Japan and Her Maritime Defense
By Commander Hideo Sekino, Imperial Japanese Navy (Retired)
As a result of the Second World War, Japan was disarmed and occupied by the Allied forces, commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. The demilitarization policy of the Allied powers was carried out to the hilt, and all the regular officers of the Japanese armed forces, down to second lieutenants and ensigns, were purged from public service. Article IX of the revised Japanese Constitution of 1946, provides that: “No army, navy, air force or other war potential will ever be authorized,” and this provision was then construed to prohibit even the possession of armament for self defense.
These were the domestic conditions prevailing when the Korean War broke out. On 25 June 1950, the North Koreans began their invasion into the Republic of Korea, crossing the 38th parallel. The troops of the Republic of Korea, being overwhelmed, were compelled to retreat southward in haste. The United States, deciding that armed intervention was necessary, committed to Korea almost all the occupation forces then stationed in Japan: the main body of the 24th Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 7th Infantry Division. Consequently, the Islands of Japan became a military vacuum.
Creation of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)
To remedy this, General MacArthur, in his directive to the Japanese Government of 8 July 1950, instructed it to create the National Police Reserve Force (NPRF) immediately. Accordingly, in August of the same year, the National Police Reserve Force was organized with an initial strength of 75,000 men. Some of the former professional officers of the defunct Japanese Army and Navy, having been released from the proscription of the earlier purge, were appointed as officers in the newly-created NPRF.
The mission of the NPRF was to keep the public peace, and to combat threats of indirect aggression against the country. It was subject to the command of the Prime Minister.
In April 1952, a Maritime Security Force was created, within the establishment of the already-existing Maritime Safety Agency. The latter, an equivalent to the U. S. Coast Guard, has been in existence since 1948; its mission is to “take appropriate action on the sea, if necessary, for the purpose of protecting human lives and property as well as maintaining the public peace in case of emergency.”
On 8 September 1951, the treaty of peace with Japan was signed at San Francisco, restoring her independence. On the same day, the security treaty between the United States of America and Japan was also signed, by virtue of which Japan came to assume her share of responsibility for dealing with direct and indirect aggression.
In August 1952, the NPRF became the Ground Safety Force. The Maritime Security Force was renamed the Maritime Safety Force and both the Forces were placed together under the newly-created National Safety Agency. Then, in July 1954, the National Safety Agency became the Defense Agency and the Safety Forces, Ground and Maritime, became the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), and the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), respectively. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) was formed at this time. Thus, the three self-defense forces, ground, maritime, and air, started their careers side by side.
The purpose of the three self-defense forces was to protect the peace and national independence. Their mission was to: “defend the country against direct and indirect aggressions.”
Equipment and Deployment
There were indications in 1950 that the Communist party of Japan and the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (under the influence of Communist North Korea) were intensifying their advocacy of armed revolution in coordination with the Communist offensive in the Korean War. Had there been no security force in Japan, grave and unfortunate influences might have been exerted, in concert with external powers, upon the security of our country.
In January 1950, six months before the Korean War broke out, the criticism by the Cominform of the Japanese Communist Party compelled that party to give up its former advocacy of peaceful means and to convert to a policy of armed revolution. This was an uncomfortable change for the Communists in Japan, who had long opposed things military and who were quite comfortable in the demilitarized Japan of the occupation. Behind that compulsion to change there were screened threats by the powerful Soviet Union and Communist China.
Because it was the mission of the NPRF to meet such threats, it was armed at its inception with light arms, such as rifles and pistols. But, when the NPRF became the Ground Safety Force, and finally the Ground Self-Defense Force, and, as its mission was enlarged from maintaining the public peace to coping with direct and indirect aggression, such weaponry as cannons and tanks were given to Japan by the United States. Construction of ships and boats in Japan began in 1953; of aircraft, in 1954; and of ground weapons and equipment, in 1960.
The initial deployment of the National Police Reserve Force was as follows: One district force (Kankutai: equivalent to an army division) with a headquarters for each was stationed at Sapporo (on Hokkaido), Tokyo, Itami (near Osaka), and Fukuoka (on Kyushu). These district forces had the following five areas under their respective jurisdictions: Hokkaido, the Eastern, Central, and Western parts of Honshu, and Kyushu. Thus, at the beginning, the strength of NPRF was deployed evenly throughout Japan.
Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
The complement of the Ground Safety Force was increased to 110 thousand men from the 75 thousand in the NPRF, and most of the additional men were stationed in Hokkaido. In 1954, when that force became the Ground Self-Defense Force, the complement was again increased, this time to 130 thousand men. At the same time, the GSDF was organized into six district forces. Thereafter, the complement was gradually increased to 179 thousand by 1969. Thus, the 180 thousand-man goal has almost been achieved. Priority in the distribution of GSDF strength has been given to the island of Hokkaido. The best equipped forces are deployed there, with four divisions as the main force. There are several reasons for this disposition.
First, Hokkaido, having Soviet territory on three sides, from west to northeast, with only narrow strips of water in between,[1] is within the combat range of Soviet fighter planes, and so within range of a possible Soviet seizure of control of the air.
Second, with Soviet territory so near, there are contingencies to be provided for; not only of airborne invasion, but also of a surprise landing from the sea in a short period of time, such as in one night.
Third, supply and reinforcement from the homeland of Japan would be difficult for the Soviets probably would have no trouble in seizing control of the sea and air around Hokkaido.
Fourth, Hokkaido is so sparsely inhabited that in any emergency, maintenance of security there by a police force alone would be very difficult. The above factors lead us to believe that unless sufficient armed forces were deployed there, Hokkaido could be “liberated” in a short time by relatively small Soviet forces, without allowing any time for the U. S. forces to intervene in accordance with the provisions of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty.
Fifth, as to the defense of the western part of Japan, the presence of powerful U. S. forces and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces in the Korean peninsula, and also the presence of the U. S. military bases in the Okinawas, which are still under the rule of the United States, have substantially reduced the threats against the western part of Japan. This makes it possible for high priority to be given to Hokkaido in the deployment of GSDF strength. Naturally, this situation will be subject to modification if a portion (certainly if a majority) of the U. S. forces now in Korea are withdrawn, or if the Okinawas are restored to Japan.
Armament of the Land Forces
The principal equipment of the GSDF is as follows:
Tanks: about 1,000 (M-4, M-24, and the Japanese-built M-61).
Guns: about 5,000 (203-mm, 155-mm, 105-mm).
Wheeled vehicles: about 20,000.
Tracked vehicles: about 500.
Liaison planes and helicopters: about 300.
The GSDF is armed with conventional weapons and equipment for both field use and air defense. It has neither nuclear warheads nor the means for delivery of such warheads. Each division of the GSDF not intended for static defense has normal operational mobility, but currently, they lack sufficient combat (armored) and air mobility.
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
The primary mission of the ASDF is to maintain superiority in the air over Japan. Its secondary mission is to attack surface targets and give close support to ground forces.
The planes now in use by the ASDF are F-104s and F-86Fs. The F-4EJ has been chosen to replace present aircraft, and production should start in 1971. These planes are to be armed and equipped as interceptors, rather than as fighter-bombers.
So far, all the fighters have been built in our country, under license from the U. S. manufacturer. However, the research for a fighter to be used after the F-4 series, and the design of the XT-2 supersonic advanced trainer, has been conducted by the Third Laboratory of the Central Technical Research Institute of the Defense Agency. Mitsubishi H. I. has been selected as the chief contractor to carry out the development and production of the XT-2. The test flight of the XT-2 is scheduled for 1971. It is thought the XT-2 will have a superior surface attack capability, like that of the Jaguar developed jointly by France and Britain.
The planes allocated to the forces and activities of ASDF are as follows:
Fighters (including reconnaissance planes)
F-104J | 196 |
F-104DF | 19 |
F-86F | 295 |
RF-86F | 18 |
Total | 528 |
Transports: |
|
C-46 | 42 |
YS-11 | 5 (Japanese-built) |
Total | 47 |
Trainers: |
|
T-34 | 14 |
T-6 | 6 |
T-1 (A and | 58 |
T-33 | 191 |
Total | 369 |
(Search and rescue planes are omitted) |
The tactical transport planes, C-46s of World War II design, constitute the main body of the ASDF air transport fleet. The XC-1 is now under development. This plane is smaller than the C-130, and its main feature lies in a new loading system. Fifty XC-1s are scheduled to be manufactured beginning in 1973.
The GSDF has 19 H-19 and 18 V-107 helicopters for airlift to and from the battlefield.
The ASDF has only 18 reconnaissance aircraft, all camera-equipped F-86Fs, but the GSDF is scheduled to be furnished with several LR-1s, close support planes which are remodeled Mitsubishi turbo-prop MU-2s.
The weapons and equipment of the ASDF aircraft are guns and air-to-air missiles—Sidewinders, Sparrows, and Falcons.
ASDF aircraft, unfortunately, have no anti-surface missiles for attack against ground targets or ships.
One Nike-Ajax battalion is stationed in the vicinity of Tokyo and another in North Kyushu, and one Nike-Hercules battalion will soon be deployed in the central part of Hokkaido and another in the Kyoto-Osaka area. A fifth Nike battalion is planned. The Ajax model in the first two battalions is shortly to be replaced with the Nike-Hercules.
Future Considerations for Japanese Air Forces
In the present situation, the ASDF is not able to attack vessels and ground targets, or to furnish close support to land fighting. Its primary mission, the air defense of the country, is based, first, on the conviction that islands are best defended by ensuring control of the air over the country and, second, upon Japan’s absolute reliance on the striking power of the U. S. Navy and Air Force, particularly the carrier force of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, which has the most effective power to prevent direct aggression against Japan.
In the air defense mission there are many problems. The islands of Japan have not any width for defense against airborne aggression from the continent. This is a grave disadvantage, but it has been remedied to a considerable extent by the adoption of the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) System.
Nevertheless, there are still at least three problems:
1. Airborne early warning, or an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), is needed to make up for the lack of the defensive width of our country against low-flying intruding aircraft.
2. Almost all the radar-sites of the ASDF are located near the shorelines of Japan in a single line, so that they are vulnerable to anti-radar attacks, particularly anti-radiation missiles, as well as to electronic countermeasures. Should these radars become ineffective, the air defense capability of Japan would become zero. To counter the attacks, ECM, ECCM, and reserve radar-sites are needed. Moreover, active direct defensive measures for the present radar-sites should be taken. In view of the situation mentioned above, AEW and AWACS should be set up as soon as possible.
3. It is necessary to make up for the lack of defensive width of the mainland of Japan by using the Nansei Islands (including the Okinawas) and the Nanpo Islands (including Iwo-Jima) to secure the rear supply sea routes from the south. Without that, sustained control of the air over Japan will be impossible, because fuel supplies would soon run out.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
The main tasks of the MSDF are two in number: the defense of Japan against invasion from the sea by meeting and repulsing it upon the sea; and securing a supply of the necessities of life for the nation, as well as various raw materials for the continued conduct of war.
Both tasks are important in principle, and there is little difference in importance between the two. But the Navy currently puts emphasis on the latter task, that is[:] protection of the sea communications. She must keep trade relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, of Oceania, and of North and South America. This requirement for maintaining herself must be accomplished both by developing friendly relations with Southeast Asian nations and through the cooperation of American and Australian sea power.
If this task cannot be carried out, the sea-routes in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans must be given up. Japan must at least secure the sea communications north of Indonesia on her own.
But with its present strength (about 40 ASW ships of about 130,000 tons, and about 150 ASW planes and helicopters), the MSDF cannot carry out its part of the tasks mentioned above. It is able only to protect in convoys 20 to 30 per cent of the nation’s maritime transportation, for a distance of several hundred miles from Japan; that is, in the waters bounded by the mainland, the Nanpo Islands, and the Nansei Islands.
MSDF Fleet Bases
Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay, and Kure in Seto-Inland, a large seaport and naval station on the north shore of the Inland Sea, 12 miles southeast of Hiroshima, are the two main bases for MSDF fleets. Others are Sasebo in Kyushu, Maizuru facing the central part of the Japan Sea, and Ominato at the northern end of the mainland. All these are ex-naval ports of the defunct Imperial Japanese Navy and once had great shipbuilding, repair, supply, and other necessary facilities as naval bases. But now, except for Yokosuka which the U. S. Navy is using, almost all of such facilities at these bases have been disposed of by the Government to private companies. The shipbuilding yard at Ominato, which was of low value for civilian needs, has been left to the MSDF as the only building and repair facility. It is a small yard and located far from industrial areas. Its present capability is limited to the repair of ships under 10,000 tons, and it has had no experience in building warships. Of course, the former naval dockyards converted to civilian use are of great value to the MSDF, so that it is natural that the ex-naval ports have been selected as MSDF bases. Together with other land and sea facilities, they can be used fully in the defense and support of MSDF fleets.
Generally the bases of the MSDF can be said to be located in appropriate positions, though not always ideal strategically. Yokosuka, for example, is well located as a terminal for convoys and for providing supplies to warships. Kure, though suited for repair and replenishment, is not well located for direct support of operations. If backed up by Yokosuka and Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, and Ominato are well placed to support ships resisting invasion. Of course, in addition to the above, advanced bases are necessary in Hokkaido, the Okinawas (after restoration to Japan), and on Tsushima (in the Strait of Korea). Such bases, though small, are now being constructed in some places among the aforesaid areas.
Weaknesses of the Present Posture
Since there are no naval yards suitable for building major warships, almost all of the building and repair work on vessels (and also on aircraft) is dependent on private companies.
Generally speaking, MSDF facilities for research and development, experimental design, shipbuilding, and the repair of vessels and aircraft are inferior to those of the former Japanese Navy, so that there are few weapons and little equipment of Japan’s own design. Many weapons and a lot of equipment have been supplied by the United States free of charge, or purchased from the United States, or manufactured in Japan under license of the American designers.
The technological array of the MSDF, and, in fact, the Defense Agency as a whole, is, because of organizational reasons, inferior. Many of the technological experts of the former Japanese Navy who have been in the service of private industrial companies have compensated for such technological deficits of the MSDF (as well as of the Defense Agency as a whole). Still, 25 years have elapsed since the dissolution of the Japanese Navy, and these experts have become aged and are retiring from active service.[2] With enhancement of Japan’s maritime self-defense power greatly needed for the 1970s, this decrease of technological potential will become a grave problem.
Large escort vessels now under construction are designed for use in the open ocean, mainly for ASW and secondly for air defense. For antisubmarine purposes, they are fitted with Japanese-modified SQS-23 sonars. In view of the potential tasks to be assigned to the MSDF, such ships are sound. But from the standpoint of the present numbers of ships, and also of the policy of the Japanese Government to date, the operating area of the MSDF will necessarily be confined to the waters around Japan. For this reason there is presently a lack of auxiliary vessels to support MSDF ships adequately while they are away from their bases, though some increase in these vessels is expected in the next defense build-up program. In case of an emergency it would be possible to use merchant vessels as auxiliary vessels.
The Ships and Aircraft of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
I. Ships in Commission, July 1970.
Type | Name | No. | Std. | Max. | Year |
SS | Oshio | 5 | 1,600 | 14/18 | 1965 |
SS | Hayashio | 4 | 750 | 11/14 | 1962 |
SS | Oyashio | 1 | 1,130 | 13/19 | 1960 |
SS | total | 10 |
|
|
|
DDG | Amatsukaze | 1 | 3,050 | 33 | 1965 |
DD | Takatsuki | 4 | 3,100 | 32 | 1967 |
DD | Yamagumo | 6 | 2,100 | 27 | 1966 |
DD | Akizuki | 2 | 2,350 | 32 | 1960 |
DD | Ayanami | 7 | 1,700 | 32 | 1958 |
DD | Harusame | 3 | 1,800 | 30 | 1959 |
DD | Harukaze | 2 | 1,700 | 30 | 1956 |
DD | Fletcher1 | 2 | 2,050 | 35 | 1944 |
DD | total | 27 |
|
|
|
DE | Chikugo | 1 | 1,470 | 25 | 1970 |
DE | Wakaba2 | 1 | 1,250 | 26 | 1944 |
DE | Isuzu | 4 | 1,490 | 25 | 1961 |
DE | Ikazuchi | 2 | 1,070 | 25 | 1956 |
DE | Akebono | 1 | 1,060 | 28 | 1956 |
DE | Bostwick1 | 2 | 1,510 | 20 | 1943 |
DE | total | 11 |
|
|
|
Others:
20 coastal escorts
10 motor torpedo boats
2 mine and cable layers
37 coastal minesweepers
6 minesweeping boats
2 submarine rescue vessels
1 training ship
1 icebreaker
__________
1 Ex-American
2 Survivor of Imperial Japanese Navy
II. Ships under Construction and Authorized.
1967 program: 1 SS
1968 program: 1 SS, 1 DDH1, 2 DE, 2 MSC
1969 program: 1 SS, 1 DD, 1 DE, 1 PT, 1 MMC, 2 MSC, 1 MST2
1970 program: 1 SS, 1 DDH, 2 DE, 1 PT, 2 MSC
1971 program: 1 SS, 1 DDH, 1 DD, 2 DE, 2 MSC
__________
1 DDH characteristics: 4,700 tons, standard displacement; speed 32 knots; armament 3 HSS-2 helicopters, Asroc, 6 12.75" ASW torpedo tubes, 2-5”/54 caliber guns.
2 MST: minesweeper tender.
The 1971 figures are estimated. This was the final year of the third Defense Build-up program.
The estimated strength of the JMSDF at the end of the third Defense Build-up program is about 150,000 tons; expected at the end of the fourth program: 200-300,000 tons.
III. ASW aircraft, as of February 1970.
Fixed Wing |
|
P2V-P2J1 | 61 |
S2F | 55 |
PS-12 | 2 |
total | 118 |
Helicopter |
|
HSS-23 | 23 |
HSS-1 | 12 |
total | 35 |
Grand total | 153 |
__________
1 P2J: Japanese modified P2V; 46 will be procured by the end of the third Defense Build-up.
2 PS-1: Japanese developed ASW flying boat, with STOL and rough-sea landing capabilities; 14 will be procured by the end of the third Defense Build-up.
3 HSS-2: By the end of the third Defense Build-up, 33 HSS-2s will have been procured.
Air Defense of Fleets and Convoys
The Navy’s ships, which must move within the operational range of Communist planes from the continent, are vulnerable to destruction from the air. The present maritime self-defense strength is exceedingly small, compared with that needed by Japan, and it is full of defects. One such defect is that so far the Navy has been obliged to settle for only one SAM-armed vessel, the Amatsukaze, which has a single-arm Tartar launcher aft, with a similar ship to be built shortly. Other than that, Japan has several escorts, called DDAs, with emphasis placed on their antiaircraft guns and equipment. The decisions to emphasize ASW armament at the expense of AAW were based on the following assumptions.
1. In the coastal waters of mainland Japan, air cover is expected to be furnished by the fighters of the ASDF.
2. Operations in the Sea of Japan and near Hokkaido outside the air-cover of ASDF or U. S. planes are not anticipated, except in case of a full-scale invasion.
3. If MSDF vessels leave the near-waters of Japan for the high seas to the south of the mainland of Japan, air attacks against our escort vessels and convoys could be made only by very large land-based planes (mainly Bears and Badgers). As these planes would not be able to retain fighter escort over the distances they were designed to fly, large scale attacks by these planes would not be expected.
Under some circumstances, ships eastbound from Japan may be made to navigate along the west side of the Nanpo Islands for some period, if necessary. Sailing southward before striking east places land-based early warning and air defense systems between the ships and Soviet aircraft which would have easy access to ships sailing due east.
Measures against the intensified activities of the Soviet planes over the high seas to the south of the mainland of Japan, as shown in the recent Soviet Exercise “Okean,” as well as against the use of Soviet air-to-surface missiles, will have to be fully considered in the next Defense Build-Up Program.
Coastal Transportation
Forty per cent of goods moved within Japan travel by sea. This local sealift is devoted chiefly to heavy and bulky cargoes, such as fuel and raw materials. Maritime transportation of passengers is limited mainly to the Inland Sea, and bays and inlets, but long distance ferry lines (with cars embarked) are going to be operating shortly.
The most important coastal shipping lanes are the ones which run from North Kyushu to Tokyo Bay, via the Inland Sea and Ise Bay, and from Tokyo Bay north to Hokkaido. The sea-lanes along the western shores, bordering the Japan Sea, are also important, but, unlike those along the east coasts, they are not vital to the survival of the whole nation of Japan.
Clearly, while it is important to protect local shipping, the protection of ocean-going shipping is even more important. In the present situation, if a large scale war were to be carried out against ocean-going shipping, it is estimated that our imports would have to be reduced to less than half their present level. This estimate takes into account the probability that only Japanese ships would be available for imports in an emergency; that Japan could not maintain the supply routes in the Indian Ocean, which now account for about 40 per cent of all Japanese sea transportation; and that if the shipping necessary to sustain Japan could sail between Japan and Indonesia and Australia in protected lanes, the largest volume that Japan could put to this service would be about 50 per cent of the present level. In the same circumstance, domestic coastal shipping will carry only those cargoes that are difficult or impossible to transport overland.
The Sea of Japan
The Sea of Japan is about 500 miles across at its widest part. But this narrows to about 180 miles where Hokkaido faces the Soviet Maritime Province, and Sakhalin and the Kuriles have only narrow strips of water (about 30 miles and 10 miles, respectively) between them and Hokkaido. The sea conditions are generally calm except in winter, so that the Japan Sea is suitable for the employment of small combat vessels and craft.
The Sea has some special characteristics when related to submarine warfare. It is really a big valley in the ocean floor with an average depth of more than 1,000 meters (more than 500 fathoms), except in the five straits and in coastal waters above the continental shelf which in some places extend many miles from the Japanese shorelines. This sea is, therefore, generally fit for submarine operations.
The sonic features are very complicated. The thermal layer depth is generally shallow, becoming deeper in summer. It is difficult to detect by sonar any submarine lying below this thermocline, so that this feature is favorable to the submarine and unfavorable to the submarine-detector. But, as sound channels favorable for conveying sound waves also lie at relatively shallow depths, this feature is advantageous to any who would want to set up fixed detection facilities along the seashores. Except near the Yamato Seamount at the center of the Sea of Japan, the bottom of this sea is generally flat, and therefore is favorable to the successful operation of long-range passive sonars from fixed stations.
The depths of the five straits leading into the Sea of Japan—the Tartar (Mamiya), Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima (Korea), and Shimonoseki—and various bays are generally shallower than 100 meters, so that these straits and bays are suitable for laying influence bottom-laid mines against submarines. But, beyond the coastal waters of the continental shelf of Japan, both in the Japan Sea and the Pacific, the shelf plunges abruptly to the deep ocean floor and therefore is not suitable for using mines. This condition also applies to the Soviet Maritime Territory and the east coast of the Korean peninsula. In contrast to these, the Yellow Sea and the East and South China seas are generally shallow and so are suitable for mine-laying.
Mines and Coastal Defense
The value of the mine in the defense of Japan is very great. But in an irregular war there are various limitations on the use of mines. For example, in order to lay mines and maintain mine-barriers in the Soya Strait, where the opposite shore is Soviet territory, one must first take and retain control of the air and sea space around the strait.
[Map depicting the five straits leading into and out of the Sea of Japan]
The Maritime Self Defense Force has only two small ships for minelaying, the Erimo and Tsugaru. But one more 2,000-ton class minelayer and one minesweeper with minelaying capability are scheduled to be built shortly.
In contrast with the vast areas to be mined in case of emergency, it is quite evident that this mine-laying force is very small. But in case of an emergency, it may be possible that small cargo ships and medium or large fishing boats may be requisitioned and converted into auxiliary mine-layers.
The numerous small vessels of the Maritime Safety Agency along with various aircraft, both land and marine, of the Self Defense Forces will be necessary to protect coastal shipping lanes. There are 44 Maritime Safety Agency stations throughout the islands of Japan which will be useful in the emergency control of shipping. During the Korean War, Japanese minesweepers manned by ex-Merchant Marine and Maritime Safety Agency crews participated in sweeping operations off the shores of Korea to safeguard shipping coming through the area. Generally speaking, direct escort will be furnished to especially important shipping rather than the indirect protection afforded by the forces and facilities just mentioned.
As to the Soviet Navy’s fast missile boats of the “Osa” class and their successors, one would expect their hit and run actions primarily to be carried out against targets at sea, both in formal war and in irregular war. In either case, they probably would not be very active where the Soviets did not control the air. Activities of this kind are expected to be the most likely assignment of the North Korean Navy, supported by Russia. Special attention should be paid by Japan to this form of sea warfare.
Soviet Amphibious Capabilities
The amphibious warfare capabilities of the Soviet Union seem to have increased rapidly in the Pacific area lately. The strength of the Soviet marines (naval infantry) in the Far East is estimated to be only around 2,000 men, but it is thought that the Navy has a considerable number of landing ships and craft of the Alligator, Polnochnyi, and MP types for use in seaborne invasion. Landing exercises seem to be carried out fairly frequently.
With the rapid increase of Soviet merchant shipping, the bottoms now moving in the Far East area amount to 4,000,000 tons, and these ships probably have the capability for the sealift and supply of several army divisions, in case of war. It is not clear whether Soviet army forces have been given any large scale landing exercises. It is estimated that the strength of the airborne troops now stationed in the Far East is about one division of 7,000 men.
To gauge the possibilities of amphibious operations being attempted against Japan, the following situations apply:
1. As a link in a general war involving both the United States and the Soviet Union, or a war of almost similar scale, such operations might be carried out in order to strengthen the Soviet Union’s strategic situation in the Western Pacific area. But, because no objective could be achieved by a nuclear exchange, it is judged that the probability of an all-out war occurring is virtually nil.
2. In case of a large local war involving both the United States and the Soviet Union in the Far East area, there would be a strong probability of its escalating into a general, or nuclear, war. Again, the probability of such events occurring are estimated to be very small.
3. Local war not involving the United States or the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union is the only country in Asia able to invade Japan directly, in such a war there would be no danger of direct invasion.
If one did not already exist, the invasion of Japan would probably bring about a U. S.-Soviet war because of Article V of the Japan-U. S. Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty. Once again, the probability of such an invasion being carried out would be small. As long as the U. S. Seventh Fleet remains in good fighting condition, the probability of the success of any invasion attempt would be quite small, for that Fleet, combined with the Japanese self-defense forces, would be a powerful opponent.
It can be said, therefore, that attacks on Japanese sea communications by submarines and airplanes must be the main tasks of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, if it should operate against Japan. Seen from its force composition, it also seems that about 100 ocean-going submarines, including the nuclear-powered ones, constitute the greatest part of that fleet; and its naval air arm is principally equipped with large land-based planes (Bears and Badgers). These planes are of course well suited for finding and attacking convoys.
Evaluating the Unknowable
Nonetheless, in case a second Korean War should break out, a direct invasion of Japan might be attempted by Russia under certain conditions.
For example, if the domestic situation in Japan should deteriorate, and the fighting power of the JSDF becomes weakened, there would be a possibility of a direct Russian invasion (perhaps to forestall a Chinese occupation), and the Communists’ object of “liberating” Japan could be fulfilled without there being sufficient opportunity for U. S. military forces to interfere. Such conditions favorable for an invasion of Japan may be said to have appeared when hostile ideological and political infiltration of Japan have become widespread, perhaps after a successful campaign has been waged against our ocean commerce in concert with such domestic political pressure. Such a two-pronged offensive would deplete both the Japanese nation’s livelihood, and the fighting power of the self-defense forces. Under these conditions, amphibious operations could be carried out against Japan.
If Soviet landing operations were carried out against the Islands of Japan, then Hokkaido is the most probable objective area. Control of the air over Hokkaido will be easily obtained by the Soviets, and it is only a one night run from Soviet territory, so that island is deemed to be a suitable objective for surprise attack. Not only deep water landing ships, but also coastal landing craft can be employed there.
In the event Japan should lose control of the air and the sea, and if she were unable to expect the cooperation of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, suitable places for landing could be found in many other places throughout Japan. If the Korean peninsula should fall to the Communists, amphibious operations against the western part of Japan, by way of Tsushima, would become very easy, and the probability that such operations would occur would greatly increase.
In case the Soviets should attempt a direct invasion of Japan, the principal task of the ASDF would be to control the air over the battlefield and its vicinity. That of the MSDF would be to destroy enemy landing forces upon the sea, as much as possible before their landing. The Japanese destroyer groups, though normally engaged in ASW, could be a powerful striking force against amphibious shipping. While the ASDF with some of its airplanes attacked enemy forces both on the ground and at sea, the MSDF forces, even if the enemy had air superiority, would make assaults against enemy anchorages under cover of night.
But with the present insufficient strength of the JSDF, as well as the unchanging geographical disadvantage of insufficient strategical width against an enemy attack from the continent, it is difficult for the Japanese forces to destroy invading forces. To defend the Islands of Japan, a carrier striking force, such as that of U. S. Seventh Fleet, is needed. Under current circumstances, it is nearly impossible for Japan to build up such a powerful force. So, the only possible way open to Japan is to cooperate closely with the U. S. Seventh Fleet.
The mission of the Japanese forces is to hold out against the invaders until the arrival of the Seventh Fleet, in case that fleet happens to be far away from the scene. Whether the three SDFs have such holding power depends upon the security of Japan’s sea communications.
Soviet Sea Communications in the Far East
The Northeastern part of Siberia, that is, the region from the coastal areas facing the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Bering Sea, and the eastern part of Siberia to the Lena River valley area depends very much upon sealift. Overland transportation there is very poorly developed. However, because in a war against Japan the strategic value to the Russians of this region is small, the effects of attacks against such Soviet sea communications would not be felt seriously by the Soviets. At least as compared with the importance of sea traffic to Japan, the importance of this sealift to the Soviets is very low. The main city of Siberia, Vladivostok, also depends on sea traffic with the rest of Russia, but to far less a degree than the rest of Eastern Siberia or Japan. Consequently, a Soviet submarine campaign against Japan’s sea communications may not be deterred by the threats of retaliatory attacks against these Soviet sea communications in the Far East.
JMSD’s Relationship with ASDF
In fulfilling the tasks mentioned above, the relationship between the ASDF and the MSDF is very important, and particularly, the closest cooperation is needed in relation to air cover and reconnaissance. At present, the ASDF can furnish air cover only over coastal waters, and only daytime photographic reconnaissance. Neither long-range air cover nor a reconnaissance capability over the high seas can be expected of the ASDF.
Navies of the Pacific East
Soviet Pacific Fleet
100 submarines (20 nuclear)
7 cruisers
50 destroyers and escorts
200 patrol craft
70 mine countermeasures craft
100 amphibious craft
200 auxiliaries
Total: about 700 vessels of 700,000 tons; 200 aircraft[;] 1,000-2,000 marines.
North Korean Navy
4 submarines
130 patrol vessels
30 mine countermeasures craft
10 amphibious craft
40 others
Total: 200 vessels of about 24,000 tons.
Communist Chinese Navy
30 submarines
27 destroyers and escorts
535 patrol craft
50 mine countermeasures craft
305 amphibious craft
130 auxiliaries
300 others
Total: 1,400 vessels of about 260,000 tons; 500 aircraft; 28,000 marines.
Japanese MSDF
10 submarines
38 destroyers and escorts
43 patrol craft
44 mine countermeasures craft
52 amphibious craft
16 others
Total: 200 vessels of 132,800 tons; 180 aircraft.
Republic of Korea Navy
23 destroyers and escorts
10 patrol craft
12 mine countermeasures craft
20 amphibious craft
20 auxiliaries
6 others
Total: 180 vessels of 64,000 tons; 30,000 marines.
Nationalist Chinese Navy
12 destroyers and escorts
73 patrol craft
12 mine countermeasures craft
95 amphibious craft
20 auxiliaries
25 others
Total: 240 vessels of 145,000 tons; 36,000 marines.
Philippine Navy
10 destroyers and escorts
37 patrol craft
2 mine countermeasures craft
6 amphibious craft
3 auxiliaries
8 others
Total: 65 vessels of 29,000 tons
United States Seventh Fleet
4 aircraft carriers
1 cruiser
30 destroyers
10 submarines
70 others
Total: 115 ships of 500,000 tons; 400 aircraft; 10,000 marines.
The weakness of a navy lacking long-range air cover and reconnaissance capability is self-evident, not to speak of the fates of Bismarck and Prince of Wales in World War II, and it is a problem the Royal Navy is again facing. Under the present situation, where the MSDF is expanding the province of its mission far out over the high seas, it will become a grave problem for Japan. But, unlike the Royal Navy, which suffers considerable inconvenience because the ASW and high seas patrol mission is assigned to the Royal Air Force, the JMSDF, has, by virtue of the enormous efforts of those concerned, had its own land-based ASW planes since its inception. This is the main reason for the excellent results which have been reaped in the area of close air-surface cooperation in ASW, as well as in the research and development of aircraft and their associated weapons and equipment. For example, the PS-1, the ASW flying boat, the Japanese-built P-2J, and their weapons and equipment, are products of this cooperation.
When it was formed, the ASDF had many ex-navy pilots including carrier-plane pilots.[3] But now many of those veteran pilots have retired, and their influence is hardly perceptible in the ASDF. As the main mission of the ASDF is the air defense of Japan, it cannot be denied that the ASDF has taken on a strong character as an army-air force. To forestall a trend toward weak air support for the navy, the MSDF may come to need some kinds of tactical planes for its own maritime air arm. Vertical take-off fighters operated from the flight deck of an ASW helicopter carrier would be one such solution. In this regard, Hawker Siddeley’s “Harrier” is noteworthy, even though that aircraft is essentially an attack plane rather than a fighter.
Research in Japan on vertical take-off and landing for civilian use is now in an elementary stage, and it should be given active and vigorous encouragement by the authorities concerned.
Landing Vessels and Fast Fighting Boats
The MSDF has no capabilities for offensive operations overseas. It does have three LSTs, six LCUs, and about 40 LCMs, but there are no marines for amphibious operations. The purpose of these craft is to supply and reinforce ground forces within the country.
In the way of small fighting vessels, the MSDF has built ten motor torpedo boats for a start, and experiments with hydrofoil boats are in progress. In the fourth, and next, defense program, for 1972-76, missile boats are to be developed and perhaps as many as ten will be built. These fast fighting craft, to be armed with torpedoes and guns until a missile can be developed, will be suitable for preventing small parties from making landings on Hokkaido and the coastal areas of the Japan Sea.
There would be many problems for the defending fast missile patrol boats trying to foil a full-fledged landing operation against Japan. How would these craft be preserved from enemy air raids in the vicinity of the landing places? With their low performance in radar, lookout, and communication equipment as well as with their short operational ranges, how can these boats detect, identify, classify, and attack objectives effectively, and how can they surmount the various obstacles presented by poor weather? These craft are suitable for employment in the Japan Sea, but it is wrong to expect too much of them.
Defense Organization
The supreme command authority of the three self-defense forces rests with the Prime Minister. The director general of the Defense Agency is a civilian and a minister of state who, subject to the command and supervision of the Prime Minister, exercises general control of the affairs of JSDF. The director general is assisted by a civil staff branch (intra-bureau) for affairs related to policy matters, on the one hand, and, on the other, three Service chiefs of staff as his supreme professional advisers. As the joint coordinating organ for command and operation on matters of the JSDF, there is the Joint Staff Council which consists of the chairman and the three chiefs of staff. The chairman of the council is selected from the three SDFs on the basis of Service rotation. The present chairman is Admiral Ryuichi Itaya.
There is no standing committee for national defense in the national Diet, and matters connected with the JSDF are deliberated in the standing committee for the Cabinet. In the Liberal-Democratic Party now in power, there is a security research sub-committee in the policy board. The chairman of that sub-committee is Mr. Munenori Akagi who has been director general of the Defense Agency and was a member of the House of Representatives. On the policy board there is also a national defense branch, whose chief is General Minoru Genda, ex-captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy, a retired general of the ASDF, and a member of the House of Councillors. It is not necessarily true that, because Mr. Akagi and Mr. Genda have great personal influence upon the defense policy of Japan, a high priority is given to the ASDF.
At present, the director general of the Defense Agency is Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone, who is the most unique personage among the successive directors. According to the press, his principal contribution to defense policy is his enunciation of the so-called Jishu Boei, “self-reliant national defense.” This doctrine lays stress on the mental attitude to be held by the nation toward the national defense problem, and does not mean that the Japan-U. S. Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty should be rescinded, or that Japan should be completely independent in her defense. Nevertheless, the five principles of Jishu Boei are subject to many criticisms. The most important of the principles, with their attendant criticisms, are expressed below.
First, Mr. Nakasone asserts Japan ought “to make the Self-Defense Force the main element and to complement it with the Japan-U. S. mutual security system. . . .” The critics reply, does that approach not make light of the effect of the collective security system, and thereby disregard the actual situation?
Second, he says, “The Japanese Self Defense Forces should devote themselves solely to the defense of the country . . .” His critics ask, don’t the protection of a democratic system and emergency relief work matter at all?
Third, he asks, why is it necessary to incorporate the three “non-nuclear principles” (non-manufacture, non-possession, and non-importation of any nuclear weapons) into the basic policy of national defense? Isn’t it necessary to deploy tactical nuclear weapons (inclusive of field and air defense nuclear weapons) in Japan, in the current context of mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union? The critics inquire, why is it necessary to weaken the U. S. nuclear deterrent power and to endanger the security of Japan?
Command Structure of JSDF
At present there is no unified command over the three Forces. The reasons for that are:
(1) There are no forces to be stationed overseas which require exercise of unified command.
(2) Because all the forces are now concentrated within the country, a unified command can be set up in case of an emergency in accordance with the demands of operations that may arise.
(3) According to the type and mode of the operations to be conducted, unified command or combined operations between the JSDFs and allied forces, rather than a joint command of the three SDFs, probably will be needed.
Combined or joint exercises between the three Forces are often carried out.
In an emergency, the Maritime Safety Agency, which resembles the U. S. Coast Guard and has the potential of making a major contribution to the seaward defense of Japan, is to be placed under the operational command of the Director General of the Defense Agency. By the provisions of the law governing the Safety Agency, which was created during the occupation period, military movements by its vessels are prohibited. Some of its vessels are lightly gunned, but none now are armed or equipped so as to be able to carry out important naval operations, such as ASW. The law governing the Maritime Safety Agency should be revised, and the equipment and armament of the vessels of this Agency’s force should be improved as soon as possible.
Joint exercises of the JSDFs and the U. S. forces have been often carried out and have brought good results. The JMSDF, in particular, has conducted ASW and minesweeping exercises with the U. S. naval forces in the Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan. This training has achieved excellent results in that the Navy’s officers and men have obtained knowledge of advanced technology, and gained experience in the tactical uses of aircraft carriers and advanced weapon systems, even though they do not exist in the JMSDF. Training together has created mutual understanding in the two navies.
It is desirable that the Republic of Korea (with whose forces the JMSDF has also conducted joint exercises), the Republic of China, and Japan, all having bilateral treaties with the United States, conduct combined three-or-four-country maneuvers with the U. S. participating. However, for political reasons, no such maneuvers have yet been carried out.
Position of the Republic of Korea
A glance at the map will clearly reveal the importance of the geographical position of South Korea to the defense of Japan. During the Meiji era, Japan fought two great wars, the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese, staking her national destiny in order to keep the stability of the Kingdom of Korea intact and to prevent her from falling under the rule of those countries which had been threatening Japan. In June 1950, in spite of there being no U. S. responsibility by treaty to defend the Republic of Korea against the invasion of the North Koreans, the United States also fought a Korean war, sacrificing a great deal to check and repulse the North Koreans’ invasion of the Republic of Korea. It showed how important the defense of Korea is to the security of Japan. Let us examine the value of the Korean peninsula to the defense of Japan.
The Korean peninsula serves as an advanced position for the defense of Japan and lends additional defensive width against air attack from the continent, so that its value in air operations is very great. It also serves to provide defending air forces a flanking position on a major source of enemy attack, whether the enemy be China or Russia. In case the southern half of the Korean peninsula should fall into hostile hands, friendly control of air over the Tsushima Straits and western part of Japan would become very precarious.
By controlling the Strait of Tsushima, the activities of the Soviet fleets, those of the submarines in particular, will be greatly restricted. If the Communist states should gain South Korea, the Sea of Japan would become the “Lake of Communism.”
[Map of East Asia and the western Pacific, showing “Two great chains of islands . . .”]
The near encirclement of Japan is broken by the Korean peninsula. This makes possible the deployment of the best part of our ground strength in Hokkaido. If South Korea falls under the Communists’ control, the threats of direct and indirect aggression against the western part of Japan by way of Tsushima would increase abruptly. Moreover, Communist China, even though lacking a seaborne invasion capability, would then become a real problem for defense planning. Irrespective of the relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union, if South Korea is lost, Japan would have to make preparations for a two-front defense, that is, against the Soviet Union in the northeastern part of Japan, and against Communist China and Korea (the most likely combination) in the western part of Japan.
Japan’s power excludes the ability to take any offensive action against any foreign country. She cannot even defend herself unassisted; she needs the cooperation and assistance of U. S. forces, particularly the Seventh Fleet. Although the GSDF has 13 divisions, it is not armed to wage land warfare on a large scale, for the strength of a division is only 9,000 men and only one of them is mechanized. Moreover, because of its lack of logistic support capability, the GSDF is not suitable for a long distance expedition.
The MSDF, as we have seen, also has a purely defensive character, with ASW and minesweeping as its main duties. The ASDF has control of the nation’s air space as its main duty. It is thought that in the next defense build-up program this exclusively defensive character of JSDF will be kept intact.
The attitude of North Korea will exert a most delicate influence upon the security of Japan as far as we can foresee. Of course, she has no capability to invade Japan by herself. But she can open the way of invasion into Japan by invading South Korea with the assistance of either or both Communist China and the Soviet Union. If the U. S. forces are completely withdrawn from the Republic of Korea in the future, there would be a possibility that the North Koreans would begin an advance southward, thereby bringing about the outbreak of a second Korean war. In that case, Japan should furnish Korea with as much assistance as possible and cooperate fully with the U. S. forces, short of the exercise of armed force itself. There would be the possibility of a grave domestic situation, brought about by left-wing anti-war, anti-American, and antimilitary-base agitation. The domestic problem would be aggravated by the activities of the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan, consisting of several hundred thousand Korean residents, some of whom are under the influence of the North Korean Government.
Most of the Japanese people are sound in their thought and conduct and would continue to support the government as long as it continued to deal with the situation with courage and determination. If that is done, there will be no opportunity for a grave crisis to develop. Nonetheless, the actions of North Korea exert a delicate influence upon Japan.
The North Korean Government has ever been hostile to the Liberal-Democratic Government of Japan. When Premier Chou of Communist China visited North Korea in May 1970, such slander as the following was directed at Japan in a published joint statement: “The militarism of Japan has been revived and she has become a cat’s-paw of . . . U. S. imperialism . . .”
The Position of Communist China
The military threat of Communist China is a latent one and is not directly felt, because she lacks the capability to conduct an invasion across the sea. But if the Korean peninsula came under the control of North Koreans, assisted by Communist China, a formidable threat to Japan would have been born. This would be particularly true after the mid-70s, with the progress of the nuclear armament of Communist China. She will exert an intensified military and political influence upon northeast Asia.
In view of Communist doctrine, the points made in the course of the debate between Communist China and the Soviet Union, the words and deeds of Mao and Lin, and Communist China’s foreign policy since her founding, it is quite evident to me that Communist China has the intention of “liberating” the world. It is also clear to me that the immediate objective of her world liberation policy, which holds the key to its ultimate success, is Japan. And, if the situation is advantageous to her, it is beyond doubt that she would dare use even armed force.
China, in the Era of Yuan (the Mongol Empire), near the end of the 13th century twice invaded Kyushu with huge expeditions, each consisting of several thousand vessels and about 100 thousand troops. The Japanese fought these invading armies very successfully and by dint of their good fighting and the opportune visitations of typhoons, the Mongol expeditions retreated on both occasions with heavy losses. These typhoons are the origin of the “Kamikaze,” or Divine Wind. At the end of the 19th century, the Empire of China (Ching Empire) dispatched troops into Korea without notifying Japan, so that Japan, feeling a grave threat from there, also dispatched troops to Korea and then the Sino-Japanese war broke out (1894-95).
But the Han race, the principal nation of China, lacks a seagoing character. Further, the continental area of China is vast, and civil wars have been continuously waged ever since very ancient times, so that, since the time of the Mongolians, China has not attempted to invade Japan.
Special Character of the Defense of Japan and the Future of Her Maritime Defense
Japan’s natural resources are scarce and she must import more than 300 million tons every year, including 200 million tons of oil, in order to sustain her industry, which yields the third largest GNP in the world. In addition, she must import most foodstuffs and feed grains. To do this, she has the second largest merchant fleet in the world, amounting to 30,000,000 tons. Can Japan maintain the nation’s livelihood and, in the event of war, build up her defensive potential with only forty ships and 150 aircraft equipped for antisubmarine warfare?
The reasons Japan appropriates the lowest percentage in the world of her gross national product for defense are to be found in domestic politics. The apparent lack of rationality in the defense affairs of a country neighboring China and Russia are not easily understood without understanding the domestic situation in Japan.
Debates on national defense in the Diet generally are quite philosophical, or ideological, rather than practical in character. A typical one might be on whether or not self-defense forces are constitutional, and many others, though basic, are far from reality, and thus constructive thought or action can hardly be expected therefrom.
Percentage of raw materials used by Japan which were imported (1968)
crude oil | 99.4% |
iron ore | 98.5% |
bauxite | 100.0% |
copper ore | 89.9% |
nickel | 100.0% |
wheat | 80.1% |
wool | 100.0% |
cotton | 100.0% |
natural gum | 100.0% |
Sources of Japan’s Imports
Mid-East: oil, 91%
Africa: iron ore: 11%
Combined, 130 million tons, or 37.6% of total imports.
South East Asia: oil, 7.9%; iron ore 29%.
Australia: iron ore, 20.3%; wool, 90%; wheat, 18%; coal, 37%.
Combined, 87 million tons, or 28% of total imports.
North America: iron ore, 8%; coal, 47%; wheat 81%.
Combined, 48 million tons, or 15% of total imports.
Central and South America: iron ore, 27%.
Total, 25 million tons, or 8% of total imports.
Many of the accounts and essays in the press on national defense and security problems are full of Utopian and idealistic arguments. And such unrealistic and illogical arguments, quite inconsistent with the common sense approach of the rest of the world, have a considerable influence over their readers.
The doctrine of unarmed neutrality, which asserts that an alliance will involve its parties in war and invite attacks upon its parties; rejection of the theory of the balance of power, based on the same premises as the above doctrine; denial of the tenets of nuclear deterrence; equation of rearmament with a revival of militarism—these attitudes, where preached as dogma, are all only parrotings of the Communist countries’ propaganda against Japan.
Unhappily, these theories are also earnestly put forward by the influential opposition (Socialist) party. The Japanese proponents of such arguments derive their ideas in part from the peace provisions of Article IX of the Japanese Constitution. No attempts have been made to revise this article, because the Japanese people have not yet reached agreement among themselves on how to interpret the provisions in the constitution renouncing arms.
The factors causing this lack of consensus are very complicated and intertwined. One of the main factors is a reaction to the extreme priority given to the military before and during World War II.
Another is the radical demilitarization implemented by the Allied Powers during the early period of the occupation of Japan. Statements such as: “because there is armament, war will break out;” “the Japanese armed forces were the only source of all the evils;” and “elimination of Japanese armed forces will bring about the peace of the world”—these expressions of policy phrased in slogans, supported by the reactions alluded to above and the influence of the bitter, wretched experiences of the last war, appealed considerably to the people of Japan.
Again, as the armed forces are, in the view of the left-wingers, a counter-revolutionary power and, to abolish or to weaken them would make easy the importation of foreign revolutionary power, opposition to the Japan-U. S. security system and to the armament of Japan have been the consistent policies of the leftist political parties and their theorists.
Both the scholars having so-called progressive views and the mass-media are strongly influenced by the leftist camp and they often support the reasoning mentioned above.
Finally, the Japan Teachers’ Union made up of the teachers of primary and secondary schools are directed by those who are strongly influenced by leftists, so that it is undeniable that school pupils inevitably absorb such influences. The pupils who were educated by such teachers soon after the formation of the Union have already come of voting age.
In spite of the aforesaid trends, the Liberal Democratic, or conservative, party (whose policy is the maintenance of the Japan-U. S. mutual security system and the gradual increase of self-defense power) has obtained majorities in every election, and those who support the existence of the JSDF in opinion polls amount to 70 per cent of the people. So, it can be said that the Japanese people in general have good sense concerning the national defense.
But the influence of opposition parties and the press have imposed restraints on the execution of the defense policy of the conservative party, thereby providing that party with a pretext to avoid as much as possible the assumption of a full share of responsibility under the treaty system.
Jishu Boei
Recently, the doctrine of Jishu Boei, “self-reliant national defense” has come to be argued in earnest, both in political and in business circles. The fact that the doctrine of Jishu Boei has come to be argued only recently is clear evidence that national defense had not previously been taken seriously in Japan.
The phrase, “Jishu Boei” has been, and is, construed in many ways, and is misunderstood very much both at home and abroad. People are prone to regard it as the doctrine of armed neutrality or independent national defense, using the country’s own resources. Because the defense of any country should be carried out on that country’s own initiative, it is natural to think, now that the doctrine of “Jishu Boei” has come to be taken up in the Japanese Government and industrial circles, that Japan has made up her mind to defend herself entirely with her own resources.
The creation of the National Police Reserve Force and the obligation of gradually building up some defense force, even the possession in itself of the self-defense forces, were not undertaken by domestic initiative. Irresponsible politicians would assert “in case of emergency, the powerful U. S. military forces would deal with various troubles for us. The tiny and weak JSDF would be of no use. The defense expenses of Japan are only the expenses paid for gaining U. S. support in the defense of Japan.”
Many persons in political and business circles and some of the top officials of the government have expressed these opinions. To this way of thinking, it is not a question of whether or not the self-defense forces are useful. According to this theory, the less the defense expenses, within the limit of avoiding protests by the United States about Japan’s effort on her own behalf, the better for Japan.
But, gradually, the situation is changing. The national power of Japan has been rehabilitated from the ruins of war. The international crises during the 25 years following the war have taught many things to the Japanese people. The United States, on which Japan has relied so much after the war, has come to show signs of withdrawing militarily from Asia.
The progress of the nuclear armament of Communist China, the withdrawal of the British military forces from the area east of Suez, the build-up of Soviet naval power with its advanced position on the open seas—these direct and indirect threats to Japan will increase in the 1970s. The remarkable growth of the Soviet strategic force since the late 1960s, even though that force is not yet sufficiently powerful to make a fully successful first strike against the United States, may furnish the Soviet Union with some margin of superiority over the United States. It will weaken the U. S. deterrent power against the Soviet Union and necessitate a strengthening of the local defense power of the Free World nations in the Far East.
Among the advocates of Jishu Boei there are few who entertain the doctrines of armed neutrality and independent self-defense by Japanese resources alone. The real intent of the Jishu Boei doctrine is a self-reliant conventional national defense, under the cover of the Japan-U. S. mutual security system, putting emphasis on the mental attitude to be held by the Japanese people toward the national defense problem. The essence of the doctrine is summed up as follows:
The spirit of defending one’s own country willingly is the basis of national defense.
To speak concretely, under the present military situations in and surrounding Japan, the security of Japan cannot be maintained independently by her own resources alone; she must rely upon the Japan-U. S. mutual security system. But as the United States is not omnipotent (for example, in areas such as ASW, minesweeping, and coastal defense against guerrillas), it is a matter of course that Japan has to build up her self-defense force.
The Necessity for the U. S.-Japanese Alliance
Many Japanese of good sense think that a Japan-U. S. mutual security system should be continued in some form for both political and military reasons.
Political Reasons
In order to protect liberty and democracy, both Japan and the United States have taken to cooperating with each other in bringing about the rehabilitation of, and prosperity to, the free countries in Asia, not least by inhibiting the destructive influence of communism. (Japan has made “anti-communism and development of Asia” one of the ideals of her national policy since before the war, although many misunderstandings have been held about it by foreign countries, and Japan herself made many mistakes which culminated in the Second World War.)
Military Reasons
Without the U. S. nuclear umbrella, consisting of weapons ranging from field size to intercontinental ones, deployed all over the world, there would be no power which could oppose and deter nuclear threats to Japan.
Without the cooperation of American world sea power, combined with her economic potential, the survival of Japan—whose dependency upon the seas is exceedingly high—could not be guaranteed.
Without supplies and reinforcements furnished to Japan from the Pacific side, the control of the air over the Islands of Japan, none of which have much defensive width against aerial or airborne attacks from the continent, would be difficult to maintain.
In case the control of the air over the Islands of Japan were to be seized by the continental powers for a while, the concentrated air striking power of the U. S. carrier task forces, maneuvering in the Pacific to the south and east behind the shield of Japan’s mainland, would be decisive in destroying the enemy’s seaborne invasion forces.
Japan is under a collective security system with the United States, which is also a partner in bilateral systems with the Republic of Korea and with Nationalist China on Taiwan, both of which are very important to the security of Japan. These security conditions are vital to the stability of the entire Far East as well as to the security of Japan.
In the present situation, on account of the prohibitive provisions of the Japanese Constitution, a multinational collective security system in northeast Asia is not a realistic possibility.
Therefore, the survival and development of Japan would be difficult without a Japan-U. S. mutual security system of some form as far ahead as can be foreseen.
What Should Japan Do in Her Own Defense?
Now, when “self-reliant national defense of Japan” is considered within the context of the Japan-U. S. mutual security system, the question of the proper employment of the defense forces of Japan should be considered with emphasis on the following questions.
First, what is of vital importance to the security of Japan?
Second, what cannot be covered by the Japan-U. S. mutual security system?
Third, what has the highest probability of occurring?
Considering these three points, the role to be played by the maritime defense power of Japan can be seen as:
(a) Nuclear attack on or the direct invasion of Japan, or the destruction of Japan’s sea communications, would be fatal to the nation as it is presently organized
(b) Of the three kinds of attacks mentioned in (a) above, the first two can be prevented by the obligation prescribed by Article V of the Japan-U. S. Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty and the formidable power of U. S. forces. (However, when the Chinese strategic nuclear striking force will have come to deter effectively the U. S. strategic nuclear force in the future, it may become nesessary [sic] to deploy a “local nuclear retaliatory force” of some kind in the Far East.)
But, as to the attacks against Japanese merchant shipping on the high seas, Article V of the Treaty does not impose any responsibility on U. S. military forces. The most effective anti-Soviet (or anti-Communist Chinese) ASW operations would be attacks against Soviet and Communist Chinese submarine bases by the U. S. air strike forces. This measure would bring about a Soviet (or Communist China)-U. S. war, and would therefore never be carried out unless full preparation were made to take such enormous risks.
(c) The kinds of conflict which have a high probability of occurring are thought to be those suitable for Communist “liberation,” those which have good prospects for success by making use of the weak points of the opponent, and those which have little risk of escalating to a general war.
From these considerations, the “guerre de course”[4] against Japan is deemed to have the highest probability of occurring.
In view of the above, the protection of the sea communications of Japan should be given first priority in the national defense of Japan, and the prevention of direct invasion of Japan should be made the secondary function of the maritime defense force of Japan.
Protection of Sea Communications
The security of the sea communications of Japan is of vital importance to the sustenance of the Japanese people as well as to Japan’s ability to fight.
However, there are many problems involved in the protection of these sea communications. The factors taking that protection difficult are:
First, Japan’s trade covers vast areas of the world. Particularly, more than 90 per cent of the fuel oil, the major source of energy in Japan, is imported from the Persian Gulf area. To protect this trade with Japan’s own resources alone is, of course, impossible. Even to get direct cooperation of the allies and the friendly countries in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf for that purpose would be difficult.
With the economic development of Japan, the volume of goods such as fuels and raw materials to be imported from abroad has increased every year. These annual imports now exceed 300,000,000 tons and will reach 600,000,000 tons during the 1970s. In tonnage, Japan has the second largest merchant fleet in the world, reaching nearly 30,000,000 tons. In tonnage this fleet will become the largest in the world, with the possibility of exceeding 60,000,000 tons before the late 1970s. In number of ships, Japan already has the largest merchant fleet in the world.
Second, such technological advances as the development of electronic warfare, of snorkel equipment, of nuclear propulsion plants, of high speed at great depths, of active and passive sonars, and of guided or homing torpedoes, make it exceedingly difficult for antisubmarine forces to execute their tasks successfully. Particularly, the capability of the radar-equipped airplanes of World War II to find surfaced submarines in a wide area of search can be expected no longer, because submarines do not now normally surface. This makes it difficult for hunter-killer operations to be conducted effectively.
The result of these unfavorable conditions for combating the submarine mean that unrealistically huge escort forces will be needed if direct escorting should be necessary. As noted previously, attacks against Soviet submarine bases by U. S. aircraft would have a great risk of bringing about a U. S.-Soviet war and escalating it to a general war, so that such attack would never be carried out, unless it concerned the grave interests of the U. S. herself.
There are many difficult problems, but, happily, some geographical conditions—the presence of straits and island chains—will bring about a few advantages to Japan.
Straits. The main Soviet submarine bases in the Pacific are on the Sea of Japan. Ships entering or leaving that Sea must pass through one of four straits—Shimonoseki, Tsushima, Tsugaru or Soya. Of these, the Strait of Tsugaru, which lies between the mainland of Japan and Hokkaido, and the Strait of Shimonoseki, between Honshu and Kyushu, can be controlled by Japan. The Strait of Tsushima is located between the mainland of Japan and Korea, so that as long as the Republic of Korea is a member of the free world, this passage can be controlled with the cooperation of the United States and Korea. But the Soya Strait is between Hokkaido and Soviet Sakhalin, and it would be difficult to control completely. The Tartar Strait, between Sakhalin and the Siberian mainland, is bounded by Soviet territory only, but it is shallow and often blocked by ice.
Island Chains. Two chains of islands extend southward from the mainland of Japan. The eastern chain runs from the Izu Islands, south of Tokyo Bay, to the Ogasawaras (Bonin Islands), Iwo Jima, and the Marianas. The western chain runs from Kyushu to the Okinawas (Nansei Islands), Taiwan (Formosa), the Philippines, and then to Borneo. On some of the Japanese islands of these chains, sonar stations and bases for patrol planes and helicopters could be established. In the sea between the two chains, hunter-killer groups could operate.
Under these conditions, hunter-killer teams could detect most of the submarines passing through the island chains and, by attacking them repeatedly, could make the sea between the two chains of islands a maritime safety zone. Ocean-going shipping could be routed through this zone and, under some circumstances, the ships could be covered by direct escort forces. Otherwise, they could make full use of the favorable geographical features there. Thus, in this zone, shipping can be defended.
As the condition of the sea bottom east of the eastern chain of islands is favorable for ASW, the submarine-barrage line to be built along that chain should include both arrays of hydrophones set at appropriate depths around the islands and a number of high power VLF active sonar stations. By means of the combined use of active, passive, and semi-active sonars in all units on the scene, there would be a high chance that targets would be detected during their passage from 100, or even 200, miles away until their passing through the line. Using the information acquired from the sensors, the patrol planes and helicopters based on some of these islands would be able to reach the points of detection within one hour. They could then classify, localize, attack, and destroy the targets, or force the targets to give up their missions.
Air Defense of the Maritime Safety Zone
By placing air search radars and VTOL fighters on these island chains,[5] or by arming jet-engined patrol planes (successors to those now in use) with long range air-to-air missiles, Japan would have an effective defense against unescorted, long range enemy bombers. If, in addition, these patrol planes carried air-to-surface missiles (as do the Russian bombers), they could engage Soviet surface ships in the Pacific, where the latter would have sailed beyond their own air cover.
The routes from Japan passing through this zone lead away from the submarine bases of the potential enemies, so that the activities of the submarines would become increasingly inefficient as they operated farther and farther away from their bases. Perhaps the effective operational range of conventionally-powered submarines would be limited to the sea areas north of Indonesia. Even nuclear-powered submarines, after passing out through the straits, would encounter our various measures including surveillance from the coast, patrols, and attacks by (nuclear) submarines, so that the range of their activities would be greatly restricted. Unfortunately, the fourth Defense Build-Up Program does not even include research and development for an SSN.
If, with her own resources, Japan can keep open her communications north of Indonesia, or the equator, then it will be possible to sustain both her people and her ability to continue her defense. If necessary, fuel could be obtained from sources other than the Persian Gulf. If Japan can maintain her trade with the Southeast Asian countries, Australia, and the Americas, or at worst, if she can keep open the sea communications with the United States, she may be able to overcome this kind of threat.
In the meantime, as the enemy’s submarine losses accumulate, continuing submarine warfare will become impossible. ASW forces which can inflict such magnitude of losses upon the enemy are needed.
Proposals for Building up Japan’s Antisubmarine Forces
The forces and facilities of the JMSDF should be built up and fully equipped, so that they can adapt themselves to the concept of antisubmarine warfare.
The cooperation of the United States, selected countries of the free world, and friendly Southeast Asian countries should be obtained, and for that purpose it is indispensable for Japan to strengthen her alliance with the United States and to promote her friendly relations with the Southeast Asian countries and the nations of Oceania.
A force designed to deter any conflict from escalating to a general war is indispensable and for that purpose, too, Japan has to depend upon her alliance with the United States.
To get the cooperation of the United States and the other countries, as just outlined, Japan should assume more responsibility than hitherto in bringing about security and stability in the Far East. This can be fulfilled by firmly establishing an antisubmarine safety zone in the western Pacific Ocean. It is essential to the security of the Far East to relieve the U. S. Polaris submarines and the Seventh Fleet of the dangers of enemy submarines by means of the safety zone, because those forces would then be more secure in carrying out their missions. In this manner, Japan could enhance the security of the sea communications which bind together, and permit the survival of, the nations of the free world in the Pacific. Furthermore, this may be the maximum measure permitted Japan at sea under our current Constitution.
Forces Needed
Under the above concept, the smallest forces necessary, including antisubmarine, mine, and anti-mine warfare, and the naval forces to assist in combating a direct invasion, are estimated to amount to about 500,000 tons of vessels of various kinds and about 600 aircraft. Even with about 300,000 tons of vessels and about 400 aircraft, some of which are already in service, a considerable part of the above mission could be executed. The installations and facilities both afloat and ashore to support the required defense forces, particularly facilities for research and development, as well as, at the least, one naval dockyard for building prototypes of vessels, aircraft, and weapons, are needed. By 1976, the end of the four-year Defense Build-up Program, it would be highly desirable to have completed the lesser figure given above: 300,000 tons of new ships of various kinds and about 400 new aircraft.[6]
Ships and Aircraft Needed
ASW Forces
6 SSNs (3,000 tons each)
9 SS (1,500 tons each)
3 CVS (20,000 each)
66 DD including DDG, DDH, DDK (4,000 tons each)
30 DE (2,000 tons each)
Total tonnage 415,500
Forces To Counter Invasion and for Coastal Defense
16 DD (4,000 tons each)
16 DE (2,000 tons each)
32 PC (500 tons each)
60 PT (100 tons each)
Total tonnage 118,000
These ships could, of course, be employed with the ASW forces as needed. And the ASW submarines and destroyers could also serve with the counter-invasion and coastal defense forces.
Mine Warfare
60 MSC (400 tons each)
MMC (2,000 tons each)
Total tonnage 32,000
Grand total tonnage: 565,000
Aircraft
198 land based fixed-wing
24 flying boats
348 helicopters
Total 570
In spite of the political circumstances in Japan and the excessive mission requirements assigned to the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and in spite of its small strength (i.e., 130,000 tons of vessels and 150 aircraft) discipline and morale are excellent, thanks to the enormous assistance and sympathetic guidance of the U. S. Navy and the strong traditions of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The operational abilities of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force are the best possible under the present conditions. When the needed build-up of the strength of the JMSDF is realized, it is expected with confidence that, with the cooperation of the friendly navies, the JMSDF cannot only protect the security of Japan, but also can contribute much to the stability of the Far East.
[signed] 関野秀夫
[1] The shortest distances are: Hokkaido to mainland of Asia, about 180 miles; Hokkaido to Sakhalin, about 30 miles; Hokkaido to Kuriles, about 10 miles.
[2] An excellent example of such an expert is Dr. Kikuhara, designer of the successful four-engined Kawanishi “Emily” sea planes of World War II and now the designer of the well-thought-of PS-1 ASW flying boat.
[3] General Minoru Genda is one of the best-known examples of such a two-fold career. As a carrier pilot in the IJN he planned and executed the attack on Pearl Harbor. Later he became Chief-of-Staff of the ASDF. The general is now engaged in a third major career as a member of the House of Councillors in the National Diet.
[4] Literally, cruising war means war on commerce or mercantile warfare.
[5] Except on Iwo Jima, which can be used by conventional jet fighters, VTOL aircraft will be needed on every island used in the Nanpo Shoto chain.
[6] It is estimated that about 245,000 tons of new ships and 200 aircraft will have been completed by 1976.