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The battles of Lexington and Saratoga marked, respectively, the beginning and the beginning of the end, of the Revolutionary War. So, too, did their namesakes come to mark a new beginning—a fresh start for American aircraft carriers after the “entirely inadequate” Langley—and the beginning of the end for the battleship.
In an attempt to help secure an end to war, the delegations at the Conference on the Limitation of Armament—convened in Washington, D. C., the day after Armistice Day 1921—insisted upon severe restrictions for capital ships.
A new warship, a ship that carried aeroplanes, had put to sea during World War I. But, because the aircraft carrier was still considered in the experimental classification, the delegates felt little compelled to place crippling limits on them.
Thus, the outcome of these historic disarmament negotiations was not the prevention of war but, rather, a certification of the new weapons with which a war of the future surely would be fought.
At the same time the U. S. Congress was authorizing American participation in this disarmament conference, new smoke was being made upon the naval horizon. During June and July, bombing tests had been carried out against target ships varying in size from a captured German submarine to old German and American battleships. Navy and Army airmen sank the smaller vessels quickly; the German battleship Ostfriesland stubbornly stayed afloat. But the last efforts of Billy Mitchell’s Martin and Handley-Page bombers sank her with heavy bombs specially made to demonstrate the potential of airpower against capital ships.
There were those who thought they heard, in Mitchell’s explosions, the death-knell of seapower.
Many naval eyes, however, saw instead a new course to be taken. In August 1921, the Navy’s Joint Board of Aviation and Ordnance Tests, had this to say about the effects of aircraft on future naval construction:
If heavier-than-air craft are to be effective in naval [warfare] they must have greater
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mobility . . . obtained by providing rn° bases, i.e., aircraft carriers.
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operations practicable. ^
Even in the present state of develop111 the aircraft carrier, as exemplified by ^ Argus of the British Navy, is a type essentia the highest efficiency of the fleet.
The Board still felt that battleships ' ^ the greatest factor in naval strength! js concluded by pointing out that these proved,
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. . . the necessity for aircraft carriers 01 .
maximum size and speed to supply our . with the offensive and defensive power aircraft provide.
on the advisory committee to the A®e5jav)' delegation, wrote to Secretary of the 1 Edwin Denby that no “additional cons
Board. This statement indicated a
th«
United States must be free to immedin1^.
Board report and the General Board the tude shows that the Navy clearly saw f importance of airpower. The pro-caI, ,
position of the most prominent Amerl naval advisors at the Arms Conference shaf ly focuses this picture. Foreseeing the p g
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In October 1921, Admiral W. L.
tion of importance except in airplane ^
riers” was envisioned by the Navy Gen
ness to accept capital ship restrictions at
upcoming Arms Conference; however,^jv
lay down two carriers which Rodgers t ( dieted could be completed by 1928. The
of aviation within the battlefleet, the k •
Navy did not intend to trail in the wake _ other nations in carrier development. Th fore, their naval advisors persuaded the An1 ican delegation to ensure only inode1'
lQns upon carriers. Then they suc- ;(] — in getting the most powerful carriers Cfor the U. S. Navy. As history unfolded, j. ,e hvo ships would be named Lexington
dSaratoga.
e conferees at the Pan-American Union lng wanted to reach two goals: to stop ^ ns>ve naval construction, thus plugging t0 j. arge drain on war-ruined economies, and ,,^lriIt the size of fleets, thus reducing their 'tnaking capability. To accomplish this at '■vork, Great Britain, Japan, France, g Italy joined the United States. The be- ,.rJUng of the Arms Conference held no c ?lse °f the unusual. It started like many erences. After the prayer, President
arren G. Harding made some generalities,
&Ut Of
electrified the audience with his pro-
8
rjfUtJhen, the unusual did happen. Secretary jj, ”*-ate Charles Evans Hughes, who pre-
some procedural detail was attended to.
rJ°Sals. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theo- dre Roosevelt, Jr., present in his capacity as 9 Vlsor, has captured that spirit better than I'One else. “Beginning quietly,” he wrote in ls diary,
.The few were, besides Roosevelt and . Pghes, Admirals Robert E. Coontz and tlliam V. Pratt, technical advisors to the Uierican delegation. The proposal they darefully worked out was the original U. S. to limit new construction of warships,
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ughes piled up point on point, and suddenly ae audience realized that there was a proposal c°®ing, and history was in the making. At °nce the entire atmosphere changed. Tense- aess took the place of indifference. Every word Ji'at he said was carefully noted. He worked rotn point to point with brilliant logic. . . • ,'t the end of his speech he again summed up ar>d finished by handing the detailed program 'f) the various conferees. While this was going 011 all were in a state of intense excitement. At rernark after remark the galleries burst into aPplause. . . . The galleries applauded loudly at the finish. I have never known at any time a 'ttore dramatic moment. No whisper of the Plan had gone abroad, no idea was held by attyone, except the few, that the first session ''’Quid be anything but formality. Here, 'Ughes, in one swift stroke, had placed, not a flittering generality, but a concrete proposal carefully worked out as to details, before all.
with a detailed list of vessels to be scrapped to bring naval tonnages within the proposed limits. Although “auxiliaries”—including aircraft carriers—were also covered, the immediate concern was capital ships. If, however, no agreement on capital tonnage could be reached among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, the three nations engaged in competitive and costly naval building programs, no agreement would have been possible. Since limitations called for extensive destruction of ships already built and building, it was evident that the weakened French and Italian navies could not make such sacrifices. Therefore, the proposals were at first restricted to the three great naval powers.
Difficult as the job was, in just over a month the determined conferees arrived at a suitable ratio of capital ship tonnage which reflected the relative strength and need of America, Great Britain, and Japan. On 15 December, Secretary Hughes announced that the now- familiar 5:5:3 ratio had been accepted, and that maximum allowable tonnage would stabilize at 525,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, with 315,000 for Japan. The important capital ship ratio had been established and now a proportionate allowance for auxiliary combatant craft could be prescribed.
The limits that Hughes proposed for carriers at the first plenary session gave 80,000 tons to the United States and Great Britain,
48,0 tons to Japan. The New York Times accurately but prematurely headlined a November 20th article “Airplane Carriers Loom as an Issue,” for it was not until 28
Mr. Craig served as an enlisted man in the U. S. Navy for five years. During his last three years, he was an ASW aircrew instructor. He was an AT-1 at the time of his discharge in 1962. A graduate of the University of Massachusetts in 1966, he received his master’s degree in history from that university in 1967. An instructor in English and History at Mary Holmes Junior College, West Point, Mississippi, from 1967 to 1968, he is now an instructor in history at Northampton Junior College, and a researcher, NDEA Local History Project, Northampton, Mass.
December that they were next discussed and then only briefly. Hughes reiterated the original tonnage limits and further stated that if the capital ship ratio should be applied to carriers. France and Italy would each be allowed 28,000 tons. He also proposed that the maximum size of any one carrier should not exceed 27,000 tons standard displacement and armament was not to exceed 8-inch guns. Because this question “involved very technical considerations,” Britain’s senior delegate, Lord Lee of Fareham asked for a short postponement of discussion on that matter.
During that short postponement, more than ample sea room for carrier development was established. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who had been “fussing around” with the various delegates, knew the original proposals were unsatisfactory to the other four powers. He especially wanted more tonnage. To get the limits raised, he thought Hughes should once more repeat the original U. S. proposal in order to provoke the views of the other delegates. Whatever their wishes, the “all-important” ratio would have to be preserved; Roosevelt predicted new carrier figures of
135,0 tons for the United States and Great Britain, 81,000 for Japan, and 54,000 for France and Italy.
Hughes opened the fourteenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament as he and Roosevelt had planned. The first objection was from Admiral Baron Acton, the Italian delegate. Since the American proposal allowed Italy only 28,000 tons, this would permit construction of only one maximum size carrier; this would not do. Italy, in order to maintain her Mediterranean status, must have at least two of these ships and 54,000 tons. Baron Acton’s argument was flawless; Britain’s Lord Lee thought Italy’s claim “very difficult to resist,” and his own call for increased tonnage was sound. The carrier was an auxiliary to the modern fleet, he pointed out, “and it was, therefore, important that the number of airplane carriers should be adequate and proportionate to the size of our fleet.” The American proposal. Lord Lee went on, was inadequate. Great Britain needed at least five first-line carriers and 135,000 tons. The French demand might have been troublesome. France wanted three carriers, which could have meant 81,000 tons; but
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she would accept a 60,000-ton limit as s3ia j ships might do. This automatically inC^ Italy’s tonnage, since she must be °n P qqO with any Mediterranean power. But > tons did not exceed the ratio too far 311 acceptable. j 3
Admiral Baron Kato, from Jap30; way with figures. If Japan could have
‘one-330’
half airplane carriers,” and that vvaStjieSe enough. Japan would need three of * ships and 81,000 tons. The new limits " agreed to by unanimous consent. Each P0'^ the Committee decided, “should be e3tlu„i to proceed to supply itself, to the ma*131 stated, with airplane carrier tonnage. Roosevelt was delighted with the
But the carrier question was only tempc becalmed. Arguments concerning an11311!.,.
Early in January 1922, Assistant Secrc Roosevelt and Admirals Coontz and 3 ‘
had a crucial conversation. They talked the scrapping rules and came up with 33 1 ^ Although it would considerably exceed 1 tonnage limitation for individual earn they wondered if the United States might n,e convert “two of the battle cruisers we h3^ on the ways into airplane carriers.” The 3e, day, Roosevelt and the admirals, with j* miral David Taylor now present, decided •1 - would propose converting the battle crun ^ Lexington and Saratoga, which would req3
33,0 tons per ship. Roosevelt, alert to mood of the delegates and looking forward ^ the mood of the U. S. Congress, and knoW>3^ that conversion of partly-built ships y cheaper than building afresh, put converst^ “squarely on a basis of economy.” AlthoUn this plan was soon known by the other de3 gations, a week passed before the conversi0’ proposal was put before the Committee.
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and the new problem of converting ex’ capital ships were to loom as issues.
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During the week, an acrimonious deba3 over the armament of carriers broke out. 'IN question of how many and what kind of g3’1' to put on carriers was so serious that RooSe velt feared it might disrupt the whole carricl settlement so far agreed upon. But there W3? no disruption; the final agreement on carrief armament was quite simple. Guns less tha3
^as cruisers, as a heavily armed carrier •Useful cruiser.’
i 'lch and anti-aircraft guns were not limited; 'o 8-i
lei, ” dele§ate Arthur Balfour summed the L ,ate- “The armament on carriers was [ed so that a nation in war would not use be by construction a bad carrier but Almost certainly the former Ll ^ord °f the Admiralty remembered ivjsnd‘ The main concern of the delegates (he destructive firepower of the big guns, 'a f carr'cr that could function as a cruiser ^tightening.
offensive firepower of the carrier Pro 0c^ed ha her flimsy biplanes was yet to be ven. It had finally taken two-thousand- l^ad bombs to sink the Ostfriesland, but in ^ no airplane which could take off from fattier could carry so large a bomb. There. e’ the primary mission of naval aircraft "as to ■ bombers. The naval bombers foreseen by the Board would have to await further development before they became reliably deadly to serve the fleet as a major weapon. In whatever manner aircraft were to be used, they obviously required aerodomes that could move with the Fleet.
The proposal that the United States be allowed to convert two battle cruisers to aircraft carriers could still founder on two points. First, it had already been agreed to scrap most capital ships building and many of those afloat, but there had been no provision to change any capital ships already laid down to a new class. The American proposal, therefore, created a major exception to the scrapping rules. Second, the conversions would place in service two carriers that exceeded the agreed-upon 27,000-ton limit by
6.0 tons. This was considerable, for in 1922, many light cruisers displaced less than
6.0 tons. The U. S. proposal was thought of as giving its Navy an advantage in potential cruisers as well as in carriers.
Roosevelt felt the conversions necessary if the Navy was to get any modern carriers within the next ten years. He explained his views to the American delegates before the next Committee meeting. To disallow the conversions would be a disaster because it would be “well nigh impossible” to get money from Congress for new construction. But where two battle cruisers were already about one-third completed, Roosevelt thought Congress might appropriate enough money to finish their construction as aircraft carriers.
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if we did not convert our cruisers to airplar>e ^ carriers, we might just as well make up out minds that we would be without these all it*1" portant craft for the next decade.
That was enough for Hughes, who “suddeflb p switched” to Roosevelt’s views. The proble"1 j
'his
Hughes, on the other hand, had almost cO11 curred with the British objections to the co*1^ versions; delegates Root and Underwo® were siding with what they thought to Hughes’s desires. At this point Roose'^ “delivered an impassioned speech to 1 effect that,
1'er excePt'ons to Ple scrapping rules, they e not adamantly opposed to the conver- P^n. However, Balfour continued to fret conversions be used as cruisers. The t|nal British proposal was to limit each lL ler to 25,000 tons. America had raised
lv l° 27,000 and now wanted 33,000 tons. *hts w— - , ,<•
pets,
•hat
lot
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two more ships, but two carriers of in- Sed tonnage. Hughes further pointed out tat the Lexingtons (as those ships were then C*lrig called) would have fewer 6- to 8-inch
H
At last Balfour was soothed; he handed
«h.
was too much. Balfour would be the last °n to criticize the economy argument, but ferried about the advantages that would rue to America if those conversions were ?ranted.
,r ^ughes tried to soothe Balfour. The in. ase to 27,000 tons was unimportant as it j ,s. 0nly to provide for the conversion of /^'sh measure to American. But Hughes, ,joV'ng been moved by Roosevelt’s irnpas- u tlcd speech, regarded retention of the two >y00-ton ships to be the really important ^Jlr't. He reminded Balfour that the United ijfteswas entitled to lay down two modern Craft carriers. By the proposed conversions was all the United States would get:
°s than would smaller carriers. Nor did 3*ghes think retention of the Lexingtons ^ ected the scrapping policy or the treaty as , Vvhole. He stressed that the United States getting only that to which it was en- ls careful draft to Hughes:
;^ny of the Contracting Powers may without htcreasing its total tonnage of aircraft carriers huild not more than two such aircraft carriers each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 l°ns, and for this purpose may convert any of their unfinished ships which would otherwise he scrapped.
^his note successfully capped Hughes’s able ^position, as Roosevelt had called it. He Voiced that Hughes had sailed through the F'arly parts of the problem, and had gotten an assent to the conversions on short order by , ly going through the paragraph on scrap- Pjhg, over which all the debate had occurred. 4 here remained, therefore, only the formality of writing this agreement into the treaty.
Each country could divide its carrier tonnage in any way it saw fit. If the United States wished to build two 33,000-ton carriers, she would be using 66,000 tons of her limit. The conversion was simply a case of reasonable economy, it did not violate the spirit of the Conference. On the last day of the Conference, 6 February 1922, the agreements on naval limitation were signed. The Navy obtained its carriers through the Arms Conference; but the Navy now had to get them out of Congress.
The 67th Congress, which in its first session had shown some willingness to grasp a new idea, was ready to debate the merit of the Lexingtons. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy went before Congress to make his arguments known. “The matter is really quite simple,” said Roosevelt,
Then he went on to show that by conversion the United States would save 18 million dollars and would get “two very much superior vessels.” This argument, Roosevelt thought, made “a very real impression” at the Capitol. Another argument also made an impression. As a result of the limitations imposed upon capital ships by the Naval Treaties, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett pointed out, the carrier was assuming a new importance. The chief of the recently created Bureau of Aeronautics, who had also been a technical advisor at the Conference, explained to the House Committee on Naval Affairs that unless the Navy had its “full allowance of carrier tonnage” it could not hope to “undertake anything but a defensive and consequently a losing naval campaign.” No Congress would condemn its navy to a losing campaign. The 1916 building program had provided for a superbly powerful battlefleet. That growth had been stunted at the Arms Conference. Little imagination was needed to see where growth could still occur.
Then Henry Cabot Lodge presented the resolution from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, strongly urging conversion of the 36-per-cent complete Lexington (building at the Fore River Ship Building Yard, Quincy). The carrier proponents were turning to the right course, then they were on it. Battle fleets were in the ratio irons, no new capital ship could be laid down in the United States for ten years; but there were 135,000 carrier tons to be built—or converted. The existing carrier strength among the powers was compared and America’s deficiency stressed. In May 1922, a New York Representative, Frederick C. Hicks, told his colleagues that the two conversions were the most urgently needed units in the whole American Navy. He pointed out that Great Britain had seven airplane carriers. Or, “to be more accurate, I should say only five, because two of them are very insignificant ships.” France had one
building; Japan one in service, onerf completion, and two planned. The Navy had the Langley (CV-l)—still un1
going conversion from the fleet collier at the Norfolk Navy Yard—but she would *jj be “fast enough [nor] large enough to rea i be effective as a fighting unit of our fle(! This reflected the view of Admiral I
who, three months earlier, had character*2 the Langley as “entirely inadequate.”
America did not intend to be equipP . with entirely inadequate warships; the c , I versions were authorized and on 1 July 1 'j —some three months before the small ^ slow Langley put to sea—the Navy was t0 to convert the Lexington (CV-2) and Sardc^ (CV-3) from battle cruisers to aircraft c { riers. Five years passed. During that 111 “flying off and on” experiments were c° ducted with the Langley as the big con' ^ sions neared completion. The Saratoga " commissioned in November 1927; the Lexl ® ton followed in December. By taking adva* age of the conversion privilege, the Navy h* . two formidable carriers slightly before v ' time forecast by Admiral Rodgers. .
In 1921 and 1922, Roosevelt, Rodge J
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Coontz, Pratt, and Moffett had foreseen value of aircraft carriers and had insist' upon adequate tonnage for those import3
‘auxiliary” ships. Since the delegati0 agreed that those ships were experiment ’ these naval advisors encountered only mode ^ ate resistance to their views. Then they c01^ vinced Congress that the freeze on cap1]^ ships signalled full speed ahead in carr*c' development. The Lexington and the Saral°S
were not experimental. They were large,
fas'
carriers tha t could sail and fight with the batte fleet. And those two ships enabled airpla**f designers to build effective naval aircra*’ A revolution in naval warfare was under"-3)’ as brave aviators steered their wood, "*rC’ and cloth flying machines on a corntt*011 course with the steel ships.
★