This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
The political and diplomatic problems inherent in the stationing of the armed forces of one country within the territory of another are not new. There are, however, three new factors that make today’s solution of these problems even more difficult and complex than in the past. First, there is an increased sensitivity about all matters affecting national sovereignty. This is noticeable both in the underdeveloped areas of the world and in the most sophisticated states of Europe. Second, there is the development of nuclear weapons and modern high-performance, long-range delivery techniques. This has permitted the Soviets to threaten direct attack upon support bases, and thus upon “host countries,” which under earlier conditions would have been far removed from the scene of conventional conflict. Third, there is the challenge that confronts the Free World as a result of the announced Communist policy of support for “wars of national liberation.”
It would be incorrect to suppose that the United States, whose experience in dealing with base rights problems has been limited substantially to the last two decades, is the only country plagued with these matters. England and France spent a great part of their resources and energies in the years following World War II trying to prevent their system of overseas bases from disintegrating. And, in November 1956, a delegation from Moscow negotiated a “status of forces agreement,” with Poland and with the other members of the Warsaw Pact, covering the stationing of Soviet military forces within the territory of these “equal and sovereign allies.” One of these “allies” happened to be Hungary on whose territory Soviet tanks and troops had been busy earlier that same month suppressing a popular uprising against the Communist authorities.
alliar
as we agree the pf °f Cc geogr east i expar Easte Strait Eritis]
in the
new (
tory,,
Worlc
hemis negot Eanai base : but a, ble cc ievel c Th«
geogr; tary p entph,
than (
sea pc also f securi G the the W Pefen; jected
Livi
armed
Proble
tenanc
as the
eorne atuch finks i it may
to hol<
as Ion additi( ^eapo f°rces ical ch Play, a back c tional This
The combination of political tensions, the tremendous destructive power of new weap' ons, and the ever-present danger of escalation of bloody insurgencies makes this an extremely volatile period in history. For the United States it poses a fundamental problem—that of extending its defenses in depth- Toward this end, the United States took the lead even before the Korean conflict in advocating a system of collective security- We established various multilateral defensive
:ms inarmed :ory of wever, >lution i coman injecting e both Id and urope. uclear nance, is has ;ct ati “host iitions : scene is the d as a policy
HI.”
at the iealing imited is the attcrs. iart of years revent isinte- ielega- tus of th the
vering within e reign to be cs and nonth
st the
is, the weap' ilation n eX' >r the prob- depth- 3 took lict in mrity.
ensive
In the the W,
case of the Russians, the result has been arsaw Pact and the Sino-Soviet Mutual
a iances (of which NATO is the best known) as well as a series of bilateral mutual defense agreements with our friends in far corners of e globe. More recently the growing power 0 Communist China has threatened another geographic region—that of South and Southeast Asia. This vast area includes the broad pXPanse of the Indian Ocean from the astern coast of Africa all the way to the ^trait of Malacca. In November of 1965, the . nbsh announced that certain of their islands ln Indian Ocean had been organized as a entity, the British Indian Ocean Terri- °ry, and would be available for possible Free orld defense needs. Here in our own ertUsphere, we are currently in the process of aegotiating new treaty arrangements with anania which will include not only revised ase rights and status of forces agreements, kjUt a^so authority to proceed with the possi- e construction and operation of a new sea- evd canal.
The Soviet Union starting from a different ^e°graphic environment and a different mili- J*ry concept than the United States—that is, th ^as’s on ground and missile forces rather san 0n the combination of mobile land and
a*isoPOWer’ strateSic air and ICBM units—has S>S0 f°und it necessary to adopt a global
In concePt based on an alliance system.
E) f
jcC ense Treaty, both of which are being sub- C^ec* to centrifugal stresses. a1VlnS as we do in the era of the nuclear Pr Ki balIistic missile, increasing political teems are being placed in the way of main- as ft!100 defenses *n depth. For one thing, cc Prospect of having one’s country be? an atomic battlefield without having stnks ‘t0 Sa^ about h one way or the other rS lnto the mind of the man-in-the-street, to V, d]'rWe^ become more and more difficult as these alliances together. Then again, add V Trange weapons systems improve, as \vea10naI nations acquire their own nuclear force °nf an<^ strategic delivery systems, the teal ch° eConomy> national pride, and polit- plaauvinism can be expected to come into back an<^,tbe natural tendency will be to fall tionr>i°n home-based military power for na-
aal security.
ls trend could not have been brought
home more vividly than it was by President Charles de Gaulle in the portion of his February 1966 press conference which dealt with NATO. He pointed out that as France has now become “a nuclear power by herself, by her own means, she is led to assume the political and strategic responsibilities which that implies.” This, in turn, DeGaulle went on to say, called for a restoration of “a normal situation of sovereignty, in which everything that is French, on the ground, in the air and on the seas, and every foreign element stationed in France must be under the sole control of French authorities.”
Any erosion of the collective security concept obviously causes far more complications for the United States, which is basically an air/sea power with continuing interests in foreign economic development, than it does for the Soviet Union, a land power with relatively little present capability for foreign economic enterprises or trade. Thus, from the American point of view, it is mandatory that we solve the problems related to our overseas bases in an intelligent, farsighted manner calculated to maintain our present system of defenses in depth, to strengthen our alliances, and to improve our relationships with like- minded people everywhere.
The basic principle governing the stationing of the armed forces of one country within the territory of another is mutuality of defense interest. Ideally, the granting of base rights by a host country is a voluntary exercise of its national sovereignty based on mutual security considerations. However, no matter how you look at it, once two countries agree that it is in their common interest for the forces of one to be stationed on the soil of the other, this recognition of military realities carries with it an unavoidable sacrifice of national sovereignty by both parties.
As complicated as the military and strategic factors are today, it is still comparatively easy to establish common ground insofar as the military analysis of the mutual defense requirements of the two parties is concerned. But it is at the next stage that both sides begin to “see through a glass, darkly.” Domestic political pressures begin to enter the equation, beclouding the issue. From there on, the heads of the respective delegations engaged in
a base rights negotiation must exhibit those rare qualities that distinguish true statesmen from clever negotiators. Only under wise leadership which senses the course of history in the decades to come will both sides find the patience to include in their analysis of the facts a sympathetic understanding of one another’s local problems.
From an understanding of the mutuality of defense interests comes a willingness to sacrifice a certain degree of national sovereignty in exchange for greater security. Thus, the first task of the two delegations is to undertake a careful and intelligent examination of the military threat and of the defensive requirements generated by this threat. They must then consider the political and economic problems inherent in meeting these requirements, including the day-to-day problems related to the operation of the bases. And, finally, they must evaluate the net long-term value of the joint defensive effort to both parties. As each side expects to gain by the transaction, the sum of the parts must be greater than the whole. But, since this is a problem of human relationships rather than mathematics, it is not impossible. The base rights negotiator must take his cue from the businessman who makes his livelihood through the exchange of goods and services to the profit of both himself and his customers.
It takes practical statesmanship to determine how far both parties can go at any particular time toward reaching an area of agreement, taking into account the current political realities in both countries. As this is the stage where discussion ends and hard bargaining begins, it often appears that a clever negotiator is a valuable asset. However, this is the point where wisdom and judgment are much more important than bargaining skills.
What we must remember is that any base rights negotiation is only one phase in a continuing and, hopefully, an enduring relationship between two sovereign nations. If the respective delegations have done their work well, they will leave behind them a stronger and more viable relationship than existed when they started. But it cannot be expected to be permanent or unchanging. Human affairs are ever in constant flux. Wise agreements last longer than foolish or expedient ones, but no agreement lasts forever. All that can be expected of any single negotiation is to make progress in the right direction so that at a later date this progress may be resumed. One of the best rules for the U. S. spokesman is to “make haste slowly.”
The first task, then, is to reach agreement on the military threat. As complex as this is when weapon systems include both conventional air power and ballistic missiles and both conventional and nuclear explosives, it is still susceptible of solution. It requires a basic understanding of the Communist doc- j trine of ultimate world conquest, of the Soviet or Chinese Communist military capabilities for attack under atomic or non-atomic conditions, and finally, of the Communists’ ability to achieve their end by subversion or through a combination of military and subversive pressures.
For the United States the process of reaching agreement on the security threat is sometimes easier with a small power than with one of our major allies. This is because the latter have their own world-wide, professional in' telligence services that frequently produce different estimates of Communist long-range intentions and capabilities than do ours; and also because the older nations have a greater technical knowledge (and consequently their own private theories) of the military implications of the development of new weapon8 systems.
son of forces target In , U. S. Positio This r
in the Tons. ( sPecifi< Unitec on the fice of
reduce nient t
Und threat fense r
complc
cornbii
ments, territoi sPecific naval f in Was the ba Tfirem ever, h Iars. T the pre
fhe lik,
initial ; and th,
Portun:
Write a
Ton’s
Vvherc
Pr°grai
degree
U- S. n
grease
difficnl
Present
develop
threat j
there i: defense §ram, ^efense Havi
The other major difficulty in reaching accord on the military analysis is that the threat) even if agreed to by both parties, looks different to the United States than it does to th<j host country. For example, we are convince that the best hope for world peace, and consequently for the security of any nation large or small, is to maintain our own capability f°f massive atomic retaliation against the sourc6 of aggression. The practical implementation of this concept requires us to take measure8 to contain the Soviet bloc within a system 0 defensive alliances and forward bases. Whde our friends generally agree that our reasoning is correct, their very geographic proximity 1 the enemy compels them to weigh careful!) the advantages of being just behind the outc1 perimeter of U. S. military power against the disadvantages of making themselves, by re3'
11 that tion is so that umed. esman
of the very presence of retaliatory U. S.
tore
:ement
this is Driven- ;s and ves, it lires a ;t doc- i Soviet bilities condi- ability irough versive
reach- some- ith one ; latter nal inrod uce ;-range rs; and greater y their
nplica-
eaponS
ing ac- threat) iks dif' i to the
ivinced
d conn large ility f°f
source ntatio'1 easure5 stem o'
While
isonin!?
mity t°
irefulh e outef inst the by rea'
,Ver> has an entirely different bill of particu-
, --Mrs is based on the theory that since the - 1
gree or anotiler) ancj the main job of the
Unr neS°tiator is to avoid being drawn into diff asonablc additional commitments. The pre;c">ty is that the same intelligence data devoted the American delegation to 10P an awareness of the Communist tion L 1S generallY used later by the host na- pj as a basis for increasing its requests for ther '.’’dltary assistance. In other cases where Hof ls neither a formal alliance, bilateral gram treaty> nor military assistance pro- df>r ’ ^le United States assumes no new -e °bligations.
avmg agreed upon these important points,
es on their soil, an even more certain target for the initial Soviet attack.
In this regard, the specter of a possible • S. withdrawal from our forward military Positions is always in the back of their minds, nis results in many seeming inconsistencies the other side’s logic during the negotia- hons. On the one hand, they seek to obtain a specific continuing commitment from the nited States to defend their country; while the other, in order to minimize their sacri- Ce of sovereignty, they make every effort to reduce the term of the defense or base agree- rtlent to 20 years or ten, or even to one year.
, Understanding and agreement on the reat must then be translated into U. S. dense requirements, of which any single base c°mplex is but a relatively small part, in c°rnbination with the host country’s requirements, in most cases the defense of its entire ^erritory. The U. S. negotiator has a fairly 0 cine bill of particulars (usually for air or in W giyen him hy the authorities
^ Washington, and he is instructed to obtain e base rights necessary to meet these re- rements. The country concerned, how. . has an e
J,rs- Theirs is
the ^.resence U. S. military forces increases • c hkelihood of their being a target for the and^ ^0V*C|; attack—a theory which Pravda the Moscow radio reiterate at every opportunity—the United States should under-
tion,C °r t^1C 6reater Part of the host nas defense budget. In those countries pro ^ WC arC suPPorting military assistance cje^rarns this condition already exists to one
the stage is now set for the most difficult phase of the base negotiations; that is the political problem of determining what elements of national sovereignty will be waived in the interests of mutual defense. No matter how much good will or personal trust exists between the negotiators on both sides, any sacrifice of sovereignty is such a sensitive domestic issue that it has to be handled with statesmanlike vision.
In general, this phase is one where the local negotiator holds a tremendous advantage. In the first place, he is thoroughly familiar with the political situation and balance of political power in his own country. Second, he has access, either direct or through “leaks,” to his own press. Third, if deemed expedient, he can stimulate the “loyal opposition” to whatever degree of protest seems appropriate —all the way from an anti-government speech to a mass meeting or even a riot. Consequently, the U. S. negotiator can never be sure that these outward manifestations of local political pressures are real or merely good stage-managing.
The political problems inherent in meeting the agreed defense requirements are threefold. There are the local political issues generated in the host country proper; there are political problems of an international nature resulting from the effect that the negotiation has on the political image of the host country in the eyes of its neighboring states; and finally there are the political repercussions which the negotiations might generate in the United States.
Generally speaking, the latter, while the most unpredictable of all, can usually be handled back in Washington by marshaling bipartisan support for the negotiation on the basis that it contributes toward the success of a broader national policy that has already been approved. This does not mean that the appropriate Congressional committees will not go through any major base rights agreement with a fine-tooth comb and ask the most penetrating and sometimes embarrassing questions. Nor does it mean that the U. S. negotiator will not be constantly reminded that whatever he comes up with will be subject to subsequent scrutiny by the legal divisions of State and Defense, not to mention Congress itself. All this is, of course, necessary.
But in the long run this problem will probably be more tangible and less onerous than some of the others.
Sometimes, just when things seem to be going well, the American negotiator is suddenly brought back to reality when the press in the local capital prints an extract from some Congressional hearing comparing the total U. S. economic and military aid that the host country has received with that received by neighboring nations in the same area. Only then does the U. S. spokesman understand that the real concern of the host country is not what its neighbors think, but rather whether it will succeed in getting at least as good, or if possible a better “deal” from the United States. Each nation wants to be the “most favored nation” when it comes to receiving U. S. military or economic assistance.
The local political issues generated in the host country by the presence of U. S. bases or U. S. military personnel are very real and, unfortunately, constantly recurring. They arise from the day-to-day operation of our
military installations overseas.
The basic question involved is that of jurisdiction—of which country’s laws are applicable in the event of criminal offenses involving our military personnel. This problem is generally the major stumbling block in any base negotiation. Its solution hinges entirely on the degree of mutual trust that exists between the parties concerned—for there can be no agreement without a waiver of some element of national sovereignty by both sides.
bases
brand
numb,
the ti arise ( Th S.
UlUst, t0 the
any n
nation the st. Precis, under: rePres trust.
Moha "-“an is ei a pick the wi just b count] Georg the pi fenses be exj: One under: forcing becorr provis that tl docun
is the
This c by 14 armed other’: Paper, provis ment i uiust ]
ble of negoti where °n the °f eco will n favore
No U. S. negotiator can expect to make progress when the subject of jurisdiction is under consideration, unless he prepares himself properly. Before he even begins to discuss the subject he must first divest his mind of all assumptions, preconceived notions, or hearsay knowledge and get down to facts. He must understand the host country’s system of justice and scale of punishments for various offenses. He must not be diverted by false notions which are often prevalent in the United States. For example, there is the persistent and erroneous belief that H
iat of rs are flenses prob- block hinges ;t that d—for waiver ity by
make i is un- limself ass the of all hear- e must of j us- various y false in the is the lat i°
the
wrist. Similarly, he must not assume that
U
Mohammedan countries the law of the Koran
... an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”
ls enforced literally to the extent that when a Pickpocket is caught his hand is cut off at
Just because a jail is located in a foreign country it is necessarily worse than a jail in eorgia or Florida. He must know statistically ne probable number of various types of of- enses by U. S. military personnel which can e expected per year.
Once he has obtained a truly objective Understanding of the local procedures for en- orcing justice, the U. S. negotiator must then econie fully informed of the jurisdiction Provisions of all other base rights agreements *, at the United States has signed. The basic ocument to start him in his field of research the ]spyro “Status of Forces Agreement.” k ls contains a set of principles, agreed upon f 14 nations, governing the stationing of the arnied forces of those countries on one an- er s soil. Having mastered that remarkable Paper, he must then study the jurisdictional Provisions of every bilateral defense agreement the United States has signed to date. He ^J"st keep himself as fully informed as possi- e °f the progress of other U. S. base rights negotiations which may be in progress else- ere in the world. This is important because the question of jurisdiction, as in the case . (rc°nornic or military aid, the host country £ 1 make every effort to obtain the “most ;u ored nation treatment” for itself.
erhaps most important of all, when the ' S. spokesman has mastered all this, he ^ st> at all costs, avoid a legalistic approach 0 the problem of jurisdiction. True, when y nation agrees to give up a portion of its the'°na^ sovereiSnty ‘n llm higher interests of state, such an agreement must be very uClsely worded so as to avoid future mis- r standings. But as stated earlier, this
Presents an area of mutual trust, not distrust. ’
rT'i
ba tlC actual operation of U. S. military p)rSes 0verseas is the responsibility of that nu k °Ur armecl services with the greatest J.er Personnel stationed on the base at arjstlme. The inevitable problems which U Sg daUy from the administration of these • lnstallations on foreign soil are, for the
most part, solved by the local commander in a satisfactory manner. From time to time, however, some relatively insignificant incident gets out of hand and becomes a cause celebre, to the considerable detriment of our relations with the country concerned. Analysis of these incidents indicates that they can usually be traced back to one of the following causes: an inability on the part of our military officials to distinguish between convenience and necessity; the subconscious tendency of U. S. commanders to run their bases as though the obsolete concept of extraterritoriality still applied; the failure on the part of the military departments to delegate to the local commander authority to handle local situations promptly without reference to Washington; and finally, the absence of a “safety-valve mechanism” (perhaps in the form of a standing body composed of the senior military representatives from both countries) where problems arising from the operation of U. S. bases could be discussed and resolved satisfactorily in private before the local politicians or press have a chance to blow them up to the stature of “international incidents.”
To enlarge briefly on each of these causes, take the first—our inability to distinguish between convenience and necessity. This is one of our greatest failings in the operation of our overseas bases. Sometimes our commanders turn down requests from the local authorities without any explanation whatsoever. Sometimes they refuse because they feel that if they make any concession at all they will invite other demands. “Give ’em an inch and they’ll take a yard” is the attitude of some base commanders. True, this is always a risk, but by being stiff-necked we frequently get ourselves in a position which is completely irrational and which we cannot possibly justify. Take the case where a local highway runs through the base. Of course it complicates the base commander’s life to have a civilian road cutting across a military base. It increases the problems of internal security many-fold. It would be far preferable, from an administrative point of view, to have the highway detour around the base. But is it really necessary to make a major issue of this point, to go to the expense of building a by-pass road, not to mention the
inconvenience which the long way around would cause the local population? Sometimes it is, but certainly not always. In the United States we have a number of military reservations which are bisected by heavily traveled national highways. To mention just two, there is Camp Pendleton, California, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
There are other instances where we seriously jeopardize our friendly relations when we refuse to be reasonable. For example, the right to fish in naval base harbors, or to timber and mine in outlying portions of large military reservations, seems perfectly natural to the local population. If we refuse to permit nationals the use of such natural resources of their own country, we place the United States in an untenable position. Obviously, the base commander is responsible for the security of his installation, but he must also take into account the local economy. He cannot be arbitrary. Where the situation requires access to his base, he must establish controls. But in this as in other matters pertaining to the operation of the base, his criteria should be based on practical necessity and reasonableness.
Unless a conscious effort is made to avoid it, it is very easy for a base commander to think of his installation as U. S. property. As a result, all his dealings with the local officials are based on this false assumption and short tempers on both sides soon follow.
Many of the problems previously discussed could be alleviated, and perhaps even eliminated entirely if there existed in each nation where the United States maintains bases, a “safety-valve mechanism” to handle, on a quiet military level, the day-to-day questions which the administration of these American installations on foreign soil inevitably raise. The U. S. negotiator, when he has had a chance to digest the various grievances concerning the operation of our bases which the other delegation is certain to bring up during the talks, will find himself confronted with a whole briar patch of thorny, unresolved issues. It will be impossible for him to solve them individually and, in fact, any discussion of them during the bases talks will only distract the attention of both sides from the true goal of the negotiations. His best course, both from the standpoint of the immediate discussions as well as that of improving the daily relations between the two nations, is to propose the establishment of a joint standing military body, located in the capital city of the host country, whose job would be to consider and, whenever possible, resolve such matters on a continuing basis.
In all probability, this proposal will be well received by the other side. This is understandable when one realizes how formal and cumbersome the present procedures for intergovernmental consultation are. In some cases the situation requires a “note” to be initiated through the U. S. Embassy, or the Foreign Office. This is slow and is generally impractical for regular use. Another method, which exists on paper, but which is never used for such routine matters, is through the consultative machinery set up by the bilateral or multilateral mutual defense treaty. These treaties usually provide for “regular meetings” to discuss the implementations of the defense agreement, but they occur so infrequently (annually or even less often) and handle matters on such a high-level that they are quite useless as far as providing assistance in the practical operation of U. S. bases is concerned. Instead, what is needed is for the senior U. S. base commanders and the senior military officials of the host country to sit down together in private at least once a month and discuss these problems.
There is a certain rapport between military men of all nations which enables them to talk frankly and to reach agreement on matters affecting their profession. Consequently, the U. S. negotiator will find it to everyone’s advantage if he can obtain agreement to establish the “safety-valve mechanism” as a purely military body. The military representatives on both sides will, of course, seek guidance from their respective governments, but they will be able to do this with a background of practical understanding, using secure channels without fear of compromise or “leaks” to the press.
the bas officer, then b<
body (,
fense be fiator s base ri; Underst the op,
result, tvhich ftient t governi fiuietly
The: an und terests : value o governi Propare each cc are reVi elosely eessions
b°th sic
. The
jobs to i hnowle, s°nalit> to its ac Nations i his sup what tl
Experience has shown that it is to everyone S advantage if the host country will assign military liaison officers to the staffs of the American base commanders to assist them in their dealings with the local civil authorities and to help them solve many of their admin' istrative problems on the spot. Matters which
General Black graduated from the U. S. Military Academy with the Class of 1940 and served in the OSS in the European Theater during World War II. He received his M.A. degree in International Relations from George Washington University. During his career, he has commanded the 2nd Battle Group, 19th Infantry, served as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Defense, and has been both student and instructor at National War College. Between 1962 and 1965, general Black served two tours of duty with the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. He was 'rector, Western Hemisphere Region, OSD, until ecember 1966, when he assumed command of U. S. 'vrrny Support, Thailand.
base commander, assisted by his liaison °fficer, are unable to solve at their level could then be referred to the military consultative °dy (which might be called a “mutual de- ense board”) for resolution. If the U. S. negotiator succeeds in his mission of obtaining a ase rights agreement founded on trust and Understanding, this same feeling will pervade the operations of the defense board. As a result, the great majority of the matters 'vhich have in the past caused embarrass- n'Cnt to the friendly relations of the two S°vernments will be handled promptly and fiuietly by the responsible military officials.
The final step in the process of establishing an understanding of the mutual defense interests is the evaluation of the net long-term Value of this joint defensive effort to the two governments concerned. This evaluation is Prepared separately and independently by ea°h country. Although parts of these studies are revealed at the conference table, they are osely held as they form the basis for the concessions and sacrifice of sovereignty made by
. The American spokesman has two difficult kn S t0 accomPhsh here. He must, through his owledge, eloquence, and persuasive personality, convince the host country that it is j° Us advantage to have U. S. military instal- fions on its soil. He must also make sure that *s superiors in Washington know exactly at they are getting for their money and
effort. The first job is generally well within the capabilities of the U. S. spokesman. The second is more difficult.
To be specific, the U. S. negotiator must acquire sufficient knowledge to evaluate political and economic trends in the host country. He must be able to think in terms of the strategic geography of the entire area and understand the importance of the host country’s location in supporting long- range U. S. defense requirements. He must be able to assess possible changes in the country’s strategic value to the United States taking into account the development of new weapons. He must weigh the military value of the base system against the political problems associated with the presence of American soldiers and American military power in that area of the world. Moreover, he must be intellectually honest in making these evaluations and reporting his findings to Washington. Toward the end of a long, arduous negotiation, when it seems that by making just one more concession or one more promise it would be possible to bring the talks to a successful conclusion, it is not easy to keep one’s objectivity and avoid becoming an advocate for the host country.
The U. S. negotiator will have military advisors of all ranks and from all services on his staff. None of them will be free of his service orientation and each will tend to present a somewhat different strategic estimate of the long-term value of the bases. Formal strategic guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is likely to be so broad and general that it is subject to various interpretations by his military assistants.
And behind all of this uncertainty and confusion stands the Congress with the power to repudiate his entire effort if it is not to its liking. Every move he makes he must be prepared to explain, in an entirely different environment—in a Congressional committee room. There his audience (and jury) will probably not be overly concerned with either the strategic or long-term political value of the bases. The Congressmen more likely will be looking at the price tag and at the amount of jurisdiction the foreign country will have over “their boys” in the armed forces who will be stationed on the base.
The poor negotiator will have many sleep-
less nights if he worries about these occupational hazards of his trade. He must push right ahead, using the talent he has available in his delegation, calling the shots as he sees them based upon his past experience, his knowledge of the U. S. government, what information he can assemble during the negotiation, and on his own philosophy as to the course of wisdom for the United States. If he can maintain his objectivity, his intellectual honesty, and his conviction that America has to move in the forefront of history, he can hold his head high, knowing that he has given his best to his country. If not, it will be for others to pick up the pieces.
The foregoing deals primarily with the problems and techniques of a base rights negotiation. However, from these observations, it is possible to generalize and list certain basic principles that would appear to have general applicability as guide lines for a much-needed review of our world-wide system of overseas bases. As such, they should also be useful to any American spokesman charged with the heavy responsibility of negotiating a base rights agreement for the United States. These principles are six in number and may be briefly stated as follows:
First: With regard to the countries providing us with overseas bases, they fall generally into three broad categories; namely (1) those who are dealing in real estate, (2) those with whom we have a mutuality of defense interests, although no formal defense commitments, and (3) allies who have joined with us in bilateral or regional defense pacts. In dealing with these three categories of nations, certainly our allies should have priority.
Second: In our relationships with our allies, there can be no such thing as a “second-class ally.” What is good for one is good for all. This applies to status of forces agreements, base rights, mutual consultation, and all other aspects of the operation of our bases.
Third: Base problems, like so many others today, stem from the natural difficulties of human relations. When we attempt to evaluate these problems to determine whether or not they outweigh the value of the bases, we must realize that such an assessment cannot be made purely on the basis of the real estate or of the weapons system involved. Far more
important in the long run are the people of the country concerned. It is they who make and break alliances; it is they who make bases . untenable.
Fourth: The concept of exclusive U. S. use ; of bases is rapidly becoming obsolete. It smacks entirely too much of extra-territoriality to survive for long in the present political climate. Furthermore, in these atomic and thermonuclear times the very presence of a base involves a definite sharing of the defense responsibility by the host country. This being the case, we should, as a matter of policy, move toward the joint use of these bases wherever this is mutually beneficial, and accept now a much greater degree of joint consultation and joint planning with our allies than we have seen fit to permit in the past.
Fifth: In allied countries whose defensive capabilities are low, the political importance : of U. S. military bases is high. In the current period of change and uncertainty, it is a fact that our allies are often more concerned over what we will do next than they are over the Communists’ next move. The presence of out overseas bases provides physical proof of our military capability to react at once to an attack. Their absence creates doubts as to the sincerity of our defense commitments. Withdrawal of a base system from the territory of an ally, particularly a militarily weak ally> could very well force that country into neutralism or into an alliance with the Communist bloc.
Sixth: Once we recognize that we are in a period of historical change, we have, i*1 effect, accepted the principle of the need fof modernization of our relationship with out allies. Contracts and agreements previously entered into should be reviewed periodically and brought up-to-date. It should be the United States who takes the initiative in such a revision. We should not, when we intend to make concessions anyway, let ourselves be put in the position of being forced into then1 or of making these concessions grudgingly. We should get ahead of events. If we are able to do this, we could take corrective measures be' fore being asked and our proposals could be presented to our friends with all the graciouS' ness of a beau geste, in a manner truly befitting a great nation.