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Admiral inunmo v^. - — eeting at his headquarters and invited an Vision commanders and above present in Manila to attend. As Commander drain Watic, consisting of the Pecos and two tteet Sweepers, I was the junior officer preset. Admiral Hart explained his Pla“ of a ;i°n: all units of the Asiatic Fleet would le
“tvs
ttct could be employed against ,he
r.vite acting as a tender for PBYs oper- nCar ™,t of ManUa. About 40 PBYs were in atmg out * hefore Pearl Harbor—
Philippine : Mond lhc eighth,
Manila.
,, v earlv on Monday, 8 December a X message was received, stating that the general messaS atlacked Pearl Harbor and
tVa ste “of war existed with Japan Almost Saw ships in Manila Bay were ordered to aU Navy sn P h East Indies at once.
The S went alongside the mile-long t b ., numped oil into the
PiCr 7 ?nk unffi late afternoon. During the storage an atched the bombing attacks
When I took command of the USS Pecos (AO-6) in July 1940, in Tsingtao, y^'na) the Japanese had full comman m ‘)0rth China. Yet, a Japanese who showed Self outside any Chinese city’s limits was * grave danger of being killed. Outside Sgtao it was necessary for the Japanese to Si in at least company-size detachments.
' n American, however, could venture m o countryside. My wife and I made a num- bcr of unescorted trips into Chinese territory.
^he only tanker in Asiatic waters w ic C°uld fuel the Fleet at sea, the Pecos made ^rnerous trips to the Dutch oil port ° Sdjoeng Oeban, across the strait horn Sapore, Tarakan and Balikpapan m “Orneo, and Surabaya in Sumatra I proD- spent more time in Indonesia during ? months prior to Pearl Harbor than any
L> S. naval officer of command rank.
We were in Manila the Sunday morning (efore Pearl Harbor when the Chief of i av Operations sent out a message to all group Slanders and above, worded approximately as follows: “War with Japan is instable, you will take all necessary precau- tlQns.” Admiral Thomas C. Hart called a
considerable loss of life.
Shortly after leaving the entrance chan" Lieutenant Commander Lawrence J- ' Peake, my executive officer, came to bridge to relieve me for a few hours. JuSt ,
I was about to doze off, “Collision Quart^ was sounded. I heard a crash forward. Be‘° .
the messenger could arrive to tell me
•afl
We had struck—and almost cut in two'
planes on the ground at Clark Field. It was a beautiful sunny day, and wave after wave of Japanese planes came out of the North—from Formosa—and dropped their bombs on planes that should have been in the air.
In late afternoon, the Langley, Captain Felix B. Stump commanding the ship and task group—the tankers USS Trinity (AO-13) and USS Pecos—got under way and proceeded past Corregidor and out the narrow, crooked channel through the mine field at the entrance to Manila Bay. It was a dark night and no navigation aids were lighted. Our courses were set by dead reckoning. When clear, we all started zigzagging according to pattern and proceeded south through Verde Island Passage.
After clearing Tablas Strait, we steamed into the Sulu Sea. About noon on a beautiful clear day, suddenly the Langley opened up with all of her anti-aircraft battery. What was she shooting at? My mess boy knew. Having just brought a tray of lunch to the bridge for me, he blurted out, “Captain, why for Langley shoot at Venus?” Sure enough, the Langley was shooting at that planet which could easily be seen overhead in a clear tropical sky. It was good pointer drill even though there really was not enough ammunition for interplanetary target practice.
Our convoy, now joined by the Houston (CA-30) proceeded through Pangutaran Passage and into Celebes Sea through Tapul Passage. In the Celebes Sea, the Pecos fueled destroyers and went into Balikpapan to take on more fuel. The ships in Balikpapan included the Houston, Marblehead (CL-12), Holland (AS-3), Otus (AS-20), Trinity, Langley and several destroyers. Our next stop was Makassar, Celebes, from which the Pecos steamed on 20 December in company with the Marblehead, Langley, Trinity, Holland, and Gold Star (AG-12) After passing through Celas Strait, the Langley proceeded independently for Fremantle, Australia.
The Pecos proceeded through the Timor Sea to Darwin where a Royal Australian Navy commander requisitioned what may have been the only warehouse in Darwin, and we unloaded torpedoes and spare parts which we had hastily loaded in Manila. We hoped to use Darwin as a fleet base. During the unloading, a longshoremen’s strike slowed the
work, but we proceeded using all aval Navy and Army personnel. At one ti®e> ^ Australian Navy friend advised me t° clare martial law to get the longshore", back on the job. I declined after ponde^” the international repercussions that irUr result from such a rash act. . j
We remained in Darwin fueling A ships, and received fuel from the coinmW1 tanker George G. Henry. a
The Pecos left Darwin on 21 January 011 ^ very black, rainy night, so as to elude^, Japanese submarine lying off the entr" to the harbor. The submarine had fired 1 ^ torpedoes at the Trinity several days befor^£ all misses. Within a day or so after we left Japanese bombed ships in Darwin Ham ^ sinking several and damaging others "
id- the
3*
wha‘
had happened, I rushed out onto the bri£^ It was raining and the bow could hardly ‘j seen. A voice from under the bow clear shouted: “Sorry sir, I did not see you.”
Australian patrol boat that did not know " ( were proceeding out of the harbor on j foul night. Later, we heard that the pall°. boat did sink, but that the Australian cre'' had escaped in their dory. Fortunately, thel<: was almost no damage to the Pecos.
We headed for Koepang, Timor, but 0,1 the evening before we were to enter the harbo1' our orders were changed. The Japanese caP tured that port town the very next day. .
We passed through Roti Strait and headeL for Surabaya, Java, by the Timor Sea roUte' About this time, in broad daylight, a Japa' nese submarine fired a torpedo at us whic, passed harmlessly ahead of our bow. ^C. went up through the narrow Bali Strait a" could see the thick jungle of that beautin'1 island quite clearly. I was not too sure what might happen should our navigation cause us to go aground in that poorly charted stra'1' Ships as large as the Pecos had little occasio'1 to take that route. I chose that channel be'
°n 15
cruiser DeRuyter and her destroyers.
February 1942, Singapore fell to the
my; a Japanese plane that had just
Th,
'Tton and the Marblehead were bombed.
, and the steering gear of the Marblehead ill j damaged. A number of men had been
°r wounded. The Marblehead had to Vvith her engines, but she made it to
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Ij Iried away, using a jury rig for steering, ^ destination the Atlantic seaboard of the
jjctt relieved of his command by President ranklin D. Roosevelt.
Tice Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich, Royal
N
ftSe the degree of safety it would provide ,\j j1 ^e Japanese. After loading fuel at the an°i?SSeS CornPany dock in Surabaya, we ].c °red in Bunder Roads and fueled the U|ttch
’ttbed Surabaya circled overhead. Later [j ’hat day, about 60 miles away, both the
e after turret of the Houston was knocked
kill,
?Cr .
^Jhatjap on the south coast of Java for tempo- rV repairs and to bury her dead. Then she Stean
ner
n'ted States.
^The pecos again proceeded through Bali
to Tjilatjap, arriving on 6 February.
^ ls port was the last and only deep water
^'hor available to the Fleet. Next day, the
:^°s Went alongside the Houston and I visited
,Cr captain in his cabin. I am sure this is the
^st visit he had from a fellow CO before the
j, °Uston was sunk in the battle of the Java
(Ca' Admiral Hart visited us and expressed
j- ri>c his wish that I keep the Pecos command
i°r a long time. Within a week he himself had be- 8 'etherlands Navy, assumed command and ^’’hin three weeks had lost almost all of the j0tttbined U. S., British, and Dutch fleets.
. Va could not be saved. Admiral Hart knew and said so. During the short period of time j’1 a t Helfrich had command of the Allied 'eet, all of Java was lost. Although a number ships did escape to Australia, a larger aarnber were sunk with no effort whatever ®*tig made by the Japanese to save any of ae men from the sinking ships.
The Pecos continued to receive fuel oil JPm bulk tankers and transfer it to Dutch, r*tish, and U. S. warships. Daily, I went to i Hied headquarters and pleaded to be al- °Wed to leave Tjilatjap in order to be able to continue my duties as Fleet tanker further aWay from the Japanese.
Among the constant stream of refugees passing across the island were wounded men, principally from the Houston and the Marblehead. They had been sent to a military hospital in Northern Java with the well known medical officer, Lieutenant Commander C. M. Wassell, U. S. Naval Reserve, in charge. In a railway coach, he brought about 40 men to the pier where we were moored and hoped to put them all on board a ship for Australia. With daily air raid alarms and intelligence that enemy warships were en route to the southern coast of Java, I knew that the Pecos, as the only Fleet tanker in the area, was a ship especially marked for destruction. I explained this to Dr. Wassell and declined to accept any men except those who were ambulatory and could take care of themselves. Dr. Wassell and several hospital corpsmen left with the men who needed hospital care and, within a few days, made arrangements for their evacuation on a small Dutch steamer. They all reached Australia safely.
On 25 February, we fueled the minesweepers USS Lark (AM-21) and USS Whippoorwill (AM-35) before they proceeded toward the south. Thus, Train Asiatic Fleet was disbanded. The street near the dock where we were moored was now being prepared to fly off the planes that the Langley was bringing into Java as a final effort to stem the Japanese advance. As the dock was required for the Langley to discharge planes, Allied headquarters ordered us to leave at about 0600 on 27 February for Colombo, Ceylon. We left with an augmented crew of 14 officers and 224 men. The Pecos normally carried a crew of about 125. Knowing that chances for survival of the ship were slim, a number of large bamboo poles were brought on board and lashed to the upper decks where they could easily be thrown overboard, or would float if the ship sank. Allied headquarters requested me to join a 10-knot convoy leaving that morning, but I declined, saying that my maximum speed was about 13 knots.
With the destroyer USS Parrott (DD-218) as escort, the Pecos left the harbor and was about 30 miles away when the Japanese bombed the Langley. Having word that the Langley survivors were being picked up by two destroyers, I proceeded west at maximum speed.
Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific, Rear Admiral W. M. Glassford, directed me to proceed to Christmas Island, about 225 miles southwest of Java, and to take the Langley survivors on board and proceed to Fremantle. Meanwhile, the destroyers Whipple (DD-217) and Edsall (DD-219), with the Langley survivors on board, were also headed for Christmas Island. Our escort, the Parrott, left during early evening for other duty and the Pecos steamed toward the rendezvous northwest of, and in the lee of the island.
The destroyers, with their greater speed, arrived considerably ahead of the Pecos and arranged that the British pilot employed by the Phosphate Company, Mr. E. Craig, would board the Pecos with Lieutenant Commander T. A. Donovan, of the Langley, to explain the plan for transferring the survivors. When we got there, the pilot boat from Christmas Island came alongside and, owing to a considerable roll, got a mooring line entangled with her propeller. The pilot did manage to climb on board, but Donovan remained in the small pilot boat. I urged him to come on board at once, but for some reason he was unable to grasp the Jacob’s Ladder.
Just at this time, three Japanese twin- engined bombers appeared from the direction of Sumatra. Apparently their mission was to bomb the dock and plant of the Phosphate Company, for we could see the explosions and smoke as bombs hit that area. Knowing that having been sighted would make us future targets, the Pecos, the Whipple, and the
. (foe
Edsall headed for a rain squall, leaving pilot boat and Lieutenant Comma11 Donovan to clear the propeller and the'1 ^ turn to the island. The bombers maneu'eI‘ in the vicinity, but could do no further ha* having apparently dropped all of their on the shore installations. After we from the rain squall, the planes could 1 longer be seen.
M
Destroyer Division 57, proceeded at ^ Pecos’ best available speed and no zigz‘1^ toward Exmouth Gulf, North West CaP‘ Australia. Early in the morning of 1 h^arc j the Pecos slowed to steerageway. A 40-1° launch was put over the side and made a trips to the Whipple and three trips to 11 Edsall. Within about three hours, all Lan’‘]{ survivors were on board the Pecos with0' any injuries. On completion of the transit the Pecos headed for Fremantle, and destroyers left in the opposite direction their assigned missions. ,
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At midmorning, while Commander R- . McConnell, who had relieved Felix Stump J captain of the Langley, Commander Lawrd1^ E. Divoll, his executive officer, and I making plans to keep the survivors busy reasonably comfortable during their stay the Pecos, we saw a Japanese observation plane approaching from the north. The gel’ eral alarm was sounded and the ship went * battle stations. The plane approached ‘,l high altitude, close enough to see us and <Ll determine our course. It then turned aroU° and disappeared in the direction from whic)1
^0rne. Although we had definite knowl- ^ aat a Japanese Task Group was operat- O* of Java, our lack of aviation for Vj n,na^ssance left us with no indication as to n J°cation or size.
:,j(j.. lhe crew were at battle stations and « , l0nal men from the Langley were posted if3se Suns, control, and lookout stations. It •,:aa beautiful, bright, clear morning. A ill '!! blanket had been placed on the top of ,\|11 tanks to reduce the probability of fire - eboats and rafts were examined to make
"4b
> had to keep firing as long as there was ir, chance that a hit on a plane might be I,,, e- No hits were sustained during the first jL.t'lt- A second run, by the three aircraft, d ar to the first, followed. On the second one direct hit was made on us just aft l^he starboard 3-inch anti-aircraft gun, ^ one member of the crew and wounding 5fj Cral others. The Pecos had only two 3-inch, th Ca^‘ber anti-aircraft guns and fortunately, :|Jj bit, though it damaged the weapon, did htake it inoperable.
W°' disa
£ oil
Allied
tanks. Our chief gunner’s mate — men to repair the damage to the rboard gun, and by the time of the second ack, about one hour later, had it in good
Ult t^at theY could be lowered without diffi- ha ^he crew was exercised at general ’til f^ers and instructed concerning a prob- ^Jmpending attack.
ipe ® '''ere headed for Australia at maximum apj 1 aH of 13 knots. All hatches were closed ori Secured wrench-tight. We were ready, °Ped we were.
?|V before noon, 1 March, three Japanese e bombers with nonretractable wheels out of the sun. Each dropped one and all missed the ship. I could see L Plane approaching and, as it started its fij]j ^lng run, I maneuvered the ship with lo\vrudder. The bombs, too, could be fol- throughout their 1,000-foot fall.
Ur training had emphasized that every- ^st CXcePt the gun crews must hit the deck Ijq and remain in a prone position until the ty^bs hit or exploded. The gun crews, how-
v'
°hietime thereafter, another wave of three ,ahes dropped their two bombs each, and appeared, having added a second hit that, d the first, combined to damage four of
working order. The gun crew was reformed with experienced men from the Langley and was ready for the next wave of planes. Our two .50-caliber and four .30-caliber machine guns also fired at the planes on each attack, but did no discernible damage. The Pecos had no fire control system and had only local control of each gun, supplemented by voice from central control on top of the bridge.
Unfortunately, when the first bomb hit, all of the service piping forward had been severed. This required that fire hose and other auxiliary equipment supply water and steam to the forward part of the ship. Until finally secured, a large boom, knocked out of its cradle, swung back and forth as the ship rolled. After the first wave, our 1,400-gallon gasoline storage tank was drained and did not explode when hit on the second attack. The damage to our oil tanks gave the ship an 8- degree list to port, which was corrected by pumping oil and water.
The next wave of attackers came in at irregular intervals shortly after 1300. They scored four hits and one near-miss. For those of us on the bridge, one, in particular, was devastating. We saw the bomb coming and most of us hit the deck. My bridge talker, however, maintained a crouching position and was hit by bomb fragments; yet, he refused to be relieved as talker. For some reason, my bridge messenger, Fireman First Class Marchland, remained on his feet as if to be ready for his next errand. He died almost instantly from a shrapnel wound in the head. A signalman took his place as messenger.
During this period, bomb fragments killed and wounded several men at the gun control on top of the bridge. The concussion stunned the assistant fire control officer. Out on his feet, he wandered about in the control station above and then climbed down to the bridge. His incoherent shouts and aimless walking about caused the bridge crew some trouble. Finally, he was firmly forced from the bridge and was given such care as possible by an already overburdened medical staff.
The bridge windows, even though lowered, were all broken and all persons on the bridge had cuts from the flying glass. There were numerous bomb splinter holes in the bridge wind breaks.
At this point, the helmsman shouted,
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white cloud until it could be turned 0[
fireroom blower to freeze. Heroic work 111
fireroom enabled the ship to continue
boild
maximum steam was carried in the firer° for the remainder of the action.
hope,
As the afternoon dragged on, some
ships. But, about two hours after the aC^
begun, and while all guns were in action
son
fic
ac^'
ally occurred. But, before it could be stopP^
direC'
with planes diving from almost every
tion. We counted nine aircraft in this str^,
true
reforming the gun crews with passengers, 3|'|)
“Captain, steering control is lost.” “Keep trying,” I said. “After steering station—after steering station. Take control.”
A half-minute later, a voice came over the captain’s circuit, “Bridge, we have control.” “Right full rudder.” The response was perfect. “Rudder amidships.”
Thus, between bombing runs. “Steer course 175.” The gyro compass showed 175.
I ordered my messenger to go aft and tell McPeake, the Exec, to be prepared to take over steering control if necessary.
Another enemy plane glided in. Its brown paint and non-retractable wheels could clearly be seen. A bomb left the bomb bay. The explosion sounded as if someone had slammed the Gates of Hell.
“Damage control stations. Report damage.” From aft: “It was a miss—no damage.” Over the phone: “Rudder amidships steer course 175.” Fortunately, the gyro compass remained in operation.
Now word came from the damage control party that a main cargo pump had stopped. “Make every effort to restart it. Engine room send your best man to pump room,” I ordered. Within a few minutes, the word came: “Main cargo pumps operating.”
One bomb passed through our 40-foot motor launch, stowed just forward of the bridge, pierced the main deck, and exploded in the navigator’s stateroom. A hole large enough to drive a one-ton truck through was blown out of the ship’s side. Most of the damage from this bomb was above the waterline and, by itself, would not have killed the Pecos.
Another hit in this wave struck the foremast, carrying away the radio antennae and part of the mast. This hit exploded below the main deck and carried away the center-line bulkhead, giving us a 15-degree list to port. To compensate, the port anchor and chain were let go and oil was pumped from the port tanks. The third hit in this wave exploded in the vicinity of the forward 5-inc.h gun, killing and wounding several of the crew and doing considerable damage below deck in the crew’s living space. The fourth of this wave, the last direct hit, struck about amidships in the hole made by the first bomb. A fragment pierced the steamline to the whistle. The escaping steam caused a considerable
off-Ar
near-miss aft killed and wounded seveIjtb{ the after gun crews. The near-miss cause^ } brickwork in No. 3 boiler to collapse 3 ^
at1
speed of about 10 knots. The damaged was secured without fire or flarebacK, ^ ■ nrk W
survival persisted, owing to heroic vV0 McPeake and other officers who reorg3111 ^ gun crews and kept them firing, and keP^ engines turning when steam and water t harrassed the engineer’s force. I vowee the ship would continue to fight and " ^ stay afloat as long as possible so as to the Japanese carriers from engaging the ship was making maximum speed, - ^ one among the passengers in the after c ,, quarters passed the word to “Abandon s ’1‘ . The word was countermanded by me an ( officers and crew, thus preventing might have been a worse tragedy than - , the two after whaleboats had been lo"eI j several life rafts had been thrown overbo and a number of men had jumped °ver ^ side. None of those who left the ship at
time were among the survivors. jn
About 3:00 p.m., the third strike came
each plane carrying two 250-kg. bombs. ^ plane made two passes, dropping one bo on each glide-in. There were no direct n but two near-misses on the starboard S1
forward further damaged the bridge s1
ture and wounded several men. A near- aft killed and wounded several men. McPe3j was a tower of strength during this perl i finally manning a .50-caliber machine g’ himself as the ship slowly slipped boW a ’
under the water. j
As this final attack was taking place, knew at last that the ship was doomed
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authorized the communications officer
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any other frequency possible, and req
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Pla,
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Ced in the passenger compartment of the a'n’s gig; even though it was known that e°gine was inoperative. Other wounded an(j VVere lashed to officer’s kapok mattresses
nnan assigned to watch out for each of !,. and to assist if possible. The gig was it, d near two 40-foot motor launches, and ^°Ped that all would float off the ship fro^act as lifeboats. The gripes were removed ff(Ji(aH motor launches. Lashings were cut
;rrjn^ad life preservers, which they had worn ,/h the start of the action. The kapok pad
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,] c Sunwale into the water as almost all had Mo
d rJie and, though the swirl pulled me un-
to k nY men an<^ mucb debris and oil were k 'Jc seen. There was talking and shouting
phvi
°ato
een those nearby. Everyone tried to grab
Vlp n ,
^ . Jur superb navigator kept the ship’s L?n plotted to the end. Our position was fCash knowing that the Japanese, hav- acked us since 1000, already were well
‘Irp rvF . .
p 01 our exact position.
;f,j Stations were hastily made to abandon ■,:Cr^everything that would float was thrown ik °ard. The gripes were removed from all '13 . Joals and lashings were cut from the re- lrilng liferafts. Some wounded men were
""n,
dle bamboo poles on deck. Almost all
4J1V ^
Spj.s stopped quite a number of bomb «va”ters and other flying debris. During the of Uation, all the men acted well and most si. aem were over the side by the time the
‘P sank.
1,^ ship was dead; but she had died hard. 0 ad taken five direct hits, six near-misses, four hours to kill her.
0 ° die bow slowly settled, I jumped down \ ° the main deck when it was awash for- 0vH took off my eyeglasses and threw them pjdioard I should have placed them in the
before me. The ship went down along-
llCt T , ■ - -
' 1 fought my way to the surface.
some floating object. The gig could be at l'rst’ bvit a wind pushed her out of Po] ^wo men gathered several bamboo I as, took off their trousers and attempted to j a the poles together without much success. fjaanaged to find a locker top and clung to it •lit S°me brne. As time passed, oil splashed |,a.° mY eyes and nasal passages, burning 'ufuliy The varnished locker top became quite slippery. A catwalk grating came floating by and I transferred to that piece of debris. I tried unsuccessfully to paddle out of the obnoxious oil. Apparently others had the same difficulty, for we drifted further and further apart. A grapefruit came floating by; Not knowing how long I would be in the water, I pulled off some of the skin and ate it.
And as I floated, I wondered if everything possible had been done to ensure the rescue of those brave men who had just left the Pecos. Could any of the wounded be saved? How long would it be possible to survive under present conditions? About 24 hours would seem to be the maximum.
Toward twilight, I heard what seemed to be bomb explosions in the distance. It may have been bombs bursting on the Edsall—- nothing was heard from that proud ship or anyone on board her after that fateful day. As night came, the loneliness of our position was felt keenly. Oily water in my belly added to my discomfort. Suddenly, out of the darkness, a light could be seen in the distance. A Very pistol was fired. The destroyer Whipple approached ever so slowly. Survivors were being picked up. A number of knotted lines had been prepared and as a survivor was sighted, a line was thrown to him. But, most men were too weak to be hauled aboard by clinging to the lines. They were pulled to the steel ladder amidships, where helping hands hauled them aboard. Shouts from the men in the water helped their rescuers to steer for them. The skipper of the Whipple, Lieutenant Commander Eugene S. Karpe, had carefully weighed the chances of rescue and had decided not to reach the Pecos' last position until nightfall and actually slowed his ship to do this. He did not wish to become an easy target for carrier planes.
Several men who did not have lifejackets and who had been helped by others to cling to bamboo poles, or other debris, were rescued. The wounded men in the gig and both doctors from the Langley and the Pecos were saved. They were able to help with first aid on board the Whipple. Their estimate of battle casualties was about 50 men killed and 150 injured. The remainder of those who died were lost by drowning and over-exposure in the oily sea water. The 220 men saved were less than one-third of those who had been on
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to 1940). Awarded the Navy cross for his ser' command of the USS Pecos, his subsequent uu
ta, tie10
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with a PBY pilot who flew from FremaB- the scene of the Pecos tragedy. The ) ^
That day, three large transports an1'
to troop'
from Egypt Some of the
disembarked in Fremantle. The s111'
were
oi1
ft*
board one of the transports, the USS - ^
Vernon, (AP-22) and on 6 March, the tra^
ports left for Adelaide, where the rernad'^
Australian troops were disembarked-
r -. eil
By the time we reached the Golden
we were well-rested and very happy to be
had prevented publication of the loss of
d°f
31 March, it was not until 3 April that
board the Langley and the Pecos.
What a sorry sight we were as we got on board the Whipple! Everyone rescued was covered with oil from head to foot. All of the spare fresh water and soap on board the Whipple was used to remove this smelly mess. It took me half-an-hour just to get the stains off my teeth. All of us had swollen eyes and the inside of our mouths and nasal passages were badly irritated by the oil. Besides this, many had cuts and bruises and worse, caused from flying bomb fragments, broken glass, and other debris. Fortunately, our clothing could be washed and the Whipple’’ s officers and men gave generously of everything they had.
We were happy to be rescued, but, as the Langley's survivors had learned, we knew that our escape might be only temporary. Several survivors reported seeing the conning tower of a submarine that appeared after sunset and steamed slowly in the vicinity. About 9:30 p.m., the sound of submarine propellers was distinctly heard on the Whipple's listening gear. Speed was increased, depth charges were dropped according to doctrine, and the ship left the vicinity at high speed. It was a hard decision to make, but Crouch, with my advice and that of Karpe and McConnell, decided that to assure the escape of the Whipple we should increase speed to 25 knots, take a careful inventory of the oil on board, and remain at this speed until there was just enough fuel left to allow us to get to Fremantle with a small reserve.
Crouch lamented the necessity for slowing down to about 15 knots the next morning and there was much anxiety the next day. Our fears of seeing an enemy plane were well justified because the weather was clear and we all knew that somewhere to the north, Japanese carriers were operating. As the afternoon wore on and no plane was sighted, we all breathed easier. At nightfall, the ship slowed down even further without zigzag and proceeded to Fremantle, where we arrived safely about 1900 on 4 March.
There was no reception for us because of security regulations. All survivors were immediately taken by bus to a military camp, where they were provided with a good meal and a welcome bunk in which to sleep. As can be imagined, food in the Whipple was sufficient, but not too plentiful that last day on
A graduate of the U. yj-
tl*
nrin11
to Inspector of Guns at the Naval Gun Factory
----------- __ ^— ------- ,----------- . ,
eluded participation in the Guadalcanal ana campaigns, command of the USS President . vjl and, at war’s end, port director of the 13th ^ District. Prior to his retirement in 1951, hc manded the cruiser Tucson and was Com1"
San Diego Group Pacific Reserve Fleet. At * ^ of his retirement from his civilian career in 1 was a Senior Project Staff Engineer for North • can Aviation, Inc. ^
board. The next day every man was supP^ with two changes of clothing, a pair ofs j, j and toilet articles. McConnell and I
lieutenant said he arrived just at davvr‘^fCc clearly saw the Japanese carrier task g headed into the wind, flying off the rn°Ip[!y.- patrol. As his was one of the last three ^} operable in that area, he turned and b hasty retreat back to Fremantle. . j.
qQp'
loaded with a brigade of Australian u
being brought home fend their homeland.
ors of the Langley and the Pecos were put j
troops
spent two very pleasant days in Adelaidf ^ joying the hospitality of those friendly pe°W, On 11 March, the Mount Vernon left for Francisco, via Wellington, New Zealand^^
the United States again. The news bla&°
Langley and the Pecos. Although we arrive1
tiie
s Scvcral times in preventing the violation curity regulations. It was a tough job to
Co
^ll and I faced most of San Francisco’s \avrters in the assembly room at the 12th Ity * district Headquarters. We were al- cfristo tell our stories without too much 4e 1° a question-and-answer period,
Public information officer came to our res- try and answer the questions of the largest group of newsmen that I had ever seen.
Orders were cut for all who were ablebodied, and the fine crews of the Langley and the Pecos were broken up, the men ordered to duties where their skills, learned the hard way, would be useful in winning the war.
And we, and the war, went on.
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'.'(jrtL UP,or has provided the following translation, by D. Ash’ °f a Japanese report of the air attack on the Pecos.
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C? 1942. Attack was carried out 240 nautical miles south of Christmas Island by the
,j(a . *r Fleet (Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo), First Carrier Division, carriers Kaga and "* l * * * V' P'e Second Carrier Division carriers Soryu and Hiryu.
dD * March 1942. 1255. Nine type-99 carrier bombers (Captain Toshio Watanabe) took
Vroi« flagship, sighted Pecos at 1321, bombed it from 1327 to 1330 (nine 250-kg. bombs), (ijj ,c °ne direct hit and 8 near misses. Tanker observed sinking after attack. Four planes were ’ Put all returned by 1439.
*'S''ne type-99 carrier bombers (Captain Shoi Ikeda), took off at 1306, sighted the Pecos C* attack by planes from the Kaga, attacked the Pecos from 1424 to 1433 (nine 250-kg. Nc bS sc°ring three hits. One hit in the side caused the tanker to list 15 degrees to port and rc.h ' Dur planes sustained hits from two dual-purpose guns and many machine guns, but all Urued at 1501.
At 1515, nine type-99 carrier planes (Sr. Lt. Ichiro Shimoda), took off, sighted the tjQat 1555 and bombed it until 1620 (nine 250-kg. bombs). Five bombs hit in midship sec- 17qqC *n t^le fl°w- The ship sank from the stern. Seven of our planes were hit. They returned
•he ^'ane type-99 carrier planes (Captain Takehiko Chihaya) took off at 1520 and sighted 5. l ecos at 1545. They waited for a clear space in the clouds and attacked at 1625. The tanker u^ently sank when two hits were made. Four of our planes were hit, began return flight at ^ and arrived at 1710.
°te: Above times are given in Japan Central Standard Time, or minus 9 time.)
One Way to Increase Circulation
In March 1968, a battered copy of the Proceedings was returned to the Naval Institute by the post office. The following letter was enclosed:
Dear Sir
Having found this Feb issue of “Proceedings” on a London, England street, am returning same to you, perhaps owner can be traced
Yours sincerely Limey “Ex Gob”
P. S. The Article on “Stonewall” was very interesting.