Pass the Command Qualification Assessment!
By LCDR Matt Farrell and LCDR Rob Keller, U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy
Within the past few years, the surface warfare community has added rigor to the command qualification process by developing an extensive command qualification assessment (CQA) for department heads. Covering a wide range of material, the assessment is both fair and challenging, requiring significant preparation. As of November 2016, only 40 percent of candidates had passed the CQA on their first attempt, though 86 percent of first-time failures passed on their second attempt. As a couple of CQA survivors, we wanted to share our experiences and tips to help our peers apply the right amount of focus, in the right subject areas, to pass on the first try.
The CQA is a two-day event with the command qualification exam (CQE) and shiphandling assessment on day one, and the tactical assessment, 360-degree leadership survey debrief, and exit interview with the commanding officer of Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) on day two. Candidates arrive, at the latest, on a Tuesday, and the exam begins on Wednesday morning with an inbrief from the command assessment director.
Command Qualification Exam
The exam includes 130 multiple choice and true/false questions (50 on rules of the road and 20 from each of the other four sections) in the following order: rules of the road, command management, material readiness, navigation/seamanship, and maritime warfare. Each section (except rules of the road) also contains two short-response questions. The short-response questions, or essays, are similar to extra credit—they will not hurt you but may be enough to boost your score in a given section to 75 percent, which is the minimum passing grade. Essay answers may be simple, and brevity is acceptable. Four hours are allotted for the exam, which is ample. Do not rush. Go back and review your answers. The instructors will be in the room to clarify any questions that may not make sense.
Shiphandling Assessment
The shiphandling assessment, normally the afternoon of the first day, is unlike any other shiphandling evaluation. Candidates play the role of commanding officer (CO), ensuring the bridge watch team keeps the ship in safe waters, avoids collision, and operates in accordance with the rules of the road while transiting a high-density sea lane. Candidates begin the assessment outside the simulator, where the officer of the deck (OOD) will provide a quick contact/situation report. Ignore the fact that in such a scenario the CO probably would already be on the bridge—the artificiality is designed to test a candidate’s ability to grasp quickly a tight maneuvering situation (at dusk, by the way) and keep the ship safe.
The OOD, played by a post-division officer lieutenant on the SWOS staff, is purposefully not portrayed as an A-team member. While he/she excels at following orders and providing ranges to contacts, closest points of approach, etc., candidates must give courses to steer and speeds to maintain. This is by design, as the assessor (who is a post-command commander) will be able to glimpse a candidate’s decision-making ability, problem-solving process, and command presence. Are you cool and collected or frustrated and chaotic? Avoiding collision does not guarantee a passing score. Close calls are taken into consideration. Use all resources available—radar, automatic identification system, voyage management system, bridge-to-bridge radio—to get through unscathed.
Tactical Assessment
Held the morning of the second day, the tactical assessment has candidates playing the role of CO in a tactical scenario. A post-command commander will assess silently from the back. Ensure the tactical action officer (TAO) (typically played by a post-department head SWOS instructor) effectively runs the watch team, in accordance with the provided rules of engagement, and that he or she successfully defends the ship should hostilities occur. The TAO will not be as skilled or as forward leaning as one would hope, and this assessment does not test the candidate’s inspirational leadership. Demonstrate the ability to operate and defend the ship should watchstanders fail to perform. Listen to the TAO’s intentions, have a questioning attitude, and take decisive action when necessary.
360-Degree Assessment
The penultimate portion of the assessment is receiving the results from the 360 degree leadership assessment in a one-on-one outbrief with a SWOS instructor. These surveys can be eye opening, particularly if a candidate has rated him/herself highly in an area and subordinates or peers disagree. Take the results with humility, and use this tool to progress as a leader.
The Results
On the afternoon of the second day, each candidate will receive a 15-minute debrief from the SWOS commanding officer or CQA director. Hopefully the news is good, but as discussed earlier, more than half of test takers end up retaking some portion of the test. Surface warfare officers are required to take the exam once. Retaking any portion and completing the CQA process is not mandatory. If a candidate fails the shiphandling or tactical assessment, he or she must return to Newport for reassessment. All other failed sections can be requested by a candidate’s chain of command and sent via SIPRNET and proctored by the candidate’s command.
Tips and Lessons Learned
While everyone studies a little bit differently, the following tips and lessons learned are offered to help people get through the CQA the first time around.
Steady Strain. Start early to absorb unplanned schedule changes. Download all references onto a tablet (or print out hard copies) and highlight or underline anything that appears important for a CO to know. Carve out study time, whether at a library or coffee shop, taking time away from the ship to dedicate to the material. Having the material easily accessible will encourage and facilitate studying and will provide a sense of just how much material there is. Read everything ahead of time, and review your notes after arriving in Newport.
Group Approach. Officers who take a group approach with the CQA bibliography as the cornerstone of wardroom training will improve their wardroom’s knowledge while at the same time preparing department heads for the exam. Schedule study sessions with peers and quiz each other on the different sections.
Good Questions. Read to a level that shows a comprehension beyond rote memorization. The goal is to understand the roles and responsibilities of the CO, as well as others throughout the command. There are multiple choice questions that ask for specific answers, but a commonsense approach allows for an educated guess between two options. There are questions from every reference, but they are not designed to deceive, nor is the intent of SWOS to see people fail. Each question has been reviewed by multiple post-command COs and approved by the SWOS CO.
Rules of the Road. This is one of the most commonly failed sections and requires extensive preparation to score the requisite 90 percent. Do not “ramp up” before the exam—be the subject-matter expert in your wardroom. The exam pulls exclusively from the U.S. Coast Guard test bank and will not include diagrams or illustrations. Download an app that generates tests and tracks progress—these can help you focus.
Navigation and Seamanship. This portion of the test cannot be passed without a thorough understanding of the pertinent sections from the Naval Shiphandler’s Guide and Bowditch’s American Practical Navigator. In addition, as the navigation section contains fewer references but the same number of questions, a candidate’s level of knowledge of each reference will need to be a bit deeper.
Gouge. Use it at your own risk! The assessment has been around long enough for multiple study guides to develop and also has been around long enough for those study guides to be out of date. The bibliography has changed every year, and the test bank has evolved at the same pace. Gouge is a useful tool, but use it only to compare the notes you take on your own.
Dedicated Study Time. COs and executive officers, do whatever you can to afford department heads (DHs) time to study. Perhaps that means taking them off the watchbill for two or three weeks, or allowing the second tour division officer and departmental leading chief petty officer to step up so the DH can get some time off. The failure rate is too high and the test is too important not to give DHs a chance to study.
The CQA undoubtedly has increased the level of knowledge required for all candidates desiring command. Does it cover everything a CO needs to know? Certainly not. But the process provides exposure to, and a greater understanding of, the key references required for success. The simulators provide a standardized examination of whether officers can make the right decisions in an uncertain situation. Significant preparation is required to do well, but do not be discouraged if you are unsuccessful on your first attempt. Pick up the pieces, hit the books, and understand that the process is fair and has a purpose. Good luck!
LCDR Keller is assistant director for surface warfare officer detailing (PERS-41B) at the Navy Personnel Command. He served afloat on the USS Comstock (LSD-45), USS Lake Champlain (CG-57), USS Stockdale (DDG-106), and Amphibious Squadron Three. Ashore he was the 7th Company Officer at the U.S. Naval Academy. He also holds advanced degrees from the University of Maryland and the Naval War College.
Get Some Sleep!
By Debbie Vyskocil, BCN
From 1968 to 1969, I served in Vietnam as a team leader with the elite Marine Special Operations unit, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. Our teams operated deep within enemy controlled territory. Covert close-in observation, prisoner acquisitions, ambushes and other direct-action missions were our specialized focus. Fitness and mental alertness were fundamental to our success… Our missions were typically four–six days in duration, often in heavily vegetated jungle terrain. Operating in and amongst enemy troop concentrations required utmost acuity and mental focus. These missions were extremely taxing as sleep was difficult to impossible. The longer on patrol the more challenging it became to focus and maintain mental concentration. Upon return to base, we would sleep for extended periods of time; the necessity for sound sleep and recuperation was vital. Sleep and its recuperative effects are absolutely fundamental to competent performance, not only in combat scenarios but in virtually all callings.
—Major C.L. Lowder, USMC (Retired), recipient of the Silver Star medal
One common thread weaves through studies on the performance and health of officers, troops, veterans, and civilians: without sleep, functioning and health erode. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has found that 62 percent of Americans have symptoms of insomnia and 50 percent of service members have clinically significant sleep problems.
How many hours did you sleep last night? How many times did you wake up? How long did it take to fall back to sleep? Each of these variables affects the amount of recharging your body and brain receive and your performance. On average, how many hours did you sleep each night last month? You most likely sleep less during a mission, but that also is when you need all your resources and your highest cognitive functioning.
The National Sleep Foundation recommends seven to nine hours of sleep per night for adults. According to recent research on military personnel, 32 percent get five hours or less sleep per night. 32 percent get between five and six hours. This leaves just a third of service members getting enough sleep to function at their highest level. Sleep problems are one of the most frequent reasons that military personnel seek mental health help on active duty and are the number one cause for veterans seeking help.
As Major Lowder noted, sleep deprivation has an acute impact on individuals and teams. He understood that, as a result of sleep deprivation during their missions, his team would be slower, their cognitive decision making would be delayed, and their reflexes would be diminished—all detrimental to a highly skilled special operations team on a critical mission.
Performance/Operational Readiness
If you are sleep deprived for a couple of nights do you feel a beat off? Veterans and active-duty service members cite several concerns related to too little sleep. In a simulated combat study in which Army officers received three hours of sleep during a 53-hour exercise, participants experienced severe impairments in vigilance, reaction time, attention, memory, and reasoning, and they reported depressed moods.1 NIH recognizes that these challenges, along with controlling emotions and problem solving, are directly correlated to sleep deprivation.
Research shows chronic sleep challenges—defined as six hours or less sleep per night over an extended period of time—have the same impact as two nights of total sleep deprivation. After being awake for 24 hours straight, an individual’s performance decreases to a level equivalent to that observed at a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent.2 You don’t want your team members driving their cars while intoxicated. Do you want them conning a ship or submarine, flying an F-35, or conducting a hostage rescue mission in that condition? Adding to the risk, self-reported sleepiness ratings suggest people are largely unaware of their increasing cognitive deficits, which may explain why the impact of chronic sleep challenges on waking cognitive functions often is assumed to be zero. It also may be why service members often don’t ask for a break. “No, I’m good.” In many military units, going without sleep or very little sleep also is considered a sign of toughness. “You can sleep when the deployment is over!” This attitude is unhealthy, leads to suboptimal performance, and can be dangerous.
Field studies reveal a profound effect on moral reasoning, as well. Studies at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research found that sleep deprivation disrupts the ventromedial prefrontal regions of the brain, which are critical to making judgments and decisions. When sleep deprived, people may experience greater difficulty integrating emotion and cognition to guide moral judgments, causing them to choose courses of action different from those that they normally would.3
The consequences of cognitive functioning impairment are most frightening for those in high-risk situations with small margins of error. Deployed Army personnel getting six or fewer hours of sleep per night reported more accidents, mistakes, and decreased ability to do their jobs. Sleep deprivation is linked to devastating accidents, such as nuclear accidents, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the Challenger space shuttle explosion.4,5
Impact on Memory
Short-term memories are converted to long-term during sleep. Memory is imperative to job performance and interpersonal functioning. Information, data, and critical details need to be stored in long-term memory for future retrieval. Without quality sleep memories can be lost. A young Marine who had just returned from deployment expressed concern that at age 23, he could not remember the names of people he met. He had been sleep deprived for months and would lay in bed for a minimum of two hours each night prior to sleep onset. Sleep protects memories from being forgotten and makes them easier to access; it almost doubles our chances of remembering previously recalled material.
Physical Health Effects
Along with performance considerations, there are physical and mental health effects from sleep deprivation. A retired Army major with an inability to sleep more than four hours each night recently required electric shock to his heart due to atrial fibrillation, a direct result of sleep issues, according to his cardiologist. He currently is on medication, occasionally needs emergency medical care, and may require surgery.
Sleep problems are the cause of or contribute to many diagnosed health conditions such as hypertension and cardiovascular disease, asthma, obesity, pain, fertility problems, diabetes, cancer, and even mortality.6,7,8 A study of military personnel showed a correlation between physical health conditions and short sleep duration, nightmares, and sleep disorders.9 A recent study of 54,279 people between the ages of 20 and 89 over a period of 11 years found those with just three symptoms of insomnia had greater than three times the risk of developing heart failure compared to those with no insomnia symptoms.
Mental Health Effects
In a 2007 study of 10,000 people, those with insomnia were five times as likely to develop depression as those without. Substantial evidence from both military and civilian studies suggests sleep issues can be a cause of or early symptom of mental health challenges including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety disorders (e.g., panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder), substance abuse, and suicide.
In a study of 15,204 service members from all military branches, predeployment insomnia was the most prevalent mental health diagnosis—ahead of new-onset PTSD, anxiety, and depression diagnosed post-deployment.10 Post-deployment soldiers who average fewer than six hours sleep per night were more than three times likely to have attempted suicide than those with adequate sleep.11 Coupled with civilian research, this suggests that sleep problems are an independent predictor of suicidality.
So What Can You Do?
1. Learning to sleep at will, quickly, is imperative when only a short amount of time is allotted between missions. An Army colonel who served in Iraq tells me 20-minute naps were key to her maintaining optimal performance. Her father, a Marine major, successfully used this method throughout his service in Vietnam.
2. Ask those who are in the room when you sleep if you snore or stop breathing. If the answer is yes, see your doctor. You could have sleep apnea, which is common and easily treated, but it does not go away on its own. Apnea can lead to atrial fibrillation.
3. To ease yourself to sleep, create a scenario of something non-stressful as your “go to” thought when you lie down. It can be as simple as happy thoughts of holding your baby girl, camping with your grandfather when you were young, or fishing with your brother. The primary reason for people not falling asleep is the constant chatter of their thoughts. What you are thinking about when you fall asleep often is what you think about when you wake up during the night and can be the first thought when you awake in the morning. For example, if you are worrying about how you are going to pay your mortgage when you fall asleep, when you wake during the night your mortgage fears will likely be back. Replacing anxious thoughts with calming thoughts can lead to better sleep more quickly
4. Mentally list the U.S. states alphabetically along with their capitals, or try four-square breathing—inhale for four counts, hold for four, exhale for four, and wait for four, simply focusing on your breath.
5. If these tips don’t work, seek medical help. Don’t let sleep deprivation or insomnia go untreated for too long. It’s not a matter of just toughening up!
As Major Lowder’s team learned in Vietnam, sufficient quality sleep is key to mission success and staying alive in a dangerous environment. To function properly, you must protect yourself from the ill effects of sleep deprivation. As a leader, you must take into account the sleep needs of your Sailors and Marines to ensure their health and safety and your unit’s mission success.
1. Harris R Lieberman, Gaston P. Bathalon, Christina M. Falco, F. Matthew Kramer, Charles A. Morgan, and Philip Niro, “Severe Decrements in Cognition Function and Mood Induced by Sleep Loss, Heat, Dehydration, and Under nutrition During Simulated Combat,” Biological Psychiatry, vol. 57, no. 4, (15 February 2005), 422–429.
2. Drew Dawson, and Kathryn Reid, “Fatigue, Alcohol and Performance Impairment,” Nature, vol. 388, no. 6639, (17 July 1997), 235.
3. William D.S. Killgore, PhD; Desiree B. Killgore, MS, CCC-SLP; Lisa M. Day, MSW et al. “The Effects of 53 Hours of Sleep Deprivation on Moral Judgment,” Sleep, vol. 30, no. 3 (March 2007), 345-352.
4. Christopher Drake, Timothy Roehrs, Naomi Breslau, Eric Johnson, Catherine Jefferson, Holly Scofield, and Thomas Roth, “The 10-Year Risk of Verified Motor Vehicle Crashes in Relation to Physiologic Sleepiness,” Sleep, vol. 33, no. 6 (June 2010), 745–752.
5. Merrill M. Mitler, Mary A. Carskadon, Charles A. Czeisler, William C. Dement, David F. Dinges, and R. Curtis Graeber, “Catastrophes, Sleep, and Public Policy: Consensus Report,” Sleep, vol. 11, no. 1 (February 1988), 100–109.
6. Lena Mallon, Jan-Erik Broman, and Jerker Hetta, “High Incidence of Diabetes in Men with Sleep Complaints or Short Sleep Duration: A 12-Year Follow-Up Study of a Middle-Aged Population,” Diabetes Care, vol. 28, no. 11, (November 2005), 2762–2767.
7. Daniel F. Kripke, Lawrence Garfinkel, Deborah L. Wingard, Melville R. Klauber, and Matthew R. Marler, “Mortality Associated with Sleep Duration and Insomnia,” Archives of General Psychiatry, vol. 59, no. 2 (February 2002), 131–136.
8. L. Gallicchio, and Bindu Kalesan, “Sleep Duration and Mortality: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis,” Journal of Sleep Research, vol. 18, no. 2 (June 2009), 148–158.
9. Vincent Mysliwiec, Leigh McGraw, Roslyn Pierce, Patrick Smith, Brandon Trapp, and Bernard Roth, “Sleep Disorders and Associated Medical Comorbidities in Active Duty Military Personnel,” Sleep, vol. 36, no. 2 (February 2013), 167–174.
10. P. Gehrman; AD Seelig; IG Jacobson; EJ Boyko; TI Hooper; GD Gackstetter; CD Ulmer; TC Smith; for the Millennium Cohort Study Team, “Predeployment Sleep Duration and Insomnia Symptoms as Risk Factors for New-Onset Mental Health Disorders Following Military Deployment,” Sleep, vol. 36, no. 7 (July 2013), 1009-1018.
11. David D. Luxton, David Greenburg, Jenny Ryan, Alexander Niven, Gary Wheeler, and Vincent Mysliwiec, “Prevalence and Impact of Short Sleep Duration in Redeployed OIF Soldiers,” Sleep, vol. 34, no. 9 (September 2011), 1189–1195.
President of Optimal Edge Performance, Ms. Vyskocil is board certified in neurofeedback. She merges neuroscience with leadership training to cultivate resilience and optimal functioning. Designing training protocols based on the brain and body’s response to challenges, she is an expert on the impact of sleep and stressors on performance and health.
Winning the War Before It Begins
By Captain Rafiel Deon Warfield, USMC
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. . . It requires. . . a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new wholly different kind of military training.
—President John F. Kennedy, 6 June 1962, West Point Commencement Speech
When President Kennedy delivered this speech, he spoke of wars and conflicts that had transpired or were ongoing in Korea, Malaya, Greece, the Philippines, Algeria, Cuba, Cyprus, and the Indo-China Peninsula. Marines, soldiers and sailors had been forward deployed and engaged in various small wars directly and as advisors to foreign security forces. Kennedy’s speech was prophetic of the 21st-century security environment and conflict that centers not around state actors but around transnational criminal and terrorist organizations that create and sustain instability. As Kennedy advised, the response also must be unconventional.
Today, many argue that our approach to national security must be revamped. The new President has suggested that our allies must shoulder a greater share of the cost of regional and global security. The types of programs that commonly are described would fall under the umbrella of security cooperation (SC).
Security cooperation encompasses all Department of Defense (DoD) interactions with foreign militaries to build defense relationships that promote specific security interests, develop allied self-defense capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. SC includes military advising, training, assessments, liaison, foreign military exchange student programs, and foreign military sales. These activities create strategic depth for our national defense.1 When the United States develops security relationships with partner nations (PN), and helps to build their capacity and capability, we enable them to act alongside, in support of, or in lieu of U.S. forces around the globe.
Engagements = Partnerships = Security
The three broad themes of security cooperation are building capacity and capability; facilitating access; and building relationships.2 In aggregate, these themes aim to set the conditions to prevent conflict, expeditiously bring it to an end once it has started, and/or facilitate a return to normalcy after—thus, winning the war before it begins.
Many of today’s global security challenges are transnational in nature—requiring meaningful partnerships with nations across the globe.
By increasing our allies’ and partners’ defense capacity, we assist them in making their own territories inhospitable to transnational criminal and terrorist organizations that would foment, exploit, and capitalize on instability.
One of the major components of SC is the cross-training of foreign forces. It is not uncommon to have a foreign officer in attendance at a U.S. military school or training course, where the lessons include tactics and operational planning but also key fundamentals of the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), integrity, ethics, and rules of engagement (ROE). Captain Samir Shrestha from Nepal shared that his perspective on warfighting was significantly changed after spending six months as a lieutenant at The Marine Corps Basic School in 2010. He explained, “As an individual from a different corner of the world, I found myself indoctrinated with a different perspective, which changed my perception. The lessons on ethics are going to remain with me for life.”
Following his return to Nepal, Captain Shrestha was assigned to his military’s version of The Basic School and he was able to teach fellow Nepalese junior officers what he learned. His experience is one of many in which foreign partners not only learn how we fight but why we fight the way we do. Studying in U.S. military schools also allows the formation of friendships between U.S. and foreign officers, which can grow into strategic relationships over time.
A Blueprint for Security Cooperation
Security cooperation is a significant focus within our national military strategy, so how should DoD organize, train, and equip for these activities? The Marine Corps has taken an all-inclusive approach to address SC mission requirements, and its initiative is a solid example that deserves consideration.
Functionally aligned under Marine Corps Forces Command, the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) was established in 2011. Among its many resources, MCSCG has the largest concentration of operationalized foreign area officers and regional affairs officers within the Corps. These professionals have developed expertise through formal language training, education, experience with foreign regions and regional security partners.
MCSCG also is the Marine Corps’ awarding authority for the foreign security force advisor free military occupational specialty code (FMOS). This designator recognizes Marines who have received formal training and/or have the requisite experience as advisors in the field. By actively tracking Marines with this FMOS, the service is able to manage SC manpower requirements and ensure that those who undertake SC missions are properly trained and qualified. MCSCG also provides training to Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), Special Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, and other teams that deploy to execute SC missions. Examples of recent SC missions include training the United Arab Emirates Presidential Guard and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Marines; and NATO training of the Georgian Army in support of the Afghanistan Resolute Support mission.
In addition, MCSCG evaluates and assesses the capacity of foreign partners—laying the groundwork for peacetime and contingency access and other interoperability initiatives. MCSCG Marines travel worldwide to engage with the military forces of partner nations and assist the geographic component commander in developing an SC engagement plan as well as a theater security cooperation program.
MCSCG actively participates in the development and review of security assistance programs.
Almost But Not Quite
The Marine Corps still struggles to ensure operating forces take advantage of MCSCG’s specialized training. As it stands now, service guidance for executing SC requires training without any definitive direction on where or how the training should be obtained. So, for example, if a MEU develops, executes, evaluates and certifies its personnel based on an internal SC training plan, it would satisfy the current policy without tapping into the resources and expertise of MCSCG. And this does happen. When time and money are tight, it is common for commanders to prioritize traditional training over specialized SC training. Sending Marines to a local weapons range often takes precedence over sending them away for several weeks of SC training.
On deployment, Marines actually are less likely to employ their weapons than their engagements skills. This raises the question of what priority SC should take in the gamut of required predeployment training. Of course Marines need to be ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations above all else, but it also is imperative to find time for courses that will equip them with the tools and resources they will use for SC missions.
Unit commanders’ concerns about devoting time and resources to train Marines on SC is due in part to a lack of understanding of the mission and its vital role in national defense. Marines often dismiss SC by proclaiming that they are combat Marines focused on destroying the enemy. Marines must understand, however, that they often will participate in security cooperation engagements and they even will conduct SC during all phases of military operations, including combat. Marines serving in a MEU or Special Marine Air Ground Task Force execute security cooperation missions while working with foreign partners and conducting exercises around the world.
The Marine Corps must educate warfighters on SC and emphasize the importance of quality training to prepare them for the mission. SC must be incorporated in all levels of professional military education and be reinforced regularly. Similar to the emphasis placed on counterinsurgency during the last decade, specialized training should increase Marines’ understanding of SC and how it is planned, executed, and used to achieve strategic political-military objectives.
MCSCG has experts who deploy globally as mobile training teams. It also hosts specialized training for unit planners and operators at Fort Story. MCSCG also should be the service lead for how the Corps educates, trains, plans, executes, and evaluates SC initiatives.
As President Kennedy foretold, security cooperation is an important means toward achieving U.S. foreign security policies and goals. SC facilitates strategic depth and breadth around the world and helps deter and undercut the activities of transnational threat organizations. For the Marine Corps to be ready for this mission, it must ensure that Marines are trained by the service’s dedicated security cooperation experts—MCSCG.
1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. “National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015” Washington, D.C., June 2015, 12.
2. U.S. Marine Corps, Security Cooperation, Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-33.03. Washington, D.C., 21 July 2015, chapter 1, p.5.