Midway Island/Battle of Midway Material
- Temporarily received topsoil from Hawaii in the early 1950s to aid in the growing of vegetables, 339-340; the island's gooney birds were amusing to watch, 340
(RADM George W. Bauernschmidt, SC)
- USS Nautilus (SS-168) operated in the area during the battle in June 1942 and sank the carrier Soryu with torpedoes, 184-190; site of "gooney bird lodge" built by Pan American Airways and used during World War II, 229-230
(RADM Roy S. Benson – Volume I)
- Japanese prisoners were taken after the June 1942 battle to Pearl Harbor, 128-130; the commanding officer of the atoll was demoralized by problems after the battle, 248-249, 251; description of Midway two days after the battle, 249, 252
(CAPT Slade D. Cutter – Volume I)
- Early indications in 1942 that Japanese geographical code AF meant Midway, 240-242; ruse concocted to prove that AF meant Midway by asking Hawaii to send a message in plain language that their evaporators had broken down, 242; scope of operation, 243; Wesley Wright and Joseph Finnegan determined systematic structure of day code, 244; good luck for U.S. that Japan was not able to change JN-25 code until 25 May, 244; night after Battle of Midway, Dyer attempted to solve message in tactical code but was unsuccessful, 245; Chicago Tribune published front-page story on Navy's advance knowledge of attack, 269-270
(CAPT Thomas H. Dyer)
- Eller's tour of the island with Admiral Chester Nimitz prior to the June 1942 battle, 536; carrier planes' actions described, 536-541; fate of the Yorktown (CV-5), the aftermath, and understanding the battle, 541-544; Eller worked on after-action report, 544-545; Nimitz’s reticence to counter the misinformation that high-level bombers defeated the Japanese, because would also be revealing the breaking of the code, 545-548; Eller viewed the battle as turning point in the war, 548-549
(RADM Ernest M. Eller, Volume II)
- USS Hornet(CV-8) participation, 495-501; speculation on what might have been, 503-504; west forging attacks on Japanese heavy cruisers (Mogami and Mikuma), 505-506; comments on the role of intelligence, 506-507
(CAPT Stephen Jurika, Jr. – Volume I)
- Jurika on the preparations made en route to battle 508-512
(CAPT Stephen Jurika, Jr. – Volume II)
- The exact date set by the Japanese for the attack was determined, 108-109; analysis of Japanese naval radio traffic helped US vessels to prevent enemy reconnaissance on Pearl Harbor, thus leading to Japan’s failure at Midway, 112-113; Japanese traffic analysis (May 1942) indicated Midway as the objective, 122-125; Layton denies all written stories that Nimitz had the entire Japanese battle order before Midway, 125-127; sequence of events leading to Rochefort’s removal, 137-140
(RADM Edwin T. Layton)
- Intense interest of the officers in the battle’s development, 73; efforts of the Army Air Forces to participate in the fight, 74
(VADM Fitzhugh Lee)
- Code breaking provided information on Japanese plans prior to attack, 239-242; Libby saw it as fortunate that Vice Admiral William Halsey was incapacitated with shingles prior to battle of Midway, 240; story about planned attack and broken Japanese code ran in U.S. newspaper, 241
(VADM Rutheven E. Libby)
- Loss of TBD Devastators from Torpedo Squadron Eight in June 1942, 58-59
(CAPT Grayson Merrill)
- Loss of Torpedo Squadron Eight in this June 1942 battle, 58-59
(Navy Wives – Mrs. Marc A. Mitscher)
- Impotence of Army Air Forces B-17s, 21, 29; importance of intelligence before battle and necessity to keep knowledge secret, 26-27, 29; Noel felt the importance of battle was never fully realized, 29; Noel considered it fortuitous that Vice Admiral William Halsey was hospitalized in May 1942 and replaced by Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance before Midway, 29-30; USS Sicard (DM-21) got news of battle from coding machine, 30-31; salvage tug skipper who heard news of Midway battle and damage to Yorktown (CV-5) during poker game at Pearl Harbor correctly anticipated orders to go to her aid, 31
(CAPT John V. Noel)
- Living conditions during 1942, 73-75; intelligence before battle in June of 1942, 39-40, 76-77; preparation for battle by PBY squadrons stationed there, 76-80; detail and accuracy of intelligence won the battle of Midway, 101-102; Ogden’s thoughts on possible outcome of the battle if prior intelligence had not been available, 102-103
(CAPT James R. Ogden)
- PB2Ys fly to island for first time, 53; (1934): beginning of its development for fleet operations, 53-54; difficulties in moving planes to Midway from Hawaii; limits of the planes and inhibitions of the pilots, 59-60; fleet exercise in spring of 1935, 61-62
(VADM Robert Burns Pirie)
- Developing the seaplane base on Midway Island in December 1940, 43-44; patrols of VP-14 from Midway, 62-64
(RADM Arthur W. Price, Jr.)
- The Army Air Forces made exaggerated claims for credit in the victorious battle in June 1942, 52-53; effect on some individual participants, 54-55; role of Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky, 129-130
(RADM James D. Ramage)
- The approaching battle for the island, 73-74; deterioration of facilities (1946), 199
(VADM Lawson P. Ramage)
- Postwar analysis of the battle by a team at the Naval War College, 102-104
(VADM David C. Richardson)
- Five patrol plane squadrons were temporarily placed there in May 1935 to scout out its suitability as a base, 87-88
(VADM Herbert D. Riley)
- Station Hypo's ploy to convince U.S. officers of Midway's identification in coded Japanese messages in early 1942, 210-213; message of 25 May 1942 gave the United States precise information on planned Japanese attack, 214-224, 230-233; Army planes procured to patrol after battle by Admiral Nimitz, 227-230; conflict between services over who could take credit for damage inflicted at Midway, 245-246; Japanese operations, 248-250
(CAPT Joseph J. Rochefort)
- Occupation of Midway would aid the Japanese in establishing a north Pacific barrier patrol to detect hostile forces, like the Doolittle raiders, 145
(ADM James S. Russell)
- Served as a U.S. submarine base in World War II, 64; grounding near Midway in 1943 by the submarine Scorpion (SS-278), 64
(CAPT Paul R. Schratz)
- Disappointing assignment with the Supply Force during the battle, 87
(VADM Roland N. Smoot)
- Flight from Johnston Island to Midway in 1935 a chance to experience "gassing by rank," 22
(VADM Bernard M. Strean)
- Construction around 1940 of U.S. aviation facilities, 60-61; the heavy cruiser Chester (CA-27) made a hurried voyage westward from California in June 1942 but was too late to take part in the battle, 122
(VADM Paul Stroop)
- General overview of location, time of departure, and state of the Yorktown (CV-5), 226-227; Thach and his fellow aviators had no doubts about the importance of the upcoming battle, and so took extra preparations to insure aircraft readiness, 227-229; held a conference with the commanders of the dive bombers and torpedo planes as to the assignment of the fighter escort, 229-231; explained how as a lieutenant he made the kind of decisions reserved for higher-ranking officers in Vietnam, 231-232; description of the capabilities of the U.S. torpedo planes, dive bombers, and fighters, 232; feelings at the time were uncertainty as well as optimism, 233-234; personal disagreement with the separation of the Yorktown (CV-5) from the other two carriers, and the bulk of the fighters being held back, 234-235; discussion of Thach’s squadron formation;, 235-238; digression on the development of the "Thach Weave," 238-240; the weather on the day of battle and the difference in take-off times for the carrier task groups, 240-241; last minutes before takeoff, 241-244; assault by large wave of Zeroes as Thach’s squadron approached the Japanese fleet, 244-251; attacks launched by the U.S. torpedo planes and dive bombers, 251-252; the squadron avoided the tempting "single Zero" trap, and Thach observed the extensive damage done to the Japanese carriers, 252-253; varying situations between the different planes concerning gasoline and flying time, 253-254; felt relief that being shot down wasn’t inevitable, but debated whether he chose right in giving the escort to the torpedo planes, 254-257; aftermath of the first attack; details concerning the American casualties, from enemy fire and friendly fire, 258-259; explained what it feels like to be a fighter plane, 259; discusses his emotions as the engagement with the Zeroes wound down, 259-260; fears were natural, but shouldn’t become overwhelming, 261-263; expressed respect and admiration for his opponent, 261-262; Thach’s mechanic removed an incendiary bullet from his gas tank, 263-264; brief digression on hand signals used to communicate with the deck crew as returning from an attack, 264; explained how his plane’s engine was completely emptied of its oil, 264-265; reasons why only his squadron engaged the enemy, 265-266; Japanese dive bomber attack began to assail the Yorktown (CV-5), 266-267; available U.S. fighters launched to combat recently arrived torpedo planes, 267-269; the dedication of Japanese pilots, 269-270; Japanese torpedo planes shot down, but not before landing the fatal hits to the Yorktown (CV-5), 270-272; expressed anger over poor placement of the carriers, emphasizing Rear Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance’s inexperience with carriers, 272-275; discussion on who was to blame for the loss, 275-277; satisfied that his squadron performed the doctrine well, 277; recounts how many pilots and planes each side lost, 277-278; meeting with Spruance as to whether to pursue the remnants of the enemy fleet, 278-279; subsequent combat air patrols allowed, but uneventful since no more attacks, 279;Army claimed success of B-17s in the battle, 279-280; Thach's press conferences in Boston and Washington, D.C. dealing with Navy successes at Midway, 301-309
(ADM John S. Thach – Volume I)
- Disposition of U.S. submarines for the battle in June 1942, 176-177, 188-189; failure of the Tambor (SS-198) to give a complete report on contacts after battle, 195
(RADM Edward K. Walker)
- Hornet (CV-8) rushed ahead of North Carolina (BB-55), considered the more vital participant at Midway, 33-34
(ADM Alfred G. Ward)
- As a base for U.S. submarine operations in 1944, 185
(RADM Norvell G. Ward)
- Rendezvous between Rear Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Jack Fletcher, the plan being to exploit the element of surprise, 175-176; first sightings of the Japanese fleet and enemy planes near Midway; Spruance launched all available aircraft to attack the carriers, 176; the Yorktown (CV-5) reported the first dive-bombing attack, and Worthington reviewed the distribution of ships guarding the U.S. carriers, 176-177; the valiant fight and loss of the Yorktown (CV-5), 177-180; as third air attack reported, the Benham (DD-397) added significantly to the recovery of Yorktown (CV-5) survivors, 180-182; the controversial withdrawal eastward, followed by Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher giving Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance fighter director command, 181-182; tranfer of rescued personnel – damage-control people to the Astoria, the remaining ones to the Portland, 183-184; potential danger of Japanese submarines in the area, 184; the return of the Benham (DD-397) and other ships in assisting salvage operations resulted in the Hammann (DD-412) getting torpedoed, 184-186; the Benham (DD-397) took part in rescuing the crew of the Hammann (DD-412), 186-188; recovery after return trip to Pearl Harbor, 188-192; recognition that the battle was over, 189; introduction to Midway speech – summary of how U.S. obtained the vital information in breaking the Japanese naval code, 195-196; the Japanese were also collecting vast data, but lacked information on U.S. forces prior to Midway and were fooled by the position of our carriers, 196; movement of the major U.S. carriers during the first 6 months of war, noting the ability to travel long distances without extensive upkeep, 196-197; defense of Midway insured by Nimitz sending everything he could find, 197; the clever ruse which verified Midway as the target of the main Japanese attack, 197-198; Japanese plans and preliminary movements, 198; comparison of the opposing naval forces, 198-199; the actions of the first day (June 3rd), 199-200; Midway fended off an enemy air attack, 200-201; successive air attacks and a marauding sub impeded Japanese carrier operations, exposing them to McClusky’s dive bombers, 200-201; revenge exacted for dive-bombing attack of the Yorktown (CV-5), by pursuing and sinking the Hiryu, 201-202; Rear Admiral Spruance unaware of the main enemy body’s location as re-assembled forces withdraw, 202; Japanese failed assaults on Midway Island, 202-203; the unsuccessful search for the retiring enemy ships, 203; departure on the 6th for a fueling rendezvous, 204; brief synopsis of the critical decisions that turned the tide for the U.S., 204-205; acknowledges the battle was won by individuals, while citing other U.S. advantages, 205-206; the effective U.S. disposition of subs, in contrast to the Japanese, 206-207; torpedo capabilites of U.S. destroyers, 207-208; a look at what-if factors, 208; analysis and questioning of Yamamoto’s actions, 208-210; presentation of the subject at the Advanced Intelligence School, 267-269
(RADM Joseph Muse Worthington)
COMPILED AND RESEARCHED BY: MICHAEL VANDEREEDT,BROADNECK HIGH SCHOOL,
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND, JULY 1999
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