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From April 1993 Proceedings Magazine

By LTCOL David Evans, USMC (Ret.)

What irony. The President who declared in his victory speech that the 1992 election was all about bringing Americans together tossed a hand grenade his first week in office that blew people apart. That grenade was Clinton's declaration to make good on his campaign promise to strike the 50-year-old ban on avowed homosexuals in the armed forces.

It was a promise he made, not just once, but at least three times during the course of the campaign. Yet it never ignited the kind of furious debate that has flared since Clinton's inauguration.

Why not? For one thing, Clinton as candidate was not saying anything different than presidential contenders senators Robert Kerrey (D-NE) and Tom Harkin (D-IA). They, too, said that if elected they would issue an executive order striking the ban on gays in the military. And Kerrey had the advantage of being a Medal of Honor recipient from Vietnam, which made him bulletproof from accusations that he didn't understand what he was proposing because be hadn't served, the rap often heaped on Clinton, whose sole experience was a brief flirtation with the ROTC.

The electorate didn't get ambushed, and voters shouldn't be surprised on this one. But even though Clinton declared on election eve that Americans turned out "in massive numbers" to vote for "a new beginning," the mathematics of the election do not suggest that Clinton was swept into the White House by the force of an overwhelmingly popular mandate.

To be sure, in percentage terms, the turnout was higher than at any time since the 1968 election. About 56% of the voting-age population turned out, but in 1992's three-way race, only 43% of the ballots cast were for Clinton. Let's see, 56% times 43% indicates that about 24% of the total voting-age population pulled the lever for Clinton.

If 2% of the population is gay, as some recent surveys suggest, then the real depth of support for Clinton's intention to strike the ban on gays in the military looks thin indeed, although activist organizations like the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund will tell you that gays cast one out of every seven votes for Clinton.

Clinton, who probably knows these numbers as well as anybody, has not been saying he's simply carrying out the popular will on the gay issue.

How, then, do we explain his determination? Here, too, there is an element of irony. By standing tough on the gays in uniform issue, Clinton stakes out a position as a man of principle. We cannot know if Clinton sees the paradox here, of a man seizing the moral high ground on behalf of a constituency whose sexual practices many Americans regard as immoral, but perceptions are important.

After all, Clinton has a history of standing on both sides of the issue. Take the free trade agreement with Mexico. Love the concept, Clinton declared, but I've got some problems with the treaty. Take the middle-class tax cut. Clinton stood foursquare behind a $300 tax cut per couple, but he later abjured, saying he didn't have the latest figures on the government's runaway deficit.

In terms of promises broken and promises Clinton can keep, the gay issue is a no-brainer. It doesn't raise the deficit another $100 billion. It doesn't trigger the "giant sucking sound" Ross Perot said would be heard if millions of American jobs migrate to Mexico under the rubric of "free trade."

After all, Clinton came through on his campaign promise to deliver a more diverse cabinet, and he delivered on his promise to overturn federal laws restricting access to abortion. The question was never "whether" he would follow through on his pledge to dismantle the barriers to gays in the military, but "how."

The political mechanics were laid out in a 14 January memorandum to Defense Secretary Les Aspin crafted by his aides. “The policy decision has been made,” they wrote. The real threat was from Congress, which they noted “has the authority to reverse the President’s decision and might do so if the matter is not handled very carefully.” The authors of the memorandum pointed out that Senate majority leader George Mitchell (D-ME) "estimates that there are no more than 30 sure votes against such a resolution."

This memorandum to Aspin was a marketing plan. The aides recommended that the President first meet with key senators to forestall congressional opposition. They recommended that the President then meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but this session was in no way intended to open the door to a reversal of Clinton's campaign pledge. "This is not a negotiation ... it is the first step in the consultation that you have promised," the memorandum said. It was plainly to be a pro forma meeting with the top brass—a placebo for the military, which, in the event, served nicely as a photo opportunity for the White House.

In its action plan, the memorandum outlined a two-phase procedure to overturn the ban on gays: an immediate suspension of policies authorizing discharges and denying enlistment to gays and lesbians, followed by an executive order that the Defense Secretary would prepare for the President's signature on 15 July 1993, making the changes permanent.

When details of the plan became public knowledge, the effect was like throwing gasoline on a smoldering fire.

Gay activist groups rejoiced. Veterans’ organizations angrily denounced the President's plan. So did a Christian fundamentalist group, which called upon Clinton to provide a 60-to 90-day public comment period on his proposed executive order. The issue took on the aspect of a fight over prerogative and turf.

A retired member of the Joint Chiefs, who prefers to keep his name out of print so as not to complicate matters for his successor, said the Chiefs should be permitted to engage in a meaningful policy debate rather than dealing only with the "how" of lifting the ban. "The Chiefs should be able to offer their best military advice untarnished and unfettered by the 'how' issue," he declared.

This officer smelled a trap. "Once the Chiefs work out the 'how,' the reaction (of their political masters) will be, 'You told us how; now let's get on with it.'"

The President's opponents on Capitol Hill grumbled openly about executive branch infringement on congressional authority. "The Constitution clearly gives Congress the right to 'make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,' yet the Clinton strategy goes to great lengths to circumvent Congress," groused Representative Floyd Spence (R-SC).

On the Senate floor, William Cohen (R-ME) complained about "a verdict first and a trial later. We should create a body of evidence that we can base a decision on."

Indeed, Sam Nunn (D-GA), the respected chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, delivered a major floor speech reiterating the Constitutional prerogatives of the Congress and the need for hearings, with testimony from all sides, before arriving at a final decision on the gay issue. "We must move very cautiously" in matters of national defense, he said. 'This caution is prudence, not prejudice."

Nunn's message, we might suspect, was intended not only to put a brake on hasty action out of the White House, but also to reassure the military. "I'm your guy; I am going to protect your culture," Nunn seemed to be saying.

The immediate result of his speech was an evening meeting with Clinton, where the two worked out a compromise to Aspin's original plan. Recruits would not be questioned about their sexual orientation, but homosexual discharges would continue. What did not change was Clinton's commitment to issue an executive order on 15 July.

While Nunn apparently was staking out a position in opposition to the President, he is part of the mathematics of this issue that can be boiled down to two numbers: There are 58 Democrats and 42 Republicans in the Senate.

How many of those Democrats are going to cross a President from their party when it comes to a roll-call vote? Not many, if the vote 4 February on a Republican-led overture to attach an amendment to a family-leave bill-which would have kept in place the Defense Department" s preexisting policies on gays-is any indication.

Only two Democrats-senators Howell Heflin and Richard Shelby from Alabama-deserted their party and President and joined the predominantly Republican vote for the measure. On the other hand, 7 of those 42 Republicans sided with the Democrats. With Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) absent, the measure went down from 62 to 37, despite the fulminations of Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) that "President Clinton has vowed to let members of Act Up and Queer Nation invade the U.S. military."

Nunn, having earlier gotten his "slow down" compromise with the President, also voted against the Republican effort.

Minority leader Robert Dole (R-KS), who opposes lifting the gay ban, vowed, "We are going to win, whether that is six months from now or whenever that may be."

The vote was not directly for or against gays in the military, but more precisely a referendum on the Nunn compromise. Even so, Dole is smart enough to know he's in a tough fight. The Republicans must avoid being seen as perpetuating the congressional gridlock that may have contributed 10 the party's defeat in the 1992 campaign.

Further, the gay lobby may co-opt some Republican votes. Consider the vocal gay population in New York, which may have influenced Senator Alfonse D' Amato (R-NY) to vote with the Democrats. If ever there was evidence of the uncertain politics of the issue, it's the vote of this Roman Catholic, right-wing, anti-abortion, social conservative senator.

The 62-to-37 vote indicates that, in the crunch, majority leader Mitchell just might be able to muster a lot more than 30 votes.

Suppose the Republican-led effort had prevailed? Clinton might have gagged on the gay ban grafted onto a family leave bill, which Democrats have wanted for years (and which Bush vetoed) and vetoed the bill himself. How many of those senators would have been willing to slap the President twice on the gay issue and override his veto? That would take a two-thirds majority. Again, we are back to the two key numbers: 58 Democrats and 42 Republicans.

Assume all 42 Republicans voted to override the President, they would still need the support of 24 Democrats to achieve the necessary 66 votes. The mathematics are formidable.

To be sure, Nunn's Armed Services Committee hearings in March might change a few senatorial minds, but it could go either way. Yes, the Joint Chiefs will testify, and Nunn will probably remind them that they are legally obligated to express their personal opinions. The top brass just might unload a heap of bitter reservations. Then again, overly strident gay activists could reinforce the Chiefs' apprehensions.

The Sam Nunn Show, covered by C-SPAN, promises to be riveting television, but when it's all over, will there be enough votes (51) to knock down an executive order from Clinton and, if necessary, 66 votes to overcome a presidential veto?

Remember, in the past four years, the Senate voted to override President Bush just once out of about 20 confrontations, many of which were over core Democrat issues like minimum wage and family leave.

Such is the power of the chief executive-Clinton can win even against odds of 65 to 1. He can bull his way past Sam Nunn, although if the public doesn't turn around, even Clinton will have to weigh the collateral damage. Dole said his phone calls are running ten to one against what he called "Clinton's mission to open the barracks to gays."

A Clinton victory could, ironically, hand the Republicans a campaign issue for 1994. The Republican message is almost predictable:"See, these are the same old liberal Democrats with their radical social agenda we've been warning you about."

Far fetched? Not based on a joke making the rounds, in which a Clinton supporter was asked if the new administration hadn't gotten off to a mighty rough start. He replied, "Well, if you're a gay illegal alien who wants an abortion, it's been a great two weeks."

To the Republicans, and many Americans, it is not very funny.

Lieutenant Colonel Evans is the military affairs writer for the Chicago Tribune, based at the Washington, D.C. bureau.