The Amphibians Came To Conquer
Vice Admiral George C. Dyer, U.S.N. (Ret.), Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972. 1,298 pp. Two volumes. Illus. $14.50 per set.
Reviewed by Hanson W. Baldwin
(Mr. Baldwin, a 1924 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, served on active Navy duty in both battleships and destroyers until 1927. After resigning his commission in that year, he became a reporter for the Baltimore Sun. Two years later, he joined the staff of The New York Times. He became military editor of that newspaper in 1942, and remained in that position until his retirement 1968. The World War H Pulitzer Prize winner for journalism, he is the author of 14 books, including his latest, Strategy for Tomorrow. Since his retirement from The Times, he has been a consultant and roving reporter for the Reader's Digest.)
“Well, I guess they always send for the SOBs when the going gets tough.”
A young junior officer—then Lieutenant Commander W. R. Smedberg, III—now a vice admiral, retired—made this remark to this reviewer a few weeks after Pearl Harbor, when Admiral Ernest J. King was assigned as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and later as Chief of Naval Operations. Smedberg was an aide to Admiral Harold R. “Betty” Stark, a warm, wise, and gracious gentleman, whose personality won friends and influenced people wherever he went. Then Stark was succeeded by King—a hardbitten, strong, distant, and reserved man—who cared little what other people thought so long as he got the job done.
Smedberg’s remark, which capsuled an era—the transition of the United States into World War II—could be, and has been, applied to the central subject of this voluminous book, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. Turner had many of the same characteristics as King—high personal integrity, a prickly personality, ferocious energy, single-minded devotion to the Navy and the nation, a bleak, no-nonsense manner, a disregard for his public image, an intolerance for inefficiency and a dislike—sometimes even a contempt—for lesser minds. Turner was a genius of a sort, a master of detail with a phenomenal memory and a highly-active thyroid, but in many aspects of his character he was, like King, a sundowner and an SOB.
In fact, Admiral Dyer, who spent nine years on this prodigious, 1,278-page, two-volume study, likes the epithet so well that in his prologue he quotes Admiral Turner as telling him when he started his tremendous task he (Dyer) is “. . . just enough of a son-of-a-bitch to do a good job.”
This reviewer would never have thought this description, though applied affectionately, really fitted George Dyer, although it certainly suited, as the author makes clear, Kelly Turner. But both the author and his subject share an old-shoe outspoken integrity which shines through these pages.
This study is the last word on many of the famous controversies of World War II—Guadalcanal and Savo Island; Tarawa and Makin; the Marshalls; Saipan, Guam, and Tinian; Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Dyer, with meticulous and painfully-detailed research and analyses, has examined claims and counterclaims, studied the conclusions of Naval War College analyses and those of many other students, and he does not hesitate to postulate what will almost certainly prove to be final and definitive judgments. And, in so doing, he gives the back of his hand to many prior historians, including the redoubtable Samuel Eliot Morison.
This is, perhaps, this work’s greatest value—this and the implicit tribute it represents to a great naval leader who had a dim public image (he was dubbed in World War II “Terrible Turner”), but who made an outstanding contribution to victory.
It is a work that defies conventional classification; it is easier to say what it is not than to describe what it is. It is not fully a biography; there are long—unnecessarily long—and arid stretches where Turner, the man and the admiral, is lost almost completely to the reader in a welter of tables and details. One never really learns what it was like to be on the bridge with Kelly Turner at D-Day and H-hour, and the man’s personal and home life are glimpsed through a glass darkly, if at all. And yet the author has not hidden the warts and blemishes of his subject: viz, Turner’s excessive drinking habits during much of the Pacific War; his often unbridled profanity; his tactlessness and rudeness. (He was fired, Dyer reveals, as assistant chief of staff for plans on Admiral King’s staff in March 1942, at the direct order of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, because General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, had complained about what Turner said, and particularly how he said it, in joint planning sessions with the Army.) Nor is this book narrative operational history. Dyer makes no attempt to duplicate Morison, and one cannot understand the Pacific War from reading these pages alone; the author often assumes a knowledge of events that the reader may not have. Nor is it simply analysis; it includes much careful and lucid analyses, but it is much more than Monday-morning quarterbacking.
No matter how described, the book defies description, as, indeed, does the author’s staccato, seagoing, homespun, straightforward, no-nonsense style, which hews through verbal thickets directly to the point—letting sentence rhythm, graceful felicities, word usage, adverbs, colons, and commas fall where they may. In fact, this reviewer has never read another book like this one—a tribute, alike, to the uniqueness of subject and author.
What Admiral Dyer has done is to paint a rough-hewn portrait of the “official” Kelly Turner—Turner the naval officer, and, most especially Turner, the great amphibian. But he has done much more than this. He has carefully examined all of the amphibious operations which Admiral Turner led from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, described their inceptions, planning and training, intelligence, weather and tides, beaches and terrain, enemy strengths, organization, and (more briefly by far) execution, logistics, and lessons, and controversies aid the part—which was always major—that Admiral Turner played in all of them. George Dyer has done this with the extreme thoroughness and care that, knowing him, one would anticipate; the naval research, to my mind, seems impeccable (There is one bad non-naval blooper; he calls New York’s Central Park “Grand Central Park;” try that on a New York cab driver!) The author has provided extravagant detail—much of it, like the lists of all ships participating in an operation—of no use to the general reader and of little or no interest save to those—now dwindling in number—who were there. This would have been, I think, a better book, certainly a more interesting and readable one, if it had been briefer; only the few and the initiate will choose to wade through all its pages.
Among the important and persuasive conclusions about some of the great controversies of the Pacific war that Admiral Dyer presents are the following:
In the Savo Island attack, too much reliance on air reconnaissance reports and inadequate and faulty air reconnaissance were primary reasons for the achievement of surprise by the Japanese. The statements in various histories that Admiral Turner was informed, well before the event, of an “approaching” Japanese force is completely refuted by the record and Dyer quotes Turner (in a typical “Kellyism”) that:
I have been accused of being and doing many things but nobody before ever accused me of sitting on my awrse and doing nothing . . . I wouldn’t mind if they said I was too g.d. dumb to have crystal-balled these things, but to write that I was told of an “approaching force” and then didn’t do anything, that’s an unprintable, unprintable, unprintable lie!
Dyer also defends as “sound” and “a necessity” the conference on the evening of 8 August 1942—the night of the battle—between Turner and Rear Admiral Crutchley, his Australian second-in-command. The division of the screening forces into three groups—a disposition criticized by many historians, including Professor Morison—is also justified by the geographical fact that there were three approaches to the two transport areas off Guadalcanal and the Florida islands. More destroyer pickets, however, should have been assigned to patrol to the west of Savo Island. The fuel situation, which has often been blamed by historians for the decision of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher to withdraw his covering carriers just about the time of the Savo battle, was a problem, though not critical, save in the possible case of one destroyer.
In the Gilbert’s operations, Admiral Turner noted, “. . . my poorest appraisal of beach areas for a landing during the whole war was at Makin.” As a result, the underwater demolition teams (UDT)—then just starting development—were pushed “hard.”
In the Marianas campaign, “. . . the failure of our intelligence to determine reasonably closely . . .” the strength of the Japanese defenders “. . . made the task of the landing force long, difficult, and costly.” Naval gunfire support at Saipan was a “decisive factor.” There is considerable background on the famous “Smith versus Smith” controversy at Saipan, including a little-known “eyes-only” memorandum from Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, U. S. Army, Commanding Army Forces, Central Pacific, to Admiral Nimitz, recommending (before the invasion) that the Marine Fifth Amphibious Corps headquarters (Major General Holland M Smith, U. S. Marine Corps) be limited to administrative duties, and that all future Corps headquarters and troops be furnished by the Army.
At Iwo Jima, the “. . . unloading of cargo was complicated and in the hands of the paperwork artists.” And “. . . the absence of that expertise, the seaman's eye, so much depreciated by the landsmen who have the final authority in the Washington defense establishment . . .” and heavy weather, caused major damage through collisions, or for other reasons, to 47 ships or large landing craft—far more damage than the Japanese inflicted.
And there was, finally, Okinawa, a tremendous, though costly, victory for the United States—“. . . the largest, single naval operation in the history of Pacific Ocean warfare.” Some 368 ships were damaged, mostly by kamikazes; 36 were sunk, and 4,907 Navymen were killed during the last campaign. Admiral Kelly Turner was now 60 years old, a four-star admiral. He had been in at the beginning and had had no respite. He was “. . . leaning rather heavily on the bottle to keep himself physically doing his job which was well within the scope of his mental abilities. He had driven himself at top speed through three years of combat and only the Turner clan’s love of hard work and the oomph from the bottom of the bottle had kept Richmond Kelly Turner doing the work he relished so heartily.”
Kelly Turner’s postwar assignment at the United Nations was an anti-climax and—in this reviewer’s opinion, he was miscast. His intolerance, lack of tact, acerbity, added to the occasions when he was a few sheets in the wind in public, did not help him or the United States. And I believe James V. Forrestal, as well as Turner, must be credited with the genesis of the U. S. Sixth Fleet.
This is a substantive book—historically and biographically. It provides new and definitive analytical judgments and so many facts, that it must long serve as a key source for future historians. It casts much light on a man who was hitherto largely faceless, as far as the public is concerned—a man about whom it was hard to be neutral. Kelly Turner was a driver, not a leader, but he drove himself even more than he drove his subordinates. He was intellectually arrogant; he “rode roughshod over people,” and kicked them around (though he showed “. . . loyalty to subordinates who performed according to his standards.”) He was described variously as “the meanest man I know;” a “tough perfectionist;” and “a mean SOB but I love him.”
Few did love him, but nearly all—seniors, peers, and subordinates—had to respect him; he kept his eye on the ball—to win with minimum personnel loss. He won, ultimately, the accolades of one of “the best strategists in the Navy,” and one of “the Navy’s all-time greats.” At last, Kelly Turner, who died in 1961, has his nautical Boswell and the recognition, tributes, and criticisms—warts and all—for outstanding service to his country, that he so well merits. Author and subject deserve each other.
The Soviet Sea Challenge
Ernest McNeill Eller. New York: Cowles, 1971. 315 pp. Illus. 18.95.
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, U. S. Navy (Retired)
(Vice Admiral Libby graduated, with distinction, from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1922, being awarded the Maury prize for excellence in physics. He served in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers before, during, and following World War II. He has been in command of destroyer and cruiser squadrons, and also served in various shore duty billets both in the United States and overseas. He was Commander, U. S. First Fleet from June 1958 until his retirement on 1 May 1960. He is presently with the Copley News Service.)
This altogether admirable book is a timely, powerful, thoroughly-researched, and beautifully-written analysis of “. . . the decisive effect of power at sea in promoting and preserving freedom—when the superior maritime power was exercised by a nation whose leaders were dedicated to liberty.”
Drawing upon his extensive knowledge of history and upon some four decades of personal experience as a U. S. naval officer, Admiral Ernest McNeill Eller sees very clearly—and tells us very forcefully—what lies in store for America and for the Free World if we do not meet the Soviet maritime challenge and rebuild our Navy to the point where we can regain naval supremacy.
As he says, many other able and knowledgeable men have recently and repeatedly pointed out to us the peril facing America at sea. “The purpose of this book will have been served . . .” the author says, “. . . if it induces more Americans to heed the warnings of these men who understand the full extent of the dangers . . .” facing America.
The Soviet sea challenge is “. . . one of the most critical problems facing the United States. . . . A storm rushed toward us like a typhoon that destroys the unprepared, the uncertain, and the weak, regardless of their ideals or their purposes. . . .” The storm, of course, is the burgeoning power of the Soviet Union, including the naval facets to which this book is addressed.
The threat to freedom everywhere, when a tyrannical, totalitarian government dedicated to world domination attains maritime pre-eminence, should be obvious. It should be appreciated and understood by all of us that this maritime supremacy is almost in the grasp of the U.S.S.R. now.
If only this book is read and heeded, it can be a powerful tool toward achievement of this essential understanding by our people.
Using as his point of departure a summary of the present maritime capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, the author draws upon the historical record to show the profound influence of the world’s oceans on the growth and development of both countries “. . . from their individual beginnings to their present world stature.” And as he says: “As the narrative moves on, the sheer weight of events on the international scene will stir within the reader a deep sense of concern . . . [over] the sweeping geopolitical gains that expanding power at sea has already brought the U.S.S.R.—from Southeast Asia to the Middle East to Cuba.”
The author notes that in every conflict in which the United States has been involved, from the Revolution to the present, seapower spelled the difference between victory and defeat. And in every instance, after achieving victory, we have allowed our Navy to deteriorate to the point where its patent weakness invited war. “This fatal shortsightedness seems to run as an ever-recurring flaw through the United States’ history—witness the slash in Navy strength before Korea, which was surely a cause of that war, and the 1969 to 1970 reductions in the face of current aggressive Soviet increase in seapower.”
In the past, thanks to the courage and steadfastness of some of our friends, and to the bravery and personal sacrifice of thousands of brave Americans, we have been given time to claw our way back from near disaster and rebuild our strength. This is not likely to be the case in the coming confrontation with the U.S.S.R.
The Soviets have learned well the lessons of history. They know that nothing can take the place of superior seapower. The fleet they are building now obviously has but one purpose- domination of the seas. “The Soviets speak peace, but they build to destroy.” The message this book seeks to impart is that from time immemorial, in the perspective of more than 2,000 years, the loss of control of the seas has ensured defeat. This truth is strikingly demonstrated by the many instances included in the narrative. This is just as true in the nuclear age as it ever was—probably more so. The Cuban missile crisis proved this yet again. Yet, the author notes:
One of the poignant paradoxes of our era is that the United States cannot absorb this lesson, hammered home year after year. . . . Somehow the majority of her citizens and her leaders—who should have more wisdom—cannot understand that in the nuclear age, as ever in the past, seapower remains a potent weapon of overseas diplomacy. . . . President Kennedy said of the Cuban missile crisis: “Events of October 1962, indicated, as they have all through history, that control of the sea means security. Control of the seas can mean peace. Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the seas if it is to protect our security.” Yet steadily and inexorably the United States lets this control slip away like the sands in the glass of doom. The sands are running low.
The only hope for America is that its citizens will again realize, before it is too late, that command of the seas is not just a fact of life, and will appreciate how difficult it is to achieve, how dangerously slim it has become, and how easily it can be lost. As Admiral Eller says: “The struggle to preserve the freedoms Americans enjoy—freedoms dearly bought by men before them—has no end. Each generation must be ready to defend them. Each has a charge to keep.”
The final chapter, titled “Hurricane Warnings,” should be required reading by every citizen. A quotation will show why:
If the United States lets the Russians surpass her at sea, disaster is assured. Despite the warnings and efforts of numerous men in government and out, America is on the brink of losing the sea. Too many leaders refuse to heed . . . the lesson of history that war occurs when aggressor nations grow strong while peace-seeking nations weaken.
The United States has many problems besides holding the sea. Success there alone will not ensure survival. Yet, if it fails at sea, nothing else will matter.
This book will stand as a fitting monument to our people if its lessons are heeded, or as a suitable epitaph if they are not. It is just that important.
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1 General Prize Essay Contest
If you have thoughts of constructive value for a professional Navy audience, start planning your essay now. Topics selected must relate to the mission of the Naval Institute, “the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy." Essays will be judged for their analytical and interpretive qualities by the Board of Control. The 1st Prize is a Gold Medal, $1,500 and Life Membership in the U. S. Naval Institute; the 1st Honorable Mention Prize is a Silver Medal and $1,000; and the 2nd Honorable Mention Prize is a Bronze Medal and $750. The Board of Control usually purchases for publication in the Proceedings, at its standard rates, a number of essays which are not among the prize winners. This year seven essays were purchased. Any person, civilian or military, is eligible to enter this contest.
RULES
1. Essays must be original and may not exceed 5,000 words.
2. All entries in the General Prize Essay Contest should be directed to: Secretary-Treasurer, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
3. Essays must be received in the Naval Institute on or before 1 December 1972.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on his essay. Each author shall assign to his essay a motto in addition to the title. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name, (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name and the address of the essayist, the title of the essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Board of Control of the Naval Institute has made its selections.
5. The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors at the annual meeting of the Naval Institute on Thursday, 15 March 1973.
6. All essays must be typewritten, double spaced, on paper approximately 8¼” [sic] x 11”. Submit two copies, each complete in itself.
7. Essays awarded the “Prize” or an “Honorable Mention” will be published in the Naval Institute Proceedings. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in the Proceedings. The writers of such essays, shall be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
8. Attention of contestants is called to the fact that an essay should be analytical or interpretive and not merely an exposition or personal narrative.
2 ENLISTED PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST
The Board of Control is pleased to announce the continuation of the annual essay contest open to enlisted men and women in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard on active duty.
A prize of $700.00, a Naval Institute Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute will be awarded to the author of the best essay of prize caliber submitted on any subject pertaining to the naval profession, the naval services, or the maritime environment.
Second and third prizes, as may be awarded by the Board of Control, will be $500 and a Silver Medal, and $250 and a Bronze Medal. The winning essays will be considered for publication in the Naval Institute's monthly professional journal, the Proceedings: all essays will be considered for publication at the standard rate of payment for articles.
This Enlisted Prize Essay Contest is separate and distinct from the Naval Institute's annual General Prize Essay Contest, which is open to anyone. Enlisted members of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard on active duty are eligible to enter either contest, or both, if different essays are submitted in each contest.
RULES
1. Essays must be original and may not exceed 5,000 words.
2. All entries in the Enlisted Prize Essay Contest should be directed to: Enlisted Prize Essay Contest, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
3. Essays must be received in the Naval Institute offices on or before 1 December 1972.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on his essay. Each author shall assign to his essay a motto in addition to the title. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name, (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name, duty station address, and home address of the essayist; the title of the essay; and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Board of Control of the Naval Institute has made its selections.
5. The awards will be announced during the annual meeting of the Naval Institute on Thursday, 15 March 1973.
6. All essays must be typewritten, double spaced, on paper approximately 8½” x 11”. Submit two copies, each complete in itself.
7. The attention of contestants is invited to the fact that an essay should be analytical or interpretive and not merely an exposition or personal narrative.
3 NAVAL AND MARITIME PHOTO CONTEST
A prize of $100 will be awarded to each of the ten winners of the contest and the winning photographs will be published in a 1973 issue of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Anyone may submit not more than five photographs to the contest. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject, and is no longer limited to the calendar year on the assumption that many fine older photographs have missed well-deserved recognition. Entries must be black and white prints, color prints, or color transparencies. Minimum print size is 5” x 7”, minimum transparency size is 35mm. (No glass mounted transparencies.) Full captions and the photographer’s name and address must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print, or printed on the transparency mount. Use no staples, please. Entries must arrive at the Naval Institute by 31 December 1972. Photographs not awarded prizes may be purchased by the U. S. Naval Institute at its usual rates. Those photographs not purchased will be returned to the owners. Naval personnel should check OpNavNote 3150 regarding photography.
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Professional Reading
Compiled by Robert A. Lambert, Associate Editor
Accidental Agent
John Goldsmith. New York: Scribner’s, 1971. 192 pp. Illus. $5.95.
A British horse trainer, the author, becomes an S.O.E. agent in World War II in this true story that has all the ingredients of an espionage novel.
(Almost) Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Boating . . . But Were Ashamed to Ask
Washington, DC.: U. S. Coast Guard, 1972. 24 pp. Illus. Free (paper).
This booklet is a short, programmed, self-learning text designed to appeal to the boatman who has yet to take the boating courses offered by the Coast Guard Auxiliary and the U. S. Power Squadrons. Obtain from Office of Boating Safety, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D C. 20590.
Armoured Onslaught: 8th August 1918
Douglas Orgill. New York: Ballantine, 1972. 160 pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
The actual day on which the Allies properly used tanks very nearly gets lost in the clutter of unneeded World War I history that surrounds it.
Arms, Yen & Power: the Japanese Dilemma
John K. Emmerson. New York: Dunellen, 1971. 420 pp. $15.00.
This survey sees Japan’s role as an international power being played through economics and diplomacy rather than through arms, as the military is not expected to grow beyond a size necessary to protect the nation, never powerful enough to threaten others.
Assassination in Vienna
Walter B. Maas. New York: Scribner’s, 1972. 180 pp. Illus. $7.95.
The only success of Hitler’s pre-Anschluss putsch in 1934 was the murder of Prime Minister Engelbert Dollfuss. Written by a man who was a student at the University of Vienna during the troubles, the complex web of intrigue is carefully analyzed in this narrative.
British Military Uniforms and Equipment, 1788-1830. Volume 1
P. W. Kingsland and Susan Keable. New York: World, 1971. Unpaged. Illus. $20.00.
Eight paintings, each 10 x 14 inches and most suitable for framing, were commissioned for this slender volume. Along with the plates there is a detailed text which has additional sketches and photographs of specific uniform and equipment features. The paintings are of a General Officer of Hussar; 3rd Light Dragoons, 1821; Royal Horse Guards, 1788; Black Watch, 1814; Gordon Highlanders, 1815; Kings Royal Rifle Corps, 1824; and The Rifle Brigade. A must for any serious collector of militaria.
Coastal Zone Management
J. F. Peel Brahtz. New York: Wiley, 1972. 352 pp. Illus. $19.95.
A rational, unified approach to planning optimal use of coastal resources is attempted in the face of the standard conflicting interests of people, politics, and economics.
De Gaulle
Philippe Masson. New York: Ballantine, 1972. 160 pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
This short biography centers around the general’s World War II trials as he attempted to build a political power base from which to control a France liberated from the Germans and the Vichy government.
From Trust to Terror
Herbert Feis. New York: Norton, 1970. 428 pp. Illus. $10.00.
The late Pulitzer Prize winner chronicles the onset of the Cold War, 1945 to 1950, as he reconstructs American-Soviet quarrels over Germany, the rise of the opposing East-West alliance systems, the emergence of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In this work traditional diplomacy is the focal point; only slight attention paid to the economic factors which dominate the interpretation of the period as found in The Limits of Power. (See page 105.)
Ghost of Bataan Speaks
Abie Abraham. New York: Vantage, 1971. 244 pp. $4.50.
By a survivor of the Death March blessed or cursed with total recall, this is an unpolished personal remembrance of the brutality, disease, filth, and hunger that were constant companions on the trek to imprisonment and of the prison camps afterwards.
Göring
Roger Manvell. New York: Ballantine, 1972. 160 pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
A deft biographical portrait of a paradoxical man who wasted great talent in the advancement of an even greater evil.
A Guide to the Sources of British Military History
Robin Higham (ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 630 pp. $22.50.
Not just for students of British history, this analytical bibliography will be a useful tool to those generally interested in warfare and the military aspects of science and technology. The Royal Navy and war at sea are generously treated as are specific wars, economics, sociology, law, and medicine.
The Hindenburg
Michael Macdonald Mooney. New York: Dodd. Mead, 1972. 278 pp. Illus. $8.95.
An exciting tale of the great airship’s last flight that ended in tragedy. The author contends that the governments of Germany and the United States, to avoid a diplomatic crisis, deliberately suppressed evidence of political sabotage—a bomb planted in the rigging by an anti-Nazi crewman who died in the flames.
Hitler’s Battles for Europe
John Strawson. New York: Scribners, 1971. 256 pp. Illus. $8.95.
Using mainly secondary sources, this volume examines some of the battles Hitler directly influenced, either in concept or execution, and shows how his influence contributed to success or failure.
Imperial Japanese Navy
Anthony J. Watts and Brian G. Gordon. London: Macdonald, 1971. 529 pp. Illus. £6.50.
This compilation represents the first extensive survey and detailing, in English, of this navy that came from nothing, to the first rank, to near-total destruction in three-quarters of a century. The photographs are generally excellent; the line drawings, a mixed-bag ranging from fair to good. The text is well-written and the data tables are large and easily read. Altogether, a much-needed historical reference, only slightly below the quality of Die Japanischen Kriegsschiffe 1869-1945, published in 1970.
The Intelligence Establishment
Harry Howe Ransom. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. 309 pp. $9.95.
The history, structure, and principal methods of intelligence as handled by several agencies of the U. S. government, are the subject of this book, which is an update of the author’s 1958 work Central Intelligence and National Security. The need for a well-organized intelligence is conceded along with a demand for tight control of their operations by policy makers within the government but outside of the agencies themselves.
In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia
Edward Geary Lansdale. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 386 pp. Illus. $12.50.
A legend in his own time—a fictional model for the hero in The Ugly American and for the bumbler in The Quiet American—this retired Air Force general tells an absorbing story of his experiences as confidential advisor to Magsaysay in Manila and Diem in Saigon.
Jane’s Weapon Systems 1971-72
R. T. Pretty and D. H. R. Archer (eds.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. 586 pp. Illus. $55.00.
The foreword claims the Soviet Union now has the initiative in weapons technology, by virtue of being the only country to have an operational anti-ballistic missile system; and by having a clear lead in supersonic bomber development and in some kinds of airborne radar. Among several new features this year, is an analysis of military satellite launches by the United States and Russia.
The Limits of Power
Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 820 pp. $15.00.
The foreign policies of the Truman and early Eisenhower years is subjected to an extremely fine raking in detail and fresh analysis. The American post-World War II policy is seen not as a misguided or hazy reaction to the growing power of the Soviet Union, but a purposeful effort to sell American goods, to ensure American profits and to have an integrated world economy subservient to American corporate needs. To do this, it was necessary to create a Communist monster. A controversial thesis, well-documented, hard to ignore; recommended reading regardless of viewpoint.
Massacre at Malmédy
Charles Whiting. New York: Stein and Day, 1971. 198 pp. Illus. $8.95.
This account of Battle Group Peiper’s drive into the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge, and subsequent slaughter of some 80 American soldiers at Malmédy focuses strongly on Colonel Jochen Peiper. Also described is the last stand of Peiper and his men as they were surrounded by two American divisions; 800 of his 5000 men survived. Peiper was brought to trial after the war and sentenced to hang, but changing political conditions saw the sentence commuted; he now lives in Stuttgart.
Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor
Charles de Gaulle. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971. 392 pp. Illus. $10.00.
The general had completed only half this volume when he died, and obviously this truncation attests the loss, but another loss is suffered as this memoir only occasionally displays the vigor of his earlier writings. The time period covered is 1958 to 1962, the ending of France’s Algeria; the beginning of her return to a sense of glory with a new president.
Official Histories
Robin Higham (ed.). Manhattan, Kansas: Kansas State University Library, 1970. 644 pp. No price given.
On an international scale, essays on and bibliographies of the corporate establishment side of military history have been brought together. It is an odd reference that will satisfy neither historian nor librarian, yet, within its awkward makeup, may prove useful to both.
The Opening of the Pacific—Image and Reality
London: National Maritime Museum, 1971. 27 pp. Illus. Free (paper).
Three diverse, scholarly papers—“Charles de Brasses, the Man behind Cook,” “Getting to Know the Beau Sauvage,” and “Penetration of the Pacific by American Whalemen in the 19th Century”—make a common point that exploration has more often been caused by fabrication and invention rather than by scientific desires and the explorers themselves were usually more interested in personal glory and profit than accurate reporting of their findings.
The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War
Ross Gregory. New York: Norton, 1971. 162 pp. $6.95.
Well-honed scholarship dissects the personalities and events which permitted and encouraged America’s drift from neutrality to intervention.
Practical Ferro-Cement Boatbuilding
Jay R. Benford and Herman Husen. Camden; Me.: International Marine, 1971. 216 pp. Illus. $10.00 (paper).
A new chapter in this how-to-do-it manual’s second edition stresses the advances that have been made in design concepts and presents better methods for building integral tanks and engine beds.
Preventive Medicine in World War II, Volume IX—Special Fields
Ebbe Curtis Hoff (ed.). Washington, D C.: U S. Government Printing Office, 1969. 650 pp. Illus. $8.00.
This volume describes progress in the fields of training in preventive medicine, public health, hygiene, and tropical medicine, and the investigative methods devised to prevent cold injuries and heat trauma. There is a chapter covering the handling and care of enemy prisoners of war. Also described are the medical laboratories developed and deployed around the world and the efforts to meet problems in occupational health and industrial hygiene.
Reichstag Fire: Ashes of Democracy
R. John Pritchard. New York: Ballantine, 1972. 160 pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
A worthwhile probing of the fire and the conspiracy trial that followed, events which both the Nazis and the Communists turned to their own political needs as each claimed the other responsible, but as the author argues neither was. He concludes that the man eventually executed for the crime was solely responsible, starting the fire out of a need for personal fame.
Sailing Yacht Design
Douglas Phillips-Birt. Camden, Me.: International Marine, 1971. 332 pp. Illus. 512.50.
For this third printing of the second edition, there has been added a discussion, with full text, of the International Offshore Rule and methods of programming a computer for obtaining comparative ratings.
The Science of Yachts, Wind & Water
H. F. Kay. Tuckahoe, N. Y.: John de Graff, 1971. 270 pp. Illus. $12.50.
Using simple mathematics, this text introduces the operating principles and characteristics of the interaction of sails, hulls, wind and waves.
Singapore: The Chain of Disaster
S. Woodburn Kirby. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 270 pp. Illus. $8.95.
Written by the British Official Historian of the war against Japan, no words are minced as he covers the fighting and lays the blame, politically and militarily, for this World War II defeat with its historic consequences.
Soviet Air Forces
Colin Munro. New York: Crown, 1972. 120 pp. Illus. $2.95 (paper).
The first half of the booklet is devoted to text and illustrations tracing the history of the air force; the second half consists of a series of photographs, specifications, performance data, and descriptions of 28 modern Soviet airplanes, including Aeroflot planes, and helicopters. Each is accompanied by a line drawing reproduced in white line on black background.
The Soviet Sea Challenge
Ernest McNeill Eller. New York: Cowles, 1971. 315 pp. Illus. $8.95.
Those who are familiar with “Judge” Eller’s products while he was Director of Naval History, will readily recognize the style and treatment of this book. The advantages of seapower, the problems of defending the sea and attacks from the sea, the inevitable results of relinquishing control of the sea, the historic heritages of both the United States and Russia and new weapons technology are all part of this potentially useful survey. A full review appears in this issue.
Tribal Class Destroyers
Peter Hodges. London: Almark, 1971. 80 pp. Illus. £1.90.
Some 80 photographs, backed by line and color drawings, show all ships of this famous British class at different stages of their careers. While individual ships are cited to highlight specific details of evolution and war service, this book is a history of the class rather than of units, as opposed to Martin H. Brice’s The Tribals which is a biography of each ship.
True Tales of the Great Lakes
Dwight Boyer. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972. 340 pp. Illus. $6.95.
Each of the 13 chapters is a separate incident, usually a dramatic event on one of the Great Lakes, and all are well told, but perhaps the most fascinating is the story of a British merchantman built in Burma in 1790, which served some 50 years as a prison ship in Australia, sank, after many years was refloated to become a touring horror museum, and finally died a burning hulk on Lake Erie 156 years after its construction.
The Universal Soldier
Martin Windrow and Frederick Wilkinson (eds.). New York: Doubleday, 1971. 264 pp. Illus. $11.95.
Each chapter of this book is a self-contained essay devoted to a single soldier, in a specific war or period of time ranging from A.D. 43 to 1944, and is an unusual attempt at depicting how the faceless men in the ranks handled life and death. The book is unusual in that it is an acknowledged mixture of fact and fiction, which is certainly dangerous practice outside the realm of historical novels, but the crossover points are clearly shown and seem to work in an interesting way that stays above the fiction level. Many photographs and 14 color plates aid the telling.
U. S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan
William M. Bueler. Boulder, Colo.: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971. 143 pp. $5.95.
The book argues for an independent Taiwan-free of both the Communists and the Nationalists—as an answer to the two China dilemma and improved relations with the mainland.
The Village
F. J. West, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 288 pp. Illus. $7.95.
The Vietnamese War is reduced to an extremely personal level in this story of a squad of American Marines living in, defending and dying in Binh Nghia. This may not be the best book to come out of the war, but it will do until another matches it.
Walkout
Frank Dom. New York: Crowell, 1971. 258 pp. Illus. $7.95.
This is a personal account of the retreat from north Burma into India led by General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell. In addition to the Burma campaign, there are descriptions of conditions in Chungking; unflattering portraits of Chiang Kai-shek and Madam Chiang, and disclosure of three aborted U. S.-Chinese plots to assassinate the Generalissimo, one as late as 1952.
Warfare in England, 1066-1189
John Beeler. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. 493 pp. Illus. $14.50.
Too few maps, along with a complete absence of diagrams of battlefields and fortification and pictures of armaments, seriously detract from what appears to be a thorough detailing of military operations from Hastings to the death of Henry II.
Watch Officer’s Guide
Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1971. 322 pp. Illus. $5.50.
Completely updated and revised to conform to the latest practices and directives within the Navy, this compact, handy reference is now in its tenth edition.
Weyers Flottentaschenbuch 1971/72
Gerhard Albrecht (ed.). München: J. F. Lehmans, 1972. 471 pp. Illus. DM68.
The technical details will pose no language problem in the main section or chronological listing of U. S. light cruisers from CL-1 to CL-159, but the seapower survey for 1921 will. An essential purchase only to those who cannot wait for the English edition next year.
RE-ISSUES
Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum
Nicolaes Witsen. Amsterdam: Graphic [1690], 1971, 628 pp. Illus. dfl 160–
Facsimile reproduction of this Dutch classic.
The Canvas Falcons: The Story of the Men and the Planes of World War I
Stephen Longstreet. New York: Ballantine [1970], 1972. 396 pp. Illus. $1.25 (paper).
The Two Ocean War
Samuel Eliot Morison. New York: Ballantine [1963], 1972. 534 pp. Illus. $1.95 (paper).