“Against All Enemies”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 22-29, March 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lawrence C. Allin, History Department, University of Maine—I am deeply disturbed by the climate of ideas and opinions that compels a senior officer to take pen in hand and, in effect, declare there is something seriously wrong in our internal civil-military relationships. I am deeply pained by what could be the consequences of this climate of opinion. Carried to its most extreme logic, this continued harping against the military could force the military into the position of attempting to seize the reins of government.
Whether the military would be successful or fail in an attempt to defend the Constitution by seizing power, our unique form of government would come to an end. If the extreme critics of our government and its military have their way, they will destroy the power of both the civil and military, and erect a mutation of all of our traditions and painfully gained institutions.
Although I am no longer legally bound by the oath to which Captain Hanks refers, the example of his integrity and honor reminds me that this oath, once sworn, is not to be broken.
Captain Hanks offers us a course of action in the face of the jeers and taunts to which those of us who believe in the basic integrity of the Armed Forces of United States feel we are exposed. I pray to God that his course of action and the collective wisdom of the American people will be enough to sustain us in this hour. I tremble at the consequences if they are not.
Commander R. C. Austin, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The prize essay by Captain Hanks is an analysis of the criticisms of the defense effort which has been long overdue, and especially in the dissection of the major protagonist’s statements and motives.
However, as was alluded to in the article, the Defense Department and the Services continue to provide examples that are used by critics to prove their point. Captain Hanks recognizes this problem and states that we must do better to reduce these examples.
That we must do better has long been recognized by all concerned with this vital area. The problem suggested in the article is that our outside critics have been more diligent in their efforts of uncovering and inviting attention to these problems than the Services and Defense Department.
The impetus to do better is twofold. First, we must do better with the resources allocated to defense because clearly there will be less allocated in the future for more costly and more sophisticated weapon requirements. Secondly, the critics are more alert and more knowledgeable in publicizing the facts when these resources are used in a manner not acceptable to the armed services nor to the nation as a whole.
Despite protestations to the contrary, there is a mutuality of interest between contractors and the program and project managers of weapons systems. When a project manager has gone on record in “selling” acceptance of a weapon system concept, his ability is measured, in a large part, by the success of his weapons system. The contractor’s representative’s ability is likewise measured on a similar basis. Indeed, as illustrated by Lockheed’s plight, the very existence of the company is involved. The litany of weapons system development pursued far beyond the point that they might well have been cancelled is long and costly in terms of resources and credibility. The decision to drop a project when just $1 million more might bring it to successful fruition is most difficult and complex, especially when the system extends through the state of the art.
The P6M seaplane was carried several years beyond this point and cancelled after $600 million had been expended. Several years before this system was cancelled, a number of individuals had indicated in private that the project could not meet its objectives. Other systems have been introduced to the Fleet, but quickly phased out, such as the F7U, R3Y, and DASH systems, to name but a few. In my own case, I recall two experiences in which after inviting the attention of the presidents of two contractor firms to their lack of performance on systems, my command was advised to restrain such actions. Obviously, the project managers[’] prerogatives were being usurped. Who, then, can control the project manager who controls and evaluates his own system’s progress?
Where does the user of the system turn when his reports of malfunctions to the project manager evoke no corrective action?
Entirely within the Navy, we have had the Thresher and the Pueblo, both of which had similar situations, wherein deficiencies may have been ignored under pressure to meet schedules and costs. With the pressures to get the ships ready on the time specified, the commanding officer faces an extremely difficult decision as to how and to whom does he turn. Again, there is a mutuality of interest, among the shipyard commander, type commander, and operational commander who need to meet schedules, costs, and commitments. The individual commanding officer is in a position of appealing to judge, jury, and prosecutor, and does so at his peril.
On board a destroyer which I had served in, we refused to sign off on a yard overhaul job, and were subjected to a great deal of pressure from the yard directly, and the division and squadron commanders indirectly. The result was that at the scheduled end of the yard overhaul, we were certified as complete without signing the job, and sent from the yard. Fortunately, the division medical officer, a reserve officer of an independent mind, condemned the equipment. On this basis, we were given a three-week yard availability, sent back to the yard, and the equipment was replaced. The correspondence that ensued between the yard commander, type commander, and the Ship Systems Command was most interesting.
In the operational area, the Pueblo incident is a case in point. Despite the resources devoted to command and control systems, instant communications, and the like, the reactions and responses to the first indications of the Pueblo situation were lamentable in the public eye. To further compound the problem, we find that after this indication of the intention and capabilities of our adversary, we sent an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft (EC-121) into a similar situation with the same lamentable results. Obviously, we must do better with the nation’s blood and treasures, but how?
One could answer that the Navy Area Audit Offices handle the contractor situations, and the Inspector General handles the remainder. However, neither of these organizations enhance the career potential of the mid-career officer and even less so if he is a stormy petrel. While one may question Vice Admiral Rickover’s role, his career is a case which, by its exception, is illustrative of the point.
It would appear that the Navy may need a body, perhaps a strengthened Inspector General’s organization, with an internal role similar to that of the General Accounting Office, which could serve this function of insuring that we do better. A new corps is not the answer, but perhaps a special designator similar to the engineering duty officer (EDO) designator and career opportunity is needed.
In addition, the reply of the First Sea Lord to a question at the Naval War College is appropriate. The answer to the question on how the Royal Navy, with limited resources, was able to develop the steam catapult and angled flight deck ahead of the U. S. Navy, was answered:
Perhaps because of limited resources, we are forced to think more about what we do.
I suggest that we are about to enter a time when we will be “forced to think more about what we do.”
Lieutenant David G. Parent, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—Upon reflection, one must conclude that Captain Hanks has unfortunately “. . . react[ed] to the current attacks [on the military services] with injured feelings, righteous indignation, panic or withdrawal.” Otherwise, he would not have verbally attacked seven U. S. Senators, a former commandant of the Marine Corps, a dead president and his administration, and one of the country’s leading intellectuals.
Moreover, I submit that we in the Service, especially in the Reserve, are not “. . . safe in the knowledge that we are properly policing our own conduct . . . .” The loss of the Pueblo and a reconnaissance aircraft, low retention of officers and enlisted men, the low number of minority group officers in our wardrooms, together with the evidence that the critics have come up with, do not inspire confidence.
I firmly believe that our military critics have done us a great favor. The Navy is going to be smaller, but by being able to rid itself of marginal ships and personnel, should be much better. Promotions are going to be much slower perhaps, but the men promoted will have had more time to prepare for their responsibilities. We will have fewer funds, and thus will be forced to spend them less foolishly.
In conclusion, if we begin now to live up to our responsibilities, our critics will have less to say, and will not be able to say it as effectively.
Lieutenant James J. Mulquin, U. S. Naval Reserve—As part of that “bellicose, sword-waving second front,” allegedly diverted from basic humanitarian concerns by two generations of militaristic influence, I took personal encouragement from Captain Hanks’ message.
Particularly impressive with the finesse and objectivity apparent throughout his argument, a subject where more than one author has fallen victim to ill-timed emotion. I felt the key element was the author’s caution against personal withdrawal—a normal reaction of normal people confronted with mounting media criticism, much of it inaccurate, deliberately misleading, and calculated to discourage and confuse. In such circumstances, it is very possible to be deceived as to the true temperament of the times, and under the erroneous impression of popular dissatisfaction, react in the fashion described.
Certain parallels exist in the matter of internal law enforcement. Police officers are singled out as individuals, that actions described as unilateral and arbitrary, and inconsistent with sentiment of the very people they serve. Rarely is it suggested that law enforcement directly reflects community support; rather, peace officers are intentionally depicted as local warlords, independent and sovereign in their operations. Similarly, members of the military are frequently accused of representing unpopular concepts of justice and constraint. Too often, they are viewed as a subversive element within society, safeguarding unpopular institutions, and maintaining unpopular governments an administrations contrary to the preference of a suppressed electorate.
Members of the armed forces must remember that they enjoy—and have enjoyed for many decades—the unquestioned support of rank-and-file America. The same press that has frequently maligned our nation’s defensive structure, has all-too-effectively expressed the foreign threats that did and do exist to our individual independence. Like Tommy Atkins, the American public “ain’t a bloomin’ fool,” and is aware of a continuing indebtedness to the military establishment. But the public is in no position to express itself on a day-to-day basis. One syndicated columnist, carried by many daily newspapers in the United States, can create massive doubt where none, in fact, exists. This hazard, probably unique to the Free World, must be recognized.
By insisting on their rights as free Americans to express themselves, by demanding “equal time” to describe personal experiences in all parts of the world where International Communism has taken root, members of the military can do much to dispel popular myths of totalitarian acceptance. Above all, the military man must never permit himself to be duped into a false sense of despair by individuals who have this as a primary objective. Captain Hanks has performed a distinct service in this article, and I will certainly look forward to more of his work in the PROCEEDINGS.
Lieutenant Commander I. D. C Pearson, Royal Navy—Captain Hanks’ prize winning essay, though lucidly written, was disappointing. Having eloquently explained the criticism leveled at the military by various distinguished public figures, he fails to counter any of the specific points that he quotes. It is unfair to impugn the motives of Messrs. Fulbright, Galbraith, Shoup, and company, who are doubtless no less patriotic than the author, without showing exactly where they have gone astray. Instead, he makes his own suggestions for improvement, in some cases tacitly agreeing with several of the “enemy within!” (For example, with Galbraith on organization.)
Certainly it is necessary to put one’s own house in order and then to stand up and be counted, but there is no use in pouring invective on one’s critics, who have already moved into the vacuum, and are making some well-aimed and uncountered censures. A vulnerable military in a democratic society is an easy target.
Perhaps the military, like the Church, should not be too proud to pray:
Where it is corrupt, purify it; where it is in error, direct it; where in anything it is amiss, reform it. Where it is right, establish it; where it is in want, provide for it; where it is divided, reunite it . . . .
Commander Peter J. Doerr, U. S. Navy— Captain Hanks’ prize essay clearly merits the Naval Institute’s recognition as an articulate exposition of a point of view widely held within the naval service, but not often expressed in public. It is a point of view with which I have much sympathy but, unfortunately, not one with which I can agree.
I cannot agree with his analysis of the causes of the current anti-military mania in the United States, with what I think is his incomplete appreciation of what men like Senator J. William Fulbright and Professor John K. Galbraith are trying to achieve, with his estimate of the seriousness of the situation, nor with the “simple truths” he cites about the present international political situation. Most of all, I cannot agree with Captain Hanks’ recommended course of action. My own initial reaction to reading Professor Galbraith’s Harper’s Magazine article and to hearing some of Senator Fulbright’s obiter dicta has been a compound of incredulity, indignation, and plain rage. But I have repressed that rage, and I think we naval officers would be foolish to give vent to it.
Our oath of office does indeed oblige us to defend the Constitution against all enemies. However, it gives us absolutely no authority to determine for ourselves who those enemies may be under any given set of circumstances, and still less does it authorize to act upon such a determination. The very Constitution we have sworn to defend, makes clear that this is not a prerogative of military officers. The laws which the Congress has made pursuant to that Constitution, which we are also obliged to obey, specifically prohibit us from engaging in domestic political activity. Furthermore, our hallowed tradition of military subordination to civil political authority requires that we take action against our country’s enemies only when the enemies have been identified for us, and the desired action has been directed by superior and competent authority. The only exceptions to this rule deal with limited and specific emergency situations with which we are all familiar, none of which are present in the contemporary domestic political scene about which Captain Hanks has written. To act as he has proposed, therefore, does not have any Constitutional warrant or sanction.
It would be, moreover, a most unwise tactic under the present circumstances. For uniformed military men to take to the hustings today in an attempt to justify themselves or any specific political course of action, would be to give the anti-military elements in the nation an unlimited source of ammunition with which to belabor us all the more. We would be offering proof, as some would see it and not without justification, of many of the charges which have been leveled against us. Such a course of action would, I think, hurt us far more than the continued public silence to which Captain Hanks objects.
It would also prolong what I am convinced is merely a passing fancy in American politics. In the extreme form in which it appears today (Captain Hanks’ descriptive paragraphs are quite accurate), anti-militarism is burning far too brightly to last for long. Indeed between the time the essay presumably was written and the time of its publication the new catchwords of ecology and the environment have already pushed us military men from the front pages.
The scope and depth of the attack on us has been much magnified by the modern media phenomena of fashions and fads in reporting the news. The novelty will wear off. When it does we will, of course, still be faced with serious, if not catastrophic, problems. We will have to make ourselves heard in appropriate fora on the essential defense needs of the nation, that is within the Executive Branch, in testimony before the legislature, and as private citizens in the living rooms, club public rooms, and letters-to-the-editor columns of America.
We will have difficulty making ourselves heard, even in these fora, if we close our eyes to the real changes which have occurred in the international political situation during the past 20 years. Some of the present talk about the demise of the Communist monolith is naive or self-serving. I doubt very much that the men in Moscow or Peking wish us well any more now than in 1947. But the political and military fragmentation of our most powerful potential enemy is a fact we cannot really deny. And one of the consequences of that fact is that these potential enemies are inhibited more today than they were yesterday from putting their hostility into effect by military action. One can hardly discuss such issues adequately in a single paragraph, but I think it is entirely proper to grant that the military posture we believed necessary at the height of the cold war may not be the posture we need today. In the face of rising domestic demands for a re-allocation of the nation’s resources, demands which are based on real problems, however much we may deplore the tactics and utterances of the more outr[é] demanders, we must justify our military needs in terms of the international political situation of the 1970s, not that of the 1940s or 1950s.
I think we can do this, if we continue to be restrained and reticent. I also think we may find some rather unlikely allies in the attempt. Recently, I attended a lecture by a prominent gentleman, whose talk would, I am sure, have aroused Captain Hanks’ ire as it did mine. Yet, in response to a question from another naval officer in the audience, this fire-breathing, anti-militarist expressed complete agreement with the Navy's desire to replace its overage destroyers with modern, habitable, and effective new ships. However extreme the utterances of men like Senator Fulbright. Professor Galbraith, or General David M. Shoup, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired), may be, they are honorable and reasonable men whose words must be understood in terms of the need they see to stimulate public debate about very serious issues. The issue of Congressional authority in foreign affairs, for example, has marshalled the support of many who cannot, by any definition of the term, be described as anti-military. (The testimony of Professor Ruhl Bartlett at the Fulbright Committee hearings on the commitments resolution is a good example of this.)
Captain Hanks would have us act in a way which is likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate an unpleasant situation, and in a way which has traditionally been prohibited to us, in order to stem “the anti-military tide.” I suggest rather that we let this tide do what all tides do—ebb. As to proposals like Marcus Raskins’, I suggest we adopt what Captain Hanks believes to be Moscow’s reaction—chuckles of incredulity.
Lieutenant Robert E. Fornal, U. S. Navy—Captain Hanks charges us “. . . to refute, item by item, the inaccuracies, half-truths and, in too many instances, utter nonsense which currently inundate American media.” I shall rather attempt to complement what I considered a rambling essay.
His notable article is, in itself, incomplete, written at a level of rarefied abstraction, and smacks a bit of paranoia. The validity of his thesis, that the military in the United States is being systematically impugned by enemies from within, and that the officer corps is charged under oath of office to raise its voice against its detractors in order to preserve the security of our country, is not logically proven since there is not a complete sequence of ideas. Rather, the essay seems more an ambitious, but unsuccessful diatribe against a few specific individuals, and the entire liberal element in American society, ill-contrived to fit a prefabricated outline consisting only of an opportune phrase from the oath of office.
That three Administrations have failed to explain the Vietnam war to the American people, means to Captain Hanks that the government ought to try harder to outline the war’s nature and importance. Could it not just be that there is no such explanation? In October 1963, the Administration in a White House statement reported that the major part of the U. S. military task in Vietnam would be completed by 1965. The controversial bombing of the North, which began in 1965, and calculated to bring North Vietnam to surrender, served only to further discredit U. S. policy and embarrass the military by its failure to accomplish U. S. policy designs. The napalm raids, “lazy dog” attacks, accidental and deliberate killing of innocent peasants, summary executions, and kangaroo court sentences, all brought to American homes in living color each evening were all done by, or with the inferred approval of, or without apparent interference by the American military command. Who can ever explain a war cooly [sic], logically, and detachedly? Those who would try must do so at honesty’s expense.
Assuming that the Vietnam war will never become “understood” in our time, does the resultant disenchantment necessarily lead to an anti-military conviction? Certainly it creates an unfavorable atmosphere for the military. But the military is in Vietnam at the order of the President, carrying out the war to achieve a stated aim of U. S. foreign policy.
In the book The Way We Go to War. Merlo J. Pusey states,
The United States appears to have acquired the habit of drifting into war without any deliberate legislative decision on the matter.
The casual Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, in view of the disclosures made after review of the incident, published in the book Truth is the First Casualty, has become a stain on the Congress, the administration, and the Navy. Given the resolution, the “inherent” powers the executive lays claim to appear to be broad enough for the President, alone, to determine the fate of our nation, quite flagrantly in disagreement with the Constitution we swore our oath to up hold. The dilemma is not that diplomacy is in the hands of the military, but that the waging of war has fallen into the hands of the executive. This issue is a grave one, and is further explicated by Mr. William B. Bader in the February 1970 issue of National War College Review.
With the explosive issue of “Constitutional erosion,” the quagmire in Vietnam, involvement in Laos, and a recent military history, including the U-2 aircraft, the mythical missile gap of the early 1960s, the TFX aircraft, the 1965 Dominican affair, the Pueblo, and the C5A aircraft, among other embarrassing episodes, can we be too surprised if academe and mill worker alike wonder, more in fear than in anger, what is to come next?
An irrational decision by either of the participants in the apocalyptic poker game would be a disaster for mankind. A superficial review of Soviet military policy reveals that any idea we may have of response “in kind” to postulated U. S. unilateral measures of arms control is absolutely denied. This does not absolutely rule out a reconsideration, should they examine and find it in their own best interests. Life under the threat, remote as it may be, of nuclear war for the duration of man’s existence is an abhorrent concept, but it is the only alternative to disarmament. We can either continue the arms race, seek parity, or disarm. Parity, of the three, is probably the least stable because of the real possibility of a technological breakthrough on either side. The arms race, as we know it today, a quest for more efficient weapons and delivery methods, developed at the cost of billions of dollars and retired after only diplomatic use, i.e., non-use, is not only dangerous and insane, but economically an untenable policy. Eventually, disarmament or holocaust must come, though the resolution of which of the two it will be may take decades, even centuries.
Each of the protest movements—civil fights, university reform, and Vietnam is. in some respect, a protest on behalf of individuals who arc the unwilling or unwitting subservients of a remote and apparently inaccessible decision-making elite. Let me quickly interject that I cannot condone the destructive violence of some protest factions, but that unlawful violence is the predictable result when rights, not privileges, are denied, and peaceful demonstration fails to bring a response.
These protests arise from the midst of a vast impersonal society whose bureaucratic institutions, mass media and other forms treat its members only in the collective. If the “silent majority” does exist, it may be that it is mute because it knows the futility of speech in a world of the deaf. The significance of these protests lies in their testimony to a rising questioning spirit in this country. If this spirit is nurtured, and in fact prevails, it could lead not only to tolerance, but also to in-depth understanding between the factions as they exist today.
Rather than bravely striking a pose for all America to either admire or stone, as we stand with a line drawn between the officer corps and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we might do our respective Services and our country a better turn by removing our gloves and dress swords, and sitting down to give some scholarly investigation to the words of our critics.
Perhaps the only way we shall ever reconcile the officer corps and the politicians, is to give military men political training and to insist that policy makers be acquainted with at least the foundations of strategy in the nuclear age. Without mutual tolerance, only further misunderstanding and the eventual demise of our society may result.
“The Naval Medical Officer: The Worst of Both Worlds”
(See F. E. Dully, Jr., pp. 60-66, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander W. C. Parrish, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery—Many of us feel that the Navy medical officer, rather than deserving sympathy for having the worst of two worlds, is deserving of envy for having the best of two worlds.
No other naval officer, in fact, probably has it as good. Dr. Dully laments the lost individuality of the doctor, when probably not even the much-courted aviator is allowed the same degree of freedom of expression accorded the medical officer. On the contrary, the doctor’s individuality generally goes unchallenged within a society (the military) where it is widely held that individuality is repressed. When Dr. Dully speaks of the senior medical officer sporting a luxurious set of sideburns, or having a salute resembling something out of a grade “B” movie, or having overly-familiar relations with enlisted subordinates, he is merely citing examples of the medical officer’s retained individuality. With the medical officer career retention rate now running at about 15 per cent and constituting a grave problem, it does not appear that the individuality and fierce independence of the medical officer is about to be challenged on a collision basis by the naval establishment.
Dr. Dully laments the vagaries of individual insecurity at being thrust away from the mother school. Admittedly, the first tour of duty in the Navy may be a little rough for some, but beyond this, there is virtually unlimited choice of duty and professional practice for the physician. He can choose clinical practice, further education, research, teaching, administration, and command. The Navy offers the same breadth of professional endeavor as is found in the civilian health care system, and Navy physicians are accorded a proportionate amount of recognition, honors, and respect by their civilian confrerees [sic]. In fact, the breadth of professional endeavor may be greater within the Navy in the future; command of naval medical facilities by medical officers continues unchallenged while the civilian equivalent, physician-hospital administrators, are rapidly being supplanted by administrators trained in the profession of management rather than medicine. The only important thing the Navy doesn’t seem to offer, which civilian doctors have, is a median income of $40,000 per year and a stable place of residence. This, of course, is where the rub lies.
Dr. Dully’s apparent opinion is that the Navy medical officer is a second-rate naval officer and a second-rate physician. If the former is true, it is because the individual physician wants it that way. The latter point is simply not true. Dr. Dully loses sight of the fact that the Navy health care delivery system is hierarchical, just as the civilian system is. It is totally unrealistic to presume that the Navy could or should staff, fund, and outfit the dispensary at Glynco, Georgia, or McAlester, Oklahoma, on the same basis as it does the Naval Hospital at Bethesda or Memphis. Would the civilian community financially support a smaller version of the Johns Hopkins Hospital in place of the present hospital in Sleepy Eye, Minnesota? Of course not. If every community over-sophisticated its health care delivery facilities, the result would be proliferation of already skyrocketing costs and aggravation to the point of chaos of the already critical shortage of medical and paramedical personnel. Thus, there are no second-rate physicians in the Navy; rather, there are Navy physicians in locales where the population and requirements simply do not justify a sophisticated hospital. This is why we have the aeromedical evacuation system and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) program.
In reading Dr. Dully’s statements regarding dependents and dependent care, I found much that should cause chagrin to the thoughtful reader. He states that dependent care is rendered as a favor, not the fulfillment of a legal contractual obligation. This view is wrong. The Military Medical Benefits Amendments Act of 1966 states that a dependent may be given authorized medical and dental care in facilities of the uniformed services, subject to the availability of space and facilities and the capabilities of the medical and dental staff. Section 1077 states that the Secretary of Defense, to assure that health benefits are available for spouses and children of members of the uniformed services, shall contract for medical care for those persons under such insurance, medical service, or health plans as he considers appropriate. Thus, the Department of Defense has a clearly defined legal obligation to render care to dependents, in military medical facilities if possible, and by contract (the CHAMPUS program), if not. Dependent medical care is hardly a favor—it is part of our legal entitlement and compensation. The Hubbell Committee placed the value of medical care for most officers with families at $458, but medical benefits strike me as having much more value than that to the careerist.
Dr. Dully’s suggestion of a nuisance value fee of $2.00 for outpatient visits is incredible. Apparently, this suggestion stems from ire at those very few patients who abuse their rights by midnight visits with absurd complaints. These patients are generally condemned by all members of the Navy Medical Department, but the worst possible answer to any problem is to penalize all when only a few are to blame. Moreover, Dr. Dully is wrong in thinking that civilian doctors are not bothered with the same kind of problems. Doctors who charge $20.00 for a house call get roused out of bed for garbage complaints the same as Navy doctors. Moreover, there is little chance that the total number of outpatient visits would be reduced by a nuisance charge. As a civilian, I was at one time employed as a detail man for a pharmaceutical firm.
I seldom entered a doctor’s outer office that wasn’t packed with patients. Most doctors usually see a detail man as soon as he arrives, a practice which made me feel guilty when there were so many patients waiting. Expressing this to the doctors, a frequent reply was, “Don’t worry about it—most of them shouldn’t be here anyway.” It is almost axiomatic that once a patient decides a visit to the doctor is needed, neither rain, nor ice, nor snow, nor cost shall deter him. One sure result of a nuisance fee would be to tighten further the economic noose around the neck of married, lower-rated enlisted men. Anyway, can we imagine the monumental bookkeeping expenses and headaches (causing more outpatient visits) that would arise from collecting for six million outpatient visits by dependent and retired personnel each year?
As a Medical Service Corps (MSC) officer, I feel obligated to comment on Dr. Dully’s implication that the MSC officer takes leadership by default. In most medical organizations, the MSC officer is a division officer for hospital corpsmen as well as their supervisor in direct working relationship, a clear mandate to exercise leadership. The medical officer, on the other hand has a more indirect leadership responsibility, when not occupying a command or senior medical officer billet. In the normal working milieu of the majority of clinicians, the Nurse Corps officer exercises direct supervisory control and leadership of hospital corpsmen. Does Dr. Dully suggest a usurpation of the nurse’s leadership responsibilities? The more appropriate role for the medical officer is to exercise his leadership through the nurse.
Lieutenant Commander L. G. Walker, Medical Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve (Inactive)—I propose that the Medical Service Corps take over administration entirely, except at the highest levels in the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BuMed); that hospital corpsmen be upgraded in training and responsibility, relieving the medical officer of much routine work; that the doctor be responsible only for the care of patients and the accurate records of this care; and that the doctor be taken out of uniform except when in the field, in combat, while flying or afloat, or on other military operations.
I further suggest that the Navy, Army, and Air Force get out of the dependent care business. There is much talk about a national health insurance, similar to Medicare, for all age groups. The military should urge that its retired service men and dependents be used as a pilot group, and the program be adequately funded by Congress to pay their premiums. In this way, military dependents could obtain private medical care, and at the same time, provide needed statistical data on utilization and financial requirements of such a plan.
Lieutenant Commander Robert L. Bratman, Medical Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve—The entire system should be revamped. If we start with the logical premise that a physician exists to take care of patients, then we can proceed. All else then becomes secondary.
First, I would eliminate all rank if the Medical Corps. This should please the line officer, and, frankly, I am perfectly willing to flip a coin to see who gets in the boat first. Advancement in pay and type of assignment would be based on clinical experience and judgment by one’s peers as to how well one took care of patients. Residency appointments would be handled in a fashion similar to the manner they are in civilian hospitals, and gone would be the absurd situation where the staff man finds himself junior in military rank to his resident.
Second, the foolish requirement that forces experienced clinicians to retire into administration in order to continue in the Service would also be eliminated The billet of “commanding officer” would be removed in favor of “chief of medical staff” which post could be occupied by a practicing clinician as it is in civilian hospitals throughout the country. There is seemingly no reason why military hospitals cannot be administered by trained hospital administrators just as civilian facilities, while the business of the medical staff is handled by a medical executive committee with representatives of all hospital departments. Physicians who wished to specialize in administration could do so, but would compete directly with pure administrative personnel, just as they do as civilians. Hopefully, this would permit some crusty old experienced clinicians to continue seeing patients whereas now their only alternative is to retire to civilian practice or man a desk at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BuMed). Ancillary personnel could retain the present rate structure under administrative control of trained administrators.
Third, “Mickey Mouse” inspections that interfered with patient care would also be eliminated, and assessment of operational readiness of a medical department would be based on how well it took care of patients. Military inspections are all right for fighting units, I suppose, but keeping patients waiting while idle equipment and personnel are inspected by a disinterested inspecting officer, can only be condemned as a ludicrous farce.
Fourth, those far flung dispensaries, now under the aegis of the Ship Systems Command and Naval Air Systems Command should be given to the nearest military (and I say military, not naval) hospital and operated as satellite clinics by a rotating staff from the hospital. This would help that communication problem Dr. Dully mentions. Physicians for the “forces afloat” could be similarly supplied. Flight surgeons would be, I suppose, classified as specialists in aviation medicine with a minor in whatever other specialty they chose.
Finally, with regard to dependent and Wired medical care, I feel the present Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) program has done a great deal to solve this problem, but I would propose that the military provide health insurance for all its dependents and let them seek care where they will. This is not so unrealistic, for universal national compulsory health insurance is becoming more feasible with each day. Where military hospitals can (or must in order to provide a rounded training program) supply total health care facilities, they should. In essence, they should compete with civilian facilities offering similar care. For fiscal purposes, they could even bill and be paid a usual and customary fee for the service rendered, with the same patient deductible applying as does now under the CHAMPUS program. They might even be rated alongside similar institutions on delivery of health care.
My suggestions are probably as politically unrealistic as Dr. Dully’s “nuisance fee,” but there must be change, for, not until the military offers a physician an opportunity to advance in his chosen profession—satisfaction derived from taking care of people—will it attract and retain capable and interested personnel. The present system only breeds mediocrity and retains incapable and disinterested personnel.
I realize that our “time-honored and proven” operation is extremely resistant to change, so I offer as a starter the requirement that all medical officers see patients somewhere on a daily basis. (Much as aviators must fly in order to collect flight pay, and submariners submerge in order to collect undersea pay.) One can only imagine the effect on patient care and staff morale if the senior medical officer or the Surgeon General for that matter, got up from behind his desk and saw some patients. The idea that the system exists for its own perpetuation might change so that it could truly be of service to the population it represents.
Captain C. L. Waite, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Naval Medical School—While the article will do little to attract physicians toward a career in naval medicine, and may upset many in its candid attack on the abuse of dependent care, hopefully it also may serve a constructive purpose. That purpose is to develop a dialogue not only between our own medical department personnel, but also between the “line” Navy and the medical department.
I would remind the line officers that their medical department and its vigor and quality at any moment, is a reflection of their interest and attention. Too often, both are limited to criticism and related only to their immediate responsibilities. Many regard having a medical officer on board as a prerogative similar to having a gig or a steward. In the same vein, new medical officers frequently must report to a ship without adequate indoctrination or seasoning, because the commanding officer cannot tolerate a gap, sometimes for operational reasons. This same CO will give voice to the medical officer’s lack of Navy know-how, without realizing that he has a responsibility to help the new doctor “learn the ropes.”
The rest of the Navy must realize that unless they give proper attention to medical department resources, they will deteriorate. Just as surely as one cannot run a nuclear Navy on a "diesel budget,” we cannot deliver 1970 health care on a 1949 budget, using facilities built in the 1800s.
“The Art, Science, and Innocence Involved In Becoming Chief of Naval Operations”
(See J. N. Horrocks, Jr., pp. 18-33, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Admiral David L. McDonald, U. S. Navy (Retired)—On numerous occasions, during my tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, people expressed disbelief when rumor had informed them that my personal goal had never included serving as CNO. What then, they asked, had been my goal? And how did I attain this position without seeking it? Now that Captain Horrocks’ article has been published in the PROCEEDINGS I rather expect that many reading his article will ask themselves the same questions.
A one-time discussion of these questions in 1964 led one of my very capable assistants to suggest that I use a forthcoming appearance before the National Convention of The Navy League of the United States to discuss some of the things that had guided me during my career—my philosophy of life, as it were. He said that from being with me a great deal, hearing me express my views upon a great variety of things—both general and specific—he felt that he had come to know what my real goal could well have been, even though I might never have outlined it in specific terms.
We worked up a speech together along these lines and I delivered it before the National Convention held in Dallas, Texas, that year. Although the talk was “advertised” under several different titles, I simply stated to the audience that my personal goal was to live to be a “happy old man.” Today, I am more convinced than ever that keeping those three words, or their equivalents, before me has really motivated me most of my life, and that following such a philosophy was what enabled me to attain a position of great importance in my chosen profession even though it was one I had never sought. I am now submitting this talk—slightly modified—to the PROCEEDINGS because I believe that steering a similar course might be helpful to all who follow it:
To want to live to be a “happy old man” doesn’t sound like much of an ambition, does it? Yet the simplicity of it tends to make it completely deceptive. Offhand, it somehow suggests a witless, feeble old fellow nodding in the sun. But let us look a little deeper into these three words. What does it take for one to be a “happy old man?”
I think that everyone would agree that you could start out as a happy young idiot, grow into a grinning middle-aged boob, and wind up as a kind of happy old man. But this isn’t the kind I have always had in mind.
For those in responsible positions—and by this I mean responsible because of the education acquired, or business or military positions attained, responsibilities which voting citizenship imposes—growing to be happy old men implies a great deal more than simply vegetating into old age.
First, let's look at the word “old” and what is involved in it. To live out one’s allotted span of life, one’s health must be maintained. This means a self-imposed degree of moderation in food, drink, tobacco, and—not least of all—work. The first three items are self-explanatory, but perhaps moderation in work deserves some amplification.
The human machine was designed to absorb a great many different inputs to produce a great many different kinds of outputs. Thus, if the only input is work, and the only output is work, you are simply not using all the capabilities of the machine. You are, in fact, distorting the work output because the machine is starved of ingredients necessary to produce a balanced output. I think the human mechanism needs regular and substantial doses of sunshine, fresh air, exercise, mental stimulation, and diversion, and an occasional booster shot of belly laughs in good company.
Though this may sound like Lecture One of Basic Physiology, when we look at how some conduct their lives it gets a little more serious. Throughout our careers we have all had friends and acquaintances suffer heart attacks, some fatal, some fortunately mild. And how many times have we said, “he never took a day off;” “he was an indefatigible worker.” Though we, perhaps, have never been in a position to judge that these attacks were the sole result or direct result of overwork, we have probably never been in a position to say that they were not, either.
The whole point is that one is not going to live to be an old man unless attention is paid to the inputs into the valuable body. And, of course, the doubly tragic part of the whole thing is that when these unfortunate overloads happen, the work doesn’t get done, either. So I, for one, have always believed that one must get a fair share of sunshine, exercise, and mental diversion—not only to improve one’s longevity, but for the cold, hard purpose of getting the work done, and getting it done right. So, that is one aspect of growing to be an old man.
There is another important one which I, as a military man, could never ignore during the last 20-odd years of active duty. I could see absolutely no consistency in preserving my good health, only to have it cancelled by the blast effect, the thermal effect, or the radioactive from a nuclear disaster. No one’s good health or longevity would mean very much if we failed to prevent the outbreak of a catastrophic war. So, all who have the opportunity to do so, should concern themselves with the contribution which they might make to ensure our national ability to deter nuclear attack.
Military men, of course, usually have what some might call cold, impersonal military responsibilities for developing the strategies and military positions our country. They must, however, operate within the framework of welfare of their own immediate families, of a larger circle of friends and neighbors, and in the interest of all Americans, plus our foreign friends. Thus, the state of our military posture has a direct effect not only on one’s personal longevity, but also upon that of millions of men and women everywhere. Prevention of war through adequate military strength is therefore a prerequisite to living to be an old man.
If we assume good health and a substantially peaceful world for years to come, what is it going to take to make one not only an old man, but a happy one?
I will perhaps tread on philosophical ground here—ground on which I can be challenged by theologians, psychologists, sociologists, and all manner of informed critics. But once again, stripped of details, in my own mind I can reduce the quality of happiness to a very short idea. I am not speaking of the kind of happiness that comes with one-putting 17 greens, or from clipping coupons on tax-free bonds. I associate the happiness of which I am speaking with a word I used earlier—responsibility.
Some of our responsibilities are large, specific, and identifiable. Others are more varied, less well-defined, and perhaps even abstract or intangible. But sooner or later, we are all faced with the question of how we meet our responsibilities. The important point is not how great was the responsibility, or did we seek it, or did we try to avoid it—the real point is, how did we discharge it?
Can it be said that loyalty to superior authority is inconsistent with a responsibility to make one’s own views candidly known? In a narrow sense, I think one might say yes, there are specific instances in which contradictory views might be viewed as a kind of disloyalty. But the very fact that an inconsistency might exist between these two values makes it one’s job to see that neither is subordinated to the other. To this end, I think one has a responsibility to speak out and make his views known when appropriate. And most of all, one must give frank, direct, and truthful answers to questions posed by proper authorities. I have always kept in mind the saying, “Always tell the truth and you’ll never have to remember what you said.” I do not see how one could possibly be a happy old man unless he had a clear conscience in this respect.
In eras of rapid change, preserving the status quo is often considered old fashioned and reactionary, and thus not too popular. And yet, there are certain important areas in which the status quo means a bit more than just absence of change. Perhaps to some extent I have always leaned toward the status quo, and certainly have not advocated change just for the sake of change.
Man has been called a “political animal,” and although men in uniform are not active participants in politics, I have always thought that as citizens it is appropriate for us to express a general view. When the time comes for me to cast my last ballot, I want it to be under the same conditions as when I cast my first; i.e., no change. I have always been impressed by the political philosophy and social progress which enables one to progress on his own merits. I have never felt any sense of being old fashioned for advocating the status quo for this kind of opportunity. I would not like what one might call an homogenized society in which every little globule of humanity was made identical to every other. To the contrary, the rewards for excellence must be those which will encourage initiative, justify risks, and promote imagination.
I have also always seen in military responsibilities a vehicle for the preservation of the status quo in another important area—that of freedom of worship. The right to freely enter the church of one’s choice is secure only so long as Fascist and Communist influences do not dominate our country. The Armed Services, along with many other forces in America, seek to prevent domination, and, therefore, to preserve freedom of worship.
While I have said that adequate military strength is a prerequisite for a long and happy life, there is another facet of our military strength. We know that our military power is the shadow of our industrial and economic power. We know there is an intricate relationship between our defense appropriations, the nation’s gross national product, the state of the national budget, the rate of economic growth, and the tax structure. Many people feel that the military recommend certain appropriations as though the money did not belong to them. Here again is a circumstance of two aspects. I never made a recommendation for an expenditure which I did not think was essential to meet military requirements. I have always had the same interest in a sound and stable economy as any other citizen. Military men live their lives within our society, not apart from it. They, too, are tax-paying citizens.
Expenditures for military strength must be appropriate to the soundness and vitality of our economy. I do not believe one can live to be a happy man, if he has to live with the knowledge that he had contributed in any way to the weakening of our country’s economic or industrial base.
In summary, there is quite a bit more to becoming a “happy old man” in this world than merely staying alive. And when we do become old men, we will have lost most of our capacity to do things. We cannot wait until then to find out if we have made the grade. If we wish to see, in the future, the kind of world in which we can be happy men, we must lay the foundation as we go along. We must impress upon our children, their children, and all young people with whom we work, that we really do not live in a world we never made. In a real sense, the world is what we make it. The only point is whether or not we aim high enough and work well enough. A most worthy goal for anyone is to discharge one’s individual responsibilities in a way which will best ensure that he will ultimately become a “happy old man.”
"Our Precarious Force Balance”
(See J. A. Winnefield, pp. 97-98, March 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Wayne Hughes, Jr., U. S. Navy—The March PROCEEDINGS annually contains the Naval Institute’s Prize Essay. This year, however, the best essay from my point of view, was written by Commander Winnefield and published in the Comment and Discussion section of the magazine.
Commander Winnefield makes his point both eloquently and concisely. Once again, we have to be concerned that we have adequate control of the seas before we enjoy the luxury of exploiting the seas.
Commander Winnefield’s explanation of why there is now the danger of a force imbalance merits careful reading. He discusses some rather subtle effects stemming from the change in the process of defense decision-making that have occurred under the present Secretary of Defense (not the reduction in gross defense spending, which is anything but subtle). He might have included more background to good effect. For example, how, at the end of World War II, the Navy was without an opponent and in search of a new mission; how we found it in the concept of projecting seapower over the land—first, with carrier striking forces and next with Polaris submarines when strategic deterrence was in vogue; most recently with emphasis on amphibious lift when flexible response was stressed.
While our eyes were turned toward the land, Soviet seapower grew. For all Mahan’s emphasis on the distinction between control of the seas and guerre de course, he may have missed the other distinction: between forces that control the seas and forces that project military power from the seas. Samuel Huntington deserves the most credit for articulating that distinction, describing for us what the Navy of the 1950s was doing.* But every student of naval history, Mahan or otherwise, has prophesied the pervasiveness of sea power’s influence over events ashore, whatever the tactical radius of the weapons of the age.
*See S. P. Huntington. “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," U. S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, May 1954, pp 485-493.
"The U. S. Coast Guard: Where Do We Go From Here?”
(See L A. White, pp. 48-53, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander William C Vaught, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—Commander White’s article would prompt me, if I had the time, to rebut with an essay entitled, Why Should We Go Anywhere From Here—Again Yet?
Essays, being out of my line of work as an educator and a Coast Guard Reservist, must give way to random rcactions to the Commander’s hypothesis.
Commander White’s first paragraph asserts that the principal mission of the Guard is “. . . safeguarding the mariner.” This no one would deny. Almost no reference is made, however, in the balance of the article concerning our military mission and its place of importance in the scheme of things. Need we remind anyone of the statute that transfers the Coast Guardsmen into the Navy in time of war, or remind them of the rammed submarines, the captured saboteurs, the convoy escorts, or the Marines we shuttled into the beaches—or, even now, remind them of the sightings, boardings, and sinkings off the coast of Vietnam? We are also, and perhaps equally so, a military outfit, and wish to remain as such. In fact, Admiral Mark Whalen, addressing a large group of trainees in Yorktown, Virginia, in 1967, assured them that one consideration remained uppermost in the deliberations on Capitol Hill, which culminated in joining with the Department of Transportation (DoT)—that consideration: We would remain a military organization. That’s why we have a Readiness Branch. That’s why we have a Ready Reserve of 15,000 men. That’s why we have a mobilization plan, and there are many other “whys” which are classified.
Commander White’s guarded, but nonetheless discernable thrust, appears to point the Coast Guard in the direction of whatever bandwagon can do us the most good in terms of: attract budgetary attention, add about $1 billion a year, rewards both professionally and personally, conglomerate with customers, marine resources, engineering development, marine sciences, and funds to implement a marine program. We, in the field, have no quarrel with the notion that the Coast Guard (Regular and Reserve), needs more financial support. We are concerned, however, that the impression has been laid on that a majority of our members share the Commander’s enthusiasm toward a mission-emphasis of science, research, engineering, technology, subsidies, grants, trust funds, and project funds. However, this is not so.
We have just been through one gigantic, and occasionally disheveling changeover to the Department of Transportation, and most of us would appreciate the opportunity to play a few seasons with that team before the league is restructured all over again.
“Retention: The High Cost of Leaving”
(See J. R. Fredland, pp. 44-47, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander A. J. Ashurst, U. S. Navy—In response to Dr. Fredland’s invitation to discuss his proposals, the following is offered.
The recommendation to limit the accumulation of unused annual leave to a maximum of 180 days would undoubtedly be of some value to enlisted men since it would mean a greater payoff at the end of enlistment. To the junior officer getting out of the service, it would provide a greater release bonus. After all, we do increase the incentive for junior officers to leave the Navy by providing travel pay, leave pay, etc., and in many cases this is a significant consideration running into thousands of dollars.
Increasing the accumulated leave allowance would then further enhance the incentive to leave the service. On the other hand, I must agree that re-evaluation of the Navy’s leave policy is sorely needed.
A basic annual leave period of 45 days would permit all career personnel to arrive at the 180-day level more expeditiously, thereby decreasing the time lag in losing leave. And, after all, loss of leave has proven itself to be somewhat of a status symbol. In counter argument the increase to 45 days per annum does make sense if you can get it, or you get paid for excess. A midyear bonus would be most helpful for vacations or getting the kids ready for school.
Professor Fredland advocates a policy of granting an additional three months of leave (in addition to leave normally accrued) at full pay, or an additional six months at half pay approximately every seven years to every career officer and every enlisted man in the pay status E-4 or higher. At the end of seven years, an officer is on the threshold of lieutenant commander and an enlisted man nears chief petty officer. (How many career E-4s do we have with seven years’ service? How many do we want?) At this stage of the career pattern, can the Navy afford to let them go for three to six months with perhaps another 180 days they have accumulated? Unless there has been a drastic change, in the last two years, the Navy can’t even fill the classes at the Naval War College because of “operational requirements.” If education takes a back seat, how can leave expect to pre-empt? The second seven-year period presents an even more interesting situation. The officer is at or near the commander level, while the enlisted man is probably a chief petty officer or at least an E-6. Contemplate the ramifications of permitting one-seventh of that group go for three months to a year.
And what would happen if the Navy were to allow any officer up to four years of leave without pay at any time in his career after his first term of required service, with loss of seniority on the promotion list equal to one half of his unpaid leave? First, a junior officer does not resign his commission as a general rule; rather, he is released to inactive duty in the reserves. As such, he is still an officer in the Navy and his naval career is not finished. Second, and speaking from personal experience, many officers do leave the service to return at a later date. In my case, it was just over a year, in others it was as much as two to three years. Third, many officers did not lose seniority, and had seniority loss been a requirement, a significant decrease in returnees would have occured [sic]. Discussions with others in my category indicate this is a general feeling. Time toward retirement was lost and, since retirement is predicated entirely upon time in service, such a “penalty” was accepted as reasonable and just. Fourth, most officers now have three to five years’ obligated service upon commissioning. To permit an officer an additional four years to make up his mind appears excessive, since he would be well behind his year group in either experience or knowledge. The Navy of today is a full time occupation responding on an almost daily basis to a changing technology and environment. Gaps in an officer’s career are critical and, as the gap increases, so does the criticality. I found that after one year of “leave without pay” I had a difficult time catching up—and that was at the lieutenant (j.g.) level. At the senior lieutenant or junior lieutenant commander level, such a task could prove to be monumental, at least for a general line officer. Professor Fredland’s corresponding reform for enlisted men may have more merit, though problems in the highly technical rates could well be expected.
It appears to me as a professional naval officer, that there are more important retention factors to which we could allocate our scarce resources than to increased leave and liberty. As a counter proposal to “more time off,” might I suggest, as a more lucrative alternative, the area of education. I must admit that it was surprising that the word “education” was conspicuous by its absence in Professor Fredland’s article. Even in our hedonistic society, education still retains favorable status. In fact, next to “money,” “going back to school” stands very high on the “get out” list for both officers and enlisted men. The increased economic potential represented by higher education is obvious; however, education in itself also inherently represents a significant status symbol in our society. The Navy has, I feel, not exploited fully the dual benefits of education represented by the commonality of objectives of both the Navy and individuals. Programs now in existence- postgraduate school (PG), associate degree completion program (ADCOP), Naval War College—are of insufficient magnitude, and the upgrading of inhouse educational institutions is required. Every career officer should be given the opportunity to attain a postgraduate degree in any area of education that contributes to Navy objectives. There are very few areas that do not. The wherewithal to do this in the form of funds and time should be the Navy’s responsibility, while the eligibility for and attainment of degree should fall to the individual.
The same type of philosophy should apply to enlisted men under ADCOP and extensive undergraduate programs. Particular emphasis should be placed upon the area of management education. Officers—commissioned, warrant, and petty—are primarily managers, and managerial education, especially personnel-oriented education, must by its very nature enhance the effectiveness of the individual and the Navy. Better “people managers” can only result in better retention.
With regard to the inhouse educational institutions, a constant upgrading is required. The Naval War College has made significant progress in the past few years; however, certification at the master’s level for both U. S. resident courses should be the immediate goal with doctoral certification for the senior course being an ultimate goal. Additionally, continuous review of the Naval Academy and the PG School are required to maintain responsiveness to the changing environment and technology.
In summary, “more time off” does not appear to be the best alternative for our limited resources after an adequate wage incentive is provided and the simple creature comfort requirements are met. There are many other possibilities—housing, rotation, separations, promotions, and the like. Each must be analyzed in the light of overall objectives, both organizational and personal. Education must be included on this list and it, at least in my opinion, far outranks “more time off” as an effective choice.
Aviation Maintenance Administrationman Second Class Richard L. Baron. U. S. Navy—Despite a very expensive enlisted retention program an increasing number of five-year to eight-year enlisted men are leaving the Service for the apparent advantages of civilian life.
One reason, as Mr. Fredland points out, is the spiraling of civilian wage levels compared to Navy pay. Regardless of the retirement, medical programs, and Navy Exchange privileges, the opportunities for advancement and education available to the serviceman, the average enlisted man looks at his civilian counterparts and sees a plumber making approximately $8.00 an hour, an electrician making somewhat more than that; a welder, who can make anywhere from $3.90 to $4.22 an hour; a commercial aircraft handler or maintenance man making from $2.85 to $4.00 per hour; plus time-and-a-half for overtime.
The intrinsic securities of military life still cannot overcome the psychological fact that the civilian has, or seems to have, more take-home spending money than the Navy man at similar age and occupation levels.
Another, and important, problem is the increasing feeling that the Navy is stifling the enlisted man's “personal liberty,” and providing nothing in return. This is prevalent primarily among the younger, first-enlistment Navy men who are strongly affected by the current social atmosphere in this country. These men tend to think in terms of the abstract, though they may not realize it. The form is usually, “What would I be doing if I were not in . . . ?”
Many enlisted men seem to see a breakdown in the system. There is a distinct decline in the pride-in-work attitude, especially since there has been an increase in the feeling that branch and division officers are not as concerned with their work center personnel as they should be. This is perhaps more prevalent in aviation units, where officers both fly and serve as branch and division heads. Similarly, there is the feeling that the Navy is no longer a military organization, but a collection of trade guilds in which belonging to the right guild can bring more “awaiting work” and liberty time.
As Mr. Fredland points out, there is also a distinct factor in the area of social psychology. The military man, especially the enlisted man, feels like a second-class citizen. If any would deny this, let him put a sailor in uniform in downtown Jacksonville or Charleston, or almost any other big Navy town. No matter how complete the surface courtesy, one can feel the undercurrents of this demeaning attitude held by the local populace.
That same uniformed sailor, walking the streets of his home town, away from Navy-occupied areas, will be erect, smartly turned out, and prideful. The civilians look upon him as someone doing something for his country, because these areas are not saturated with Navy uniforms and their “inconveniences.” This is true of any branch of the U. S. Armed Forces.
It is difficult for me to recall the last time someone among those I work closely with said that he joined the Navy to serve his country. Perhaps this, too, is a problem area. It is also an indication. From avoiding the draft to the need for a change of scenery, of all the reasons for enlistment, how many enlisted men indicate that they volunteered for patriotic reasons? And even if this were the reason, how many are not too shy to admit it?
The fact is, the idea of national service, the desire to defend one’s country, and all the connotations of the word “patriotism,” no longer seem to have the effect they once did. It appears to be an outmoded concept. Historians have been killing the idea of nationalism for years; perhaps patriotism has gone the same way. Thus Mr. Fredland’s last paragraph his conclusion, is substantially correct. The concept of wage increase as an incentive might serve as a retentive device. However, is this, and similar concepts, enough to ensure that the Navy will continue to get the best possible men for the job? Say that the wage increase, or the leisure time idea, are not enough. What could help?
A return to that “outmoded” patriotism might be valuable. It doesn’t have to be of the rampant, rabid variety. For example, aside from what they learned in a couple of hours in recruit training, very few enlisted men of any rank are aware of the history of the U. S. Navy, with its close and valuable connections to the history and development of this nation. In my experience, there is very little training in this area.
There is an inordinate amount of time spent telling enlisted men to wear their uniforms proudly, but little is done to explain why they should, and what association their uniforms hold for the nation. Other areas can be bolstered by attentive training, and through this process the younger enlisted men might gain a sense of history and purpose. There is also much aimlessness connected with being an enlisted man.
There is an extremely heavy emphasis in the recruiting program on “learning a skill for civilian life.” The recruiting folders are full of jobs that one can apply for after training in the Navy. If we want a volunteer force with a high percentage of re-enlistments, perhaps we might stop dangling the wrong carrots. After all, we ought to be emphasizing the values of the Navy in and of itself, and not advertising ourselves as a transit stop between high school and maturity.
But, perhaps all of these things can serve as no more than temporary stopgaps. Until the Service can provide its men with measures of real psychological, social, and material value, the strength of solid esprit de corps, a sense of the elite, the Navy might continue as it is.
“The Eight-Inch Gun Cruiser”
(See R. F. Rockwell, pp. 119-121, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander Wayne J. Smith, U. S. Navy, Weapons Officer, USS Newport News (CA-148)—I concur on the usefulness of a third turret. The fact that the USS Newport News (CA-148) was never hit during several hundred strikes on Operation “Sea Dragon,” can be partially attributed to counterbattery fire from the 8-inch, 50-caliber rapid fire guns of Turret 3 (located aft). During one gun duel with enemy shore batteries, over 250 rounds were fired from Turret 3.
The situation after the bombing halt and termination of active “Sea Dragon” operations was somewhat different than that described by Commander Rockwell. The entire gunfire effort was directed below the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Naval gunfire was almost exclusively spotted indirect fire. The number of rounds expended on unspotted harrassing-and-interdiction (H-and-I) fire was sharply reduced and counterbattery fire was nonexistent. There were fewer targets near the coast and the extra range of the 8-inch gun became more important. The role of the 8-inch gun in this environment evolved from that of the high volume saturation weapon to a highly accurate artillery piece.
From a fire control standpoint, the increased accuracy became particularly challenging. All steps such as alignment, proper transmission, all tests within specs were basic to the problem and had been accomplished previously. Additional steps were taken, however, such as biasing adjustment so that virtually no error existed in the computers for the geographic direction in which firing was expected to be conducted. As experience was gained with this type of firing, it was found that while in certain areas, such as the vicinity of the DMZ, it was necessary to correct for even a small error in the master gyrocompass. Data was kept on each call for fire mission. An analysis of the initial corrections and salvo errors revealed strong grounds for doubting the veracity of stargauging as a gunwear measure. Bore erosion gauge readings (BEGR) on the other hand, appeared to provide gun wear data which yielded initial velocity losses which were in close agreement with those actually observed. Equivalent service rounds data tracked quite closely with that of the BEGR. Initial velocity calculations were made about six times daily for all gun batteries, or more often if a significant number of rounds were fired.
All of the nitpicking corrections meant nothing, however, if equipment failure occured [sic] during any phase of a gunfire support mission. The reduced tempo of operations caused relatively long periods between missions. There was an increased chance for preventive maintenance on the equipment, but there was also an increased chance for a casualty to occur. This necessitated that all critical points in system transmission be rapidly checked, just prior to a firing mission. It was necessary to check, manually, the calculations of all the computers.
The challenge to push system accuracies to their designed limits, gave the men manning them great confidence in both the equipment and their own capabilities. The use of the systems for multiple, independent, simultaneous missions was not uncommon.
It has long been recognized that there is a strong need for a modern large-caliber, long-range gun and accompanying fire control system, as noted by Commander Rockwell. Full use of the experience gained in Vietnam must be made in designing these new systems. There is a general awareness of major caliber gun systems’ limitations and capabilities in gunfire support and surface interdiction roles. Little work has ever been done, however, in determining how well these weapons can perform against aircraft and airbreathing missiles. It is naive to believe that any commanding officer, who has a long-range weapon, such as the major caliber gun on his ship, will not try to use it against all types of targets including air targets. Hence, it would seem reasonable that this capability should be designed into the new system. If not, we will fall into the same trap as the Boston’s main battery design.
It will, of course, be some time before new major caliber gun systems appear, in quantity, within the Fleet, so it would be prudent to closely examine how the present gun systems could be upgraded.
By pushing the gun systems we now have to their designated limits and beyond, we can provide the test beds to develop the new gun systems.
“The Never-Never Sea”
(See D. Luehring, pp. 142-146, August 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant William R. Dailey, U. S. Navy, Patrol Squadron 30— Lieutenant Commander Luehring’s flight has served to spotlight a long neglected area of antisubmarine warfare (ASW), one which has been given tremendously added significance by the transit of the super-tanker SS Manhattan across the Northwest Passage and the parallel discovery of huge oil reserves along the northern coast of Alaska. Assuming the opening of a commercially feasible Northwest Passage during the next decade, predicted by the backers of the Manhattan project, the strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean Basin will be increased immeasurably.
The ability of the U. S. Navy routinely to conduct ASW and ASW surveillance in the Arctic regions will be of primary importance in ensuring that the full military and commercial advantages of this new route will be realized by the free world. As Lieutenant Commander Luehring points out, however, the present “. . . experience of fleet units in the never-never sea is minuscule.” As is also made clear, the ability of the long-range ASW aircraft “. . . to operate effectively in almost any area of the globe,” and the restrictions placed on surface ASW units by the polar ice pack mark the ASW aircraft as one of the prime elements of Arctic ASW operations.
The P3 Orion aircraft flown by Lieutenant Commander Luehring is presently the mainstay of U. S. Navy long-range air ASW (VP) forces, and as such is the the aircraft most likely to be employed in any future Arctic ASW situations. The level of experience among VP crews in Arctic operations, however, is presently very low. An excellent step toward remedy of this situation would be an exercise in which one or several nuclear submarines operating in the Arctic Ocean were deployed against a squadron of P3 aircraft. In addition to providing invaluable experience in Arctic flying conditions to the air crews involved, such an exercise would serve to identify and define ASW problem areas unique to the Arctic. It would also yield an immense amount of much needed information of what would be termed the “basic research” variety in the scientific community.
Besides illustrating the peculiarities of long-range navigation described by Lieutenant Commander Luehring, other areas to be explored by the exercise would include problems encountered in high latitudes with the precise small area navigation required in air ASW; performance and reliability of detection and weapons systems in the Arctic environment; the feasibility of current tactics in ice-covered seas; the development of new tactics; and the suitability and availability of current bases to support sustained ASW operations—to name a few.
The opening of a Northwest Passage is an event of such historic significance that the strategic implications cannot be ignored. It is hoped that, like the voyage of the Manhattan in opening a new ocean to commerce. Lieutenant Commander Luehring’s flight will be the first step in a program designed to give U. S. Navy’s ASW forces the same ability to operate freely in the Arctic that is enjoyed in the other oceans.
Readers may be interested in the experience of the author’s former squadron in operating P3 navigation systems in latitudes above 70 degrees North. While conducting ice reconnaissance in the northern half of Baffin Bay (between 70 and 75 degrees North), the aircrafts’ Litton LN-2C Inertial Navigation Systems were operated in their normal modes on numerous low altitude flights, averaging eight hours in length. Except for rapidly changing longitude counters, no significant degradation of normal navigation information supplied by the system was observed. On at least one occasion, an aircraft was flown to Latitude 83 degrees North with its inertial system in its normal mode supplying accurate navigation information the entire flight. So long as regular deviation checks were made, no difficulties were encountered. Squadron navigators considered using grid navigation, but found it to be unnecessary.
“The United States Effective Control Fleet”
(See S. W. Emery, pp. 158-177, May 1970 PROCEEDINGS, NAVAL REVIEW ISSUE)
Breck P. McAllister, Chairman, American Committee for Flags of Necessity—Congratulations should go to Lieutenant (j.g.) Emery for an objective and penetrating article on the U. S. effective control fleet. In arriving at a computerized validation of the “effective control exercised by the Departments of Defense and Navy over U. S.-owned Liberian and Panamanian ships, he has, in his own words, put the “theory into practice” in an assumed full-mobilization wartime crisis with a two-ocean demand for ships, taking into account crew loyalty and flag registry.
The authentication of the principle was arrived at by mathematically programming known facts into the computer. This is in sharp contrast to the loosely constructed and factually unsupported approach to effective control by Dr. John J. Clark in his article entitled “Flags of Whose Convenience?” which appeared in the October 1968 issue of Proceedings.
Had space permitted, Lieutenant (j-g) Emery might have mentioned that members of the American Committee For Flags of Necessity also own and operate almost half of the tankers under the U. S. flag. As such, these American companies have been more than aware of the inability of U. S. flag tankers and bulk cargo ships to compete successfully in international trade because of exceedingly high construction, labor, and other operating costs.
During the past two decades, members of the executive branch of government, including top Defense and Navy officials, have maintained that the U. S.-owned effective control fleet can, in times of emergency, be counted on to continue serving the raw materials import trades they now serve. Lieutenant (j.g.) Emery’s analytical study has confirmed this fact.
As the former Trident Scholar correctly points out, 50 per cent of our members’ ships are crewed by Italian licensed and unlicensed personnel, with ships manned by British and Spanish seamen coming next, all receiving higher wages than their own national standard. These men are not “cheap” labor, but the cream of the crop drawn from maritime countries of long and respected tradition, and possessing a loyalty born out of mutual respect between employee and company over many years. A goodly number of Italian officers, for instance, have completed 20 years’ service on board the ships of various member companies.
In terms of crew loyalty, the computerized analysis cited in the article establishes once and for all the fact that there has never been a single instance in which a crewmember of a U. S. effective control ship has refused to sail cargo to Vietnam. This is important in view of recurring inferences to the contrary made by U. S. maritime unions and other misinformed critics.
Although the article does not deal with the mathematically-based study until its virtual conclusion, it is apparent that most of Lieutenant (j.g.) Emery’s earlier findings are based on that study. Moreover, it is especially significant that a naval officer, currently in active service, and, evidently, deeply concerned about the logistic support needed by our country in times of all-out emergency, should seek to establish an objective basis—in his words, “. . . the first analytical basis for future effective control policy decisions.” His use of a computer puts future arguments, for or against the idea, on a no-nonsense basis. If you argue with a computer, you’ve got to argue facts.
Supplying facts about effective control has been one of the primary jobs of the American Committee for Flags of Necessity for the past 11 years. So it is gratifying to have Lieutenant (j.g.) Emery and his computer verify what we and, far more importantly, the Department of Defense and Navy, have been saying all along: U. S. effective control vessels are an integral part of the nation’s sealift mobilization plans and constitute an American-controlled source of transportation of bulk materials which are essential to the nation’s economy and defense industries.
“Escort-of-Convoy, Still the Only Way”
(See R. A. Bowling, pp. 46-56, December 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Thomas D. McGrath, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I cannot fully subscribe to Captain Bowling’s thesis, and consider that its acceptance would restrict ASW strategy to a dangerously narrow approach. The reasons for my reservation include:
The lessons of the past are valid only if it can be demonstrated that the projected circumstances of a future conflict will correspond to those obtaining in the past.
In the article no assumptions as to the conditions of the projected conflict are given. Without these the validity of the conclusion is difficult to assess.
Many of the statements which are stated as axiomatic appear to be really opinions.
The article appears to be based on the premise that there are only two alternatives in ASW, offensive “search and destroy” or escort of convoy. There may be other options.
These reservations lead to a number of questions:
In both World Wars, the ASW campaigns were conducted only as part of the war as a whole. The sea war was never really brought to a conclusion, but was terminated by defeat of the enemy on land. Is it possible in these days of limited wars to postulate an antisubmarine war in which the homelands will not be attacked?
To an extent in World War I and certainly in World War II, one of the major factors in Allied success was the capability to replace losses. Will this apply in the future?
The submarine opponent in the past was a semi-submersible of limited submerged capabilities. Now, and in the future, it is a true submersible with little need to operate on the surface. This would favor the escort-of-convoy concept if the opponent’s primary weapon is a conventional torpedo. Will this be so?
Will shipping and naval forces be the target? Submarines exist whose missions are destruction of land targets. Escort-of-convoy has little application in this case.
What will be the opponent’s weapons in the hypothesized conflict? If torpedoes, the escort of convoy strategy may be applicable. If the weapons are missiles, especially if warheads of area destruction are used, convoys would seem to offer attractive targets.
The possible opponent has large naval forces and merchant fleets. If it should be necessary to conduct an antisubmarine war and an anti-shipping war would the convoy escort concept be affected?
Can a submarine be used effectively in escort-of-convoy or will the noise field of a convoy coupled with the speed necessary to maintain station deteriorate a submarine’s effectiveness to an unacceptable degree?
My own conclusion is that an ASW strategy based on any single concept will lead to disaster. ASW strategy must be based on imposing attrition on the opposition at bases if possible, in the approaches thereto (where he is constrained by hydography [sic] and geography), in transit, and at his target. We must plan to use mines, submarines, aircraft, and surface forces to accomplish this, in the most effective combinations and most favorable locations.
I am sure Admiral Ernest J. King would, today, change his statement to, ". . . escort is not just one way of handling the submarine menace, it [was the only way in World War II] . . . .”
Admired Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Bowling’s article omits a significant and successful escort-of-convoy operation carried out in the North Atlantic under U. S. Navy command and direction—the operations of the Support Force. It was commanded initially by Rear Admiral Arthur Bristol, and subsequently by Rear Admiral Roland Brainerd.
Significance and success are attested by a Distinguished Service Medal citation, which I quote in part for purposes of ready documentation:
. . . as Operations Officer and later as Chief of Staff, Support Force, Task Force TWENTY FOUR, United States Atlantic Fleet during the period March 3, 1941 to April 17, 1942 . . . the escort-of-convoy instructions which resulted in the notable record of the safe escort of over two thousand ships with a loss of only eight ships, and the development of escort tactics which have proved highly effective in combating the submarine menace . . . .
For the President
(s) Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy
The 17 April 1942 date coincided with the date of Admiral Bristol’s death, subsequent to which he was awarded the medal posthumously. Why, then, was this notable U. S. Navy record overlooked by Captain Bowling? Undoubtedly for reasons on which I can shed some light.
President Roosevelt was convinced that the sinking of war supplies from “The Arsenal of Democracy” must be stopped, even though the word “convoy” was anathema to U. S. public opinion in 1940 and early 1941. The upshot of that conviction was the secret organizing of a special protection-of-shipping force, given the nondescriptive designation of Support Force.
At the President’s direction, ships and planes were assigned, and funds made available for outfitting and training. Bristol’s chosen staff reported in January and early February 1941. The Chief of Staff, Captain Louis Denfeld, negotiated for base sites; material matters were assigned to Commander Fred W. Pennoyer, Jr.; and I was charged with planning and training. Admiral Bristol remained in Washington to oversee financial and other policy matters. Material for the various selected bases was assembled at, and shipped from Quonset Point so circumspectly that even Admiral King’s staff remained uninformed.
The Force operations progressed from training in home waters, through a period of antisubmarine surveillance and tracking, to the assumption of operational command of the escort of the convoys sailing between Halifax and the Western Approaches CHOP line in September 1941. The Operation Order for that assumption of command was unique, in that it emanated from a neutral-nation commander, addressed to a mixed force of neutrals and belligerents, for the purpose of countering the operations of a belligerent nation with which the United States was not at war.
The basic theory of the Support Force ASW tactics was the occupying by our escorts of the trailing and firing positions essential for enemy surveillance and attack. Depending on range, patrol aircraft were an important pan of the team. “Kills” were few, but the ships and supplies went through, and that was the main objective. At this point. Captain Bowling and the reader must be wondering why the Support Force story seems to have been lost in the shuffle. The reasons are obscure, but some good surmises can be made.
Admiral Bristol was insistent that all records—messages and the like—be destroyed when an operation had been completed. We on the staff believed that he was following Presidential instructions, as a way of keeping the secrecy lid on an operation that did not yet have public-opinion approval. Consequently, the Force records were sketchy at best.
After the war, several efforts were made to prepare a complete and authentic story of the Support Force, but in each instance roadblocks were encountered. On one occasion, I was told, orally, that publishing would adversely affect world opinion as to the integrity of U. S. avowals of neutrality during the period prior to Pearl Harbor.
It may also be that comparison of the Support Force results, vis-à-vis the Atlantic Coast holocaust, would not make good reading. Whatever the reason, or reasons, the Support Force story does not jump out of the archives demanding the attention of historians and researchers.
From the Support Force view, a footnote can be added to Captain Bowling’s account of the U-Boats’ “Happy Times” on our East Coast and also in the Caribbean area.
As we in the Support Force read of the shipping slaughter on the East Coast, we were convinced that the local approach to shipping protection was technically unsound and invited disaster—escorts assigned on a Naval District basis; shipping passed along from one District to another; escorts assigned, at times, on a one-for-one basis. We believed that the Support Force system, organized on a major-area through-escort basis, would significantly cut the coastal losses. However, the suggestions of our emissaries obviously required Departmental study—a process which takes time.
When the U-boats resorted to night surface attacks, radar was obviously needed. When the Bureau of Ships was unable to promise early delivery of suitable equipment, the Support Force stall wangled 13 sets of airborne radar from the R.A.F., modified it as best we could, and installed it in our escorting destroyers. It was unsophisticated equipment, but tided us over, somewhat, until U. S. sets were available.
By way of epilogue, let me repeat that up until the 17 April 1942, the Support Force escorted over 2,000 ships with a loss of only eight ships. Later, the Battle of the Atlantic waxed and waned, but the Support Force record deserves a good place in ASW history.