“ASW vs. AAW: A Question of Direction”
(See I. D. C. Pearson, pp. 64-69, March 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Thomas H. Suddath, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The statement which I cannot agree with is:
The NATO navies have realized that next to the hunter/killer nuclear submarine, the most efficient A/S vehicle is probably the helicopter or hovercraft. . . .
Having served two tours in Task Group Alfa, as a destroyer division and squadron commander, and one tour as chief of staff in Task Group Bravo, I believe I have the credentials to make a comparative operational judgment between the surface ship in antisubmarine warfare and the helicopter.
Submarine Detection—The helicopter is a noisy vehicle. Because of the noise which it puts into the water, the possibility of its being used in the sound-listening-only mode of detection is virtually impossible. This, then, limits its detection capability to active sonar. The helicopter’s sonar transducer is limited to the size which can be physically lowered and hoisted into the water. This, therefore, limits its use at lower frequencies.
It is only by lowering the frequency and increasing the power in sonar transducers that detection range may be increased. The helicopter has limitations in both of these areas where a surface ship does not. Therefore, the helicopter is up against a brick wall in increasing its submarine detection capabilities.
Classification—The helicopter has nowhere near the classification capability (of determining whether the contact is a submarine or non-submarine) which the fixed-wing aircraft possesses, and which a surface ship possesses to a lesser degree. Therefore, it is my judgment that the capability of the helicopter in the classification area is practically nil.
All Weather Capability—This is the surface ship’s greatest forte, and the principal reason that the helicopter is a vehicle of opportunity in the ASW business rather than being a vehicle of reliability. In ASW task group operations, wind conditions frequently make it necessary to ground the helicopters because of their inability to spread their rotor blades. Then, of course, in adverse conditions of visibility and high seas, everything that flies is grounded.
Duration on Station—A helicopter’s endurance is obviously limited to the amount of fuel which it can carry. On the other hand, a nuclear-powered surface ship has unlimited endurance and a gas turbine-propelled surface ship has an endurance far in excess of a helicopter.
Weapons Delivery System—The helicopter’s biggest asset is its capability as a fast reaction, manned weapons delivery system, in good weather only. On the other hand, the surface ship has enough platform area to make her useful to launch the highly sophisticated weapons now going into the ASW arsenal.
These points summarize my ideas concerning the operational aspects of the helicopter in ASW warfare. Because I believe them to be irrelevant, I have deliberately stayed clear of the cost analysis deliberations which were so popular during the McNamara days.
Regarding Lieutenant Commander Pearson’s inclusion of the hovercraft as an ASW vehicle second only to the hunter/killer nuclear submarine, I submit that he is talking about a vehicle which has not yet been evaluated for approval for service use. It is my judgment that the hovercraft would suffer from most of the limitations which now beset the helicopter in antisubmarine warfare.
The main thesis that Lieutenant Commander Pearson’s article opens up for discussion is the age-old one of a single-mission ASW surface ship versus marrying AAW with ASW. This single-mission concept of ASW surface ship design will be submitted to the Board of Governors of the Boston Chapter of the U. S. Naval Institute with a recommendation that it be discussed at one of its next meetings. The results of this round table forum might possibly be of interest to PROCEEDINGS readers.
“Retention: The High Cost of Leaving”
(See J. R. Fredland, pp. 44-47, January; pp. 106-109, June; p. 109, July; and pp. 106-108, August 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant William F. Speers, U. S. Naval Reserve-R, Instructor of English, Oregon Technical Institute—The Navy needs a school similar to the Supply School for its newly commissioned line officers. Navy supply officers have, for the most part, majored in some aspect of business administration during their university years. Yet, because they must handle government money, they attend a long, intensive course of training at Athens, Georgia, before they report to the Fleet. On board ship, they can confidently deal with any aspect of their duties, from disbursing to mess catering and laundry operation. Even the most junior shipboard supply officer knows that he is making an important contribution to the efficiency of his command. He is respected, and more—more important—he respects himself.
If the Service can provide a complete post-commissioning course for some of its staff junior officers, it should be able to do the same for its line officers. A line officer’s school for newly commissioned ensigns—perhaps a modification and/or expansion of destroyer school—would admittedly be expensive to set up and operate. Its establishment might necessitate changes in obligated-service requirements. But by turning out officers who would be fully qualified to perform their operational and administrative duties, such a school could more than pay for itself by increasing the efficiency of the operating forces. In this era of tight budgets and “cost-effectiveness” studies, maximum efficiency is a prime consideration.
Equally important, I believe that a thorough education in shipboard duties and procedures, attained before reporting for duty on board ship, would encourage more officers to stay in the Navy. Pay, leave time, status, privileges—and other factors—are all important considerations when an officer is trying to decide whether or not to make the Navy a career. Individual morale is also an important consideration; and individual morale depends, to a large extent, on the officer’s ability to perform his duties well. If a new ensign could approach any assigned job with a measure of self-confidence from the first day he reported on board, he would be not only more efficient, but much happier. He would also be more likely to decide in favor of the Navy at “shipping-over” time.
“In Defense of the Large Slow Target”
(See J. H. Bower, Jr., pp. 128-130, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander Bernard F. O’Rourke, U. S. Navy, Former Commanding Officer, USS Henry County (LST-824)—The points set forth are the favorite topics of discussion among the dozen or so former LST skippers here at the Naval War College where I am a student.
Following World War II, a few LSTs were mothballed, and many more were broken up for scrap or given to our allies. Our in-commission assets were allowed to dwindle in those austere years. The value of the 542-class ship was relearned during the Korean conflict, particularly at Inchon, but promptly forgotten in the quieter Cold War years which followed. During the latter years, operational commanders in the Western Pacific were loath to use the slower types, and in fact, they were not required in amphibious landings over known beaches where logistics backup was not a problem.
With the landing of U. S. Marines in DaNang, however, real problems were once again encountered. Once again, the 542-class LST was an important part of the solution. In his Naval Review, 1968 account of building the advance base at DaNang, Captain K. P. Huff, U. S. Naval Reserve, then-commander of that activity, described his reliance on the 542 class, and added:
. . . a point to be seriously considered by those responsible for new ship construction, it is worth noting that the LST-542 class is the only class of LST that could have kept the Chu Lai operation going. . . . One wonders if the new 20-knot LST, which not only has beaching restrictions but is too big to go everywhere a 542-class can go, should not be complimented [sic] by a replacement for the 542 design—many of us who relied so heavily on the latter believe so.
Nor, as was pointed out by Lieutenant Bower and by my October 1966 PROCEEDINGS Professional Note, “The LST in Vietnam,” has the 542-class been restricted to performing its design functions. It is interesting to note that in three articles concerned with U. S. Navy operations in Vietnam, printed in the Naval Review, 1968, these versatile ships were central figures in each, playing different roles. In addition to the obvious advantage of an uncluttered main deck and cavernous tank deck, the key to this demonstrated flexibility is the simple construction and design of the ships.
Almost totally unsophisticated, they were rushed to completion during World War II at a very nominal cost. According to one well-qualified observer, “They were built by the mile, then cut off in convenient lengths.” This lack of sophistication permits their operation by small crews (less than 100) whose training requirements can be met by shipboard programs without reliance on lengthy courses in shore-based schools. Specialized machinery is simple, yet rugged, and wherever possible, is backed up by an alternate, manual method. For example, bow doors can be opened or closed, and ramps lowered or raised manually in an emergency.
This, then, is the low-cost, proven performer that is being eliminated from our active forces because of a lack of speed. Her replacements, while worthy ships in their own right, most certainly will cost far more to build and operate, and will be far less competent in the brown and shoal water environment.
Why eliminate simplicity of design and case of operation? Instead, why not retain as much simplicity as possible, and merely allow the state of the art engineering, as suggested by Lieutenant Bower, to improve the basic design. Why allow experimental technology and ship designers to “drive” our requirements, instead of vice versa? Surely, there is no need to prove that we can build ships which require the skills of engineers and technicians instead of sailors. We have been building such costly mistakes for several years now.
To those who doubt that a “modern 542-class” is feasible, I suggest that they take a close look at the Soviet “Alligator” LST. As described in Jane’s Fighting Ships, the Alligator more closely resembles the ship suggested by Lieutenant Bower than does anything we have built recently.
FRAMP Training
Lieutenant Michael A. Krebe, U. S. Navy—All too often an aviation squadron division officer, asked about FRAMP training, will ask, “What is it?” FRAMP stands for Fleet Replacement Aircraft Maintenance Personnel. Therefore, FRAMP training concerns all group IX personnel holding orders to report to a squadron.
All replacement squadrons have a program of this type, although each replacement squadron may have a different name for its program and a slightly different procedure for administering it The underlying concept is the same.
FRAMP training is designed to take individuals from various shore duty backgrounds and disciplines, and relate this knowledge to a specific series of aircraft, i.e., (A4s, F8s, F4s, A7s). Many of these individuals have come directly from “A” schools, and have not been at sea or previously assigned to a squadron. Ideally, second class petty officers and above will receive training that is identical to the men that they are ordered into a squadron to replace.
For many individuals checking into the squadron for FRAMP training, this is the first opportunity to be recognized as an individual and not just a part of a class. To help in this transition, each trainee is placed in “X” division for one or two weeks, depending on his reporting date.
The “X” division is controlled by the FRAMP Division Officer, and is used to indoctrinate the individual as to his duties and responsibilities to local commands in the area. During this period, each individual’s record is screened and a letter of proposed training is sent to the squadron that will receive him after his training is complete. In the meantime, trainees are scheduled for Fleet fire fighting school, defensive driving, and career benefits.
Upon receiving the letter of intended training, the squadron division officer may request changes based on his immediate and projected needs. He need only mail the same letter back with the noted changes and the trainee’s program will be altered.
At last count, only 10 to 15% of the intended training letters are returned with any comments. If a letter of intended training is not returned, the proposed training is followed.
The trainee then begins Phase One, formal training, which consists of courses taught by the local Naval Air Maintenance Training Detachment and associated support facilities. This formal training is highly technical and is directly related to a specific aircraft system or a component in an aircraft system. During this school, the trainee learns the theory, function, and also the repair of the system.
After a student completes formal training, he is assigned to the work center associated with his rate. Each work center has one or more individuals, depending on student load, specifically assigned to monitor and document the trainee’s progress.
During Phase Two, on-the-job training (OJT), the student learns to coordinate the knowledge gained in school and the various maintenance procedures used to repair an aircraft system. In addition, he learns trouble-shooting techniques and man-hour documentation. After OJT training is completed, the individual is transferred to his designated squadron.
The time that a student is in FRAMP training may vary from three or four weeks to three or four months. At any point prior to completion, a student’s training can be changed to reflect a squadron’s needs.
The FRAMP training officer can provide valuable assistance to the maintenance division officer if the latter will notify him of current and projected training requirements—one of the easiest ways to do this is to complete and return the letter of proposed training.
Progress Photograph
(See pp. 152-153, August 1969; and p. 97, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Henry C. Beck, Former Chief Engineer, Hudson Laboratories & Program Manager for the USNS Mission Capistrano Position-Keeping System—Mr. Garger is, of course, quite right in that the Cuss I barge used in the Mohole Project was equipped with a workable position-keeping system and preceded the Mission Capistrano installation by some years. The Cuss I installation used a man in the control loop, providing thrust magnitude and direction commands via a joy-stick control and ship’s wheel. I believe both acoustic and radar buoy position displays were used by the operator.
The Mission Capistrano installation was the first of a position-keeping system on a naval vessel. It is a sophisticated, fully-automatic system which uses acoustic, Loran, or other information to maintain both heading and position. The heading is particularly critical in this installation. It was, to my knowledge, the first fully-automatic system installed on any ship using acoustic or electronic navigation information. Although a man can be used in the control loop, a completely automatic mode is generally used. A position directly over or at a fixed offset from a bottom pinger is selected as is the desired ship’s heading. The time difference of arrivals of the pinger signals at a planar array of three hydrophones suspended from the ship, corrected for vessel roll and pitch, together with heading error are fed through a computer to derive thrust and azimuth commands for two rotatable propulsion units. The system was retrofitted to an existing ship, and physical constraints and the economics of the situation dictated the two propulsion unit approach.
The Mission Capistrano system predated the Glomar Challenger system by a year or more, but was not reported in the press until 1969. The important thing to realize is that developments of this nature often do not happen by revolution, but rather by evolution. The question of “who was first” does not matter. The team that worked on the Mission Capistrano system made free use of the work of the Mohole team. Many of the problem areas which arose in the Mission Capistrano installation did not appear in the Glomar Challenger system. The same contractors were used in both systems, so I am sure that the experience gained on board the Mission Capistrano, was put to good use on board the Glomar Challenger.
The Navy is not always last in engineering developments, but often appears reticent to “blow its own horn.” Because of this, it is no wonder that Mr. Garger received a garbled impression of the time sequences involved.
Notebook Item—“Merchant Fleet Measure Signed”
(See p. 139, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Ensign C. H. Hollander, U. S. Navy (Retired)—In the Notebook section of the PROCEEDINGS, an article reprinted from the Baltimore Sun states that the President had signed an authorization bill which included funds to build twice as many merchant ships as President Nixon had originally requested for Fiscal Year 1970. I feel that this article may lead to a misconception, on the part of your readers, that more funds were appropriated than was actually the case. It is true that an amount of $145 million was included in the authorization bill for merchant ship construction and that this amount had been increased by the Congress from the $15.9 million originally budgeted by the Administration. However, the bill that subsequently appropriated funds for FY 1970, and which was later signed by the President, included only the $15.9 million that was originally budgeted.
The Bureau of the Budget seems to have a firm control of funds. A bad budget figure can be a kiss of death to a program, whereas a good budget figure can give a favorable start to an authorization bill or an appropriation bill. For Fiscal Year 1971, the prospect for funding merchant ship construction is much brighter. This is precisely so, because the Bureau of the Budget, in accordance with President Nixon’s plans for revitalization of the American merchant marine over a 10-year period, has included $199.5 million for merchant ship construction in the FY 1971 budget.
The Bureau of the Budget total figure of $427 million for certain maritime programs, which includes $199.5 million for ship construction, passed through the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and the House with very little change or fanfare, except that $2.3 million was added to keep the NS Savannah operating actively. The total amount in the authorization bill as passed by the House on 11 March 1970 and sent to the Senate, was $429.3 million. Maritime Administrator Andrew E. Gibson said at the time of the announcement of the new Maritime Administration budget that, “It (the new maritime program) shows the Administration’s concern for the American merchant marine . . . a program which cannot wait.” The FY 1971 budget is the largest maritime budget in 25 years, and, according to Mr. Gibson, the amount earmarked for merchant ship construction will be sufficient to contract for the building of 19 new merchant ships.
Public hearings have been completed in the House and Senate on HR15424 and S3287, which would enact into law those portions of the President’s maritime program requiring legislation necessary for revitalizing the American merchant marine. This legislation should be followed with interest by all seafaring men, since what is happening now will undoubtedly determine whether or not the American merchant marine of the future will remain an effective part of this nation’s composite naval, merchant marine, and oceanographic seapower structure.
Ours Not to Reason Why
Lieutenant Commander James L. Donovan, Supply Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—Recently, I completed two weeks of active duty for training on board the USS Wright (CC-2). There were about a dozen Reserve officers on board at the same time, mostly line types, one chaplain, and myself, a supply officer. As part of our training program, we had to give a lecture on our special field, or on research projects we were working on.
As the lone “porkchop,” it was incumbent on me to represent the Supply Corps; but my problem was how to do it. How could I talk intelligibly about supply matters to a group of officers with little knowledge of supply—and perhaps less interest? I finally decided to address myself to a problem that I had thought about several times, but had never really come to grips with. It was the communications barrier that exists between supply officers and their counterparts in the line and in other staff corps.
I decided to see what I could do about breaching the barrier between us and them. Since we were all Reservists, I tried to answer the question, “If you were mobilized, how could you best make use of the supply department?”
In my talk to the other Reservists, my purpose was to indicate to them how they could best use the supply department if they were mobilized. Here, I will outline only enough of my talk to convey the general idea of my approach:
If you were mobilized, you would be concerned with these supply areas: general stores, the general mess, pay, and ship’s services. Let us look at each one in turn.
General stores—What are they? Define and illustrate. One question always tends to sour the line and supply relationship: “If the material I want is over on the beach at the supply center, why can’t I have it?”
Answer: Suppose ½-inch steel plates are very scarce. Who should decide who gets them? Should you decide? Should I decide? Or, should the question be decided by someone who can see and evaluate the Fleet’s needs? As a matter of good management, some items are controlled, not at the local level, but by a higher authority. The same situation exists in business, where certain resources cannot be committed without the consent of higher authority. Most often, the material can be had.
Question: How can you get it?
Answer: Exact identification is necessary so that the storekeeper can give you the correct order. The storekeeper will help your man get the proper number.
Some items are carried on board ship; some are not. The high usage items are carried on board the ship, while items not in demand are not. This is good money management, and is a situation not likely to change.
The fact that an item is not carried on board ship does not mean you cannot have it. In fact, if there is sufficient demand, the material will be carried on board. Explain meaning of NC (not carried); why an item is NC; how the supply department collects usage data.
There is a need for proper forms and numbers, but the supply department does not want them to be a barrier. If you need help, ask for it. The supply department can prepare a gouge on the proper procedure, blown-up drawings of requisitions, and the like. You can help supply a lot by giving us feedback on how well we are meeting your needs.
The General Mess—The Navy has devoted a lot of money and effort over the last 20 years to improving the general mess. A trip to the Wright’s Ney-award-winning mess will show you that the effort has paid off.
Question: How can you work with supply in this important area?
Answer: Do not pass your disciplinary problems on to the supply department as mess cooks. Mess cooking should not be used as a punishment, because it does nothing to improve the quality of the general mess.
Give us feedback. Your men will often tell you how they feel about the food, while they will not tell the cooks. When you are the officer-of-the-deck, you are supposed to sample the mess. Take this responsibility seriously. Support supply in any way you can to cut down waste.
Finally, to do our job well, we need your co-operation—but this does not mean that you should tolerate sloppy work. Be co-operative, but demanding.
I think the approach described can be used by supply officers on active duty, to help build a better understanding of the way the supply system works. Supply officers, chief storekeepers, and other rated storekeepers should make presentations to other divisions. The supply procedures should be explained and, perhaps more important, the reasons for the procedures should be explained.
While I do not know that a more general understanding of why the supply system functions as it does would reduce the amount of flak most supply officers catch in the wardroom, I do know that it would result in a better appreciation of a system designed to serve the Fleet.
“Professionalism and Writing”
(See D. W. Brezina, pp. 108-109, November 1969; pp. 95-97, April; and p. 101, August 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Paul K. Schratz, U. S. Navy (Retired), Director, Office of International Studies, University of Missouri—I am encouraged by the continued interest expressed by our younger officers, both in writing for publication and in setting up a forum for discussion of professional matters.
Since I apparently was the instigator of this particularly encouraging trend in thought through my statement at the Naval Institute’s annual meeting two years ago, I should like to do what I can to encourage this hopeful trend.
I think that most of our younger officers are far too modest about their contribution to the PROCEEDINGS simply because they have not been around salt water long enough to really qualify. The first article which I published in the PROCEEDINGS was a report of an interesting sub-solar celestial fix, when I simply happened to be in the right place at the right time incident to a routine’s day’s work in navigation. This could have happened within three days of my departure from the Naval Academy or even during a Midshipmen’s cruise. The story would have been of equal interest and the Midshipman or junior officer equally qualified to publish it.
With specific regard to Lieutenant Commander Loftus’ comment, I suggest that the reason he never found formal expression of ideas on logistics, planning, strategies, or tactics during his schooling is because of the severe and extensive gap in our military professionalism today, which limits the ability of even our senior officers to discuss these major subjects in fluent terms as we should be able to do. I further suggest that the gap in strategy is so severe, that of the 124 books published by the Naval Institute, only one is on strategy and that is about the Soviet Navy and not the U. S. Navy. If ever the younger officer had a chance to commence carving for himself a role in a valuable field of research, I would suggest that modern strategy be that role. Let me convince Lieutenant Commander Loftus and his colleagues that based on my experience at both the Naval and the National War Colleges, both as student and faculty, the void extends through the senior colleges almost to the extent which he experienced it at OCS (Officer Candidate School).
The U. S. military officer traditionally isolates military power from national policy. The American diplomat isolates policy from war. Yet, the purpose of military power is to achieve a political goal. Hence, how can the military professional isolate himself from the study of national politics or the diplomat from study of the role of power in policy? How do the various forms of power affect policy and how do economic or psychological considerations augment or undermine military power? Our narrow view of the role of military power is such that despite the greatest air power in history presently wielded by the United States, for example, we have never really analyzed the basic difference between the punitive versus the persuasive role of air warfare. Such doctrinal failures in the air war in Vietnam, I believe, have crucified our strategy there.
Because of the gaps in our professional education, we must all, senior and junior, begin at the beginning by a process of self-education, and this is slow and inefficient. Let our younger officers take the initiative; let them take correspondence courses and see what the Navy currently has to offer in many professional fields related to strategy and war. Let them also contribute to the dialogue, and we will all benefit from the results. I shall never forget the tremendous eye-opener it was to receive literature in anticipation of my orders as a student at the Naval War College and the new world which that literature opened for me. Even then, it was a self-education course, but I loved it. From that day, I have regretted the vast amounts of time which I spent previously in other pursuits in my carefree junior officer days, which might well have been used to lay a professional groundwork, had I only been reached by a proposal such as that put forward by Dennis Brezina.
After all, Alfred Thayer Mahan could not publish an article in the PROCEEDINGS until he was a commander for at least two reasons—there was no Naval Institute and no Naval War College, and he was a captain before his orders to help establish the War College first opened his eyes to the new world around him.
“Image of Command”
(See S. H. Edwards, pp. 36-39, February; and pp. 102-104, July 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Donald J. Kreutzberger, U. S. Navy—In addition to the fine article by Lieutenant Commander Edwards, I thought that readers of the PROCEEDINGS would enjoy the following “set of orders” taken from Patrick O’Brian’s book Master and Commander (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1969). They are the instructions given to Lieutenant Jack Aubrey, Royal Navy, when he was ordered to duty as captain of the sloop Sophie at Port Mahon, Minorca, on 1 April 1800:
You are hereby required and directed to proceed on board the Sophie and take upon you the Charge and Command of Commander of her; willing and requiring all the Officers and Company belonging to the said Sloop to behave themselves in their several Employments with all due Respect and Obedience to you their Commander; and you likewise to observe as well the General Printed Instructions as what Orders and Directions you may from time to time receive from any your superior Officer for His Majesty’s Service. Hereof you nor any of you may fail as you will answer the contrary at your Peril. And for so doing this shall be your Order.
If changed slightly to modern English, we still have today’s CO.