Today's Naval Aviator and Naval Flight Officer are an integral team completely dependent upon each other; but the back seat that the Flight Officer takes in the aircraft becomes symbolic for, from a career standpoint, he can never fly as high and as far as the Aviator.
A policy decision must soon be made concerning the development of an acceptable career pattern for Naval Flight Officers, those highly trained, specialized, non-pilot officers who are responsible for operating, or supervising the operation of, some of the world's most sophisticated and complex weapons systems. The results of that decision will finally determine whether the NFO truly is an unrestricted line officer as advertised, or whether he is actually restricted from operational command billets within his chosen profession.
To date there have not been appreciable numbers of NFOs in or above the rank of lieutenant commander to reflect accurately career development through the senior ranks. The number of NFO lieutenant commanders is increasing yearly, however. Within the next three years many will face the selection process for the rank of commander. An additional 3,500 NFOs will measure the results of those boards, and the subsequent billet assignments, as manifestations of their own career opportunity. The future of the NFO program depends directly upon the reaction of those vitally interested, but not yet career-oriented, members of the NFO population.
The NFO program is often thought of as an innovation in naval aviation. Actually, less than ten years old, the genesis of the program dates back to the very first flight that carried an observer whose function was other than that of a pilot or passenger. That puts the conception of the program within the same time frame as the conception of naval aviation itself. As far back as 26 July 1912, Ensign C. H. Maddox, U. S. Navy, flew as a technical observer on board a Wright B-1 aircraft and conducted airborne wireless tests with the USS Stringham. Although the total inventory of naval aircraft at that time consisted of three seaplanes, it was perhaps the first indication that a future need existed for qualified flying officers other than pilots to perform airborne functions outside the parameters provided by the pilot training syllabus.
Naval aviation history is dotted with similar examples throughout its development, but it was 1924 before official recognition was given to the Naval Aviation Observer, as he was then known. During that year, Admiral E. W. Eberle, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, headed a special board which submitted a report on naval aviation to the Secretary of the Navy. Included in that re port were recommendations that aviation courses be expanded at the U. S. Naval Academy. It also provided for the assignment of qualified Academy graduates either to aviation or observer training after two years of sea duty. That same year, an Act of Congress seemingly enhanced the early NAO's future by providing that command of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders be as signed either to Naval Aviators or Naval Aviation Observers. This is the plum that for 40 years has eluded the NFO because the intermediate billets necessary to qualify for such a command have been assigned to aviators only. Realistically, this was not the least bit unusual, nor unexpected, in view of the limited nature of early Fleet requirements for non-pilot observers. An examination of the development of naval aviation indicates that the need for NFOs has been proportionate to the sophistication of associated borne weapons systems.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the technological advancements in aircraft, ships and submarines necessitated a change in the tactical employment of forces. These innovations placed a heavy burden on The pilot, who was expected to fly the aircraft and operate newly developed electronic sensors simultaneously. As the state of the art expanded, it became apparent that an additional man would be required to operate the complex weapons system. Commanding officers of squadrons, employing heavy attack, were warning, and antisubmarine aircraft, were hard pressed to find qualified personnel to fill the positions created by avionics advancement. It was not long before planners realized that assigning pilots to these seats was not the answer.
As an interim measure, a group of NFOs was formed from a mixed group of officers within the non-pilot community. Supplementing these officers were First Class and Chief Petty Officer radiomen and radarmen some ex-pilots who were no longer qualified to fly because of degraded visual acuity, and many "1100 designator" volunteers who expressed interest in the program and met the physical requirements. There was no formal training to speak of, and the program sustained itself and enlarged, its membership through needs alone. It soon became obvious that a specific program had to be established to procure and train candidates to fill these positions. As the broad concept of the required training program was examined in scope, it was determined that the manpower base from which the prospective NFO would be chosen should begin at the baccalaureate level. The selected candidates would be required to assimilate accurately and rapidly fragmentary information from various electronic sensors, evaluate the combined total, and decide what course of action should be taken to carry out effectively his assigned mission.
Volunteers for the program were sparse at first; it seemed a questionable field for the career-minded naval officer. As the number of technical observers (pre-NAO) grew through established fleet needs, schooling prior to the squadron level was attempted,—first at Glenview, Illinois, then at Glynco, Georgia. Specialized training was given later at different locations.
Although these schools provided much of the necessary training for prospective NFOs, there was extensive duplication of effort and little or no standardization in the training format. The missing ingredient was soon evident. A formal basic training school was necessary to ensure that each NFO would receive an educational curricula which would be common to all, regardless of his chosen specialty.
In the spring of 1959, the General Aviation Training Conference set forth the requirement for a program to provide NFOs to the Fleet. In July 1960, the Basic Naval Aviation Officers School was established by order of the Chief of Naval Operations. The school was a by-product of the Training Department of the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, and eventually became a commissioned unit on 1 August 1963. Its mission is to provide academic training and flight indoctrination for non-pilot aviation officers and officer candidates to prepare them for advanced flight and technical training, leading to eventual designation as NFOs.
Prospective NFOs report to the Basic Naval Aviation Officers School after an intensive 14-week indoctrination period at the U. S. Naval Aviation School Command, Florida. An additional 16-week curriculum is then divided into two phases—academic, and flight indoctrination—to provide the necessary practical knowledge with which they can make an intelligent request for advanced training and Fleet duty in the aircraft of their choice. This brings the NFO's training in line with and in some respects it surpasses the academic training the naval aviator receives.
After approximately 500 hours of academic training, the prospective NFO is allowed to make his choice of aircraft. Virtually every major subdivision of naval aviation embodies aircraft for which the unique talents of the NFOs are required. Seven operational subdivisions, toward which he must focus his attention, and some of their associated aircraft, are as follows:
ATTACK
A-6 Intruder
A-3 Skywarrior
FIGHTER
F-4 Phantom
F-111B (TFX)
ANTI-SUBMARINE
P-3 Orion
EARLY WARNING
E-2A Hawkeye
ELECTRONIC
EC-121 Constellation
INTELLIGENCE
A-3Q Skywarrior
PHOTORECONNAISSANCE
RA-5 Vigilante
There are also additional aircraft to which NFOs may be assigned in support, training, and development activities.
Additional training is then provided to each prospective NFO to ensure that he arrives in the Fleet with the greatest amount of technical and operational knowledge possible.
After a reasonable amount of exposure to the Fleet, and to the Navy in general, a question begins to formulate in the NFO's mind as to his future as a career officer. While in basic NAO School, he was told that the following billet opportunities exist for the designated Naval Flight Officer:
Lieutenant Commander:
Executive Officer, Surface Units
Executive Officer, Tactical Air Control Squadron
Executive Officer, Air Shore Command
Commanding Officer, LST
Commander:
Commanding Officer, Fleet Squadron
Commanding Officer, Tactical Air Control Squadron
Commanding Officer, Air Shore Activity
Commanding Officer, Surface Units
Executive Officer, Fleet Squadrons
Department Heads, CVA/CVS/LPH/CA
Captain:
Commanding Officer, Major Aviation Activities
Commanding Officer, Air Transport Squadron
Commanding Officer, Naval Air Technical Training Center
Commanding Officer, Deep Draft Surface Ships
A closer examination reveals that perhaps the "opportunities" spoken of are really not concrete opportunities, but, in some cases, in valid assumptions. For example, in order to command a fleet squadron, Navy Regulations and Title 10 of the U. S. Code require that the incumbent be a designated naval aviator. The same law applies for command of Naval Air Stations and aviation schools which train naval aviators. It follows, therefore, that this particular avenue to senior command is closed to the NFO until action is initiated to correct the present situation. However, Navy Regulations and Title 10 are not going to be changed to allow NFOs the opportunity to compete with their pilot counterparts for command of squadrons and schools, until those persons with the authority to recommend such a change are fully convinced that the NFO is a full time, participating, unrestricted officer of the line and fully qualified to make significant decisions as to the tactical employment of forces within the aviation community. There are several senior naval officers who are fully aware that many NFOs possess these qualities, but there are a great many others who require documented proof. Proof, unfortunately, cannot be expressed in words, but must be attained through exposure to the NFO in his own environment. It not unusual to overhear two senior naval aviators voice diametrically opposed viewpoints on the abilities and future of the NFO. Consistently, however, the aviator with the pessimistic opinion has had little or no experience with NFOs. Nor does he so desire. It is this naval officer, and those like him, who must be shown that the future of naval aviation can only benefit by the inclusion of the NFO as a competitor for command. To force an unusual and drastic attrition rate, because of uncertainty and complacency toward the NFO, is out of place in a service where progress and advancement are common goals.
It is difficult to understand the strenuous objections to allowing NFOs the opportunity to command tactical or training squadrons and schools, when the development patterns of pilots and NFOs are examined in parallel through the rank of lieutenant commander.
Their training, responsibilities, experience, and command potential are essentially the same during this period. As a junior officer, the NFO is assigned to billets within the squadron which are commensurate with his capability and experience. The major factors leading to these assignments are the results that such assignments will bring, although not necessarily their relationship to specific designators.
There are numerous cases where NFOs are producing outstanding results in positions which historically have been reserved for pilots. These everyday occurrences are doing much to modify the theory that in order to be an administrator in aviation matters, you must also be a pilot. The commanding officers of squadrons today are no longer reluctant to rely upon the NFO for responsible decisions in jobs that relate to the operational management of their squadrons. They recognize the fact that the NFO, along with the pilot, must be judged on an individual basis, with administrative, managerial, and leadership qualities as basic criteria for selection to key positions.
The major objection to command opportunity for NFOs apparently centers on his operational qualifications, since there have been no objections to his handling administrative or maintenance positions after an adequate period of indoctrination and qualifying billets. The same criteria should hold true for the assignment of NFOs to operational billets and, ultimately, for the assignment to command billets.
It is the contention of many that the NFO actually has an advantage over the pilot in developing operational qualifications. His primary duties require that he become an expert on the employment of his aircraft as a weapons system against an assigned target. In order for him to use the weapons system effectively and to its fullest capabilities, he must know every facet of his equipment, its design characteristics and limitations, theoretical vs. actual operating curves, interfaces with complementary equipment, and a multitude of information and procedures which would take volumes to address thoroughly. He must also be fully aware of his target's characteristics, its probable retaliatory or evasive course of action, the limitations of his own airframe and system, the weapons to be used and their proper employment. In addition to this, he must ensure the accurate navigation of his aircraft to and from the target area. It would appear that the NFO, from the moment of take-off until the aircraft is returned to its base, is responsible for the delivery of the weapons system platform to the target, the operation of that system against the target, and its subsequent return to base.
While the functions listed above are also of major importance to the pilot, he is understandably more concerned with the control of the aircraft and the proper functioning of its systems. Most of the pilot's time is spent learning various and complex systems, subsystems and procedures by which the aircraft is manipulated. The NFO, on the other hand, spends most of his time learning the electronic sensor and delivery systems which relate directly to the accomplishment of the mission. The same pilot/NFO analogy is true during airborne training periods. While the pilot requires many hours of instrument flying, carrier landing practice, simulated emergencies and tactical patterns, the NFO spends virtually all of his airborne time increasing his operational proficiency with the weapons system. In the final analysis, it is the application of that knowledge and proficiency which will result in the successful or unsuccessful completion of the mission.
The NFO, then, is at least as knowledgeable about the operational employment of his aircraft and weapons system as his pilot counterpart. Is he not, therefore, operationally qualified? If he is, why is he not qualified to lead the squadron in fulfilling its tactical mission?
There are, of course, several roles within a squadron that the NFO is not qualified to perform. There are an equal number of roles, however, that the pilot cannot execute.
The primary role for which the NFO is not qualified is the physical control of the air craft. Neither is he qualified to instruct other pilots to do so. These facts should not preclude the use of a NFO as the commanding officer of a squadron that requires both pilots and NFOs to fulfill its obligations and responsibilities.
It is assumed beforehand that because the NFO does not actually control the aircraft granting him command would constitute a threat to the safety of a squadron. On the surface, this sounds like a plausible argument, but one very important fact refutes it. The commanding officer of a squadron is not the only member of that squadron who is qualified as a naval aviator.
Each squadron has a fixed allowance of pilots in all grades, regardless of the designator of the commanding officer or executive officer. It is the responsibility of the commanding officer to ensure that the normal training cycles and procedures are carried out. He not personally responsible for flying each and every syllabus flight with each and every pilot. Squadrons rely daily upon officers other than the commanding officer and the executive officer to ensure that flight training is carried out, just as they rely upon other qualified officers to train NFOs in the operation of the weapons system. Squadrons are led by one man whose primary responsibility is to carry out the orders and policies of his superior officers. Those orders and policies can be executed or implemented by an NFO with as much competence as a naval aviator.
There is a great deal of importance attached to the commanding officer's billet; not simply because it is what the NFO has been training for since his commissioning, but because it is the key to higher and more responsible positions. Without it, he has little chance of furthering his career along operational lines, thus depriving himself of a full and productive career—and for the Navy, there is equally little opportunity to benefit from his command abilities.
The need for an acceptable career pattern tor the NFO is fully recognized throughout the senior ranks in the aviation community. There is great diversification of opinion, however, as to how it should be accomplished. Some flag officers are fully convinced that the NFO should compete on even terms with pilots. Others offer alternate routes in sub specialties. Still others advocate lateral transfers to other designators. At some point there must be an amalgamation of views and opinions; a negotiation between the "yeas," the "nays," and the "maybes" to produce a tenable ladder to responsible senior billets for the 1320 designated officer.
An analysis of the varied opinions reveals the following possible courses of action with respect to career development for the NFO:
- Command opportunity on an equal basis with the naval aviator;
- Delineation of qualifying billets, other than tactical air command, which would lead to deep draft and major command;
- Emphasis on a technical subspecialty, with eventual transfer to the restricted line.
Prior to implementation of the first course action, there are legislative changes which would have to be enacted. Title 10 of the U. S. Code, Section 5942 reads as follows:
- To be eligible to command an aircraft carrier or an aircraft tender, an officer must be an officer in the line of the Navy who is designated as a naval aviator or naval aviation observer and who is otherwise qualified.
- To be eligible to command a naval aviation school, a naval air station, or a naval aviation unit organization for flight tactical purposes, an officer must be an officer in the line of the Navy designated as a naval aviator.
While sub-section (a) refers specifically to naval aviators and naval aviation observers (NFOs), subsection (b) omits any reference to naval aviation observers. One must wonder whether, 40 years ago, when these provisos were written, it was considered necessary for the naval aviation observer to have had command of a tactical flight unit to qualify for command of an aircraft tender or carrier. Apparently not, or the provisos would not have been written as they were. However, situations change rapidly as technological advances create new areas of personnel qualifications. To keep up with these advances, laws must be constantly reviewed to ensure that they allow full use of all qualified personnel.
Such is the case of the NFO today, restricted by a law enacted long before he achieved maturity in his community.
Section 5942 of Title 10 needs to be changed to include NFOs in the command pipeline for naval aviation schools, air stations, and naval aviation unit organizations for flight tactical purposes. By doing so, there would be no commitment of the Bureau of Personnel to "spoon-feed" these commands to NFOs.
There would be, however,—and this cannot be over-emphasized—the legal means by which to place an NFO in a command billet if warranted. As it is now, the door is closed to these assignments, and so the argument as to the NFO's ability to assume command remains largely a conversational one.
To coincide with the change to Title 10, paragraphs 1350 and 1374 of Navy Regulations, quoted below, would require substantive change.
1350. Command of Air Activities.
- The officer detailed to command a naval air station or a naval air unit organized for flight tactical or administrative purposes shall be an officer of the line, qualified as a naval aviator, eligible for command at sea.
- The officer detailed to command a naval air activity on shore of a technical nature may be an officer of the line not eligible for command at sea but qualified as a naval aviator. 1374. Succession to Command of Aircraft Units.
The officer succeeding to command of an aircraft squadron, group, or wing shall be a line officer qualified as a naval aviator.
These paragraphs are even more restrictive than the U. S. Code. For example, note that paragraph 1350, sub-paragraph 1, requires that the incumbent commanding officer of a naval air unit organized even for administrative purposes, be qualified as a naval aviator. Further, sub-paragraph 2 requires qualification as a naval aviator to command a naval air activity on shore of a technical nature.
It is readily apparent that without change, these two legislative documents will continue to restrict NFO command opportunity within the aviation community to such a degree that promotional opportunity will also be effected.
The second course of action, the delineation of qualifying billets other than tactical air command, which would lead to deep draft and major command, will most likely appeal to the middle of the road advocates. They are the proponents of a strong career development pattern for NFOs, but they will not support a bid for tactical air command.
This avenue to senior commands is one which requires close examination before actual billets are pegged as "qualifying billets." Billets within the aviation community should not be divided or identified as 1310 billets and 1320 billets. Such an action would split the community into two factions, instead of strengthening the bond which has developed over the past ten years. Rather, an attempt should be made to identify those billets which are determined to be responsible steppingstones to senior commands. An example of such a billet would be that of the executive officer of a squadron. While he is not actually in command, he is in a position of command association which should sufficiently reflect his potential for future assignments. There are similar billets on board ship that would qualify in this respect. Certain department head billets are normally assigned to officers who have progressively demonstrated outstanding performance and are considered to be forerunners of their contemporaries. The successful completion of such a tour would be indicative of the ability and further command potential of the assignee. Without being specific as to billet titles and numbers, it is recommended that billets outside of command billets be examined for inclusion in a category which could be defined as "normally prerequisite to and qualifying for" senior commands. Such an action would not only strengthen the NFO's position in this highly competitive society, but provide a relief valve for those deserving aviators, who because of timing, schooling, numbers, etc., were not in a position to compete for command within an expected time frame.
This second alternative of delineating qualifying billets, while far from epitomizing equitable competition, would, however, provide a collateral route to commands beyond that of tactical air.
The third course of action is the suggested emphasis on a technical subspecialty with an eventual transfer to the restricted line. It is easy to see why this course of action would appeal to many senior officers. They are, by virtue of their experience and foresight, fully aware of the increasing complexity associated with the rapid technological advances in aviation. They are also both aware and apprehensive about the personnel requirements at all levels to keep abreast of the situation. The writing on the wall, so to speak, indicates that the key word associated with the aircraft of the future is avionics. With the lead time in all phases of aviation development and procurement getting longer each year, the Navy must design the aircraft of the future today. It is most natural to think of the NFO and aircraft avionics as closely related to each other. It is also most logical to assume that the obvious person to determine future operational avionics efficiency will be the NFO. Therefore, the NFO should definitely be encouraged toward postgraduate training in avionics and weapons systems development. The addition of NFOs with postgraduate training in avionics, to the technological cadre of the Materiel Command will undoubtedly ensure a better weapons system for the future. This course of action is available now to the NFO, by application and acceptance for transfer to the restricted line as an Aviation Engineering Duty Officer. However, this procedure should not be mandatory in any sense. It constitutes only one possibility for an NFO's future, not a recommended career pattern for all.
In summary, the requirement for an acceptable career pattern for the NFO becomes more evident each year. Rapid technological advancement has created a need throughout naval aviation which can not be denied. The NFO is the solution to that need. He is an integral part of naval aviation and must be included within the superstructure of its management if the need is to be fulfilled and incorporated as a significant part of our Navy's strength. This can only be done by providing the means by which the NFO can advance, through responsible positions, to a plateau level with that attainable by the naval aviator. Opening the doors to intermediate levels of command is the optimum method of achieving the desired end. To do so requires the dissolution of age-old barriers and stumbling blocks. Conflicting and contradictory instructions need extensive revision, and new instructions, reflecting corrective measures, need promulgation and execution.
The NFO Program has, by its own momentum, and by the professional direction of the Navy's top management officers, passed several major milestones so far. Not the least of these is the establishment of permanent flight orders and the recognition of their unique talents by the assignment of a separate designator. Now, as they attain their maturity, they find themselves at the threshold of the most significant milestone in their history, command opportunity. After a relatively few years of exposure to the Fleet, the modern NFO has gained the respect and admiration of his peers throughout the aviation community. But the force and vitality of the program will be debilitated rapidly unless action is initiated now to employ the NFO in positions of importance in the years to come.
To this end, it is strongly recommended that a career development program, designed to provide realistic command opportunities for the NFO be established. It should contain, but not be restricted to, the following points:
- Dynamic procurement programs to attract top Naval Academy and civilian college graduates into the NFO program.
- Increased avionics and electronics training at the Basic NAO School, Pensacola, in view of future weapons systems requirements.
- Increased postgraduate quotas for NFOs in management and technological courses. Proportionate distribution of first tour and second tour NFOs in fleet squadrons. Promotion opportunity in all grades equal to that of the naval aviators.
- Full command opportunity at all levels, i.e., Squadron Command, Deep Draft Command, and Major Command.
The Chief of Naval Personnel once remarked that there must be a reasonable career opportunity through the grade of captain for all unlimited officers who are given a regular commission. The Naval Flight Officer most certainly fits into this category. Those who have demonstrated proven ability and have an outstanding career going for them deserve more than token recognition and stratification halfway through their chosen career.
A graduate of the University of Massachusetts in 1956, Lieutenant Commander Loftus served in VAW-12 from 1957 to 1959. Following a 30-month period of inactive service, he served in VP-21 from 1963 to 1965. He was Assistant Operations Officer of FAW-3 in 1965-66, when he assumed his present duty as Executive Assistant and Aide to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D. C. He holds three NFO Designators: Airborne Air Controller, Navigator, and ASW Tactical Co-ordinator.