to Paducah, Kentucky, east of Cairo, near the mouth of the Tennessee River. To counter this move, Union General Ulysses Grant was sent down from Cape Girardeau, below St. Louis, with two regiments of troops to fortify the Kentucky shore opposite Cairo before the rebels arrived. Emboldened by Confederate
work awaited Eads. On the trip down from CarondeM' the gunboats’ engines had "worked water” instead 0
be replaced because it was decided that the origin
ab
fel'
proper armament for the boats, Foote said that be
to make them ready to receive their armament.
to collect the rest of the money due him accon
din$
One by one, as extra work was done to comp
1#
advances, pro-Southerners boasted in the saloons around Carondelet that the gunboat hulls would be burned before they could be launched. In the tinder- spark atmosphere, workmen at Carondelet threatened to strike for more money. Army troops were requested to guard the gunboats.
Early in September, Rodgers was replaced by flag officer Andrew H. Foote as commander of the "naval operations upon the Western waters." The exacting, experienced Foote and James Eads quickly developed a close working relationship, something that had been difficult to achieve with the headstrong Rodgers. The new aura of cooperation at the local level, however, was not matched at higher headquarters. In supplying his estimate for the three hulls at Mound City and two sets of engines and boilers under subcontract on 14 September, he told Meigs that his outlay had already exceeded the total contract price because of extra work ordered. He also reminded Meigs that he was still "without one dollar of money from the Government” and that his subcontractors expected him to pay them their due. So far he had been able to do so, out of his own and borrowed funds, but he despaired of doing so much longer. Yet, he was confident that if only the government would pay him promptly he could meet his contractual obligation by the designated date. As if to emphasize the verity of his words, Meigs received word from an engine supplier that Eads was overdue in paying a $25,000 invoice. By the end of the third week in September, Eads had received the $43,736.55 (75%) due on the estimate of 27 August. In the meantime, two more estimates had gone in, one for $40,501.53 and one for $107,669.20. Along with these, Eads sent word to Meigs that he had authorized an ex-mayor of St. Louis to act as his agent for the receipt of disbursements at the Quartermaster’s office in New York. Having an agent on-site brought results: On 29 September the government paid Eads $111,000 on the last two estimates. Eads observed that the government was in arrears 23 days on the first estimate and 13 days on the second.
On 2 October, Eads submitted an estimate of $32,000 along with a statement of work completed and took the opportunity' to say that since "all of my engines and boilers, all of the plate iron for five boats, and nearly all of the work on my hulls is completed . . . 80% of my contract is completed,” which, he said, entitled him to at least "$200,000 more than I have received. I am cramped and annoyed for money and have been for the last 40 days to an extent that you cannot appreciate. In five days I must again be upon the market as a borrower.”
As the date of contract completion drew near, Eads increased his work force to 700 men. On 6 October,
Meigs was advised by the superintendent of shipbuild ing of another estimate by Eads, for $191,000, and of a prediction that it would be a week before the firSl boat was launched at Carondelet. A follow-on comWtt' nication to Meigs indicated that if the requirement f°[ added iron plate developed by Flag Officer Foote an his staff to cover the forward casement were to be me1, 25 more tons of iron per boat would be require
On 12 October at 4 p.m., two days after the desig' nated contract completion date, the first gunboat si1 down the ways at Carondelet. But by now Eads 'vi;, finding it difficult to continue the work for lack 0 funds. On 28 October, without a penny more fr0(” the government since 29 September, Eads declared flad)’ to Foote that he would have to issue a stop-work or# that night if funds were not forthcoming. Foote reactf swiftly, sending a strongly worded telegram to Me# Eads got $223,751, based on his last estimates, an work on the gunboats continued.
November saw the launching of the remaining th# Carondelet boats and in December the three Moun City boats were launched. Outstanding was an estim# of $99,637. By the third week in December, all se#1 boats were at Cairo where more requirements for extt3 steam, which necessitated revising the boiler plumbic The wooden-framed, iron-plated pilot houses had r0
had been too lightly constructed and armored. pumps and hog chains, not in the specifications, ^ctC directed to be installed. The fantails of the boats C<C redesigned and reconstructed to permit greater clearafl^ for the paddlewheel. And, not least, the additional - tons of iron plate were added to each boat. ^
On 21 December, the boats were inspected 311 reported completed according to contract, except time of deliver)', by the government-appointed supet intendent. Foote signed the certification of their insP^ tion but declined to accept the gunboats forfl#' Distracted by difficulties in securing crews and c the contract obliged Eads to "do all work neces#' decision sent Eads hurrying to Washington to try ag to his estimates. Meigs denied his claim. The work " J not completed on time, stated the Quartermaster ^ eral; therefore, the government was entitled to da^ ages. Eads returned to Cairo to prepare his rebuttal 3(1 to borrow more money to finish work on the gunboat them, Foote accepted the gunboats and by 16 Jam#) 1862, they were all in commission.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
,, October. On the other hand, the government had ahed in its obligation to pay him his 75% every 20 ays. Now, asked Eads, ", . . am I liable to forfeiture?” this stage, Meigs thought it prudent to have a ^ctnber of his staff, O. M. Dorman, review the Eads c°ntract and its performance. In his report, Dorman ^°ted that the gunboats were accepted by the govern- 97 cjayS after they were to haye been completed. , Mso noted that the work done on the boats after eir arrival at Cairo was not contemplated to be done j. llr> the original contract period of 65 days. Dorman , rt^er noted that since the boats were all at Cairo by ^ December the "difference between time of delivery Boats to Cairo and their final acceptance” was days and no forfeiture was required of Eads for that
!*tiod.
The timing was opportune. Grant, hovering in Cairo, was eager to launch an operation based on the r^port of a brother general in the field that "two ironed gunboats would made short work of Fort Henry.” 0rt Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on Cumberland were the two Confederate-held obsta- es to Union control of those two key rivers.
Once more, on 27 January, Eads was in Washington, ls time with his arguments in the form of a prepared statement in which he defended his performance in Ylew of extra work and changed orders and pointed out lc government’s lack of prompt payment of his esti- ^tes. Meigs was unmoved. Eads wired Foote, "I can tain no assurance of receiving a dollar and must return as I came.” When he arrived home, Eads heard Mth what must have been some bit of irony that Foote and Grant had taken Fort Henry in a combined opera- tlon on 4 February', using gunboats to which he, Eads, Sti11 technically held title.
®ads now took a new tack. Writing to Meigs, he j’tated that as of 2 November, if extra work were ’Counted, he had completed $10,500 more work than Called for in his contract. He also reaffirmed that under e contract he was obliged to forfeit $1,750 per day °r every day delivery of the boats was delayed after
Since both Eads and the government proceeded
Eads’ gunboats under construction at the Union Ironworks in Carondelet, near St. Louis. The St. Louis, the Pittsburgh, the Louisville, and the Carondelet were built here, and Eads leased the Marine Railway and Shipyard at Mound City, near Cairo for construction of the Cincinnati, the Mound City, and the Cairo.
as if there had been no delay and since neither party declared a forfeiture, strict performance could not be enforced by either party. Dorman commented that the requirement for additional iron plating for each boat, which was difficult to procure, added weight to Eads’ "allegation that these changes may have occasioned some of the delay in completing and delivering the boats.” It was Dorman’s recommendation that the time of the extra work done at Cairo be discounted and that Eads be held liable to forfeiture for the 72 days between 10 October and 21 December, This would have meant that Eads owed the government $126,000. But, in line with Eads’ statement, Dorman found that the government would have still owed the gunboat builder $148,925.45 if the contract had been completed on time. There was, in addition, $85,456.86 in extra work, approved by Foote.
On 14 February, Grant captured Fort Donelson after Eads’ gunboats, commanded by Foote, softened its resistance on two days of furious bombardment, thus, with the Tennessee and Cumberland secure, the main work of driving the rebels from the Mississippi could begin. The next day Meigs forwarded Dorman’s review to Comptroller Madison Cutts. Answering Meigs, Cutts wrote, "I have no doubt to the legal right of Mr. Eads to payment from the Government of the amount reserved under the contract.” Subsequently, U. S. bonds, not currency, in the sum of $234,382.31 were issued to Eads. If there was any enmity on either side it was transitory. At the request of the government, Eads went on to design and build six more gunboats for the river navy that became the spearhead of the successful Union campaign to control the Mississippi.